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General Editor

DR. NAGENDRA PRASAD, M.A., D.LITT.

INDIAN LOGIC:

ITS PROBLEMS AS TREATED BY ITS SCHOOLS

By

DR. KRISHNA KUMAR DIKSHIT, M.A., PH.D.

सत्यमेव जयते

RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF PRAKRIT, JAINOLOGY AND AHIMSA,
VAISHALI (MUZAFFARPUR) BIHAR (INDIA)
1975

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लेखक Dr. Krishna Kr. Dikshit

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The Government of Bihar established the Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology and Ahimsa at Vaishali in 1955 with the object, *inter alia*, to promote Advanced Studies and Research in Prakrit and Jainology, and to publish works of permanent value to scholars. This Institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Vaishali Research Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last few years, namely, Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit learning at Darbhanga, the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna, the Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad for Research and Advanced Studies in Hindi at Patna and the Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate Studies in Buddhist learning and Pali (the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara) at Nalanda.

As a part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship this is the Research Volume no. 10 which is the thesis of Dr. K. K. Dikshit, approved for the Ph. D. degree of the University of Bihar. The Government of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service to the world of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the fulness of time.

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GENERAL EDITOR'S NOTE

It is a privilege to introduce this work of a promising scholar Dr. K. K. Dikshit, a scion of our Institute, to the academic world. The following pages embody the results of a wide but neatly balanced and systematic study of the major logical problems that occupied the best brains in the Indian schools of thought. Logic has seldom been studied in India as an independent subject as it has been in the western countries. The problems which Indian logicians grapple with are rather psychological, epistemological and metaphysical than purely logical. As the very nature of these problems is such that opinions with regard to the solution of these problems are bound to differ, many schools of thought have come up in India in the past with their own distinct views over these problems. Each of these schools has its own point of view in logic determined by its general philosophical outlook. In this book, the author, Dr. K. K. Dikshit, has dealt with these problems of logic as treated by the different schools. So far as our knowledge goes, perhaps it is the first attempt to evaluate critically the Indian logic as exposed by the Samkhya, Vedanta, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Buddha and Jain systems. A modern student of logic will be much able to appreciate the ancient Indian's attempt.

In his treatment of the subject the author has classified the problems faced by Indian logicians belonging to different schools into two groups, the first relating to the definition of valid knowledge and the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge, the second to the different instruments of valid knowledge, their number and their respective accounts. The treatment has throughout been dispassionate and critical. He has studied the classics of Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain Philosophy with a penetrating insight under competent authorities as is attested by the chapters that follow. His acquaintance with the subject is deep and extensive and his treatment is arresting and occasionally thought provoking. His thorough grasp of the subject along with his clear presentation will, I hope, offer a comprehensive hand book on the subject to the ordinary reader and scholars alike. He covers a vast subject within a comparatively short space. He has followed the maxim of 'nā' mūlaṃ likhyate kiñcin nā, napekṣitam ucyate' which is seldom followed. I trust the readers will be struck by his lively style, original presentation of problems and scathing criticism.

Words fail to express deep gratitude to our ex-Director late Dr. Gulab Chandra Chaudhary, M.A., Ph.D. He was the guiding force behind this publication.

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I must place on record our thankfulness to Dr. N. Tatia, M.A., D. Litt. and at present Director, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara under whose stewardship the author successfully completed his research at this Institute. I extend my thanks to Dr. R. P. Poddar, Lecturer and Dr. N. K. Prasad, Research Fellow and incharge of Publication Section of our Institute for the ungrudging help rendered in seeing the volume through the press. I take this opportunity to cordially thank the learned author for allowing us to publish this work in our series.

My thanks are also due to the Superintendent, Government Press. Gulzarbagh, who completed the printing of the book with zeal and alacrity.

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The 3rd August 1974.

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PREFACE

In this thesis an attempt has been made to introduce a modern student of Logic to the ancient Indian's treatment of the problems pertaining to his subject. With a view to avoiding a possible confusion of issues these problems are catalogued at the very outset, so that one having a different notion of the science of Logic might not feel unduly puzzled by the variety of topics covered here. This forms a general introduction to the thesis. Again, the fact that there are several schools of Indian Logic is made clear immediately after the statement of the problems of Indian Logic. This forms a historical introduction to the thesis. Lastly, there comes an account—along with critical comments—of the problems in question as treated by the schools in question. Broadly speaking, these problems fall in two groups, viz. (*i*) those pertaining to the definition and the criterion of valid knowledge, and (*ii*) those pertaining to the number and nature of the instruments of valid knowledge. The latter group of problems has been further subdivided as shown in the Table of Contents; here the various instruments of valid knowledge posited by Indian logicians are arranged in such an order that a more generally accepted instrument occurs earlier than a less generally accepted one.

It will be useful to take a bird's eye view of the total scene as it appears to us before we have studied in some details the features it exhibits in this or that sector of its considerably vast span. Our study pertains to the problems of Indian Logic as treated by its schools, and the central problem of Logic as conceived by us is that of defining and classifying knowledge. Now the English word 'knowledge' stands for the right ascertainment—based on a conclusive evidence—of some fact or other. In conformity with this usage, it is not proper to give the name knowledge to the bare sensory awareness of a thing, nor to the mere guess as to nature of a thing, nor, of course, to the wrong ascertainment of the nature of a thing. That all knowledge is of the nature of ascertainment is in a way equivalent to saying that all knowledge is judgmental in character, for our judgments are the most conspicuous means through which we give expression to our ascertainment of the nature of things. Of course, judgments are not the only means through which one might give expression to one's ascertainment of the nature of things. For a still more widely prevalent medium for the purpose is practice, e. g., even babes innocent of all languages (nay, even animals) seek to ascertain the nature of things, but it is in the very nature of things impossible for them to express this ascertainment theirs in the form of a judgment: what the

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babes (and animals) do is to undertake practice in accordance with their ascertainment of the nature of things. As a matter of fact, even in the case of judgmental knowledge, the surest criterion for testing its validity is the successfulness of the practice undertaken in accordance with this knowledge. Nevertheless. the fact remains that Logic is exclusively concerned with that type of knowledge which is expressed in the form of judgments made by human beings. That is why we have described knowledge as the right ascertainment—on the basis of a conclusive evidence—of some fact or other; for the question of offering evidence in support of one's ascertainment of a fact arises only in the case of humanly acquired knowledge expressed through a judgment. Again, it is because all knowledge is judgmental in character that the object of a piece of knowledge is better called a fact rather than a thing, for what a judgment seeks to describe is a fact rather than a thing. By fact we understand certain things behaving in a particular fashion, so that a particular ascertainment of a fact (and consequently the corresponding judgment) is right in case it describes things as behaving in the fashion in which they are actually behaving while it is wrong in case it describes them as behaving in a fashion in which they are not actually behaving. But strict English usage does not permit a piece of knowledge to be called either right or wrong—not right because that involves redundancy, not wrong because that involves self-contradiction. Hence it is that the right ascertainment (based, of course, on a conclusive evidence) of a fact is called knowledge, while the wrong ascertainment (based on an inconclusive evidence mistaken to be conclusive) of a fact error; an ascertainment based on an inconclusive evidence recognised as inconclusive is a case of doubting while an ascertainment which is neither of the nature of knowledge nor of the nature of error nor of the nature of doubting (i. e., an ascertainment which is based on no worthwhile evidence) is termed 'belief' (to be deemed right if the fact ascertained happens to be the case and wrong if it happens not to be the case). Lastly, facts are of two types, viz., universal and particular. By a universal fact we understand a certain *type* of things behaving in a particular fashion, by a particular fact certain *particular* things behaving in a particular fashion. Induction is (ultimately speaking) the only source for acquiring knowledge concerning a universal fact, but knowledge concerning a particular fact might be either perceptual or inferential. Perceptual knowledge consists in identifying an object or an objective character that is being observed through sense experience, inferential knowledge in ascertaining the presence of an unobserved object or objective character on the basis of having observed another object or objective character whose invariable concomitant the former object or objective character is. In the case of inferential knowledge it is obvious how there takes place the offering of an evidence, for the very form of a piece of inferential knowledge is "such and such is the case, because of this

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and that". But some kind of offering of an evidence takes place also in the case of perceptual knowledge. Thus while identifying an observed sensory feature of an object we say (to ourselves or to someone else): "Such and such a sensory feature characterizes this yonder-lying object, because the type of sensory experience I am having now is indicative of the presence of this type of sensory feature"; similarly, while identifying an object observed through sensory experience we say: "This yonder-lying object is called by that particular name, because the objects exhibiting the type of sensory features it does are called by that name". A characteristic trait of human knowledge is its augmentation through verbal instructions received from those who are better informed (i. e., its augmentation not merely through practice as is the case with an ordinary animal's knowledge). However, knowledge received through verbal testimony is as much of knowledge based on an evidence as are perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge; for while acquiring a piece of knowledge through verbal testimony too we say: "Such and such is the case, because that particular person, who is an authority on such matters, says so".

It is with these considerations in mind that we have sought to appreciate the ancient Indian's treatment of the problems of Logic. We needed two such words to stand for knowledge and error as should be able to tell us at a glance that they are each other's contradictory as is the case with the Sanskrit words pramā and apramā. In default of a better vocabulary we have taken some liberty with the English usage and have translated 'pramā' and 'apramā' as valid knowledge and invalid knowledge respectively. For the rest we have tried our best to understand by 'valid knowledge' what an Englishman understands by 'knowledge' and by 'invalid knowledge' what he understands by 'error'. Thus we have emphasized the presence of the element of thought or cogitation in the cases of perceptual knowledge and those of knowledge received through verbal testimony, both of which are at the same time sought to be distinguished from the cases of inferential knowledge not merely the right ascertainment of a fact but also the ascertainment based on an evidence; that this evidence ought to be conclusive is suggested by pointing out an ultimate criterion, viz., that of successful practice for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge. Again, since the evidence supplied by a person in support of a particular judgment depends on his thus far acquired knowledge-system we have opined that the same judgment acquires a different significance when made by a different person or by the same person at a different occasion (this is what we consider to be the hard core of the 'coherence theory of truth' which is, however, treated by us as supplementary rather than rival to the 'correspondence theory of truth'). We have made

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no attempt to read these ideas into the ancient Indian texts on Logic. As a matter of fact, it is because of this that our criticism of an ancient Indian doctrine too often appears to be rather uncharitable. But we have not hesitated to take due note of an approach, however halting, made by an ancient Indian logician in the direction of accepting a position which we happen to regard as sound. Thus we have found occasion to acclaim the near unanimous view of Indian logicians that practice is the ultimate criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge, the Jaina view that perceptual knowledge involves a good amount of preliminary cogitation, the Buddhist view that casual considerations must lie at the basis of all formulation of a relation of invariable concomitance between two things, the Buddhist-*cum*-Vaiśeṣika view (for all practical purposes also a Prabhākarite view) that knowledge received through verbal testimony is but a type of inferential knowledge, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the cases of arthāpatti considered by the Mīmāṃsā logicians are but cases of inference, etc., etc. To the extent that our reading of a logical problem or our reading of an ancient Indian text is mistaken our evaluations are open to correction.

From what is said above it should also become clear that our study of the problems of Indian Logic is rather selective. That is to say, we have been compelled to leave out of account a good number of such problems as are not entirely devoid of importance (at least, as have been considered to be important by Indian logicians themselves), e. g., we have not dilated upon the question as to how the various sense-organs produce the various types of perceptual knowledge, nor upon the question as to whether the object of inferential knowledge is a particular feature or a generic one, nor upon the question as to how the words of a sentence bring about sentential meaning In short, we have selected only those problems which as discussed by Indian logicians have an important bearing on what we consider to be the crux of all treatment of Logic. Another limitation of our study arises from our almost total neglect of the chronological data. This is because we have confined ourselves almost exclusively to a consideration of the logical inter-relationships that obtain among the stands adopted by the various schools of Indian Logic in connection with the various problems examined by them. Thus, e. g., in a different type of study we must squarely face the question as to how the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika traditions of treating the problems of Logic got merged into one. But we have left this question entirely untouched and have treated the existence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of Logic as an accomplished fact. Nay, even for a presentation of the Naiyāyika's criticism against certain typical Vaiśeṣika positions we have relied on authors whom we have chosen to call Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians. To an extent this procedure is anomalous,

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but the remedy lies in a threadbare discussion of certain chronological matters. Suffice it to admit that we have not ventured a discussion of this nature.

One word about the mode of quoting Sanskrit texts. In the body of the thesis these texts invariably occur in their translated form, the translation being our own even in those cases where another one is available in print; in the footnotes the texts are either just mentioned or quoted in their original form. In the case of a text quoted in the body of the thesis the corresponding original occurs in the portion specially allotted for the purpose (for whatever difference there might be between the published version of a text and the version given here the responsibility is entirely ours). One can see that in majority of these cases the translation is literal to the extent possible, but there are also occasions when the translation either somewhat expands the original or somewhat contracts it. However, even in these latter cases care has been taken not to distort the intention of the Sanskrit authors.

As for the scholarly studies in Indian philosophy, even if I have consulted as many of them as were within my reach and competence I have been benefited most by the writings of Prof. Stcherbatsky, Mm. Phanibhushan Tarkavagish, Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Dr. Satkari Mookerjee and Prof. Ingalls, but for which the Indian texts on Logic—particularly those on Buddhist Logic and Navya-Nyāya—would have remained a sealed book for an 'uninitiated' student like myself. Of course, it is my misfortune to have occasionally disagreed with these titans of Indian studies, but that in no way diminishes the debt I owe them. (In the case of the Appendix A my dependence on Prof. Stcherbatsky's 'Buddhist Logic' and in the case of the first part of the Appendix B that on Prof. Ingalls' 'Material for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic' as also on Mm. Maheshachandra Nyayaratna's Sanskrit pamphlet 'Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy' and its Technical Terms might seem heavier than is permissible for *bona fide* research purposes. But in these cases too, I have perhaps endeavoured to present the material in a form that is my own choice.)

For the rest, let these pages speak for themselves.

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107. The Buddhist and the Jaina on the nature of word-meaning.

108. The various types of words and the two-fold meaning of a word.

109. The conditions of sentencehood and some confusions resulting from the doctrine of "three-conditions".

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110. The nature of sentential meaning—three theories detailed and examined.

2. II. (4). 111. Whether to posit instruments of valid knowledge other than perception and inference.

2. II. (4). (*i*) 112. Introductory.

113. The Nyāya case on upamāna and its criticism

114. The Mīmāṃsā case on upamāna and its criticism.

115. Pārthasārathi, Udayana and Jayanta on upamāna.

116. A concluding remark.

2. II. (4). (*ii*). 117. The problem of arthāpatti.

118. The Kumārilite position on the question.

119. The Prabhākarite position on the question.

120. Pārthasārahi and Rāmānujācārya on arthāpatti.

121. Udayana on arthāpatti.

2. II. (4). (*iii*). 122. The problem of non-cognition.

123. Pārthasārathi on non-cognition.

124. A critical appraisal of the Kumārilite case and Udayana on non-cognition.

125. A critical appraisal of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika case.

126. Rāmānujācārya on non-cognition.

127. Dharmakīrti on non-cognition.

128. An appreciation of Dharmakīrti on non-cognition.

2. II (4). (*iv*). 129. Why re-consider memory, recognition and hypothetical reasoning.

130. The Jaina case for the positing of these additional types of instruments of valid knowledge.

131. Hemacandra on memory, recognition and hypothetical reasoning.

132. A critical appraisal of Hemacandra's position.

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THE CATALOGUE OF THE SANSKRIT TEXTS QUOTED

I. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Texts* :

1. Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā
   (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1936).
2. Nyāyamañjarī
   (Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. I, 1936, Vol. II, 1934).
3. Nyāyakusumāñjali
   (Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1957).
4. Ātmatattvaviveka.
   (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1940).
5. Tattvacintāmaṇi Tarka-prakaraṇa
   (Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1944).
6. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali.
7. Tarkasaṅgraha

II. *Mīmāṃsā Texts* :

1. Ślokavārttika (along with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara).
   (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series).
2. Bṛhatī (along with the commentary Ṛjuvimalā)
   (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series).
3. Śāstradīpikā
   (Nirnayasagara, 1915).
4. Mānameyodaya
   (Adyar, 1933).
5. Prakaraṇapañcikā
   (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1904)
6. Tantrarahasya
   (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 1957).

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III. *Vedānta Texts* :

1. Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya
   (Achyutagranthamala, 1961).

IV. *Buddhist Texts* :

1. Nyāyabindu (along with Dharmottara's commentary and Durveka's sub-commentary).
   (Kashiprasad Jaiswal Research Institute, 1955).
2. Hetubindu (along with Arcaṭa's commentary)
   (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 1949).
3. Pramāṇavārttika Svārthānumānapariccheda
   (along with the author's auto-commentary).
   (Benaras Hindu University, 1959).
4. Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra
   (Kashiprasad Jaiswal Research Institute, 1953).

V. *Jaina Texts* :

1. Pramāṇamīmāṃsā
   (Singhi Series, 1939).
2. Laghīyastraya (along with the commentary Nyāyakumudacandra)
   (Manikchandra Jaina Granthamala, Vol. I, 1938 Vol. II, 1941).
3. Jainatarkabhāṣā
   (Singhi Series).
4. Syādvādaratnākara.

VI. *General* :

1. Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha
   (Anandashram Edition).

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1. INTRODUCTION

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I. THE PROBLEMS OF INDIAN LOGIC

1 *The word 'Logic' is used in a broader and in a narrower sense. When used in the broader sense it means 'an investigation into the nature of knowledge in general', when used in the narrower 'an investigation into the nature of inference'. But the two meanings of the word, we think, are not entirely unconnected. For inference constitutes the innermost core of all knowledge whatsoever, and this in the following manner. To know a thing is to be in a position to recognize it while encountering it in a new situation; but no valid recognition is possible without first observing certain marks that ensure this validity, while to say that a thing is of such a nature because it possesses such a mark is essential to all inference. Thus in what are called the cases of perception we really first undergo a particular sensory experience and then recall to ourselves that such a sensory experience is a sure mark of the presence of such an object (or of such a quality of an object) over there; and in what are called the cases of verbal testimony we first hear a particular set of words from a person and then recall to ourselves that such a set of words when uttered by such a person is a sure mark of so being the case. These, therefore, do not essentially differ from the standard cases of inference where we first observe one object and then recall to ourselves that the presence of such an object is a sure mark of the presence of such other object. Of course this essential reduction of all forms of knowledge to inference will not be acceptable to all logicians, may be most will object to it. But it will serve the purpose of considerably bridging the gulf between those who use the word 'Logic' in the broader sense and those who do so in narrower. For we can now pose before the former group of logicians the question: Is not all knowledge after all inferential in essence?; and we can pose before the latter group the question: Is not inference after all the essence of all knowledge whatsoever? This will result in the same set of questions being discussed while treating Logic, irrespective of whether one uses the word 'Logic' in one sense or in the other.

2. Let us also dispose of another question at the very outset, particularly because in the subsequent course of our treatment we are going to deal with matters Indian and ancient. By 'knowledge' a logician means—at least he ought to mean—empirical knowledge, that is ordinary knowledge of the objects of our everyday experience. Thus it is no concern of a logician—quâ logician—to enter into a discussion of the alleged 'supra-empirical' modes of knowledge; nay he has to come out against those who would pooh-pooh all empirical knowledge as false and would contend that some form of supra-empirical

*Such numbers occurring at the beginning of paragraphs refer to '*topics*' catalogued under "A detailed topicwise analysis of the main text" given after the table of contents; the numbers occurring within paragraphs refer to '*footnotes*' given at the end of the text.

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knowledge is *alone* competent to reveal the true nature of reality. Of course, a logician might harbour a private conviction that some form of supra-empirical knowledge is *also* competent to reveal the true nature of reality, but this conviction of his has nothing to do with his duty as a logician. It will, therefore, not be unsafe to define logician as one who argues in support of the position that ordinary sense-perception and inference based thereupon are competent to reveal the true nature of reality, that is, to yield valid knowledge. The logicians are likely to differ—substantially or otherwise—as to the nature of valid knowledge, the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge, the number of the instruments of valid knowledge, the account of the various instruments of valid knowledge, etc., etc., but they will be one against those who maintain that to acquire valid knowledge is an impossibility on the part of ordinary mortals and in the course of their everyday life.

3. Coming now to the ancient Indian scene, we find that this country has produced quite a good number of logicians of no mean calibre, that is, scholars who have devoted the best part of their lives to a threadbare and competent discussion of the problems of empirical knowledge. These scholars came from within the ranks of Brahmins—further classified into Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas (i. e., the adherents of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā systems of philosophy)—, Buddhists and Jainas, though not all Brahmanical, Buddhist or Jaina scholars were positively and seriously interested in the problems of Logic; nay, even the logicians had in most cases a near-blind faith in certain things or others that were patently illogical. These illogical matters chiefly pertained to the theological dogmas upheld—sometimes in common, sometimes in bitter opposition to each other—by these logicians. Thus professing as they did either Brahmanical or Buddhist or Jaina religion all these logicians accepted the doctrine of rebirth (saṃsāra) and the ultimate cessation of the cycle of births and rebirths (mokṣa)—a theological dogma held in common by these three religious orders. Besides, the Brahmanical authors had faith in the efficacy of Vedic rituals—the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas basing their faith on the alleged divine authorship of the Vedas, the Mīmāṃsakas on the alleged authorless character of these very texts, while the Buddhists and Jainas, though vehemently critical of Vedic ritualism, would heartily endorse the rituals sanctified by their respective scriptures. The logicians perhaps realized that no convincing empirical evidence is forthcoming in support of these and similar theological dogmas, and hence, to be logical as it were, they all posited this or that supra-empirical source of knowledge in addition to the empirical ones. For Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, the chief repository of supra-empirical knowledge was God—the alleged author of the Vedas, for Mīmāṃsakas these Vedas themselves allegedly possessing the unique virtue of being texts with no author, while for the Buddhists and Jainas the Enlightened (and Emancipated) ones like Buddha and Mahāvīra. But this only means that our logicians' faith in their respective theological dogmas and

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in the supra-empirical capacities of these who promulgated these dogmas was based on rather extra-logical considerations, a fact which, in turn, explains why in the course of their subtle and sophisticated enquiries into logical problems they make little mention (at least little use) of these dogmas and leave their promulgators severely alone.

4. The chief questions that have engaged the attention of our logicians are following: (1) What is the definition of valid knowledge?, (2) What is the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge?, (3) How many and what are the instruments of valid knowledge? and (4) What are the respective accounts of these various instruments of valid knowledge?

5. The first question, viz., the one concerning the definition of valid knowledge should, in fact, pose no problem. For commonsense tells us that valid knowledge of A is its knowledge as A, while invalid knowledge of A is its knowledge as something not-A. Thus to know a piece of rope as rope is to know it validly while to know it as something else, say as snake, is to know it invalidly. The really puzzling question is: How are we to be sure that a particular piece of knowledge acquired by us is valid? And that is our second question, viz., the one concerning the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge. As a matter of fact, the logicians have not unoften this second question at the back of their mind even when they are apparently tackling the first. For example, when valid knowledge is defined as that type of knowledge which leads to the acquisition of the object concerned what we are really offered is the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge. For our knowledge of an object as A is proved to be valid in case on acquiring this object we find it to be A. This confusion of issues is partly due to the ambiguity of the Sanskrit word 'grahaṇa' (like that of the English word 'grasp')[1]. Thus the Sanskrit phrase 'artha-grahaṇa' means both knowing an object and taking hold of an object (just as does the English phrase 'grasping an object'). But what is really meant by the statement that our knowledge of an object as A is valid in case on acquiring this object we find it to be A? The meaning simply is this, that our knowledge of an object as A is valid in case our practice connected with this object undertaken under the belief that the object is A is successful. Thus suppose we see an object from a distance and judge it to be water. Now the only way to determine whether this judgment of ours is valid or not is to take hold of this object and see if it can be used as water: if it can be so used, our judgment was valid, otherwise not. As against this objectivist criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge there is a subjectivist criterion, viz., that of self-evidence. It is a favourite contention of the anti-Logic mystics and illusionists that not practice but self-evidence is the criterion of truth; and the self-evident truths are for them the dogmas of their metaphysics so that what is self-evident to one mystic need not be so to another. True, in a way the objectivist criterion or the criterion of practice too involves an appeal to self-evidence, and much is often made of it by the subjectivist whose sophistries sometimes bamboozle

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even a logician who is not on his guards. To take the example just quoted, the objectivist submits that our knowledge of an object as water is valid if this object (say) quenches our thirst; the subjectivist asks : "But how (if not on the testimony of self-evidence) are you certain that your thirst is actually being quenched?" The only way to silence the subjectivist is to tell him that reports on the part of a normal waking man concerning his practical experiences are past all doubt as to their validity, in other words, that such reports are self-evidently valid. We must, however, note the vital difference between the objectivist employment of the notion of self-evidence and its subjectivist employment. The objectivist offers a general criterion for the validity of knowledge and then suggests that the validity of this criterion itself is open to no further test; the subjectivist, on the contrary, offers no general criterion for the validity of knowledge but insists that certain metaphysical dogmas are self-evidently valid because open to no test as to their validity. Thus closes our summary review of the first two questions considered by Indian logicians. Now we take up the remaining two.

6. As suggested above, we can define logician as one who argues in support of the position that ordinary sense-perception and inference based thereupon are competent to yield valid knowledge. In this connection also the logician has to come out against the mystic who would declare sense-organs to be thoroughly incompetent quâ instruments of valid knowledge (and against the fideist who would dismiss all inference save that based on scripture). But the logicians might differ among themselves as to the precise nature of perception and inference and as to whether there are instruments of valid knowledge in addition to perception and inference. Here are the most striking Indian instances of the difference of opinion among logicians.

7. That sense-object contact is an indispensable condition of perceptual knowledge will be admitted on all hands, but it is a matter of serious dispute as to what else is required to produce such a piece of knowledge. Distinction is sometimes made between indeterminate perceptual knowledge and the determinate, and it is contended that while the former takes its rise immediately in the wake of sense-object contact the latter is produced by the concerned indeterminate perceptual knowledge followed by some thought-element. Some logicians maintain that all perceptual knowledge is necessarily of the indeterminate variety, others that it is necessarily of the determinate variety, while the rest posit both these varieties of perceptual knowledge. As for inferential knowledge, practically all logicians are agreed that it presupposes the admission that the presence of a particular thing (or character) is a sure mark of the presence of another particular thing (or character) and the recognition that a given place is possessed of the former of these things (or characters). Now some would maintain that these exhaust the necessary conditions of inferential knowledge, while others urge that certain additional conditions are required for the production of such a piece of knowledge. For example, it is sometimes held that in an inference we

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require not only the admission that a particular thing (or character) is a sure mark of the presence of another thing (or character) and the recognition that a given place is possessed of the former of these things (or characters) but also an assurance that the place in question does not possess something that is a sure mark of the absence of the latter of these things (or characters) and an assurance that the possession by this place of the latter of these things (or characters) does not stand contradicted otherwise (say through direct perception); others contend that these additional assurances are needless. Again, it is sometimes held that in an inference the admission that a particular thing (or character) is a sure mark of the presence of another thing (or character) must be accompanied by the admission that the absence of the latter of these things (or characters) is a sure mark of the absence of the former; others contend that the two admissions are absolutely equivalent and that therefore either will do. A major point of difference of opinion arises here in connection with the question as to what are the types of relation that must obtain between two things (or characters) so as to make the presence of one a sure mark for the presence of the other. Some logicians maintain that there is a fixed number of such types, others that these types are indefinitely numerous. A minor point of difference arises in connection with question as to how many steps are required in order to state in words a piece of inferential knowledge. Some logicians maintain that in the verbal statement of an inference there are required just two steps—one stating that the presence of a particular thing (or character) is a sure mark of the presence of another thing (or character), the other that a given place possesses the former of these things (or characters); others feel that certain additional facts need being stated in this connection, e.g., it is sometimes urged that the statement of an inference must contain explicit mention of what the inference has sought to prove—some maintaining that this thesis should be mentioned either in the beginning (i.e., as something sought to be proved) or at the end (i.e., as something already proved), others that it should be mentioned both in the beginning and at the end. And there are many more such minor points of difference among the logicians in connection with the problem of inference.

8. However, perception and inference do not seem to be the only instruments of valid knowledge. Verbal testimony, for example, seems to be an additional such instrument. In this connection there arise two questions considerably independent of each other and they are as follows: (*i*) How is it that a word possesses a meaning and how is it that a sentence does so? (*ii*) Under what conditions is a sentence so uttered that it conveys a true piece of information? In answer to the first question the logicians have propounded various theories as to the import of words—some maintaining that the meaning attached to a word is conventional and originated, others that it is inherent and eternal, and, again, some maintaining that this meaning is something positive in character others that it is something essentially negative; similarly, the logicians have, in this connection, propounded various theories as to the nature of sentential meaning, some maintaining that

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the meaning of a sentence is a combination of the respective denotations of its constituent-words, other that it is the denotation possessed by these words as combined into a sentence, while still others that it is the intention (rather than denotaton) possessed by these words as thus combined. In answer to the second question posed above the logicians have maintained almost unanimously, that a sentence conveys true information only when uttered by a trustworthy person. There is, however, no gainsaying that the differences among the logicians on the problem of verbal testimony seem to be more formidable than they actually are. For certain logicians are insistent that verbal testimony is an independent instrument of valid knowledge while others equally insistent that it is but a case of inference. But as a matter of fact, this difference of opinion is not so acute as it appears on the face of it. For almost all logicians maintain in common that while acquiring a true piece of information through verbal testimony the listener must first make out to himself the meaning of the sentence in question and then make sure that the person uttering this sentence is trustworthy; the difference arises when some insist that this is all that happens here, while others that the listener thereafter resorts to an inference to the effect that such a sentence uttered by such a trustworthy person must convey such a true piece of information—the former constituting the group of those who attribute to verbal testimony the status of an independent instrument of valild knowledge, the latter the group of those who reduce it to a case of inference.

9. Then there are logicians who posit certain instruments of valid knowledge in addition to perception, inference and verbal testimony. For example, analogy—curiously and variously conceived—is an independent instrument of valid knowledge according to some logicians. Again, some logicians maintain that when a given state of affairs remains unaccounted for except through positing a particular fact this state of affairs is an altogether new instrument of valid knowledge (yielding the knowledge of the fact in question) called 'implication', while others submit that all this is but a case of inference. Similarly, it is maintained by some that an absence, in order to be known, requires an altogether new instrument of valid knowledge called "non-cognition", while others rejoin that the ordinary instruments of valid knowledge are quite competent to grasp an absence as well as a positive entity. Furthermore, some logicians are particularly reluctant to attribute the status of a genuine instrument if valid knowledge to hypothetical reasoning, i.e., to reasoning to the effect that such and such would not have been the case unless such and such was the case, but others point out that this is but a slightly roundabout way of expressing the 'relation of universal and invariable concomitance' so essential to all inference; the latter accordingly treat hypothetical reasoning as an independent instrument of valid knowledge. Lastly, some logicians deny to memory too the status of a genuine instrument of valid knowledge. Now recognition is a most vital element in all cases of acquiring knowledge, and since memory is but instrumental—though most powerfully so—in recognition it may be technically correct to deny to memory the status of a (direct) instrument of valid knowledge. But the

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mode of classification adopted by the logicians in question would tend to suggest that there is somehing essentially invalid about all memory whatsoever, and this certainly is a misleading suggestion. As a matter of fact, since memory is directly and most powerfully instrumental in recognition, while recognition is a most vital element in all cases of acquiring knowledge, the relation of memory to geenuinely valid knowledge is pretty intimate. As if to obviate these difficulties some logicians have attributed the status of an independent instrument of valid knowledge to both memory and recognition.

II. THE SCHOOLS OF INDIAN LOGIC.

10. As remarked earlier, not all Indian philosophers were positively and seriously interested in the problems of Logic. Of those who did not develop interest in Logic certain circles were positively hostile towards it while others just did not care. In order to be convinced of this certain basic facts concerning philosphical development in India ought to be taken into consideration.

11. Thus here there have come forth philosophers whose primary contention was that the world of our everyday experience is an illusory show while its underlying reality is to be grasped through some supra-empirical mode of knowledge. And naturally it was impossible for this group of philosophers to have taken Logic seriously; nay, they were bound to wage vendetta against it and this is what they actually did. For a logician believes that the world of our everyday experience is governed by certain laws which can be discovered with the help of the cognitive faculties available to an average man; but as against this, the illusionist must maintain that our everyday world is a product of ignorance amenable to no laws (or, at best, amenable to laws that are practically but not really valid) while the true reality falls within the reach only of the super-man who is a practising world-denier. To be consistent with this basic attitude, an illusionist must, therefore, discourage and denounce Logic as a kind of snare that might bind one to a world worthless to the core. That these anti-Logic Indian philosophers also differed among themselves goes without saying but is of little consequence, at least from the point of view of our present interest. Two schools of Buddhism, viz., Sūnyavāda and Vijñānvāda and one school of Vedānta, viz., Advaita Vedānta are the most outstanding representatives of the trend in question.

12. The remaining schools of Indian philosophy—whatever else they might or might not be—are averse to illusionism. These schools are, Sāṅkhya (though not Yoga which, to tell the truth, is no school of philosophy—illusionistic or otherwise), Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika Mīmāṃsā and the non-Advaita Vedāntic systems among the Brahmanical ones, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika among the Buddhist ones, and Jainism taken as a whole. And they sought to understand, to the best of their abilities, the basic constitution

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of the empirical world and the basic constitution of the human cognitive faculties through which this world is to be grasped, that is to say, to develop an empirical ontology and a Logic. However, in some of these schools, the endeavours to develop a serious empirical philosophy—inclusive of Logic—remained at a rather rudimentary level and there were definite reasons for that.

13. Thus Sāṅkhya was a philosophical school with a hoary past, but precisely because of its antiquity an advanced age could not defend it as it stood. And since even in an advanced age, that is, in the age capable of cultivating Logic, endeavours were made to defend Sāṅkhya as it stood, the school just refused to grow and remained a stunted development. As a result, no school of Logic named after Sāṅkhya came into existence.

14. Then there were the various non-Advaita schools of Vedānta. These schools arose in an age when Sanskrit learning in general was on the decline; as a matter of fact, it is these schools, which were chiefly instrumental in making vernacular languages instead of Sanskrit the medium of literary expression in the different parts of our country. This however was not the only—not even the chief—reason for the meagreness of the logical output of these schools; the chief reason was that these were essentially theological rather than philosophical movements. Seeking to develop various theistic cults these schools were one against Advaita Vedānta whose illusionism would seem to put in jeopardy all worldly interests—not excluding religion; but religion itself is in a way an other-worldly concern and hence his excessive preoccupation with religious problems resulted in the non-Advaita Vedāntist's failure to adopt a straightforward attitude towards ordinary worldly affairs in general and Logic in particular. Little wonder that the non-Advaita schools of Vedānta share their Advaita counterpart's belief in the supremacy of scripture over Logic. The atmosphere within the non-Advaita Vedānta circles was thus as much uncongenial for the development of Logic as that within the Advaita ones; consequently, whatever texts on Logic were written from the various non-Advaita Vedānta points of view are as much of a curiosity as that alleged Advaita Vedānta manual of Logic called 'Vedāntaparibhāṣā'.

15. The case of the Mīmāṃsā school has its own complexities. For Mīmāṃsā too was, in essence, not a philosophical school but a school of those old-fashioned ritualists who would seek to perpetuate the practice of Vedic sacrifices promulgated—at least given their present form—in the age that witnessed the composition of the Brāhmaṇa-texts. But the school had a tradition of discussing logical problems even if from a rather perverted angle. Since the very start the Mīmāṃsakas were arguing that Vedic sacrifices are capable of yielding this or that worldly result but that their mode of doing so lies beyond the pale of empirical comprehension. In this connection they investigated into the nature of the empirical sources of valid knowledge (with a view to arriving at the conclusion that the source of valid knowledge which

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reveals to us the inner working of Vedic sacrifices is not an empirical one but the supra-empirical—because authorless—texts called Vedas). In the Age of Logic this thread was picked up by certain Mīmāṃsā stalwarts who—though, of course, as a kind of side-business—undertook a detailed treatment of all the problems of Logic. This led to the emergence of what we intend to call the Mīmāṃsā school of Logic.

16. But the credit for having founded the most genuine school of Indian Logic goes to the Naiyāyikas and their allies the Vaiśeṣikas. It was in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika circles that the problems of empirical ontology and Logic were given the most serious consideration; as a matter of fact, their discussion of these problems became a set pattern for all those who would seek to follow this—for those medieval times rather dangerous—line of ideological endeavour. We have just said that in the Age of Logic the Mīmāṃsakas—so far as it concerns their logical activity—picked up the thread left by their much early predecessors, but the need would not have arisen had not the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers ushered in this most glorious age in the history of Indian philosophy. Similarly, the development of Logic within the Buddhist and Jaina folds owes not a little to the impetus received from the calebrated researches of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians.

17. To take the case of Buddhists first, let us note that Buddhism was originally a school of simple ethico-theological teachings and this is what it essentially remained in the hands of those who went on writing in Pali. The beginnings of genuine philosophical activities among Buddhists are to be traced in the writings of those who adopted Sanskrit as their medium of expression. The Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika authors, imbibing to whatever extent possible the spirit of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, began to evince interest in the problems of empirical ontology and Logic; the Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda authors, deeply hostile to all logical thinking, Buddhist or otherwise, began to marshall arguments in support of an illusionist-idealist world-outlook. But, curiously enough, the founder of what deserves to be called the Buddhist school of Logic came neither from among the Vaibhāṣikas or Sautrāntikas nor from among the Śūnyavādins or Vijñānavādins: this man—the illustrious Diṅnāga whom Vidabhushana calls 'the father of medieval Logic' and for whom, in his eyes, 'there is no praise too high'—had partial affiliations with both these camps. True to the spirit of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Diṅnāga—and his most renowned followers like Dharmakīrti-grappled with the problems of empirical ontology and Logic as few others did. In the field of empirical ontology their defence of momentarism, a noted characteristic of the Sautrāntika school, is the undying glory of Indian philosophy; and in the field of Logic they have succeeded, as it were, in fulfilling the Indian teacher's cherished desire of 'being defeated by the disciple', for they have improved upon the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika positions in almost every direction. A comparative study of Diṅnāga and Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the much-dreaded (on account of its high-flown technicalities) sub-school of neo-Nyāya will prove to the hilt that

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the latter's much-vaunted innovations are a tiny fraction—in many cases they are bodily the same—of those introduced in the school of the former. But regrettably enough, there was from the very beginning a tendency in Diṅnāga's school to gather arguments in support of illusionism; to make matters worse, these arguments sometimes, though not too often, occur in the very midst of their serious and worthwhile discussions on empirical ontology and Logic. The situation is intriguing and deserves scrutiny.

18. Lastly, we take up what we are going to call the Jaina school of Logic. Jainism was a school of simple ethico-theological teachings in an even more pronounced form than Buddhism. Partly it was so due to the fact that asceticism preached by the Jaina teachers was of a more rigorous variety; for certainly, the more ascetically-minded you are, the more possible it is for you to neglect the problems of empirical philosophy. But in one respect the Jaina was in an advantageous position, and this in that illusionism never found a foothold within his order. This made it comparatively easier for some among the Jainas to follow the lead given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors and devote themselves in right earnest to the problems of empirical ontology and Logic. The first conspicuous beginnings in this direction are to be found in Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, and other big names were not late to follow, though admittedly the Jaina is the youngest member belonging to the family of Indian logicians. For Akalaṅka, the author who gave final shape to the Jaina positions on Logic, was born after the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school had produced its Praśastapāda and Uddyotakara, the Mīmāṃsā school its Prabhākara and Kumārila, the Buddhist school its Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. This, however, does not mean that the Jaina's contribution to the discussion of the logical problems was of a mean order, as will become evident when we take up for a detailed and comparative examination the stands adopted in connection with these problems by the different schools of Indian Logic.

19. Chronologically speaking, we divide the history of Indian philosophy into an Early Phase, a Mature Phase and a Decadent Phase. The first of these covers philosophers coming before Diṅnāga, the second those coming between Diṅnāga and Gaṅgeśa, while the third those coming after Gaṅgeśa. And the most conspicuous (and most glorious) thing about the Mature Phase is the emergence of the four schools of Logic whose findings we intend to examine critically in the course of our present investigation.

(2) THE PROBLEMS OF INDIAN LOGIC AS TREATED BY ITS SCHOOLS.

20. As was noted earlier in our preliminary review, the Indian schools of Logic have given consideration to problems that broadly fall in two groups, the first relating to the definition of valid knowledge and the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge, the second to the different

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instruments of valid knowledge their number and their respective accounts. We now propose to examine, in order, how these two groups of problems have been tackled in details.

I. THE DEFINITION AND THE CRITERION OF VALID KNOWLEDGE.

21. The following simple-sounding declaration (or something like that) occurs in the introductory part of most text-books on Indian Logic: 'One succeeds in attaining what he seeks after only when he takes recourse to an instrument of valid knowledge; that is why an enquiry into the instruments of valid knowledge is being undertaken here'2. What is noteworthy in this is that the logician does not look down upon things sought after and attained by ordinary human beings in the course of their everyday life; nay, it is these things that are chiefly had in mind while formulating the declaration in question. Thus even while most (rather all) logicians believe that there are certain supra-empirical truths which are revealed by some supra-empirical instrument of valid knowledge what they were endeavouring their best to understand was the manner in which empirical truths are revealed by the empirical instruments of valid knowledge. In this the logician's attitude was just the reverse of that adopted by the mystic and the illusionist who would concentrate his attention on demonstrating how certain supra-empirical truths are revealed through some supra-empirical mode of knowledge and on seeking to dismiss the claim of empirical truths to be called truths at all. Here it will be well to recall the oft-made assertion that in India philosophy was not a mere theoretical curiosity but an essentially practical concern. What is usually meant to be upheld is that in India philosphers were above all interested in discovering the modes of that 'high knowledge' which leads to the attainment of *mokṣa* or release from the cycle of births and re-births, but this will be strictly true only of our mystics and illusionists and not also of our logicians. However, the assertion in question is in a way true also of the Indian logician, for he too never for a moment forgot the practical purposes that were to be served by his apparently detached studies. Thus when our logicians tell us with almost one voice that valid knowledge is that knowledge which enables one to attain the object sought to be known (and thereafter to be attained) they are simply subscribing to the doctrine that practice is the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge; (this will be strictly true of empirical knowledge and true in a Pickwickian sense —if in any—of the so-called supra-empirical knowledge).

Historically speaking, the case against the possibility of Logic seems to have been first advanced by the Buddhists of Śūnyavāda persuasion. These Buddhists were also the first to have boldly declared that the world of our everyday experience is an illusory show. Naturally, however, the doctrine preached by these philosophers could not have been pure skepticism, for as members of a theological sect they had after all to offer a positive way out

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of what they considered to be the root-misery of man, that is, a positive way out of the transmigatory cycle. Hence it was that the Sūnyavādin's tirade against Logic, even if it imvolved a repudiation of the empirical means of knowledge, was at the same time a vindication of some supra-empirical means of realizing the true nature of reality. For the illusionist, no less than the logician, was emphatic in asserting that one can attain one's summum bonum only as a result of realizing the true nature of reality. This fact, coupled with the circumstance that the logician too was apparently serious enough in suggesting that a realization of the true nature of reality is chiefly meant to put an end to the transmigratory cycle, often tends to confuse the issue and blur the line of distinction we are seeking to draw here between the illusionist mystic and the empiricist logician. But a close and dispassionate study of the profession as well as performance of both the illusionist and the logician will convince of the cogency of our procedure. The illusionist world-outlook of the Sūnyavādin subsequently came to be shared by the Vijñānavādin among the Buddhists and the Advaita Vedāntin among the Brahmins so that so far as their anti-Logic arguments are concerned the Sūnyavādins, Vijñānavādins and Advaita Vedāntins can be considered to be constituting one monolithic block, just as so far as their defence of the empirical means of knowledge is concerned the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsaka, Buddhist and Jaina logicians to be constituting another such block.

Let us however not gloss over the differences that existed among Indian logicians on the question of defining valid knowledge and prescribing the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge. In the following two sub-sections we propose to discuss the two aspects of the question one by one.

(1) THE DEFINITION OF VALID KNOWLEDGE.

22. As it later on came to be put succinctly in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika circles, to know an object validly is to know it as it is (while to know it invalidly is to know it as it is not)[3]. In other words, valid knowledge of an object is knowledge that is true of this object. There was little to dispute in such a definition and, as a matter of historical fact, nobody did ever dispute it. But some logicians would prefer to put the matter in a negative form and submit that valid knowledge of an object is knowledge that is not untrue of this object. This mode of expression was particularly favourite with the Buddhists and Kumārilite Mīmāṃsakas[4] and thereby the Buddhists meant to suggest that

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a piece of knowledge that is proved to be untrue of its object is not valid while the Kumārilites that a piece of knowledge, unless proved to be thus unture, is valid. These suggestions, particularly the latter one, have deeper implications but we cannot do them full justice until we have taken up for consideration the question of the criterion of valid knowledge. Here it would suffice to say that the two modes—positive and negative—of defining valid knowledge are absolutely equivalent.

23. Really speaking, a need for discussing the question whether we can possibly define valid knowledge arises because the skeptically inclined illusionist answers it in the negative. The great Advaita Vedāntin Śrīharṣa has for example, urged the following difficulties against the logicians' several attempts at defining valid knowledge[5] :—

(i) Some people define valid knowledge as'samyak paricchitti, i.e., discernment that is samyak'. On being questioned they say that by the word 'samyak' they understand something in its entirety, so that the definition in question amounts to saying that valid knowledge is the discernment of a thing in its entirety. However, this is not tenable. For 'a thing in its entirety' might mean either a thing along with all its constituent parts or a thing along with all its characteristics. But if we adopt the former meaning a discernment of the things that have got no constituent parts or of things whose several parts, are not being taken note of will have to be treated as invalid, while if we adopt the latter meaning all discernment on the part of one who is not an omniscient will have to be treated as invalid.

(ii) One might amend the earlier definition and say that the discernment of a thing along with a distinguishing feature is valid knowledge. But in that case even the illusory apprehension of shell as silver will have to be treated as valid, for here too the shell is being grasped along with the distinguishing feature called 'silverness'. Now somebody has suggested that by the phrase 'distinguishing feature' we should mean those features of a thing whose non-cognition gives rise to illusion

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or doubt as to the thing's identity. But the suggestion is not proper because it is impossible to point out in a thing any such feature whose cognition might leave no room for illusion as to the thing's identity. Certainly, there is not a single observable feature of an entity under notice which is not liable to appear in dream or to be described by a pseudo-sentence (i.e., by an untrustworthy sentence).

(*iii*) Another definition (rather one explanation of another definition) says that valid knowledge is that knowledge which is similar to its object (i.e., which has the same form as its object). But this too is not tenable. For if knowledge is something different from its object it is in the very nature of things impossible for a piece of knowledge to be wholly similar to its object; on the other hand, if knowledge is not something different from its object we can say even about an illusory piece of knowledge that it is similar to its object so that the explanation will defeat its purpose.

(*iv*) Also untenable is the definition that valid knowledge is knowledge free from cancellation. For if it is meant to cover knowledge that does not meet with cancellation for the time being the definition will be too wide (for this can be the case also with an invalid piece of knowledge), while it is impossible to make out what it is like to be a piece of cognition that is never liable to be cancelled.

Śrīharṣa's arguments give us a fair idea of the type of detractors the logicians were faced with, even if there is no denying that the worthy illusionist at times puts his finger at difficulties that are genuine. In the entire course of our subsequent discussion we will find Śrīharṣa's ghost hovering over the logicians' treatment of the problems of empirical knowledge. We have just referred to the Buddhist's and the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsaka's negative mode of defining valid knowledge and to their introducing the idea of 'a piece of knowledge proving to be untrue'. As will become clear in the sequel, such detours—successful and otherwise—were made with a view to avoiding the sallies coming from Śrīharṣa's illusionist camp. In passing,

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let us also note that Srīharṣa here comes out even against the definition that valid knowledge is uncancelled knowledge. Elsewhere he himself argues that the knowledge of non-dual Brahman (a knowledge derivable from scriptures alone) is liable to no further cancellation for, so he argues, all series of cognition where the former member is (tested and, if found false) cancelled by the latter must culminate somewhere (otherwise, there arises the contingency of an infinite regress or that of mind having nothing else to cognize) and it is this culminating cognition that constitutes the knowledge of non-dual Brahman[6]. The position is somewhat anomalous but the anomaly has an explanation. Srīharṣa knows that the logician places chief—in fact, sole—reliance on empirical knowledge and he is, therefore, out to prove to the latter that no empirical knowledge is free from the liability to cancellation. This way Srīharṣa seeks to convince the logician that the only knowledge that might possibly be free from the liability to cancellation is some kind of supra-empirical knowledge; to this extent his stand will be endorsed by all the mystics even if they will differ when they come to describe the alleged object of this alleged supra-empirical knowledge.

24. A perusal of another line of thought pursued by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika logicians will throw further light on the problem. These logicians divided all cognitions into those of the nature of memory and those not of the nature of memory. The latter cognitions were further subdivided into pieces of valid knowledge, pieces of erroneous knowledge, pieces of doubtful knowledge and pieces of knowledge of the form of hypothetical reasoning[7]. Thus in accordance with this division and subdivision valid knowldge could be defined as 'cognition which is not of the nature of memory and is neither a piece of erroneous knowledge nor a piece of doubtful knowledge nor a piece of hypothetical reasoning'. So we find that here too, that is, not only in the definitions offered by the Buddhists and Kumārilites not being a piece of erroneous knowledge is a part of the definition of valid knowledge. The other constituents of this definition are equally significant.

25. That a piece of doubtful knowledge is not a case of valid knowledge seems obvious, but that a piece of hypothetical reasoning is not a case of valid knowledge is open to challenge. As stated earlier, hypothetical reasoning is reasoning to the effect that such and such would not have been the case unless such and such was the case, and it is difficult to see what is intrinsically invalid about such a piece of reasoning. As a matter of fact, all relation of invariable concomitance—a relation indispensable for formulating inference—can be put in the form of hypothetical reasoning,

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but certainly no logician will admit that the expression of such a relation is always a case of invalid knowledge. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians themselves seem to see the cogency of this criticism when they grant that hypothetical reasoning sometimes acts as an aid to formulating inference[8]. but, to be fully logical, they will have to grant that hypothetical reasoning is but a particular form of expressing the relation of invariable concomitance that is indispensable for formulating inference. Nor will it do to say that inference being itself a case of valid knowledge what is merely instrumental in formulating inference cannot be a piece of valid knowledge. For there is no inherent bar to one piece of valid knowledge being instrumental in arriving at another piece of valid knowledge. Not quite unreasonably do the Jaina logicians adopt the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's word for hypothetical reasoning. viz., 'tarka', to denote an independent instrument of valid knowledge.

The question whether hypothetical reasoning is a case of valid knowledge is in fact the question as to how we arrive at a valid universal judgment. And since a universal judgment is an indispensable prerequisite of inferential knowledge we shall be discussing the numerous ramifications of the present question while dealing with inference. Here we should briefly consider only a few points. We can arive at a universal judgment through an inference whose both premises are universal, or we can arrive at it through an inductive process. For example, we can say 'All *p* is *q*, because all *p* is *r* and all *r* is *q*' or we can resort to induction and conclude 'All *p* is *q*'. Now the former of these methods simply pushes the problem a step back, for instead of enquiring as to how we arive at the universal judgment 'All *p* is *q*' we will now have to enquire as to how we arrive at the universal judgments 'All *p* is *r*' and 'All *r* is *q*'. So ultimately, induction seems to be the only method capable of enabling us to arrive at a universal judgment. With these considerations in mind let us examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's contention that hypothetical reasoning often aids us in formulating an inference. The contention emerges roughly as follows. As we have just remarked, an indispensable condition of formulating an inference is a universal judgment of the form 'All *p* is *q*'. Now sometimes it so happens that we know 'All not-*q* is *r*' and all *r* is not-*p*,' so that it is logically impossible to grant that a thing lacks *q* and yet possess *p*; e.g., we know 'All that lacks fire lacks a cause of smoke', and all that lacks a cause of smoke lacks smoke', so that it is logically impossible to grant that a place lacks fire and yet possesses smoke. This is why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician says that our knowledge of the universal judgment 'All

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that possesses smoke possesses fire' is buttressed by the hypothetical reasoning to the effect 'Had a place not possessed fire it would not have possessed a cause of smoke'. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician somehow feels that here the real question is : "Why is it that a place that does not possess fire does not possess a cause of smoke? In other words, why is it that fire is a cause of smoke?" That is why he says that the hypothetical reasoning in question simply aids the inference in question but does not establish it. But then it will be more straightforward for him to maintain that all universal judgment is ultimately justified by an inductive process though sometimes in the course of doing so it is convenient to bring in additional universal judgments. The Jaina logician, no doubt, maintains that all universal judgment is the result of a piece of hypothetical reasoning, but it remains to be seen whether he also maintains that all hypothetical reasoning involves a resort to induction. As we shall see later on, the problem of induction was tackled most satisfactorily by the Buddhist rather than either the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Jaina logician. In any case, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's submission that hypothetical reasoning is not a case of valid knowledge is fraught with confusion.

26. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's contention that a piece of valid knowledge is not of the nature of memory also deserves critical examination. To the pieces of valid knowledge, erroneous knowledge, doubtful knowledge and hypothetical reasoning these logicians have given one general name, viz. 'anubhava' just in order to distinguish them all from memory (in Sanskrit 'smṛti'). And there is an important truth underlying this distinction. For memory is most obviously not a case of acquiring a new piece of knowledge—valid, erroneous or doubtful—but simply a case of calling back to mind a piece of knowledge acquired in the past. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's 'anubhava' can be taken to stand for cognitions that are presentative in character while '*smṛti*' for those that are re-presentative in character: and we may treat 'knowledge' as a rough English equivalent for 'anubhava' (rough because, as must have been clear by now, we will have to grant that a piece of knowledge may be either valid or erroneous or doubtful) just as 'memory' is the standard English equivalent for '*smṛti*'. From this it logically follows that memory is not a case of valid knowledge simply because it is not a case of knowledge: but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā logicians seldom adopt this simple course of reasoning and always go in for sepecial reasons to show why memory is not a case of valid knowledge, thus insinuating as if there is something essentially invalid about all memory (this becomes peculiarly obvious in the case of the Prabhākarite

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Mīmāṃsaka who, on account of his further belief that all knowledge is necessarily valid, divides all cognitions into memory on the one hand and valid knowledge on the other). An additional difficulty is created because of the refusal on the part of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites to grant that all knowledge is necessarily an acquisition of a new piece of information, though this ought to be a very obvious corollary of dividing all cognitions into memory on the one hand and knowledge on the other. Thus unlike the Kumārilite who, on account of his further admission that knowledge is necessarily the acquisition of a new piece of information, straightway argues that memory is not a case of valid knowledge (though, as pointed out, it would have been more correct to say that memory is not a case of knowledge because it is no acquisition of a new piece of information. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites have to indulge in a roundabout argumentation often of dubious validity. Thus they sometimes argue that memory is not a case of valid knowledge because it is born of past impressions alone[9] (with emphasis on 'alone', for past impressions might render a service even in the genuine cases of valid knowledge), but it is difficult to see how this is different from saying that memory is not a case of valid knowledge) because it is no acquisition of a new piece of information. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians more generally argue that memory is not a case of valid knowledge because it is not produced by one of the four instruments of valid knowledge recognized in their school; but this is an argument in circle, for these logicians *first* sharply demarcate from memory knowledge in general and valid knowledge in particular and *then* proceed to enquire as to how many and what are the instruments of valid knowledge. Be that as it may, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā position that memory is not a case of valid knowledge remains a stumbling block for a modern student of Logic. Of Indian logicians the Jaina alone treats memory as a case of valid knowledge on a par with the remaining such cases, but this means involvement in another kind of error. For here little notice is being taken of the re-presentative character of the cases of memory as contrasted with the presentative character of those of knowledge, valid or otherwise. An additional difficulty that certain Jaina logicians have to face will occur to us after we have taken account of another controversy which we have incidentally touched upon just before and are going to consider in details now.

27. The controversy centres around the question whether all valid knowledge is necessarily a new piece of information. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites are emphatic in answering the question in the negative, the Buddhists and Kumārilites in answering it in the affirmative;

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the Jaina speaks with two voices. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites contend that if an instrument of valid knowledge—perception, inference, verbal testimony or the like—is rightly employed in cognizing a thing, the ensuing knowledge must be deemed valid irrespective of whether the features thus cognized in the thing are familiar to us or not; the Buddhists and Kumārilites answer back by arguing that since all things are becoming different every moment (this famous Buddhist thesis is also to an extent the position of a Kumārilite, for the latter maintains that a thing as associated with one moment must look different from the same thing as associated with another moment10) not to take cognizance of an unfamiliar feature in a thing means not to acquire valid knowledge concerning this thing. Perhaps both sides are correct only partly. For all acquisition of knowledge involves the recognition that certain familiar features are occurring over there *as also* the recognition that they are occurring now in a new set-up; the first party seems oblivious of the latter aspect of the situation, the second party of the former. This becomes clear from the vehemence with which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers argue against momentarism (implying thereby that it is logically possible for a situation to remain absolutely identical for a fairly long period) and the vehemence with which the Buddhist tends to argue that all recognition is a false cognition (implying thereby that it is logically impossible for any feature to persist in a thing for more than one moment). Here the Prabhākarite can well adopt a position substantially akin to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher but the Kumārilite position must present an anomaly. For the Kumārilite is one with the remaining non-Buddhist philosophers in repudiating momentarism and he is one with them in admitting that recognition is a case of valid knowledge. Now his repudiation of momentarism is somewhat inconsistent with his above-noted contention that a thing as associated with one moment must look different from the same thing as associated with another moment, even though his admission that recognition is a case of valid knowledge is not at all inconsistent with the contention in question. For to say that a thing must become different every moment is not at all inconsistent with saying that this thing might exhibit features that persist for a considerable stretch of time; as a matter of fact, this is a lesson that the Buddhist has to learn. The Jaina stand in connection with the controversy in question arises from the school's general metaphsical position that a thing exhibits features which change from moment to moment as also those which persist for a considerable stretch of time. This position has enabled the Jaina logician to treat recognition as a clear case of valid knowledge (they do not treat it as a kind of preceptual knowledge as is done by their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā colleagues but assign it an independent place in their list of the types of valid knowledge).

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But in spite of this—may be because of this—on the precisely central issue of the present controversy, viz., whether all valid knowledge is necessarily a new piece of information, the Jaina logicians have taken no unanimous stand. Some have answered the question in the negative and have endorsed the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhākarite arguments against the Buddhists and Kumārilites; others have answered the question in the affirmative and have endorsed the Buddhist and Kumārilite arguments against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites. (It is this latter group of Jaina logicians who should find it difficult to convincingly defend the unanimous Jaina position that memory is a case of valid knowledge, for in no case can memory be proved to be a new piece of information. A clear realization of the necessarily presentative character of all knowledge would alone have saved these Jainas the predicament thus posed). A better course for the Jaina logicians to adopt and one in consonance with their basic tendency to reconcile the opposites, would have been to evolve a proper synthesis of these two rival positions, but that now remains to be done by a modern student of Logic.

28 As might have become obvious by now, the question whether memory is a case of valid knowledge and the question whether all knowledge is knowledge of a hitherto-unknown object are closely connected with one another. The former is really the question whether all knowledge is presentative in character, the latter whether a piece of cognition that reveals nothing hitherto-unknown can be called knowledge. In order to have a clear idea of how the controversy on these allied questions was conducted in ancient India we reproduce below the salient points urged by Udayana, the last great representative of the old-Nyāya school and connecting-link between it and the neo-Nyāya of Gaṅgeśa, while seeking to assail the Kumārilite distinction between memory and valid knowledge and to substitute for it the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinction between the two[11] :—

(1) It is not true that no knowledge can arise concerning an object that is already known. For as a matter of fact, when there is nothing to prevent an instrument of valid knowledge from functioning it yields valid knowledge irrespective of whether the object concerned is already known or otherwise.

(2) When one persists in validly cognizing an object for several successive moments the resulting cognition is obviously valid for all these moments, but if all valid cognition were cognition of a hitherto-unknown object this should not be the case. And

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it will not do to say that in this case the object, inasmuch it is associated with several moments in succession, is not the same object for all these moments; for these 'moments', inasumch as they are not amenable to perception, cannot account for the object being (allegedly) not the same for all these moments. (The question whether the continuous cognition of the same object for several moments is valid or not was another matter of lively controversy among Indian logicians. Those like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites, who did not think that the object of a piece of valid knowledge should necessarily be a hitherto-unknown object answered the question in a clear affirmative; those like the Buddhists and Kumārilites who thought that the object of a piece of valid knowledge should necessarily be a hitherto-unknown object answered that the cognition in question is a piece of valid knowledge only in case some novelty is being noticed evey moment. The Kumārilite rather thought that the cognition in question is always a piece of valid knowledge, because he was of the view that the observation of the several successive 'moments' is a matter of course. Udayana is here having this Kumārilite position in mind).

(3) One might say that the object cognized for several moments is different every moment because the 'cognizedness' produced in this object is different every moment but then one might as well say that an object cognized through memory now possesses one 'cognizedness' while the same object cognized through memory at another time possesses another 'cognizedness' (and in that case he would have no right to argue that memory is no valid knowledge because it is no cognition of a hitherto-unknown object). (It is again a Kumārilite position that a piece of cognition produces 'cognizedness' in the object of which it is cognition.)

(4) If all knowledge which has for its object an already known something is invalid even the Vedas might be supposed to be a source of invalid knowledge; for there is no guarantee that in the beginningless cycle of births and rebirths a person has not learnt earlier, say, the injunction to perform a particular sacrifice with a view to attaining heaven (a sacrifice which the Vedas happen to enjoin). Nor will we

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be helped if we confine our consideration to one single life of a person, for then suppose someone learns a Veda and then forgets it; in that case re-learning that Veda on this man's part will have to be treated as a case of acquiring invalid knowledge.

(5) What really distinguishes memory from the other types of cognition is that memory is not 'anubhava' while the other types of cognition are 'anubhava'. And 'anubhava true of its object' is called valid knowledge. However, one should not think just as 'anubhava that is true of its object' is valid knowledge (while 'anubhava untrue of its object' invalid knowledge) 'memory that is true of its object' is valid knowledge (while 'memory untrue of its object' invalid knowledge); for 'valid knowledge' stands not for any arbitrarily chosen type of cognition but only for that tpye which is born of one of the recognized instruments of valid knowledge, and since memory is not treated by the authorities on Logic as born of an independently recognized instrument of valid knowledge it is not valid knowledge (or, we may even say, is invalid knowledge).

(6) The validity or otherwise of memory depends on the validity or otherwise of a past anubhava having the same object so that even if memory is at times treated as valid cognition, it is so done because of the validity of a past anubhava. This past anubhava, on the other hand, is treated as valid knowledge because its validity depends on the validity of no other cognition which is not the case with memory inasmuch as it invariably depends on an anubhava. Hence it is that memory is not valid knowledge.

(7) One might feel that if memory is not valid knowledge there remain no guarantee with us that we have had an anubhava in the past and consequently no guarantee that our memory is born of a past anubhava. But this feeling is unjustified, and that is because even if memory is not valid knowledge one has direct recognition of 'one's own self as possessed of a past as well as a present state'.

29. These points occasion some further thought on the problem. When one has at two occasions knowledge concerning one and the same object, these two pieces of knowledge must be qualitatively (and not merely

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numerically) different from another. Similarly when two persons have knowledge concerning one and the same object, these two pieces of knowledge must be qualitatively (and not merely numerically) different from one another. This happens because the character of a piece of knowledge vitally depends on the character of the thus far acquired knowledge-system of the knower concerned. Failure to realize this is responsible for the Kumārilite's difficulty in convinicing the Naiyāyika why all valid knowledge must be knowledge of a hitherto-unknown object. All that the Kumārilite says is that since the 'moment of time' (or 'cognizedness') associated with an object now is different from the 'moment of time' (or 'cognizedness') associated with this object at another time the object can be treated as being of one kind now and of another kind at another time; but this is a pseudo-explanation. As a matter of fact, a man's knowledge of an object at one time is different from his knowledge of the same object at another time because his knowledge-system has gained in maturity in the meanwhile (and not because the 'moments of time' or 'cognizednesses' associated with the object happen to be different at these two occasions). This explanation should convince the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician why a man's re-learning a Vedic text which he has forgotten cannot be of the same nature as was his first learning of the same text (it is needless to consider the case of learning a Vedic text in an 'earlier' life).

30. Udayana's characterization of memory is also revealing. On the one hand he is eager to emphasize that to call memory 'no valid knowledge' simply means that memory is not caused by one of the recognized instruments of valid knowledge (and not that all memory is necessarily invalid), but on the other hand he seeks to belittle the role of memory as much as he can. That memory and knowledge proper have different roles to play in a man's mental make-up goes without saying, but there is something misleading about the contention that the validity of memory depends on the validity of a past cognition. For memory is an act of recalling to mind a past experience, and such an act is genuine memory in cass it correctly recalls a past experience. while it is pseudo-memory in case it incorrectly recalls a past experience. Thus genuineness or otherwise of memory depends on whether or not it correctly recalls to mind a past experience and not on whether or not it recalls to mind a valid past experence. As a matter of fact, most experiences that are recalled in memory are of such a nature that the adjectives 'valid' and 'invalid' are just inapplicable to them. For example, one can recall to his mind, correctly or otherwise, his past pains and pleasures, but it will be nonsensical to talk of valid or invalid pains or pleasures. It is

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with a view to belittling the role of memory that Udayana refuses to grant that memory is indispensable if one is to make assertions concerning his past experiences; for he tells us that a man has direct recognition of 'one's own self as possessed of a past state as also the present one'. But to talk of recognition without assigning a role to memory is to play Hamlet without the king of Denmark. And to make matters worse, the 'self' posited by Udayana seems to be an object of no genuine cognition whatsoever.

31. The following passages from Hemacandra, the Jaina, should give us an idea of how a Jaina logician who is of the view that the object of a piece of valid knowledge need not necessarily be something hitherto-unknown would argue against his colleague who holds the contrary view[12]:

> One might object: "If a piece of valid knowledge grasps what has already been taken cognizance of it will become a case of powdering the powdered (i.e. of undue repetition). In that case even those pieces of cognition which constitute continuous cognition (of the same object) will have to be treated as cases of valid knowledge, even if they happen to grasp what has already been taken cognizance of. Hence valid knowledge ought to be defined as 'ascertainment of a hitherto-unknown object'. As has been said: 'Valid knowledge is that piece of determinate cognition which grasps itself and a hitherto-unknown object (Parīkṣāmukha, 1, 13), '(Valid knowledge is) the cognition of a hitherto-unknown object'." To this we reply:
>
> "Just as a piece of cognition which grasps what *is going to be* taken cognizance of is not a case of no valid knowledge, so also is a piece of cognition which grasps what *has been* taken cognizance of not a case of no valid knowledge,
>
> Our question is: What is sought to be dismissed here—the piece of cognition that grasps the same *substance* as an earlier one or the piece of-cognition that grasps the same *mode* as an earlier one? So far as a mode is concerned it is impossible for it to be grasped by several pieces of cognition even when they happen to constitute continuous cognition (of the same object), for a mode is but a momentary entity; so where is the need for adding a qualification in the definition of valid knowledge with a view to avoiding the contingency of several pieces of cognition grasping the same mode? Nor is there any such need if

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what is sought to be avoided is the contingency of several pieces of cognition grasping the same substance (rather than the same mode); for a substance being a single permanent entity there is no difference between its state when it has been taken cognizance of and its state when it is going to be taken cognizance of. On what special ground will then it be said that the cognition which grasps what *is going to be* taken cognizance of is a case of valid knowledge while not so the cognition which grasps what *has been* taken cognizance of?...........Moreover, memory which we all admit to be a case of valid knowledge is, by nature, the cognition of something that has been taken cognizance of. Even those who deny to memory the status of valid knowledge do so not on the ground that it grasps what has already been taken cognizance of but on the ground that it is not produced by a real thing (i.e. by the thing that happens to be its object). As is said: 'Memory is a case of no valid knowledge not because it grasps what has been taken cognizance of;' it is so because it is not produced by a real thing'. (Nyāyamañjarī)''.

32. Hemacandra well poses the dilemma of the Jaina who would insist that the object of a piece of valid knowledge must be hitherto-unknown in the sense of being hitherto-absolutely unknown. However, it is doubtful whether any non-Buddhist logician did actually adopt such an extreme position; nay, it is doubtful whether even the Buddhist really meant to uphold this position. The probability rather is that the Jaina logicians (and the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsakas—if not also the Buddhists) who insisted that the object of valid knowledge must be something hitherto-unknown only meant to maintain that to some extent at least all valid knowledge must be a new piece of information, a position virtually the same as Hemacandra is seeking to defend. But Hemacandra, on his part, tends to make a mistake of another nature. For he seems to be of the view that a piece of cognition which reveals absolutely nothing new in the objective situation can well be treated as a case of knowledge, a view also maintained by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician. However, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician had a vague inkling that a piece of cognition which is not presentative in character is not a case of knowledge; that is why he sought, even if confusedly, to deny to memory the status of valid knowledge. Hemacandra, quoting Jayanta—another name in the old Nyāya school—exploits the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's confusion and suggests that if valid knowledge need not be a cognition pertaining to a hitherto-unknown object nothing prevents memory from being

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treated as a case of valid knowledge. Hemacandra should have taken into consideration the fact that the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsaka denies to memory the status of valid knowledge precisely on the ground that it grasps an object that has already been taken cognizance of. There is however no denying that his Jaina colleagues whom Hemacandra is criticizing here are in a thoroughly unenviable position. For they have no justification whatsoever to treat memory as a case of valid knowledge. In passing, let it also be said that Hemacandra's retort that if the cognition which grasps an object that has already been taken cognizance of is no case of valid knowledge the cognition which grasps an object that is going to be taken cognizance of must follow suit is more ingenious than convincing.

(2) THE CRITERION OF VALID KNOWLEDGE.

33. In connection with prescribing the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge the difference of opinion that first draws our attention is the one existing between the Mīmāṃsakas on the one hand and the rest of the Indian logicians on the other. For certain reasons the Mīmāṃsakas though fit to come out with the suggestion that all knowledge is somehow valid; the Prabhākarite put it in a most blatant form and sought to prove that invalid knowledge is an impossibility, the Kumārilite diluted it to some extent and sought to prove that all knowledge is valid until and unless it is proved to be otherwise.

34. The Prabhākarite followed the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician in dividing all cognitions into those of the nature of memory and those not of the nature of memory, but, unlike the latter, he refused to further subdivide the non-mnemic cognitions into pieces of valid knowledge, pieces of invalid knowledge, pieces of doubtful knowledge, etc., and maintained that these non-mnemic cognitions are all of the nature of valid knowledge. Thus with the Prabhākarite the simple definition of valid knowledge is 'cognition that is not of the nature of memory'[13]. The question naturally arises: How then does the Prabhākarite explain the obvious cases of erroneous knowledge, e.g., our mistaking a rope for snake? And the honest answer will be that he simply explains away these cases. For the Prabhākarite tells us that in the alleged cases of erroneous knowledge there take place two pieces of cognition, of which one is of the nature of knowledge (that has to be necessarily valid) and the other of the nature of memory, while the so-called error results from our not distinguishing between these two pieces of cognition and between their respective objects. Thus according to the Prabhākarite, in what is called our mistaking a rope

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for snake we *first* have a (necessarily valid) piece of knowledge which has for its object 'the yonder-lying this' and a piece of memory which has for its object the snake cognized in the past, and *then*, failing to discriminate between these two pieces of cognition and between their respective objects, we being to say: 'the yonder-lying object is snake'. This explanation is too naive to carry conviction.

35. The Kumārilite, therefore, amends the Prabhākarite account of 'self-validity of all knowledge' and maintains that all knowledge is valid, though only so long as it is not proved to be erroneous. Thus the Kumārilite would have us believe that our knowledge of a rope as snake remains valid so long as it is not proved to us that we are mistaking a rope for snake. And a piece of cognition, the Kumārilite continues, is proved to be erroneous either by showing that the organ employed for attaining it is defective or by showing that it stands contradicted by another piece of knowledge subsequently arrived at, e.g., our knowledge of a rope as snake is proved to be erroneous either by showing that the percipient eye is dim-sighted, the place is inadquately-lit, or something of the kind, or by showing that the perceived object, when (carelessly) taken hold of, does not bite. But we should pointedly ask the Kumārilite: Is our knowledge of rope as snake *really valid* so long as it is not proved to be erroneous, or it just *seems to be valid* that long? If it is really valid no subsequent event should ever invalidate it, if it just seems to be valid there is no sense in calling it a piece of valid knowledge or even a piece of 'temporarily valid knowledge' which phrase would be a veritable monstrosity in the present context (as we shall see later on, there is a sense in which the universal judgments inductively arrived at by us are tentatively valid).

36. It is fortunate that no Indian logician was taken in by these Mīmāṃsā sophistries even when they came from the pen of a Kumārila. Moreover, Kumārila's move beyond Prabhākara was a move in the right direction. For certainly a piece of erroneous knowledge is proved to be so either by showing that the organ employed for attaining it is defective or by showing that it stands contradicted by a piece of valid knowledge subsequently arrived at, a position which is but a slightly changed version of the Kumārilite contention noted above. The Kumārilite feared that if that knowledge alone be treated as valid which stands in no danger of being contradicted by a subsequent piece of knowledge the attainment of valid knowledge will become an impossibility, for—so he thought—there can be no guarantee that a subsequent piece of knowledge will not contradict any one whatsoever we

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have now arrived at. He had therefore to be shown that there are pieces of knowledge which stand in no danger of being contradicted. To wit, the *normal warking man's practice in relation to an object is the ultimate criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge concerning this object;* this is what the Mīmāṃsaka was in essence told by his fellow-logicians—above all by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who stood opposed to his theory of self-validity of all knowledge. Thus Jayanta argues[14]: "You ask us as to what distinguishes the cognition of successful practice from the original piece of cognition (whose validity is, on our view, tested by the cognition of successful practice), and it is your argument that if the cognition of successful practice too, in order to be established as valid, requires the services of another piece of cognition there is bound to arise an infinite regress. Our reply is that all this talk of yours since it goes counter to the universal human experience, is sheer jumble of words. For there never arises the need for testing the validity of the cognition of successful practice. ....Or we may even admit that there is a distinguishing mark that ensures the validity of the cognition of successful practice. Being asked as to what this mark might be we reply that in relation to water, say, there arises cognition of cleaning the body with it, drinking it, bathing in it offering it to the gods and manes, washing clothes with it, relieving ourselves of exhaustion and heat with its help. Now these so many functions are never found to have been performed by one who is impelled to undertake activity because of a mistaken piece of cognition. You might point out that such functions are also found to have been performed in dreams, but to that our reply is that we have a clear awareness of being in a state of wakefulness as contrasted with that of sleep. Every man who is not asleep always has a feeling of being not in a dreaming state, a feeling expressed in the form 'Here am I—awaxe and not asleep'; and in such a state the functions enumerated above are never found to have been performed without water being there. So this is the distinguishing mark which easily establishes the validity of the cognition of successful practice." Prajñākaragupta, the Buddhist, likewise says[15]: "We might be asked: According to you (i.e. the Buddhist) an earlier piece of knowledge is proved to be a case of valid knowledge in case it is followed by the cognition of successful practice. But what about this cognition of successful practice—Is it valid or invalid? Since an invalid piece of knowledge does not result in successful practice the cognition of successful practice should be treated as a piece of valid knowledge. But then this cognition of successful practice should require a second cognition of successful practice, and thus there would arise an infinite regress.' To this we reply: 'This is not proper. For if the subsequent presence of successful practice establishes the validity of an earlier piece of knowledge why should not the simultaneous presence of successful practice

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establish the validity of a cognition coming after this piece of knowledge (i.e. of the cognition having this successful practice itself for its object)? If a piece of knowledge is valid when another piece of cognition has successful practice for its object, then this latter piece of cognition, since it is experiencing successful practice then and there, should all the more be a case of valid knowledge'."

37. The thesis that practice is the ultimate criterion of truth is the most natural to be adopted by a logician (and but for certain preconceived notions of theirs the Mīmāṃsakas themselves could have adopted it); it is, therefore, little surprising that this thesis was strenuously defended in the mutually hostile camps of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians, though an impression is sometimes created that the positions the two are taking up on the question are mutually divergent. As noted earlier, an Indian logician started his enquiry into the nature and instruments of valid knowledge on the assumption—tacit or otherwise—that all successful practice results from valid knowledge and from it alone; and it is a logical corollary of this assumption that successful practice is an absolutely sure criterion of the validity of a piece of knowledge. It was this truth which the Buddhist was bringing out when he defined valid knowledge as knowledge that does not fail to enable us to attain the object known, and it was the same truth which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician was bringing out when he was impressing upon the Mīmāṃsaka that the validity of a piece of knowledge is not automatic but is to be tested at the bar of practice, though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician too often took exception to the Buddhist's definition of valid knowledge and the Buddhist stood apparently unconcerned in relation to the Mīmāṃsā-*versus* Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika controversy as to the self-validity or otherwise of knowledge.

38. Thus according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians, a piece of knowledge is proved to be valid in case it leads to successful practice and is proved to be invalid in case it fails to do so; and the position was directed against the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsaka who maintained that a piece of knowledge is valid until and unless it is proved to be invalid. To literally paraphrase the Sanskrit mode of expression, the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsaka maintained that the validity of a piece of knowledge is intrinsic while its invalidity extrinsic whereas according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians both the validity and the invalidity of a piece of knowledge are extrinsic. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that Mādhavācārya, the author of the compendium of Indian philosophy 'Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha',

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is endorsing an unauthorized statement (so far as it concerns the Buddhist logicians) when he quotes a mnemonic verse to the effect that with the Mīmāṃsakas the validity of knowledge is intrinsic and its invaldity extrinsic, with the Buddhists its invalidity intrinsic and its validity extrinsic, while with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas both its validity and invalidity extrinsic[16]. As a matter of fact, to uphold the doctrine of self-invalidity of all knowledge is logically impossible for a logician whose sole business it is to enquire into the nature, conditions and instruments of valid knowledge; the doctrine in question is in fact preached by the mystics and the illusionists and there were certainly mystics and illusionists among the Buddhists, but they cannot be treated as representatives of Logic within the Buddhist camp (while Mādhavācārya's context puts him under the obligation to refer to Buddhist logicians). The inadvertance or Mādhavācārya's authority may be partly due to the fact that the controversy as to the self-validity or otherwise of knowledge was largely confined to the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika circles so that other philosophers did not consider it to be incumbent upon themselves to take sides in it (that Mādhavācārya's authority was perhaps only conjecturing the possible Buddhist position is further confirmed by his assertion that with the Sāṅkhyas both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are intrinsic—a curious, if not impossible, position and one to be met with in no Sāṅkhya text). However there is no absolute dearth of Buddhist texts touching upon the question, and from them it becomes clear that the Buddhist logician just like his Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika colleague was maintaining that the validity or otherwise of a piece of knowledge depends on whether or not it results in successful practice

39. But here the Kumārilite raised an objection (noticed above by us in passing): 'Is the cognition of successful practice self-valid or not? If it is self-valid, why reject the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge?; if not, it will at once prove that one would be landing himself in an infinite regress in case he insists that the validity of a piece of knowledge depends on something other than itself'. In answer to this objection the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians in effect said (and, as we have seen, there are available explicit statements to that effect) that the cognition of successful practice is self-valid; its plain meaning was that a normal waking man's sensory experience resulting in the wake of his practice in relation to an object stands in no danger of further contradiction and will, therefore, determine whether his knowledge concerning this object is valid or otherwise, e.g., in case a normal waking man touches an object and finds it hot, his knowledge that this object contains fire stands corroborated and irrevocably

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so, in case he drinks an object and finds that it quenches his thirst his knowledge that this object contains water stands similarly corroborated, and so on and so forth. This position was the most effective counterblast to the illusionist's asertion that the entire empirical world is an illusory and a dream-like existence. The pity is that the Kumārilites who were genuinely in arms against illusionism did not draw sustenance from the thesis that practice is the ultimate criterion of the validity of knowledge. Thus on the one hand they argued as against the illusionist that waking experience is not like dream-experience because the latter is contradicted by the former which in turn is contradicted by nothing else—a favourite argument of the anti-illusionists, while on the other hand they argued as against the logician that successful practice is no guarantee of the validity of a piece of knowledge because successful practice is to be met with in dream-experience as well as in waking experience—a favourite argument of the illusionists. We have seen earlier that the Kumārilite was some kind of split-personality on the question of momentarism *versus* anti-momentarism controversy; and now it turns out that he was similarly a split-personality on the question of illusionism *versus* anti-illusionism controversy.

40. There is nothing very conspicious or profound about the Jaina stand on the controversy as to the self-validity or otherwise of knowledge. Only it may be noted that the Jaina logicians talked as if they found something defensible in both the sides to the controversy. They thus emphasized that a piece of knowledge is self-valid if it is a case of repeated occurrence, while its validity requires testing if it is a case of first occurrence. The idea is that in case the situation before you now is the same as one you had encountered once earlier the knowledge, which on the earlier occasion was proved to be valid after the application of an appropriate test, can at this occasion be taken to be valid without the application of any test. It is easy to see that the need for applying a test to determine the validity or otherwise of a piece of knowledge is not dispensed with here; we are only advised not to put the same kind of knowledge to the same test more than once—not a very brilliant piece of advice. Let it, however, be noted that the Jaina was also not averse to endorsing the stand we have attributed above to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians, nor were the latter usually averse to endorsing the stand we are attributing here to the Jaina[17].

41. Coming to ancient texts, we must first take note of a circumstance that often tends to confuse the issues. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā logicians claim to have conducted the self-validity *versus* otherwise controversy on two points, the first concerning the *origin of knowledge*, the second

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concerning the *knowledge* of *knowledge*. In controversies centring around the first point, the question is posed whether the same cause which *produces knowledge* also *produces valid knowledge*, in those centring around the second point the question whether the same cause which *produces knowledge of knowledge* also *produces knowledge of valid knowledge*. In plain language the first question amounts to asking whether knowledge and valid knowledge are the same thing, in other words, whether all knowledge is valid; for if the same thing causes x and y, x and y are the same thing. Similarly, the second question amounts to asking whether in knowing a piece of knowledge we at the same time know it as a piece of valid knowledge. But our logicians seldom put forward these questions, particularly the first, in so clear-cut a fashion.

42. Taking the first question first, we find the Prabhākarite alone adopting a logical, even if palpably wrong, position; for he categorically identified knowledge with valid knowledge, defined both as 'cognition that is not of the nature of memory', and technically called them 'anubhava'. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians, who too gave the technical name 'anubhava' to cognitions that are not of the nature of memory, could not accept the Prabhākarite equation 'anubhava-knowledge-valid knowledge', and that was quite proper. Now strictly speaking, an alleged piece of knowledge is either valid knowledge or no knowledge, but we have agreed to speak of 'valid knowledge' and 'invalid knowledge'. However, we too can say that a piece of knowledge is either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge (and not of any other type, nor, of course, both). We can, therefore, further maintain that in case the appropriate causes for producing valid knowledge are not available the resulting knowledge is invalid, and this is what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians (for that matter, all logicians) also did; for this was the whole point behind defining valid knowledge, classifying it into various types and determining the 'instrument' causing each of these types. Thus in the controversy under consideration the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician could take up the position that a piece of valid knowledge ensues only when an instrument of valid knowledge is employed appropriately, but as a matter of fact he adopted a rather odd course. For he tells us that a piece of valid knowledge ensues when the cause that produces this piece of knowledge contains a 'merit', a piece of invalid knowledge when this cause contains a 'defect'. As against this, the Kumārilite maintains that a piece of invalid knowledge ensues when the cause that produces this piece of knowledge contains a 'defect', a piece of valid knowledge when this cause contains 'absence of defect'. This way of expressing the

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difference of opinion gave a curious turn to the controversy in question, and that as follows.

The Kumārilite submitted that since 'absence of defect' is nothing positive his position amounted to saying that the same cause which produces knowledge also produces valid knowledge but that since 'defect' is something positive he was maintaining that the cause-of-knowledge when accompanied by a 'defect' causes invalid knowledge. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician, whose own position was that the cause-of-knowledge when accompanied by a 'merit' produces valid knowledge and the same when accompanied by a 'defect' invalid knowledge, retorted that the Kumārilite was virtually adopting the same position as his. And the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician was in a way right, even if the position in question was thoroughly misconceived. For both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsā philosophers recognized 'absence' to be an independent entity so that the Kumārilite could not dissociate himself too sharply from the Nyāya-Vaiśesika stand simply by saying that the additional something which enables the cause-of-knowledge to produce valid knowledge is an 'absence' rather than a positive entity. However, a much more serious difficulty with the Kumārilite was that he did not really mean to maintain the position that the cause-of-knowledge *accompained by 'absence of defect'* (*i.e.*, *by no defect*) produces valid knowledge; for his real position was that the cause-of-knowledge *not known to be accompanied by a defect* produces valid knowledge. This latter position is very different from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician and is doubly defective. As a matter of fact, the entire Kumārilite endeavour was meant to camouflage the palpably wrong Prabhākarite position that all knowledge is valid knowledge. Be that as it may, it was on account of this difference of opinion that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position came to be known as 'the doctrine that both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic' (because in both cases the cause-of-knowledge is accompained by something additional—by 'merit' in the former case, by 'defect' in the latter), while the Kumārilite position came to be known as 'the doctrine that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic and its invalidity extrinsic' (because in the former case the cause-of-knowledge is accompanied by nothing additional, in the latter by 'defect').

43. It is in this background that we have to follow the following piece of reasoning advanced by Udayana against the Kumārilite[18]:

If the Mīmāṃsaka is ready to grant that 'generating conditions of knowledge in general plus a defect' cause invalid knowledge,

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he should likewise grant that the 'generating conditions of knowledge in general plus a merit (in the form of) absence of a defect' cause valid knowledge. For 'the generating conditions of knowledge in general' must be accompanied by 'absence of a defect' if they are to cause valid knowledge. The Mīmāṃsaka might submit that 'absence of a defect' cannot be treated as a merit inasmuch as a merit must be something positive (while 'absence of a defe t' is no positive entity), but this submission will be untenable. For there are also cases where the defect whose presence gives rise to invalid knowledge is itself an 'absence', and in those cases 'absence of a defect' will be a positive entity. (That is to say, the Kumārilite is forced to admit the possibility of cases where valid knowledge is produced not by 'mere generating conditions of knowledge in general' but by these conditions plus a positive merit).

We may elucidate this position with the help of an illustration. Things towards which we have a feeling of attachment also happen to be things towards which we have a feeling of 'absence of aversion', while things towards which we have a feeling of aversion also happen to be things towards which we have a feeling of 'absence of attachment'. And yet nobody says that the cause of our attraction towards things is 'absence of aversion' while the cause of our repulsion from things 'presence of aversion; for the correct position is that the cause of our attraction towards things is 'presence of attachment' while the cause of our repulsion from things 'presence of aversion.' Similarly, the generating conditions of valid knowledge in clude a merit as also 'absence of a defect' while the generating conditions of invalid knowledge include a defect as also 'absence of a merit'. And yet nobody should say that the cause of valid knowledge includes 'absence of a defect' (but not 'presence of a merit'), while the cause of invalid knowledge includes 'presence of a defect'; for the correct position is that the cause of valid knowledge includes 'presence of a merit' while the cause of invalid knowledge includes 'presence of a defect'.

41. Udayana's illustration should suffice to expose the weakness of his position. There are only two ways in which a man may act in relation to a thing. In case the man has a feeling of attachment towards the thing he

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will seek to acquire this thing while in case he has a feeling of aversion towards it he will seek to avoid it. But in case a man seeks neither to acquire a thing nor to avoid it he cannot be said to be active in relation to this thing. Similarly, there are only two ways in which a man may know a thing. In case the man is describing the thing as it is he is knowing this thing correctly while in case he is describing it as it is not he is knowing it incorrectly. But in case a man is describing a thing neither as it is nor as it is not he cannot be said to be knowing this thing. Again, an action in relation to a thing which is aimed neither at acquiring this thing nor at avoiding it is an idiotic action; similarly, description of a thing which depicts it neither as it is nor as it is not is an idiotic description.[19] That is to say, there is a correct way of describing a thing (which way may be called the 'cause of valid knowledge') and there is an incorrect way of describing a thing (which way may be called the 'cause of invalid knowledge'), but it will be meaningless to suggest that there is a neither-correct-nor-incorrect way of describing a thing and that the super-addition of a merit makes it a 'correct way of describing the thing' while the super-addition of a defect an 'incorrect way of describing the thing'.

45. Jayanta has likewise argued that an effect is properly produced when there is present a merit in the concerned causal aggregate and that it is improperly produced when there is present a defect in the concerned causal aggregate. From this he concludes that an effect which is produced neither by 'a causal aggregate possessed of a merit' nor by a 'causal aggregate possessed of a defect' is an impossibility. To this he adds a corollary that valid knowledge is produced by the " 'causal aggregate of knowledge in general' plus a merit" and that invalid knowledge is produced by the " 'causal aggregate of knowledge in general' plus a defect"[20]. This entire argument is utterly laboured, and all that Jayanta succeeds in proving is that an effect is produced when the concerned causal aggregate is present there and not when it is not present there.

46. This, however, does not mean that the Mīmāṃsaka's stand on the question was not much more faulty than that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician. Thus, for example, runs Kumārila's defence of his position[21] :

> It has to be admitted that the validity of all pieces of cognition is natural to them, for a capacity which is not natural to a thing cannot be produced in it by something else. Things certainly require a cause for their production, but once they are

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produced they perform their appropriate function all by themselves. (Here Pārthasārathi comments: A jar requires clay, etc., for its production but not for its drawing water, etc. Similarly, a piece of cognition requires a cause—may be accompanied by a merit or by anything you like—for its production but it requires nothing else for its producing the function called 'ascertainment of an object'). On your showing a piece of cognition, even after coming into existence, does not ascertain its object until its defectless causation is brought about by another piece of valid cognition. But then you will have to wait for another cognition to be produced by some other cause that will ensure the defectless causation of this second piece of cognition, for defectless causation is as good as non-existent until it is cognized. Again, this third piece of cognition will be deemed valid only after its own defectless causation is ensured by a fourth piece of cognition. The same problem will arise in connection with the fourth piece of cognition, and the process will go on *ad infinitum*. On the other hand, when the validity of a piece of cognition is natural to it, we do not require anything additional (in order that this cognition may perform its function), while on account of the 'non-cognition of a defect' its invalidity gets removed without an effort. (Pārthasārathi's Comment: Defects prevent the validity of a piece of cognition only when they are known so that the invalidity which might possibly counteract the validity of this piece of cognition gets removed on account of the mere 'non-cognition of a defect', a non-cognition that comes about without an effort. Thus no infinite regress vitiates our position.) Thus a piece of cognition is proved to be valid knowledge simply by virtue of its being of the nature of apprehension, while its validity is done away with when it is known that its object is not of the description yielded by it or that its cause possesses a defect.

It is easy to see that Kumārila's whole argument vitally depends on a confused identification of 'absence of a defect' with 'non-cognition of a defect'. Kumārila rightly feels that a piece of knowledge which is neither valid nor invalid is an impossibility, but his further suggestion that a piece of knowledge is valid until and unless proved to be otherwise is preposterous Kumārila also rightly hints that we need not ascertain

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the validity of a piece of knowledge in order that we may act on it, but from this too it is faulty to conclude that all pieces of knowledge are valid by nature or even that they are so until and unless proved to be otherwise.

47. And here is Prabhākara's representation of his case22 :

"When a cognition has for its object something which is similar to another thing but when it fails to take note of the former thing's features that distinguish it from the latter this cognition generates memory of this latter thing in the person who is, however, ignorant of the fact that he is having a piece of memory. Thus are explained the cognitions like that of shell as silver. (On this Śālikanātha comments : It might be said : 'If an object must have such a nature as is revealed in a cognition concerning itself there can be no false cognitions, while if there can be false cognitions an object need not have such a nature as is revealed in a cognition concerning itself'. To this we reply : 'When there arises concerning shell that is similar to silver a cognition which, on account of defective sense-organs, fails to take note of such features of the shell as are no doubt present there and distinguish it from silver, while taking note of only such of its features as are common to it and silver this cognition gives rise to a piece of memory. On account of the defect in question the cognizer with shell in mind does not have introspection to the effect that he is having a piece of memory. That is why he makes no distinction between the thing seen and the thing remembered. Thus as a matter of fact, here there take place two pieces of cognition, viz., perception of 'it' and memory of silver, for otherwise it is impossible to explain how the cognition of silver comes about in this case. Certainly, the cognition of silver is not born of senses, for silver has not here come in contact with senses. It is a rule that senses do not produce cognition concerning an object which has not come in contact with them e.g., a blind man has no visual cognitions. Hence the concerned cognition of silver is a case of memory. This is how the cognitions like that of shell as silver are explained as cases of memory)".

Prabhākara's error is no less obvious than that of Kumārila. The Prabhākarite correctly points out that the cognition of shell as silver involves

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both the activity of sense organs and an act of memory. But that is true of all perceptual knowledge whatsoever. What distinguishes a valid perceptual knowledge from an invalid one is the circumstance that the former correctly identifies an observed object (or an observed objective feature), while the latter mis-identifies it. The Prabhākarite's endeavour to obliterate this vital distinction is certainly ruinous.

48. Then we come to the second point around which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas waged controversy. The point concerned the question whether the same cause which produces knowledge of knowledge also produces knowledge of valid knowledge. Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician maintained the—essentially correct—position that we know a piece of knowledge through introspection while we know that this knowledge is valid through an inference to the effect "This piece of knowledge is valid, because it leads to successful practice". The Kumārilite, on the other hand, maintained that while knowing a piece of knowledge we know it as valid but that in the case of invalid knowledge we are in a position to argue. "This piece of knowledge is invalid, because it fails to lead to successful practice". But this Kumārilite position was obviously mistaken; for after acquiring a piece of knowledge and then resorting to the requisite practice we are in a position to argue. "This piece of knowledge is invalid, because it fails to lead to successful practice" as well as to argue. "This piece of knowledge is valid, because it leads to successful practice." As a matter of fact if the Kumārilite is really serious about maintaining that while knowing a piece of knowledge we know it as valid he has no need to resort to the argument he proposes; while, on the other hand, if he really feels the need for resorting to the argument in question he cannot seriously maintain that while knowing a piece of knowledge we know it as valid. Thus here too the entire Kumārilite endeavour was meant to camouflage the faulty Prabhākarite position that all knowledge is valid and is known to be so without any special effort. Be that as it may, it was on account of this difference of opinion that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position came to be known as 'the doctrine that both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic' (because in both cases we have to go beyond mere introspection and resort to an argument based on the report of practice) while the Kumārilite position came to be known as 'the doctrine that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic and its invalidity extrinsic' (because in the former case we need not go beyond mere introspection, more correctly, beyond inference as to the presence of a piece of knowledge, while in the latter case we have to resort to an argument based on the report of practice).

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19. It is in this background that we have to follow the following piece of reasoning advanced by Udayana against the Kumārilite[23]:

"Hence we formulate an inference to the effect: 'The validity of a piece of knowledge is known extrinsically, because in case this is a type of knowledge acquired for the first time there arises a doubt as to its validity, just as there arises a doubt as to its invalidity.' If the validity of a piece of knowledge were known intrinsically (i.e., automatically) there would never have arisen a doubt as to its validity—just as there never arises a doubt as to its being a piece of knowledge. For certainly, there is no scope for doubt concerning a thing that is known definitely. It might be said: 'Here we do not pause to consider whether evidence for or against (its being valid or otherwise) is forthcoming but fall in doubt simply on account of observing certain features that are common to both the valid and the invalid knowledge'. But if it is really so the doubt in question should never come to an end (for these features will continue to be there for ever). It might be said: 'Feeling of validity arises in the case of valid knowledge as also in that of invalid knowledge; so here we are in doubt whether this feeling pertains to a piece of valid knowledge or to a piece of invalid knowledge'. But then we ask: Do you here grasp the piece of valid knowledge but not its validity or you fail to grasp the piece of valid knowledge itself? If the former, how can you say that the validity of knowledge is grasped automatically?; for here in spite of there being a feeling of validity you are not grasping (i.e., knowing definitely) this validity. If the latter, how can there at all arise a doubt?: for here you are not grasping the object itself concerning which the alleged doubt is to arise. It might be said: 'Since immediate and immense successful practice (undertaken in the wake of valid knowledge) remains unaccounted for otherwise we maintain that the validity of knowledge is grasped automatically'. But even that is not the case, for this immediate and immense successful practice can be accounted for otherwise. Thus immediate successful practice is due to the immediate availability of the cause of successful practice, and so the presence of successful practice will only prove that the cause of such practice is immediately available; similarly,

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immensity of successful practice will prove that the cause of such practice is available in an immense amount. And as for the cause of successful practice it is desire, the cause of this desire the knowledge that the thing desired is a means to achieve some purpose, the cause of this (inferential) knowledge the observation of probans of the form 'being of the same form (as something experienced earlier and found to be a means to achieve the purpose in question)', the cause of this observation of probans sense-object contact; in all this we nowhere find any use for the 'grasping of validity (of the piece of knowledge in question)'. And even granting that there is some use for such 'grasping of validity' why should this grasping be deemed automatic? That is to say, even if we grant that immensely successful practice is due to the immensity of the validity of the piece of knowledge in question or due to the immensity of the grasping of this validity we are not required to further grant that this 'grasping of validity' is automatic. Certainly, from the fact that a thirsty man's practice in relation to water is immediate, immense and successful it does not follow that water's capacity to quench thirst is an object of perception (like water itself)."

50. Udayana's point is clear. You never know automatically whether a piece of knowledge acquired by you is valid or otherwise, but only after resorting to practice and drawing proper inference from its report just as you never know that water quenches thirst but only after drinking it and finding that it quenches thirst. Nor do you require to know before you put your knowledge to practice that this knowledge of yours is valid; it is subsequent practice that will prove whether your knowledge was valid or otherwise. (In the above enquiry we have attributed to the Kumārilites the position that the invalidity of a piece of knowledge is inferred from its failure to result in successful practice. In a way, this is being somewhat generous to them: for really speaking, the Kumārilites are blissfully vague as to the method of detecting the errors possibly vitiating a piece of knowledge. We have already noted Kumārila and Pārthasārathi maintaining that the mere non-cognition of a defect in a piece of knowledge is sufficient to assure us that this knowledge is valid. But since the Kumārilite, in distinction from the Prabhākarite, does somehow concede the possibility of invalid knowledge it would not be much improper to attribute to him the position that the criterion of practice—a criterion universally accepted by the sober Indian

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logicians—helps us in detecting the error that might possibly vitiate a piece of knowledge. The Kumārilite's discomfiture only proves that there is no halfway house between the Prabhākarite stand on the question and the stand adopted by the rest of the Indian logicians).

51. In order to have an idea of the Jaina case on the question let us peruse the following passage from Hemacandra which, in spite of its typical Jaina undertones, advocates a position that will be broadly acceptable also to a Nyāya-Vaiśesika or a Buddhist logician[24]:

> It might be said: 'Let valid knowledge be defined as you please; but the question arises as to whether we ascertain the validity of a piece of cognition through itself or through something else. It does not seem proper to say that the validity of a piece of cognition is ascertained through itself, for even if a piece of cognition, being of the nature of a self-cognizing entity, does cognize itself as a piece of cognition, it does not cognize its own validity, that is, its own correctness, inasmuch as 'being a piece of cognition' characterizes both the valid and the invalid pieces of knowledge. (That a piece of cognition is a self-cognizing entity will not be acceptable to a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or a Kumārilite logician, but that is a minor point). Moreover, if the validity of cognition is grasped through itself there should arise no occasion for a doubt as to the validity of any piece of cognition whatsoever. But nor does it seem proper to say that the validity of a piece of cognition is grasped through something else. For this something else might be a piece of cognition which grasps the object of the original piece of cognition (whose validity is being sought to be ascertained), or it might be a piece of cognition which grasps the successful practice (given rise to by the original piece of cognition), or it might be a piece of cognition which grasps something invariably associated with the object of the original piece of cognition. But none of these three pieces of cognition can establish the validity of the original piece of cognition unless its own validity is first established somehow. And if any of these three pieces of cognition is treated as self-valid what is the harm in doing the same about the original piece of cognition? But we have already seen that the validity of a piece of cognition cannot be grasped through itself, while now it appears that there will arise the contingency

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of an infinite regress in case it be supposed that this validity is grasped through something other than itself'. To all this we reply :

'The ascertainment of the validity of a piece of cognition comes about through itself as well as through something other than itself.

That is, the validity of a piece of cognition is in some cases ascertained through itself; thus the piece of cognition that is a case of repeated occurrence, e.g. our cognition of our own hand, is self-valid. Similarly self-valid is the perceptual cognition that grasps the successful practice like our bathing, drinking, wading-through-water, the quenching of our thirst, etc.; of such a piece of cognition no sensible person desires to test the validity. For here there first arises the cognition of water then the movement towards water on the part of one who is suffering from heat and thirst, then the acquisition of water by him, then the bathing, drinking, etc. undertaken by him, then the cessation of his heat-sensation and thirst; when all this has taken place the cognizer feels satisfied and does not proceed to test the validity of his cognition of the cessation of his own heat-sensation and thirst. It is this why we treat such a piece of cognition (i.e. cognition which grasps successful practice) as self-valid. As for inferential cognition, all cases of it are self-valid inasmuch as they leave no room whatsoever for a doubt as to their correctness and this, in its turn, is because they all arise from a probans which never fails to be accompanied by its probandum; certainly, a piece of cognition that grasps the probans cannot arise without the probans being present there and the probans cannot be present there without the probandum too being present there.

In some cases, however, the validity of a piece of cognition is ascertained through something other than itself. This, e.g., happens when there takes place a piece of perceptual cognition that is not a case of repeated occurrence; since this cognition is not already known to be true of its object its validity has to be ascertained either through a corroborative piece of cognition that has got the same object as the original piece of cognition, or through a piece of cognition that grasps successful practice,

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or through a piece of cognition whose object is invariably associated with the object of the original piece of cognition. As for these latter pieces of cognition (that are employed in order to test the validity of the original piece of cognition), they are all self-valid, and so there does not arise the contingency of an infinite regress (feared by the opponent)'25.

II. THE INSTRUMENTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE.

52. The other group of problems treated by Indian logicians concerns the instruments of valid knowledge. In this connection let us first be clear as to what is meant by an instrument of valid knowledge. The Sanskrit word for valid knowledge is 'Pramā' (or '*pramiti*') while the word for instrument of valid knowledge is '*pramāṇa*'; but the grammatical rules also permit the word 'pramāṇa' to stand for valid knowledge. Some amount of difficulty in following the Indian discussions on Logic results from this ambiguity attached to the crucial word '*pramāṇa*'. We have already had some taste of this difficulty. For when we were speaking of instruments of valid knowledge we said that hypothetical reasoning, memory, recognition, etc., are treated as independent instruments of valid knowledge by some logicians and not so by others; but when we were speaking of valid knowledge we said that hypothetical reasoning etc. are treated as cases of valid knowledge by some logicians and not so by others. Of course, we have also submitted that there is nothing incongruous about one piece of knowledge acting as an instrument in the acquisition of another piece of knowledge, a submission that should somewhat reduce one's difficulty in following our account of the Indian logicians' treatment of the problems of empirical knowledge. Let us, however, elaborate this point in some details, though its many more implications will be gradually brought to light as our enquiry proceeds.

53. Our chief means—and ultimately speaking, our only means—of becoming aware of the external world are our sense-organs. And it is the logicians' business to tell us how our entire stock of knowledge—not excluding what are considered to be the most abstract of its constituents—is generated out of our basic sensory activities. Thus the logician has to tell us how we come to identify things first as red, soft, sweet, odorous, sonorous, etc. and then as tables, chairs, books, lamps etc., how on having observed one thing we come to surmise the existence of another unobserved thing, how

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we come to make out the meaning of the sentences uttered in our presence, how we come to distinguish true sentences from false ones, etc., etc., these being some of the most obvious cases of acquiring knowledge. Now whatever helps us in acquiring any of these various types of knowledge should be called an 'instrument of knowledge.' Thus the sense-organs and their contact with physical objects are an instrument of bare sensory experience, bare sensory experience an instrument of the determinate perceptual knowledge of physical objects, the determinate perceptual knowledge of physical objects an instrument of inferential knowledge, and so on and so forth. In what precise manner these various 'instruments' generate the various types of knowledge is a question on which it is possible for the logicians to hold divergent views. But Indian logicians have sometimes differed as to the identity of the instrument of a particular piece of knowledge even when their account of how this knowledge is generated is broadly the same. Thus the Buddhist and Jaina logicians have persuaded themselves that no physical object or process can act as an instrument of valid knowledge, and as a result they deny that sense-organs or sense-object contact is an instrument of perceptual knowledge; they will not deny that sense-organs and sense-object contact are a remote case of perceptual knowledge, but they would refuse to assing to them the status of a '*pramāṇa*'. (Really speaking, the Buddhist did not describe 'pramāṇa' as cause of *pramā*. He rather said that the very same piece of knowledge is called *pramāṇa* in one capacity and *pramā* in another. However, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā logicians have chiefly the Buddhist in mind when they criticize the contention that a *pramāṇa* must be of the nature of cognition rather than a physical process[26]). On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians would generally insist that nothing else but sense-object contact is the instrument of perceptual knowledge (though a stalwart like Jayanta had sense enough to endorse the correct position that whatever goes to cause a particular piece of knowledge is its 'instrument'. be it something non-physical or physical[27]). And yet the Buddhist, Jaina and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians offer an almost identical account of how perceptual knowledge is generated. Similarly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians will almost agree with their Jaina colleague in describing how perception, memory, recognition and hypothetical reasoning go to generate a piece of inferential knowledge, but they will refuse to endrose the latter's contention that memory, recognition, and hypothetical reasoning are independent instruments of knowledge in addition to perception and inference. These facts must be kept in mind if we are to avoid the mistake of thinking that two Indian logicians must differ as to their account

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of the generation of a piece of knowledge in case they happen to differ as to the identity of the 'instrument' of this knowledge (though there is no denying that Indian logicians have often differed on the former as well as on the latter point).

Thus the proper question to be asked about an Indian school of Logic is as to how many and what are, according to it, the types of valid knowledge, and what the general and specific causes of each of them. But since for all practical purposes by '*pramāṇa*' or 'instrument of valid knowledge' we can understand the specific cause of a type of valid knowledge an enquiry into the various '*pramāṇas*' virtually becomes an enquiry into various types of valid knowledge. This explains why an Indian logician finds it possible to specifically identify a type of '*pramā*' or valid knowledge by the '*pramāṇa*' or 'instrument of valid knowledge' that produces it, a circumstance which also partly explains why the generic word '*pramāṇa*' and the specific words '*pratyakṣa*' '*anumāna*', etc., are made to mean both an 'instrument' and a 'result'.

54. With this much clarity attained we can raise the general question as to what precisely are the *pramāṇas* or instruments of valid knowledge posited by Indian logicians. All Indian logicians are agreed that perception and inference are two independent types of instrument of valid knowledge but they differ as to the remaining types. Thus the Buddhists and Vaiśesikas do not go beyond these two (here is one of those rare points on which the Vaiśesikas and Naiyāyikas hold divergent views), the Naiyāyikas admit two additional types, viz., verbal testimony and analogy, the Prabhākarites three additional types, viz., verbal testimony, analogy and implication, the Kumārilites four additional types, viz., verbal testimony, analogy, implication and non-cognition, the Jainas four additional types, viz., verbal testimony, memory, recognition and hypothetical reasoning. And not only do the Indian logicians differ as to the number of the types of instrument of valid knowledge they also at times differ as to their nature. We now take up one by one these different types of instrument of valid knowledge

(1) Perception.

55. In a way perception holds a unique place among the instruments of valid knowledge. While other instruments of valid knowledge seem to be of the nature of psychological processes perception seems to be of the

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nature of a physiological process called sense-object contact. As Gaṅgeśa puts it, perceptual knowledge is that type of cognition whose instrumental cause is not a piece of cognition[28]. But here there arises a difficulty. Sense-object contact gives rise to a bare (i.e. dumb) sensory experience, but a piece of knowledge has to be an articulated expression of the form 'such and such is the case'. To put the dilemma more explicitly, if we stick to the position that perceptual knowledge is directly born of sense-object contact we find that what is directly born of sense-object contact is not a piece of knowledge but dumb sensory experience, while if we stick to the position that perceptual knowledge (like any knowledge) is an articulated expression of the form 'such and such is the case' we find that this knowledge is not directly born of sense-object contact. The realization of this difficulty has led to acute differences among Indian logicians.

56. The Buddhist logicians were the first to equate perceptual knowledge with the bare sensory experience that arises in the wake of sense-object contact: as to the objection that bare sensory experience, since it is not an articulated expression of the form 'such and such is the case', is not a case of knowledge these Buddhists answered that all knowledge need not be an articulated expression of the form 'such and such is the case'. Thus according to the Buddhists, there are two types of cognitions, viz., cognitions-unaccompanied-by-thought and cognitions-accompanied-by-thought and it is their contention that the latter is and the former is not an articulated expression of the form 'such and such is the case'. Again, the Buddhists maintained that cognitions-accompanied-by-thought may be either of the nature of memory or of the nature of a new piece of information, the former covering among other things the cases of articulated expression of the form 'such and such is the case' arising in the wake of perception (i.e., of sensory experience) the latter covering among other things the cases of inference. And since it was a Buddhist position that valid knowledge must be a new piece of information the conclusion was drawn that bare sensory experience is alone valid knowledge of the perceptual form while the articulated expression 'such and such is the case' arising in the wake of this sensory experience a case not of valid knowledge but of memory. (We shall later on take up for a detailed consideration the Buddhist conception of inference).

57. Now all this sounded very puzzling to the non-Buddhist logicians. Since olden times the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas were discussing the nature of perceptual knowledge, treating it as knowledge arising in the wake of sense-object contact and being of the form of articulated expression 'such

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and such is the case'; but it never occurred to them that something intervenes between the sense-object contact and what they considered to be perceptual knowledge. And here came the Buddhist to tell them that real perceptual knowledge is the bare sensory experience arising in the wake of sense-object contact while what they were considering to be perceptual knowledge was but memory of this real perceptual knowledge and hence not a case of valid knowledge. A serious consideration of the Buddhist position compelled the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas to admit the occurrence of bare sensory experience in between the sense-object contact and what they used to consider to be perceptual knowledge; they also admitted that this bare sensory experience is not of the form of articulated expression 'such and such is the case' and that it yet deserves to be called perceptual knowledge. But beyond this they refused to go. That is to say, they did not deny the status of perceptual knowledge to what they were up till now considering to be perceptual knowledge; (not that they were not ready to deny to memory the status of valid knowledge, but they were not convinced that what they were considering to be perceptual knowledge was a case of memory).

58. Thus there arose two rival positions on the question of perceptual knowledge. On the one hand, there were Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas who maintained that perceptual knowledge is of two kinds, viz. indeterminate and determinate, the former arising in the wake of sense-object contact and being of the form of bare inarticulate sensory experience, the latter arising in the wake of the former and being of the form of articulated expression 'such and such is the case'; on the other hand, there were Buddhists who maintained that bare sensory experience arising in the wake of sense-object contact is alone entitled to be called perceptual knowledge while what the other party calls determinate perceptual knowledge should better be called post-perceptual thought and treated as a case of memory that merely recalls what was grasped by perceptual knowledge proper. The debate was remarkably sustained and at times highly acrimonious, but it made for a great clarification of issues and that is its significance for a modern student of Logic.

59. Even at the cost of repetition jarring to many ears, we must first of all note that no logician was for dismissing the claims of sense-perception to be treated as an instrument of valid knowledge as was being done by our mystics and illusionists; the logicians only differed as to the precise role of sense-perception in knowledge-formation. Some Buddhist logicians indeed went to the extent of arguing that all perception is necessarily valid, and,

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from the Buddhist's point of view, there was sense in what they were saying. For in what are treated as the cases of erroneous perceptual knowledge on the part of a normal waking man existing in normal surroundings the error is necessarily an error of interpretation, and since with the Buddhist all interpretation, being of the form of thinking rather than sensing, falls outside the sphere of perceptual knowledge he could well maintain that in the cases under consideration there is nothing erroneous about perceptual knowledge as such. That is why even those Buddhists who would admit the possibility of erroneous perceptual knowledge bring under it only those cases where the situation under notice is somehow abnormal, e.g., the percipient has a defective sense-organ or is moving in a speedy vehicle or is in a disturbed mental condition (these being some of the cases actually considered in the Buddhist texts on Logic[28]). In other words, by erroneous perceptual knowledge these Buddhists would understand but bare sensory experience that is somehow abnormal.

60. Nevertheless, the Buddhist stand had serious difficulties of its own and they should not be lost sight of. As a matter of fact, the Buddhist's basic submission that knowledge need not be necessarily something articulate was itself misconceived; he was thus wrong in ascribing to bare sensory experience, which is necessarily inarticulate, the title 'perceptual knowledge'. But if bare sensory experience does not constitute perceptual knowledge what else does? In the course of answering this question we come across another misconception of the Buddhist. Perceptual knowledge consists in identifying on the basis of a sensory experience an objective character or an object. Thus when we touch an object and say on the basis of the sensory experience thus gained 'here is a hot something' we are giving expression to a piece of perceptual knowledge. Similarly, when we feel the touch, smell, colour, taste, etc., of an object and say on the basis of the sensory experiences thus gained 'here is a tomatoe' we are giving expression to a piece of perceptual knowledge. The Buddhist will call these the cases of post-perceptual thought rather than perceptual knowledge. But his error is not merely terminological, for really misleading is his contention that post-perceptual thought is but a case of memory and hence not a case of valid knowledge. The fact of the matter is that what the Buddhist calls post-perceptual thought (and is really perceptual knowledge) is not just a case of memory even if it does certainly involve memory so that even if it is granted that memory is not a case of valid knowledge the conclusion will not follow that post-perceptual thought is not a case of valid knowledge. As soon as we have a sensory experience we recall to ourselves the similar experiences had in the past, and on the basis of this recollection we succeed

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in identifying the objective character or object now before us; this identification which the Buddhist calls post-perceptual thought and is really perceptual knowledge is thus not just a case of memory even if it involves memory. Really speaking, the conclusion that post-perceptual thought is just a case of memory is drawn by the Buddhist on the sole evidence that this knowledge involves reference to a sensory experience had a moment earlier—certainly, a preposterous piece of reasoning.

61. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians were therefore perfectly right when they refused to reduce determinate perceptual knowledge to a simple case of memory rather than treat it as a new piece of information. However, they were not themselves clear as to the role of thought in perceptual knowledge. We have quoted above Gaṅgeśa's famous thesis that perceptual knowledge is that type of cognition whose instrumental cause is not a piece of cognition. The obvious meaning of this thesis ought to be that perceptual knowledge is produced exclusively by certain processes of a non-cognitive character. Now granting that sense-object contact is a non-cognitive process, and even granting (what seems doubtful) that the sensory experience arising in the wake of sense-object contact is a non-cognitive process, the fact remains that the causes responsible for the emergence of perceptual knowledge are not exhausted by these two. For, as we have seen, perceptual knowledge arises only when the sensory experience in question recalls to mind the similar experiences had in the past and on the basis of this recollection there takes place the identification of an objective character or of an object. As a matter of fact, this procedure is not very much unlike what we adopt in a case of inferential knowledge. To take the example given earlier, when we touch an object and say on the basis of the sensory experience thus gained, 'here is a hot something, because the tactile experience I am having now indicates the presence of a hot something' we are giving expression to a piece of perceptual knowledge; in the same circumstance if we say, 'there must be a heating agent somewhere in the vicinity of this thing, because this thing is hot' we are giving expression to a piece of inferential knowledge. So the essential difference between perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge is not that the latter does and the former does not involve thought but that in the former we identify an observed objective character or object while in the latter we surmise the existence of an unobserved objective character or object. It was this realization that led the Buddhist to bracket togther post-perceptual thought and inference as cognitions-accompanied-by-thought (contrasted with bare sensory experience which he characterized as cognition-unaccompanied-by-thought); his mistake lay in further proposing that while

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inference be treated as a case of valid knowledge post-perceptual thought be treated as a case of memory and hence not a case of valid knowledge (his other mistake, as we saw, was to treat bare sensory experience as a case of valid knowledge). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians sought to understand the nature of perceptual knowledge by somehow conceiving it as a process involving no thought but this was a venture foredoomed to failure.

62. A more charitable view of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika position (at least as understood by Gaṅgeśa's followers) would be that it recognizes the presence of the element of thought in perceptual knowledge. For the neo-Naiyāyikas have also argued that indeterminate perception is a case neither of valid knowledge nor of invalid knowledge because it is not a case of attributing a character to some entity[30]. This is a fairly accurate description of bare sensory experience, but let us not imagine that the neo-Naiyāyika identifies indeterminate perception with bare sensory experience. The case rather seems to be that the neo-Naiyāyika brings under the concept 'indeterminate perception' everything that is needed to produce perceptual knowledge proper, that is, he brings under it not only bare sensory experience but also the relevant memory, cogitation etc.[31]. This reading can be made to tally with the neo-Naiyāyika's basic contention that perceptual knowledge is that type of cognition whose instrumental cause is not a piece of cognition. For slightly modifying the official neo-Nyāya position on the question we might argue that since an instrumental cause is by definition a cause which produces something that directly produces the effect concerned the instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge is sense-object contact which produces indeterminate perception (inclusive of bare sensory experience, memory, cogitation etc.) that directly produces perceptual knowledge; certainly, sense-object contact is not a cognitive process, even if indeterminate perception (as now understood) clearly is. [That indeterminate perception is a cognitive process is also the official neo-Nyāya view. Our earlier criticism of Gaṅgeśa's position implied that instrumental cause means total specific cause. The definition given here is the more usual one—though we shall note later on that there is also a third definition (equating instrumental cause not with penultimate cause' but with immediate cause) which is accepted by a section of the neo-Naiyāyikas In accordance with this third definition the instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge should be indeterminate perception, i.e., a cognitive process Even then it would have been proper if the neo-Naiyāyika clearly identified indeterminate perception with bare sensory experience and boldly recognized that some thought element intervenes between indeterminate perception and perceptual knowledge proper. This essentially correct position

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is maintained by the Jaina logicians who describe indeterminate perception exactly after the manner of the Buddhist (but refuse to treat it as a case of valid knowledge); for they explicitly admit that a good deal of cogitation takes place before sense-object contact gives rise to perceptual knowledge. (Of course, the admission was made also by the Buddhist, but he made a mess of the whole matter by his faulty understanding that bare sensory experience is a case of valid knowledge while determinate perceptual knowledge but a memory of this sensory experience.) As we have seen, the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors were at times explicit in conceding that memory (at least) intervenes between indeterminate perception and perceptual knowledge proper, but they lacked courage to declare that indeterminate perception is not a case of knowledge—valid or otherwise, a declaration that was ringingly made in Gaṅgeśa's school. As a matter of fact, the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author's reticence on this point makes one doubt whether he really meant to identify indeterminate perception with bare sensory experience; (in the case of the neo-Naiyāyika the same doubt arises owing to his almost absolute silence about the role of memory etc. in the causation of perceptual knowledge). Perhaps it will not be unfair to suggest that the Nyāya--Vaiśeṣika logician always remained confused as to this or that aspect of the nature of what he came to call 'indeterminate perception[32]'.

63. A fairly clear idea of the difficulties faced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians on the question of perception can be formed from Jayanta's examination of a discussion held within the school. The discussion arose in connection with the interpretation of the word 'avyapadeśya' (lit. non-verbal) occurring in the Nyāya-sūtra definition of perception. The position that all perceptual knowledge is necessarily non-verbal savours too much of Buddhism—though one school of interpreters went periliously near maintaining this position and was accordingly warned by its opponents who made studious attempts to remain at a respectable distance from the Buddhist. The most that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician could grant was that indeterminate perceptual knowledge is necessarily non-verbal, but here too he would hesitate to identify indeterminate perceptual knowledge with bare sensory experience, e.g., he would insist that 'universals' (i.e., generic properties conceived as independently and eternally existing entities) are taken note of in indeterminate perceptual knowledge as well as in the determinate. Thus in the course of his polemic against the Buddhist who repudiates the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of 'universals' Jayanta avers that universals are as much taken note of in indeterminate perceptual knowledge as in the determinate.

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This way Jayanta controverts the Buddhist argument that universals are unreal because they are not taken note of in indeterminate perceptual knowledge while determinate perceptual knowledge is invalid because it takes note of universals. As to the objection that noticing the universals is invariably accompanied by an employment of words (while there is no employment of words in indeterminate perceptual knowledge), Jayanta replies that one can notice universals even without employing words[33]. Here are some of the most important observations made by Jayanta while summing up the discussion on interpreting the word 'avyapadeśya'[34];

(1) Old Naiyāyikas maintain that in the wake of sense-perception there often arises a knowledge in the form 'here is a knowledge of colour', 'here is a knowledge of taste', etc. But this knowledge is verbal rather than perceptual. In order to demarcate perceptual knowledge from this type of verbal knowledge (which too is produced by sense-object contact) Gautama, the author of Nyāya-Sūtra; inserted the word 'non-verbal' in his definition of perception. Hence according to Gautama, that knowledge of colour, taste, etc. which is produced by sense-object contact but is not expressed in the form 'here is a knowledge of colour', 'here is a knowledge of taste', etc., is perceptual knowledge.

(2) The 'Ācārya' (some unidentified authority), on the other hand, maintains that it often happens that an object (Jayanta's example is jackfruit-tree) is demonstrated to a novice and he is told the name of this object. This knowledge of the object as denoted by an appropriate word no doubt involves sense-object contact on the part of the novice but since it also involves employment of words on the part of an elderly instructor it cannot be characterized as perceptual. It is in order to demarcate real perceptual knowledge from this type of knowledge born of both sense-object contact and employment of words that Gautama has inserted the word 'non-verbal' in his definition of perception.

(3) The Interpreters (again some unidentified group of authorities) take exception to the Ācārya's position on the ground that a knowledge which invariably requires the occurrence of sense-object contact cannot be called non-perceptual. Thus the

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Ācārya would have us believe that when an object is demonstrated to a novice and he is told the name of this object, the ensuing knowledge on the part of the novice is verbal and this merely on the ground that words have been spoken to this novice by an elderly instructor. But then why not treat the knowledge in question as perceptual on the ground that sense-object contact here takes place invariably? The real position rather is that no knowledge born of sense-object contact can be called verbal. Hence these Interpreters are of the view that Gautama is here seeking to controvert the objection of those who maintain that there is no knowledge whatsoever which can be treated as born of sense-object contact inasmuch as even the case of one's seeing a cow and saying to oneself 'Here is a cow' is a case of verbal rather than perceptual knowledge (for the object of this knowledge is cow as denoted by the word 'cow'). According to these interpreters, Gautama meant to grant that the knowledge-of-cow here spoken of is verbal rather than perceptual but at the same time to insist that there is a real perceptual knowledge which arises in the wake of sense-object contact, is indeterminate in character, and involves no employment of words at all, this perceptual knowledge being possible irrespective of whether the percipient is or is not conversant with words and their denotations.

The Ācārya objects to the view (3) on the ground that those upholding it play into the hands of the Buddhist (who maintains that all perceptual knowledge is necessarily indeterminate and hence one that involves no employment of words at all). As he sarcastically remarks: "If knowledge that is born of sense-object contact as assisted by the recollection of words becomes verbal on your view you must be a marvellous Naiyāyika. How can you then puncture and demolish with the weapon of perception the rascal Buddhist who says that words have nothing to do with real things?" Thus on the Ācārya's view when a man sees a cow and, recollecting the name of that type of animal, says to himself "Here is a cow" this statement of his is a piece of perceptual rather than verbal knowledge.

In their defence the upholders of the view (3) (rather some of their allies referred to as 'Pravaras'. i.e., the worthy ones) say that the knowledge arising in the wake of sense-object contact must have for its object something which is different in kind from the object of all other sorts of

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knowledge. Thus on their view, an 'entity pure and simple' is the object of perceptual knowledge while an 'entity bearing a name' is the object of the non-perceptual sorts of knowledge.

To this the Ācārya replies that two pieces of knowledge belong to two different kinds not on account of their objects being of two different kinds but on account of their pursuing different methods in order to grasp the objects that are common to both. Hence the same objects that are grasped by perceptual knowledge (of the determinate as well as indeterminate kinds) are also grasped by the different kinds of non-perceptual knowledge. Hence by inserting the word 'non-verbal' in his definition of perception Gautama wants to exclude from the purview of perception not *all* knowledge involving the employment of words but only the knowledge which arises in the mind of a novice when an object is demonstrated to him and its name told.

But an objection is raised against the Ācārya's own position. For if the knowledge that a novice has at the time of an object being introduced to him and its name told is verbal rather than perceptual then there arises the danger of even ordinary perceptual knowledge being treated as verbal rather than perceptual. For even when a man sees a cow and says to himself 'here is a cow' he recollects the occasion when the cow was introduced to him and its name told. Thus perceptual knowledge remains an impossibility even on the Ācārya's interpretation of Gautama's aphorism. And a Nyāya position with no scope for perceptual knowledge, particularly determinate perceptual knowledge, is an anomaly. It therefore seems logical (so think some) to agree with the old Naiyāyikas and maintain that perceptual knowledge is the knowledge which arises in the wake of sense-object contact but is not expressed in the form 'here is a knowledge of colour', 'here is a knowledge of taste', etc. (Note that what is excluded here from purview of perceptual knowledge is not the knowledge of colour, taste, etc., a knowledge which is undoubtedly perceptual, but the knowledge expressed in the form 'here is a knowledge of colour', 'here is a knowledge of taste', etc.).

Some Naiyāyikas have argued that Gautama wanted to emphasize that not even determinate perceptual knowledge which undoubtedly involves the employment of words is a verbal type of knowledge. That is, according to them, Gautama took it for granted that indeterminate perceptual knowledge is a possibility and that it involves no employment of words but with a view to rebutting those who would reduce determinate perceptual knowledge to

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a verbal type of knowledge he said 'perception is a non-verbal type of knowledge' (meaning thereby that even determinate perception is a non-verbal type of knowledge).

(The difficulties noted above crop up because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians, on the one hand, argee with the Buddhist and maintain that all perceptual knowledge is sharply distinct from inferential knowledge, but, on the other hand, disagree with him and maintain that all perceptual knowledge takes note of similarities obtaining among things. As a matter of fact, the former description is true of bare sensory experience but not of perceptual knowledge while the latter description true of perceptual knowledge but not of bare sensory experience).

64. An idea of the Buddhist position on these matters can be formed from a passage accurring in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* (and from Arcata's commentary on the same). Dharmakīrti maintains that in the inference. "This mountain possesses fire, because it possesses smoke" the existence of smoke on the mountain (i.e., of the probans in its locus) is known through perception. Now this will not be disputed even by the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas and Mīmāmsakas, but Dharmakīrti has a peculiar theory of perception and that gives rise to a controversy. Thus Dharmakīrti says that the real perceptual knowledge of smoke on the mountain is indeterminate in character while the so-called determinate perceptual knowledge but memory of the indeterminate perceptual knowledge in question; this memory, again, has two aspects, one negative and the other positive—the former recalling that this smoke is different from everything other than itself, the latter that this smoke possesses such and such features. Furthermore, it is Dharmakirti's contention that indeterminate perceptual knowledge is a piece of valid knowledge because it takes cognizance of things that are hitherto unknown and practically efficient (i.e., real—for with Dharmakīrti practical efficiency is the criterion of reality). Hence according to him, memory in general and determinate perceptual knowledge in particular are not pieces of valid knowledge because they take cognizance of things that are already known and are not real (i.e., not practically efficient). Here Dharmakīrti might be asked : But why are the things taken cognizance of by memory in general and determinate perceptual knowledge in particular not real? To this he replies : Because particulars alone are real (and this, in turn, is because they alone are practically efficient) while the so-called 'universals' are unreal (because

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they are not practically efficient); and it is indeterminate perceptual knowldge that alone takes cognizance of particulars while memory and determinate perceptual knowledge, being of the nature of thought, take cognizance of universals. The question lastly arises: But should it mean that inference is not a piece of valid knowledge' for inference too is of the nature of thought? And to this Dharmakīriti replies: No, inference somehow enables us to determine the nature of things that are hitherto unknown and real. Let us quote Dharmakīrti's argument in his own words[35]:

> Existence of the probans in its locus is known either by perception or by inference. Thus in the inference 'This spot possesses fire, because it possesses smoke' the existence of the probans in its locus (i.e., of smoke on the spot) is known by perception.........Here the man making inference first sees the spot-possessing-smoke as distinct from everything else and as possessed of a form (i.e., practical efficiency) that is exclusive to itself; after this there arises in him the (determinate) 'knowledge of the probans' which in so far as it takes note of those very exclusive objective features that were cognized by perception, is of the nature of memory. Of these two pieces of knowledge, the first, viz., perception of the 'spot-possessing-smoke' is alone valid knowledge because it alone is a knowledge of something which was hitherto-unknown and which possesses an exclusive practical efficiency. After this something has been perceived the perception occasions a memory which gives verbal expression to the thing's exclusive practical efficiency and its distinction from everything else. But this memory is not valid knowledge because it is no cognition of a hitherto-unknown thing.........This has been an account of the memory in question in its role as 'negative thought'. 'Positive thought' of the from of inference does yield knowledge of things that are hithereto-unknown as well as practically efficient, but the memory in question even in its role as 'positive thought' does nothing of the sort.........(For) the 'generic feature' that is taken note of by the thought (i.e., positive thought) occasioned and caused by the perception of a real thing performs no function whatsoever. For example, if one sees a blue thing and then judges 'here is a blue thing' the blue thing that is capable of performing a function—including the one which is allegedly attributed to a 'generic feature, has already

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been taken note of by visual perception : on the other hand, the 'thought of blue' that has arisen in the wake of 'perception of blue' has for its object something that is incapable of performing a function.........Or we may say that (positive) thought is memory because it imitates the perception which has caused it and which has grasped a real thing earlier.

Here are selected portions from Arcaṭa's commentary on the above *Hetubindu* passage[36] :

(1) Kumārila has in effect argued that the objection that perception, being necessarily indeterminate, cannot grasp the probans, its locus or the relation between the two applies only against the Buddhist's position according to which all perception is necessarily indeterminate but not against his own position according to which determinate perception is also a possibility. It is with a view to rebutting the criticism of the Buddhist position implicit here that the author has made a statement whose net meaning is as follows; "Perception reveals the positive existence of (say) smoke-as-occurring-on-a-spot. Now these particular smoke etc. are, each of them, excluded from everything else, similar as well as dissimilar, for the possession of its own specific nature without getting confused with anything else characterizes everything whatsoever. Things thus characterized directly produce perception concerning themselves while this perception, in its turn, produces thought that has got a positive and a negative aspect. It is this thought that grasps smoke and spot, the former occupying the latter and thus qualifying it, through an assertion to the effect 'Hhese are thus situated and in no other manner'. What thought a particular perception will give rise to depends on the causal factors like repetition (of the concerned situation), competence (to recall) etc. Thus according to our position as well the nature of a qualifier and its qualificand as also the relation between the two turn out to be something amenable to perceptual knowledge."

(2) Thoughts are of two types, viz., those arising in the wake of perception (and conceptualizing the features taken note of in perception) and those arising in a baseless fashion. It is on

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the ground of this distinction that we meet Kumārila's objection to the effect that those who treat universals as something not revealed in indeterminate perceptual knowledge and determinate perceptual knowledge as a case of memory might also say that one can well have memory of the barren woman's son.

(3) Kumarila has raised another objection against our position as follows: "Since it is a Buddhist position that perception grasps the particular things while inference the generic features you should concede that the generic features characterizing smoke etc. are grasped only by inference. But then there will arise an infinite regress. For the inference supposed to grasp the generic feature acting as probans in the original inference will itself require a probans, and since this second probans will also be of the nature of a generic feature a third inference will be required to grasp this second probans; thus no period of time will be sufficient to grasp even a single probandum." To this we reply that this objection is valid only against those who are of the view that inference alone grasps generic features, but according to us thought arising in the wake of perception equally grasps generic features though mistaking them to be real things. Thus thought concerning a probans, since it arises on the basis of the perception of a real thing, is indirectly related to this real thing (and still more indirectly to the real thing sought to be inferred) and is therefore an unfailing revealer of this real thing itself, just as the man who mistakes a jewel's ray for the jewel (and then proceeds to acquire it) succeeds in getting the jewel itself.

(4) Thus when we say that inference grasps the generic features we do not mean that inference alone does so, for thought arising in the wake of perception and so also certain other types of thought do certainly grasp the generic features. Our simple contention is that inference grasps only the generic features, meaning thereby that it does not grasp the real things themselves.

(5) In an inference the probans as occurring in its locus has to be known first. Thus in the case under consideration the spot as possessing smoke has to be perceived. Such perception is

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the germ of positive thought. But the spot in question has also to be perceived as distinct from everything—similar as well as dissimilar—other than itself; for every real thing is possessed of its own specific nature and that in turn is because it is not confused with anything else (otherwise anything might be of use in any case). Through the mention of such perception the author has indicated the germ of negative thought and the ground for positing "generic features". For even if each of the things of a particular type is different from every other thing of this type as also from every other thing of every other type thought overlooks the former aspect of the situation and comes to surmise that the generic (i.e. common) feature of the things of a particular type is their distinction from the things of every other type.

(6) According to us, a thing as distinct from everything else is grasped by perception itself. That is to say, we do not endorse Kumārila's dictum that one thing's distinction from another thing is grasped not by perception but by an independent instrument of valid knowledge called "absence" (better known as 'non-cognition'). Certainly, perception which is directly produced by its object itself cannot grasp this object as it is not, for in that case there will arise the contingency of this perception turning illusory. Thus after a thing as distinct from everything other than itself has been perceived there arises in the cognizer concerned a piece of cognition which is of the nature of memory; it is as the object of this memory that this thing acts as a probans in an inference. This is our explanation of how the generic features grasped by the pieces of post-perceptual thought act as probantia.

(7) Of perception, positive thought and negative thought it is perception alone which is a case of valid knowledge and not also the positive and negative thoughts, for the first does and the other two do not satisfy the definition of valid knowledge. The definition in question demands that the object of valid knowledge must be something hitherto unknown and practically efficient, and that is the case only with (indeterminate) perception.

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(8) With a view to establishing that negative thought is of the nature of memory because its object is the same as that of an earlier piece of perceptual knowledge the following observations are made. After a thing as distinct from every other thing has been grasped by (indeterminate) perception that is produced by the thing as distinct from every other thing there arises memory which takes cognidance of the fact that this thing is not of the nature of this or that type of things other than itself; this is certainly memory because its object is a thing as distinct from this or that type of things while the perception which has caused it has for its object the same thing as distinct from every other type of things. Thus negative thought tells us that a thing is distinct from this or that type of things while an earlier piece of perceptual knowledge has already told us that this very thing is distinct from every other type of things; this means that negative thought does not grasp an object that is hitherto unknown while valid knowledge is by definition (acceptable to Kumārila himself) something that grasps a hitherto unknown object.

(9) But here it might be said that positive thought can well be of the nature of valid knowledge even if negative thought is not; for there is no lack of a hitherto-unknown object in the case of positive thought. This is because positive thought takes cognizance of the generic features which are not grasped by perception whose object invariably is a thing as distinct from every other thing. But in answer to this we say that even if a piece of positive thought takes cognizance of a generic feature that is hitherto-unknown it is not a case of valid knowledge because this generic feature is incapable of performing a function so that a cognition, e.g., positive thought, grasping this generic feature is as good as hallucinatory. By way of contrast, let us consider the nature of inferential knowledge. Thus even if the spot that is the locus of probans and is practically efficient has already been perceived the fire that is (the probandum and is) practically efficient is something hitherto-unknown; this something hitherto unknown in respect of its generic feature (to follow the less likely reading, in respect of its non-generic feature) is grasped by inference, for a non-perceptual type of cognition is incapable of grasping a real thing itself rather than a generic feature.

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But the object which in respect of its generic feature is grasped by positive thought is not something hitherto-unknown, and that is because the corresponding real thing in this case has already been grasped by the preceding (indeterminate) perceptual knowledge. Hence in respect of this real thing positive thought is of the nature of memory and not valid knowledge.

(10) Thus about positive thought we are saying that it is no valid knowledge because its object is unreal even if hitherto-unknown, while about negative thought we had said that it is no valid knowledge because its object is not hitherto-unknown. But in a way even about positive thought it can be said that its object is not something hitherto-unknown. For positive thought is caused by the perceptual knowledge whose object is a real thing; it can therefore be said to imitate this perceptual knowledge. Of course, we say this on the understanding that the object of perceptual knowledge and the object of thought are somehow of the same nature though, strictly speaking, here there takes place no imitation whatsoever. However it is certainly of the nature of memory...... For even in the ordinary cases of memory we just say that its object is the same as that of an earlier perceptual knowledge while as a matter of fact the two objects are altogether different in nature. For a real thing's distinct reflection takes place in the cases of perceptual knowledge but not so in those of memory. Exactly the same is the case with positive thought (for here too there does not take place a real thing's distinct reflection). Why then should it not be of the nature of memory?

These remarks—particulary those of Arcaṭa—are a clear mirror of the Buddhist's mind with its strong as well as weak points. The Buddhist makes a clear and correct distinction between bare sensory experience and thought arising in the wake of this experience, but the tendency to extol sensory experience at the cost of thought plays havoc with his position. Thus even after having distinguished post-perceptual thought from baseless thought Arcaṭa goes on to bracket post-perceptual thinking with hallucination. The Buddhist has to realize that bare sensory experince is not a case of knowledge even if he need not give up his conviction that perceptual

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knowledge and inferential knowledge are the only two types of knowledge. Broadly speaking, his description of post-perceptual thought is a correct description of perceptual knowledge, but here too he has to insert one major amendment to the effect that the object of perceptual knowledge is a real thing as possessed of generic features. As for his description of inferential knowledge it is on the whole correct, but he must recognize that the object of this type of knowledge too is a real thing as possessed of generic features.

65. Lastly, let us try to evaluate the Jaina stand on the question of perceptual knowledge. Since the Jaina logicians make it a point to emphasize that valid knowledge must be a piece of determinate knowledge it is a foregone conclusion that they would refuse to identify perceptual knowledge with indeterminate perception, i.e., with bare sensory experience. Now this fact, as also several others, concerning the Jaina notion of perceptual knowledge are clearly brought out in the following passages from Hemacandra[37] :

As for the empirical (as against the transcendental) perceptual knowledge, its cause are sense-organs and manas (i.e., a specially posited internal organ) and it is of the from of avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāraṇā.

Avagraha is that grasping of an object which arises in the wake of darśana which, in its turn, is produced as a result of sense-object contact.

(Here by 'contact' is meant the object not being present too far or too near or in a concealed fashion. ....After such a sense-object contact there is produced 'darśana' that is of the nature of an awareness of the object-as-devoid-of-allspecific features. When it is said that avagraha arises in the wake of darśana what is meant is that the latter (quâ a property of soul) is transformed into the former, for the rule is that nothing that was absolutely non-existent ever comes into existence nor does anything that is in existence ever vanish altogether; this is why we maintain that it is darśana itself which subsequently assumes the form of avagraha. By 'object' we mean the object that is of the nature of substance-cum-modes and is capable of performing a function, by 'grasping' we mean ascertainment: for since our general definition describes valid knowledge as 'right ascertainment of an object' and since this general definition of valid knowledge must apply to perceptual knowledge, avagraha must not be identified with mere darśana which is by nature a piece of indeterminate cognition rather than ascertainment.

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Nor is avagraha a mere mental thought, for it invariably requires the services of eyes, etc. and it cannot be set aside through sheer cogitation. Mental thought, on the other hand, is capable of being stopped through sheer cogitation. So avagraha is not a mere mental thought.)

Īhā is a desire to know the specific properties of what has been grasped by avagraha.

(After an object, say a sound, is grasped by avagraha there first arises a doubt as to whether it is the sound of a conch-shell or that of a horn and then a consideration of the specific properties that belong to one and not to the other, this consideration taking the form 'Here there are observed sweetness, etc., which are the specific properties of the sound coming from a conch-shell but not harshness etc. which are the specific properties of that coming from a horn'; it is the intellectual endeavour of the form of consideration which we call īhā. In between avagraha and īhā there does always arise a piece of doubt even in relation to the objects that are well-known, but on account of its quickness it is not noticed. However, this doubt is not a case of valid knowledge, for it is not of the nature of 'right ascertainment of an object' (which, according to us, is the definition of valid knowledge).........

Now even if īhā is called an endeavour it belongs to an intelligent being and is therefore of the nature of cognition; hence it is proper to treat it as a variety of perceptual knowledge. It should not be suspected that īhā is not a case of valid knowledge because it is not of the nature of ascertainment; for īhā too does ascertain its own object. Nor should it be argued that īhā is not a case of ascertainment because it is unlike certain other cases of ascertainment, for if that logic is followed many more cases of ascertainment will have to be treated as no cases of ascertainment).

Avāya is the ascertainment of the specific properties of the object grasped by īhā.

(In relation to an object grasped by īhā the ascertainment of its specific properties in the form "This sound is certainly coming from a conch-shell and not from a horn' is called avāya).

Dhāraṇā is what causes memory.

(Dhāraṇā, also called saṃskāra, is the cause, i.e., the cause that gets itself transformed into the effect, of memory which is of the form of recalling a past event; it is the retention of a piece of cognition for a period that is

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measurable or otherwise. Avagraha, etc., on the other hand, are, each of them, capable of lasting for a period that might be as long as one muhūrta (forty-eight minutes).

This saṃskāra being a variety of perceptual knowledge must be conceived as a piece of cognition and not as 'a sub-species of saṃskāra called bhāvanā which is not of the nature of cognition' as is done by others (viz., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers). If saṃskāra itself is not of the nature of cognition it cannot give rise to memory which is of the nature of cognition; for certainly, one type of existence cannot assume the form of another type. As a matter of fact, if saṃskāra is not of the form of cognition it cannot be a property of soul, for a conscious entity cannot have a property that is not of the form of consciousness).

66. It is easy to see that what Hemacandra calls the varieties of perceptual knowledge are in fact the stages in the generation of a piece of perceptual knowledge. For the rest, Hemacandra's account of the generation of perceptual knowledge is broadly correct and should be acceptable to all his logician colleagues. This account has the merit of clearly recognizing the element of thought present in all generation of perceptual knowledge. The Buddhist will not deny this presence of the element of thought; as a matter of fact, it is because of this that he calls determinate perception a case of post-perceptual thought rather than a case of perceptual knowledge, a view correctly criticized by Hemacandra in passing. But it will be difficult to apply to perceptual knowledge thus described Gaṅgeśa's definition "knowledge whose instrumental cause is not a piece of cognition i.e., knowledge no constituent of whose total specific cause is a piece of cognition" for Hemacandra's account clearly shows that so many varieties of cognition do in fact contribute in the generation of perceptual knowledge. It is, therefore, a bit disconcerting to find Hemacandra himself defining perceptual knowledge as 'cognition that is lucid[38]' and then describing lucidity as 'awareness that is independent of the other types of valid knowledge'[39], a description reminiscent of Gaṅgeśa. By way of commenting Hemacandra remarks: 'Unlike verbal testimony, inference, etc., which require for their generation the valid knowledge of word, probans, etc., perceptual knowledge does not require for its generation any type of valid knowledge other than itself'[40]. A close consideration of Hemacandra's own account leaves one in no doubt that perceptual knowledge more or less clearly involves memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning, inference and verbal testimony, that is, all the types of non-perceptual valid knowledge

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recognized in Jaina Logic. Hemacandra's other description of lucidity, viz. 'awareness expressible in the form "This is such and such an object[41]" is absolutely correct; this was also his meaning when he had earlier told the Buddhist that perceptual knowledge is not mere thought but thought that necessarily requires the continuous operation of a sense-organ.

67. These were the major issues that divided our logicians on the question of perceptual knowledge. Besides, there were minor issues on which they sometimes agreed and sometimes differed. One minor—though considerably disturbing—issue was the admission of supra-sensuous perception. The early Nyāya (and Vaiśeṣika) logicians, while treating perception, did not take into consideration the alleged supra-sensuous variety of it though there are evidences that go to indicate that they perhaps believed in its possibility, e.g., both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sūtras (i.e., the earliest aphoristic texts) talk of yoga and yogic powers as if their possibility is a truism[42]; and it was a commonplace with those who believed in such possibility that practisers of yoga come to acquire the capacity for supra-sensuous perception. However, it was the later logicians and first of all the Buddhists who felt the need for so defining perception that it covers the cases of both sensuous and supra-sensuous perception. It was in answer to such a need that the old Nyāya definition of perception as 'knowledge born of sense-object contact' came to be regarded as incomplete and definitions like 'knowledge that is direct', 'knowledge that is lucid', 'knowledge whose instrumental cause is not a piece of cognition', etc., came to be substituted for the same. Only the Mīmāṃsakas, who tenaciously denied the possibility of supra-sensuous perception on the part of any being, human or divine (as a matter of fact, they were stark atheists), stuck to the old account. In spite of all this, the logician's robust commonsense, which was indeed the hall-mark of everything that he said and did, prevented him from paying more than lip-homage to supra-sensuous perception and, as a result, his treatment of perception remains for all practical purposes a treatment of sense-perception. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians particularly undertook a detailed investigation into the nature of the various types of sense-perception, i.e., into the nature of visual perception, olfactory perception etc. (and for certain reasons the Mīmāṃsakas took avery special interest in the problems of auditory perception), but in the light of modern scientific researches much of their output in this sphere will be proved to be of doubtful validity though praise must be due to these Indians who were so stubbornly empirical-minded in an age so rabidly medieval.

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(2) Inference.

68. The other instrument of valid knowledge unanimously posited by Indian logicians is inference, which may be regarded as the most crucially important of all such instruments. As a matter of fact, one can even demonstrate that inference constitutes the innermost core of each and every instrument of valid knowledge. We have already taken note of the similarities obtaining between perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge; similarities, likewise, obtain between the remaining types of valid knowledge and inferential knowledge (nay, many—in fact, all—of these alleged independent instruments of valid knowledge can be and have been proved to be but cases of inferential knowledge). But what is inference? Here is a rough answer to the question: In case we happen to know about two objects or objective characters (say *A* and *B*) that *B* is found wherever *A* is we can say about a thing which is seen to posses *A* (but not *B*) that it also possesses *B*; this will be inferring the existence of *B* from the existence of *A* in the thing in question. In the technical languages of Logic *A* will be called 'probans' (in Sanskrit hetu or liṅga). *B* 'probandum' (in Sanskrit Sādhya), and the thing in question 'locus of the probans (and of the probandum)' (in Sanskrit pakṣa); the relation of invariable concomitance obtaining between *A* and B will be called '*vyāpti*' in Sanskrit. To take the stock example of Indian logicians, in the inference. 'The mountain possesses fire, because it possesses smoke' smoke is probans or hetu, fire probandum or sādhya, and the mountain concerned 'locus of the probans' or pakṣa: the relation of invariable concomitance obtaining between smoke and fire is the vyāpti in question.

The neo-Nyāya practice (which is also the current practice) is to study the problems connected with inference under four heads and in the following order :—

(*i*) Anumiti-karaṇa (i.e., the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge),

(*ii*) Vyāpti,

(*iii*) Pakṣatā (i.e., pakṣa-ness),

(*iv*) Hetvābhāsas (i.e., pseudo-hetus).

A modern paraphrase for these heads will be—

(*i*) The Conditions of Valid Inference,

(*ii*) The Relation of Invariable Concomitance,

(*iii*) The Occasion for Inference,

(*iv*) The Possible Fallacies of Inference.

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We also divide our study under these four heads but disposing of the third first of all.

(i) Pakṣatā or the Fccasion for Inference.

69. The problem of pakṣatā is in essence the problem of 'occasion for inference'. Now an inference is meant to prove a thesis, and hence there will be no occasion for inference in case the thesis concerned is *either* already proved *or* not desired to be proved (or both). But the neo-Naiyāyika thinks that there will be no occasion for inference only in case the thesis concerned is both already proved and not desired to be proved. By this he means that there will be an occasion for inference in case—

(*i*) the thesis is already proved and is yet desired to be proved,

(*ii*) the thesis is not already proved but is desired to be proved,

(*iii*) the thesis is not already proved though also not desired to be proved,

while there will be no such occasion in case

(*iv*) the thesis is already proved and is not desired to be proved[43].

This means that the neo-Naiyāyika conceives the possibility of inference even in the case when the thesis is already proved (provided there also exists a desire to prove it); again, he conceives the possibility of inference even in the case when there is no desire to prove the thesis (but when it is in fact unproved). Both of these are faulty notions. For what is the sense in proving a thesis which is already proved? And how can you prove a thesis which you yourself do not desire to prove? As a matter of fact, the most natural occasion for inference is the case when the thesis is unproved and also (rather hence) desired to be proved, while the most natural occasion for no inference is the case when the thesis is proved and also (rather hence) not desired to be proved. The neo-Naiyāyika says that all the cases except the one which is most natural for no inference are legitimate occasions for inference; we, on the other hand, are suggesting that all the cases except the one which is most natural for inference are legitimate occasions for no inference (and hence illegitimate occasions for inference).

70. As a matter of fact this is how the matter was put by the Buddhist logician who was the first to become clearly aware of the problem (and the spirit of whose stand will be endorsed by all Indian logicians

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except the neo-Naiyāyika with his craze for novelties, often misconceived). Thus the Buddhist defines thesis (or pakṣa—for the old Indian logicians used the word pakṣa in the sense of thesis rather than 'locus of the probans') as that which is desired to be proved, is unproved and is uncontradicted (i.e., is not already disproved)[44]; that is to say, he does not follow the neo-Nyāya practice of conceding the possibility of a thesis which is not desired to be proved or of a thesis which is not unproved. (That the thesis must be an uncontradicted something is admitted by the neo-Naiyāyika in another and a less appropriate context. For in the course of his discussion on pseudo-probans he tells us that one possible defect of a probans is that the thesis is a contradicted something. But it will be more proper to call the contradicted thesis a case of pseudo-thesis rather than pseudo-probans; the Buddhist actually calls it a case of pseudo-thesis (pakṣābhāsa) but to the neo-Naiyāyika the concept of pseudo-thesis has not occurred at all).

(ii) Anumiti-karaṇa or the Conditions of Valid Inference.

71. As noted above, in case we happen to possess the knowledge that two objects or objective characters (say *A* and *B*) are such that *B* exists wherever *A* does and also the knowledge that a particular thing possesses *A* there ensues inferential knowledge to the effect that this thing possesses *B*, Let us also recall that the Indian logicians will here give to *A* the name hetu, to *B* sādhya, to the thing in question pakṣa and to the relation of invariable concomitance between *A* and *B* vyāpti so that we can say that in case we possess knowledge that there obtains the relation of vyāpti between hetu and sādhya and the knowledge that pakṣa possesses hetu there ensues inferential knowledge to the effect that pakṣa possesses sādhya. Now this discovery was made by the old logicians in the course of what they called an enquiry into the 'essential characters of a valid hetu'.

72. The old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians came to the conclusion that a valid hetu must possess five essential characters, viz. (1) residence in pakṣa, (2) residence in a sapakṣa, (3) non-residence in a vipakṣa, (4) not being counterbalanced, and (5) not being contradicted. The character (1) needs no explanation, but the rest do. Sapakṣa means the thing that is definitely known to possess sādhya, vipakṣa the thing that is definitely known to lack sādhya; hence the character (2) demands that there must be a thing which is known to possess both hetu and sādhya and the character (3) that there must be a thing which is known to lack both hetu and sādhya. A counterbalanced hetu is one for which there exists a rival hetu, that is a hetu

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whose invariable concomitant is the absence of sādhya; hence the character (4) demands that a hetu, in order to be valid, must be such that it is impossible to point out in pakṣa a hetu whose invariable concomitant is the absence of sādhya. A contradicted hetu is one whose pakṣa is known (but not through inference; that is, through perception, verbal testimony, etc.) to lack sādhya; hence the character, (5) demands that a hetu, in order to be valid, must be such that no perception, verbal testimony, etc., (i.e., no non-inferential means of valid knowledge) testify to the absence of its sādhya in pakṣa[45].

73. The Buddhist logicians urged serious difficulties against this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. They accepted the character (1) (adding, however, that in case the pakṣa is a class rather than a particular object the hetu must reside in all the members of this class), amended (2) and (3), and rejected (4) and (5). About (2) and (3) they said that it will not do if there exists just one thing where both hetu and sādhya exist and just one thing where both are absent; what we need to be sure is that there are no things which possess hetu and lack sādhya, in other words, hetu must exist in sapakṣas only and it must in no case exist in a vipakṣa. Thus in Buddhist Logic, the character (2) was changed from 'residence in a sapakṣa' into 'residence in sapakṣas only (and not also in any vipakṣa)' while the character (3) was changed from 'non-residence in a vipakṣa, into 'non-residence only (and not also residence) in vipakṣas As for the characters (4) and (5) they said that their non-existence is an impossibility if the characters (1), (2) and (3) already exist. For the character (1) tells us that hetu exists in pakṣa, while the characters (2) and (3) tell us that the absence of sādhya is an impossibility where hetu exists so that if these three characters are realized we become absolutely certain that the sādhya concerned exists in the pakṣa concerned. There is, therefore, no need to be further certain that some inference does not prove the absence of the sādhya concerned in the pakṣa concerned or that some non-inferential means of valid knowledge does not prove the absence of the sādhya concerned in the pakṣa concerned. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's character (4) actually demands that we must be further certain that no inference proves the absence of the sādhya concerned in the pakṣa concerned and his character (5) that we must be further certain that no non-inferential means of valid knowledge proves the absence of the sādhya concerned in the pakṣa concerned. From all this the Buddhist logicians draw the conclusion that the characters (4) and (5) are quite redundant[46].

74. The above controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logicians is known as the hetu-pāñcarūpya versus hetu-trairūpya controversy, the former phrase meaning 'the doctrine that the nature of probans has five aspects' the latter 'the doctrine that the nature of probans has three aspects'. However, a deeper probe will suggest that the Buddhist's own position also needs correction; for the characters (2) and (3) as formulated

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by him are absolutely equivalent. Certainly, to say that a hetu must exist in sapakṣas only is the same thing as saying that a hetu must never exist in vipakṣas. Fortunately, this fact has occurred to the Buddhist himself who frequently tells us that these are but two alternative ways of formulating the relation of vyāpti or 'invariable concomitance' between hetu and sādhya[47]. Thus, strictly speaking, there are for the Buddhist just the following two necessary characters of a valid hetu : (*i*) Its presence in pakṣa and (*ii*) Its relatedness to sādhya by vyāpti relation.

75. The Jaina logicians seem to go too far when they contend, as against both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist logicians, that the aspects of the nature of a hetu are neither five nor three but just one. According to them, otherwise-unaccountability is the only character required by a valid hetu, and by otherwise-unaccountability they mean precisely what the Buddhist means by vyāpti-relation. So the Jaina position amounts to maintaining that a hetu, in order to be valid, must be just related to sādhya by vyāpti-relation. But certainly, a hetu, in order to be valid, must also reside in pakṣa. Hemacandra, e.g., while arguing against the Buddhist thesis on hetu-trairūpya, in essence, observes;[48] "The hetu's mere presence in a sapakṣa and its mere absence in a vipakṣa will not render it a valid hetu. For what is required is the assurance that hetu remains unaccounted for except when sādhya is posited, and if this be the meaning of hetu's absence in a vipakṣa we have no hesitation in treating this as the only necessary requirement of a valid inference. But hetu's presence in pakṣa is no necessary requirement of a valid inference, for there are cases of inference where there is no pakṣa for hetu to reside in. The following, e.g., is an inference with no pakṣa for hetu to reside in : 'There are pramāṇas even according to the non-dualist, for otherwise his proving his own theses and refuting those of his rivals remains unaccounted for.,' It is difficult to see how Hemacandra's illustration proves his contention. He seems to feel that the inference in question has no pakṣa because there are no pramāṇas according to the non-dualist, but this consideration is logically irrelevant. For we can easily put this inference in the form "The non-dualist is compelled to posit pramāṇas, because he seeks to prove his own theses and to refute those of his rivals"; here 'the non-dualist' is pakṣa, 'being compelled to posit pramāṇas' sādhya and 'seeking to prove his own theses and to refute those of his rivals' hetu.

76. It should now be possible for us to return to our starting point. We saw there that inferential knowledge to the effect that a thing possesses *B* ensues in case we possess the knowledge that this thing possesses *A* and the knowledge that *B* is of such a nature that it exists wherever *A* does. And we have also noted that the Indian logicians will give to *A* the name hetu, to *B* sādhya, to the thing in question pakṣa, and to the relation of invariable concomitance vyāpti so that we can say that inferential knowledge to the effect that pakṣa possesses sādhya ensues in case we happen to possess the knowledge that pakṣa possesses hetu and the knowledge that

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hetu stands related to sādhya by vyāpti relation. Now this exactly is what the Buddhist has told us when he maintained that valid hetu (i.e., a hetu that enables us to infer the existence of sādhya in pakṣa) possesses two necessary characters, viz. (*i*) its presence in pakṣa, and (*ii*) its relatedness to sādhya by vyāpti relation. The only new thing to be noted is that the Buddhist has arrived at this position through a critical examination of the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika case. The neo-Naiyāyika adopts a curious course. For on the one hand he accepts the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of a valid hetu possessing five essential characters, while on the other he virtually accepts the Buddhis amendments to this doctrine, something like running with the hare and hunting with the hound. His defence of the doctrine in question need not detain us here (for necessary note will be taken of it in connection with our examination of his position as to the number of pseudo-hetus), but the way he accepts the Buddhist amendments to this doctrine deserves more than passing notice.

77. The central question of his enquiry is posed by the neo-Naiyāyika in the form : What is the karaṇa of anumiti? Now anumiti is the standard Sanskrit equivalent for 'inferential knowledge', but the word karaṇa (earlier translated by us as instrumental cause) is here a technical term of the neo-Naiyāyika and, what is worse, a technical term defined ambiguously. Sometimes we are told that karaṇa is that member of a causal aggregate which produces the effect concerned by first producing something that produces this thing immediately (this something being technically called vyāpāra or 'operation'), at other times we are told that karaṇa is that member of a causal aggregate which produces the effect concerned immediately—so that what is called karaṇa's vyāpāra on the former understanding is itself called karaṇa on the latter. But this ambiguity should neither puzzle us nor detain us. For we may simply enquire as to what according to the neo-Naiyāyika is the immediate cause of inferential knowledge and what the immediate cause of this immediate cause without bothering as to which of these is to be assigned the dignified title 'karaṇa' (the title is dignified because karana is to treated as 'the most efficient member of a causal aggregate'[49]).

The neo-Naiyāyika maintains that the immediate cause of inferential knowledge is knowledge (technically called parāmarśa or 'consideration') to the effect that hetu resides in pakṣa and is related to sādhya by vyāpti relation.[50] In view of what has been said earlier this seems understandable and reasonable. As to the immediate cause of this knowledge called parāmarśa we are told that it is two separate piece of knowledge, viz. knowledge that hetu resides in pakṣa and knowledge that hetu is related to sādhya by vyāpti relation. This too should be easy to follow. We have some difficulty only when it is too often hinted that of these two pieces of knowledge the latter is the main cause and the former

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the subsidiary cause of parāmarśa;[51] for (to use the technical terms of Western Logic) this is like saying that both the major premise and the minor premise are necessary to draw a conclusion but that the major part of the force is supplied here by the major premise while the minor part by the minor. Be that as it may, on the question under consideration the more usual neo-Nyāya position is that vyāpti-jñāna or 'knowledge to the effect that hetu is related to sādhya by vyātpi relation' is the karaṇa of anumiti while parāmarśa or 'knowledge to the effect that hetu resides in pakṣa and is related to sādhya by vyāpti relation' the vyāpāra of this karaṇa, the less usual position is that parāmarśa itself is the karaṇa of anumiti. However, this difference of opinion is nominal and not substantial, for to the question as to what is the immediate cause of anumiti both parties will give the identical answer that it is parāmarśa—an answer practically the same as was given by the Buddhist (and is suggested by commonsense).

The neo-Naiyāyika lays special emphasis on the alleged requirement that the same hetu which is known to reside in pakṣa should be known to be related to sādhya by vyāpti relation,[52] but the emphasis is needless. For things are not hetu, sādhya and pakṣa in and for themselves but only as components of this or that inference so that to say that the same hetu should be known to reside in pakṣa and to be related to sādhya by vyāpti relation is like saying that the same man who is known to be the son of his father should be known to be the son of his mother. The point is obvious. Just as *every* man is the son of his father and the son of his mother, so *every* hetu resides in pakṣa and is related to sādhya by vyāpti relation. Two things may no doubt be known to be related by vyāpti relation but one of them will be called hetu and the other sādhya only when on the basis of the observed presence of the former in a third thing (which thus becomes pakṣa) we seek to infer the presence of the latter in this third thing.

78. In passing we may note that the conditions of valid inference thus formulated by the Indian logicians are after all not much different from those arrived at by their western counterparts; for the anumiti of the former corresponds to the latter's conclusion, 'hetu's residence in pakṣa' of the former to the latter's 'minor premise', and 'hetu's relatedness to sādhya by vyāpti relation' of the former to the latter's 'major premise' (necessarily universal). The students of Western Logic will find particularly interesting the controversy as to how many and what are the minimum steps necessary for the statement of an inference. The Mīmāṃsaka prescribes a course that will make this statement akin to an ordinary syllogism of Western Logic (as a matter of fact, he recommends

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two forms, one having the order Conclusion-Minor Premise-Major Premise the other the order Major Premise-Minor Premise-Conclusion), the Buddhist a course that will make it akin to an enthymeme of the third order (for the Buddhist here demands suppression of the conclusion), while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician a course that seems too much cumbrous. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position somewhat amounts to saying that we must state first the conclusion, then the minor premise, then the major premise, then the minor premise once more, and lastly the conclusion once more; (it is by way of amending this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that the Mīmāṃsaka develops this that is given above, for he says that while stating an inference we must offer either the first three steps recommended by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika logician or the last three recommended by him).[53]

(iii) Vyāpti or the Relation of Invariable Concomitance.

79. Uptil now we have made repeated references to the relation of vyāpti or invariable concomitance. As a matter of fact, hetu's relatedness to sādhya by vyāpti relation is one of the two necessary conditions of valid inference. But what is precisely meant by the relation of vyāpti or invariable concomitance, and how is such a relation to be established among things? Now it is very necessary to keep in mind that these two are different questions. For we find the neo-Naiyāyika considering the first question in fantastic details while hitting upon the second only accidentally (if ever), perhaps under the misimpression that the two questions are somehow one.

80. To take the first question first, we find that Buddhists were the first to have become aware of the exact issue involved here. We have seen that in place of the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika dictum that 'a valid hetu must be present along with sādhya in one place (at least) and be absent along with sādhya in one other place (at least)' the Buddhist offered one to the effect that 'a valid hetu must be present only where sādhya is present and must be absent wherever sādhya is absent'. We have further seen that the Buddhist also realized that the statement that 'a valid hetu must be present only where sādhya is present' is absolutely equivalent to the statement that 'a valid hetu must be absent wherever sādhya is absent', both being equivalent to the statement that 'a valid hetu must not be present where sādhya is absent'. Now this is almost all that has to be said by way of answering the question under consideration for we can define vyāpti as the technical name for the relation obtaining between hetu and sādhya while this relation is of such a nature that hetu is never present where sādhya is absent. And as a matter of historical fact,

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no Indian logician, while defining vyāpti, has said anything more that is of importance. One is therefore amazed to find that the neo-Naiyāyika could have dilated upon the point to such an absurd length.

81. The neo-Naiyāyikas have considered two kinds of definitions of vyāpti: one consisting of the one final definition and the other consisting of numerous prima facie definitions. Presumably, the neo-Naiyāyika thought that the final definition could be only one (and this is why the generations of the neo-Naiyāyikas following Gaṅgeśa only elucidated the one final definition formulated by the Master) but that the prima facie definitions could be as many as one wished (and this is why Gaṅgeśa's followers displayed extraordinary ingenuity in coining newer and newer prima facie definitions, thus going much beyond the Master's original list of five plus two—five occurring in the celebrated section Vyāpti-pañcaka of Gaṅgeśa's magnum opus and two in the following section with a curious title 'Lion and Tiger').

Now the gravamen of Gaṅgeśa's charges against the prima facie definitions is that they fail to apply to those cases (in fact few and of doubtful validity) where the sādhya is universally present. An oft-quoted case of this kind is the vyāpti 'whatever is nameable is knowable'; here nameability is hetu and knowability sādhya, and sādhya is said to be universally present because everything under the sun is knowable. The prima facie definitions fail to apply to such cases—so argues Gaṅgeśa—because they all somehow or other involve reference to 'absence of sādhya, while, as a matter of fact, the absence of an universally present sādhya is inconceivable. To tell the plain truth, the only significant distinction between most prima facie definitions and the final definition is that, unlike the former ones, the latter succeeds in an ingenious fashion in avoiding all reference to 'absence of sādhya'.

Take, for example, the first and the fifth prima facie definitions. The first says: 'Hetu must not have for its seat what is a seat of "absence of sādhya"; the fifth says: 'Hetu must not have for its seat what is different from all the seats of sādhya'. As against these, the final definition says: 'Hetu must co-exist with sādhya and be of such a nature that no absence coexisting with hetu has sādhya for its pratiyogin'; ('pratiyogin' is a technical term of neo-Nyāya and can be defined by saying that 'absence of x' is an absence having x for its pratiyogin). For our present purpose we need not take note of the assertion (occurring in the final definition) that hetu must coexist with sādhya, for this assertion is implied

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in all the prima facie definitions as well. Thus the vital part of the final definition may be taken to consist in the assertion that hetu must be of such a nature that no absence coexisting with hetu has sādhya for its pratiyogin. Now with slight variation of terminology all these three definitions are saying one and the same thing, viz. that hetu must not coexist with the absence of sādhya. For the first prima facie definition clearly says: 'hetu must not exist in a place where there exists absence of sādhya'; the fifth says: 'hetu must not exist in a place which is different from all places where sādhya exists'. But 'a place where there exists absence of sādhya' and 'a place which is different from all places where sādhya exists' are one and the same thing, and this means that the fifth prima facie definition is essentially the same as the first. The final definition says: 'if an absence coexists with hetu it must not have sādhya for its pratiyogin', in other words, 'if an absence coexists with hetu it must not be the absence of sādhya'. Thus formulated even the final definition in effect says that hetu must not coexist with the absence of sādhya, and this according to us is the common meaning of all these definitions, prima facie or otherwise. Gaṅgeśa thinks that his final definition is of a qualitatively different variety inasmuch as it, unlike the prima facie ones, avoids all reference to 'absence of sādhya', but this is poor consolation.

Nor did so much preoccupation with the problem of defining vyāpti prevent the neo-Naiyāyika from committing blunders on this very score; we will take note of just one that is specially relevant for our purpose. With a logician it must be a commonplace that hetu cannot coexist with 'absence of sādhya', but the neo-Naiyāyika has the audacity to conceive of valid cases of inference where hetu coexists with absence of sādhya and, by way of example, he points to the (allegedly) valid inference: 'This tree possesses conjunction-with-monkey, because it is this tree'. Now this inference is certainly valid though on the condition that the tree in question is always possessed of conjunction-with-monkey, but since the fulfilment of this condition is not logically impossible we treat the inference as valid. But how is it a case of hetu coexisting with absence of sādhya? Let us follow the neo-Naiyāyika's explanation. Here pakṣa is 'this tree', hetu 'this-tree-ness', and sādhya 'conjunction-with-monkey'; now 'this-tree-ness' exists throughout the length and breadth of 'this tree' but conjunction-with-monkey exists only in that portion of 'this tree' where the monkey is actually seated; this means that throughout the length and breadth of 'this tree' barring the place where the monkey is actually seated there exist 'this-tree-ness' (i.e., the hetu in question) as well as 'absence of conjunction-with-monkey, (i.e., absence of the sādhya in question).

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This explanation is faulty. For if in the statement 'This tree possesses conjunction-with-monkey' the phrase 'this tree' can stand for a particular portion of this tree the inference in question remains valid and precisely because hetu will now not be coexisting with the absence of sādhya; on the other hand, if in this statement the phrase 'this tree' can stand only for the whole of the tree the inference in question will become invalid and precisely because hetu will now be coexisting with the absence of sādhya. The neo-Naiyāyika is simply exploiting the ambiguity of the phrase 'this tree' when he tells us that we here have a case of valid inference and also a case of hetu coexisting with the absence of sādhya.[54]

82. Then we take up the second question posed above, viz. How is the relation of invariable concomitance to be established between hetu and sādhya? In other words, the question is: Under what conditions are we entitled to say about two things that the relation of invariable concomitance (and hence the relation of hetu-sādhya-ship) obtains between them? Generally speaking, there seem to be two kinds of invariable concomitance nominal and real. By nominal invariable concomitance we mean the simultaneous applicability of two names to the same thing, by real invariable concomitance we mean the necessary co-presence of two independent things. Now a particular name is attributed to a thing on account of its possessing a particular set of properties—so that if the name *X* is attributed to things on account of their possessing the set of properties *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e* and Y on account of their possessing the set of properties, *a*, *b*, *c* we can say that the names *X* and *Y* are simultaneously applicable to things possessing the former set of properties (and that because the latter set is but a sub-set of the former). Again, in case the same group of things is assigned two different names by virtue of possessing two different sets of properties we can say that a thing bearing one of these names must also bear the other. This will also be a case of simultaneous applicability of two names. These seem to exhaust the cases of nominal invariable concomitance. Again, in case P and Q are two independent things and are such that Q is present wherever and whenever P is one of the following must be the case: (*i*) Q constitutes the total causal aggregate of P, (*ii*) Q constitutes a part of *P*'s total causal aggregate, (*iii*) *P* constitutes the total causal aggregate of *Q*; (note that if *P* constitutes a part of *Q*'s causal aggregate it will not be the case that *Q* is present wherever and whenever *P* is). These seem to exhaust the cases of real invariable concomitance.

From all this we may conclude that the nominal invariable concomitance validates two kinds of inference while the real invariable

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concomitance validates three kinds. The former two can be schematically represented thus:

(1) 'A thing bearing the name *X* must bear the name *Y*, because *Y* symbolizes the presence of such properties as are a sub-set of the properties whose possession is symbolized by *X*'.

(2) 'A thing bearing the name *X* must bear the name *Y*, because *X* and *Y* symbolize the possession of two such sets of properties as belong to one and the same group of things'.

The latter three can be schematically represented thus:

(3) 'A place possessing *P* must possess *Q*, because *Q* constitutes the total causal aggregate of *P*'.

(4) 'A place possessing *P* must possess *Q*, because *Q* constitutes a part of *P*'s causal aggregate'.

(5) 'A place possessing *P* must possess *Q*, because *P* constitutes the total causal aggregate of *Q*'.

83. Considerations like these were at the back of the Buddhist's mind when he proposed to reduce all cases of inference to two kinds, viz. svabhāva-anumāna and kārya-anumāna[55]. The above-given schematic representations (1) and (2) will exactly describe what the Buddhist understands—at least, what he should understand—by svabhāva-anumāna. Thus take one of his stock illustrations of this kind of inference: it is 'X is tree, because X is śiṃśapā'. This inference is valid simply because 'śiṃśapā being the name of a particular tree the connotation of the word 'śiṃśapā' includes the total connotation of the word 'tree'. This is a case coming under (1). A case coming under (2) is 'X is momentary, because X is real'. Here we find that (according to the tenets of Buddhist metaphysics) the same group of things which is assigned the epithet 'momentary' is also the group assigned the epithet 'real'; hence the inference is valid (for a Buddhist). 'X is a rational animal, because X is a featherless biped' will be a modern illustration of the cases coming under (2). And the above-given schematic representations (3) and (4) will describe what the Buddhist understands by kārya-anumāna. Here take the stock-illustration of Indian Logic: 'X possesses fire, because X possesses smoke'. This will be a case coming under (4), for fire is after all a part of smoke's total causal aggregate. [The corresponding cases coming under (3) will be 'X possesses fire and wet fuel, because X possesses smoke', for fire and wet fuel constitute the total causal aggregate of smoke.]

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There is some difficulty about the cases covered by (5). As far as one can see they come neither under svabhāva-anumāna nor under kārya-anumāna, and as a result there is current a notion that the Buddhist, who accepts just two kinds of anumāna, denies the validity of these cases. As a matter of fact, the Buddhist accepts these cases as valid but refuses to call them kāraṇa-anumāna (as is proposed by the anti-Buddhist logicians). He rather seeks to bring these cases under svabhāva-anumāna, and this on the plea that just as (for example) a thing which is śiṁśapā needs nothing additional in order to become tree so also does a thing which possesses a total causal aggregate need nothing additional in order to possess the effect concerned[56]. Now this plea will at once establish that the Buddhist could point out very correctly as to when it is valid to infer the existence of effect from the existence of cause (for certainly, an effect can be inferred only from its *total* causal aggregate and not from a *part* of this aggregate): but it will also bring to light a confusion of his mind. For it will further establish that the Buddhist was not aware—at least, not so clearly as is desirable—that the cases coming under svabhāva-anumāna are all those whose validity is ensured by a nominal rather than real invariable concomitance. There was, in fact, nothing wrong in classing together the cases of inferring effect from cause, calling them kāraṇa-anumāna, and maintaing that kārya-anumana and kāraṇa-anumāna are the two types of inference whose validity is ensured by a real—rather than nominal—invariable concomitance.

84. However, nothing will establish that the anti-Buddhist logicians were correct in their repudiation of the very concept of svabhāva-anumāna. All that is certain is that they were against specifying the conditions under which alone a vyāpti is valid. Thus these logicians made a parade of curious cases of inference—valid and otherwise—and asked the Buddhist to prove these to be the cases of either svabhāva-anumāna or kārya-anumāna; but a modern student of Logic, who knows that all valid inference either is but a clarification of the meaning of some word or has its validity ensured by some causal relationship, can rest assured in advance that all these must be either the cases of invalid inference or somewhat complicated cases of svabhāva-anumāna or kārya-anumāna (or, of course, kāraṇa-anumāna), e g., on having observed that certain fruits, when they attain a particular stage of ripeness, acquire a particular colour and a particular taste, it was found valid to infer the existence of this colour from the existence of this taste and vice versa, and the Buddhist was asked to account for this phenomenon; for certainly, it was not a case of svabhāva-anumāna, nor was the colour in question the cause or the effect of the taste in question

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The Buddhist answered that the colour in question and the taste in question are the co-effects of certain causal conditions that are available when the fruits in question attain the requisite stage of ripeness, so that it is valid to infer the existence of this colour from the existence of this taste and *vice versa*[57]. Now if, as is granted by both the parties to the controversy, the colour in question and the taste in question are always co-present the Buddhist explanation is unexceptionable; for in that case the two will have to be treated as a part (if not the whole) of the effect-aggregate produced by one single causal aggregate (and this is what is meant by their being called two co-effects of one causal aggregate). But on empirical grounds it seems doubtful whether that is the case with any fruit and its colour-*cum*-taste complex (i. e., it does not seem to be the case that a fruit's colour-*cum*-taste complex is produced by one cause). However, the consideration is logically irrelevant—at least for our present purpose. For even when we are disputing—on empirical grounds—the contention that a particular colour of a fruit and its corresponding taste are caused by the same causal aggregate we are not denying that in case they are so caused it is logical to infer the existence of either of them from that of the other and that the validity of this inference will be ensured by certain causal considerations.

85. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians were particularly against reducing valid inferences to certain fixed types even though both Nyāya-sūtra and Vaiśeṣika-sūtra had evinced a contrary tendency. Thus the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 9. 2. 1[58] maintained that a hetu must be either the cause of the sādhya, or the effect of the sādhya, or something in conjunction with the sādhya, or something inherent in the sādhya, or something that is a rival of the sādhya. This sūtra, though loosely worded (and partly incorrect), was an expression of the same tendency which the Buddhist exhibited when he set out to enumerate the conditions of valid vyāpti. Similarly, the Nyāya-sūtra 1. 1. 5[59] maintained that a hetu must be either the cause of the sādhya, or the effect of the sādhya, or it must be something whose analogues are invariably found to be accompanied by the analogues of the sādhya. This Nyāya sūtra, on account of its approval of an omnibus type of hetu, viz. the third type, was considerably vaguer than the Vaiśeṣika sūtra just quoted, but it was the later Naiyāyikas who made a virtue of this vagueness[60].

86. The attitude of Jaina logicians was typical. They too were vehemently against the Buddhist's reduction of all inference to svabhāva-

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anumāna and kārya-anumāna (though, in fairness, let it be admitted that they were alone among the non-Buddhist logicians to have admitted the validity of svabhāva-anumāna). Roughly speaking, they were for admitting six types of hetu, where svabhāva, kārya and kāraṇa would more or less correspond to the similar types accepted by the Buddhist while the remaining three, viz., pūrvacara, uttaracara and sahacara respectively covered the cases where the hetu was found to precede the sādhya, to succeed it and to co-exist with it but for no apparent reason[61]; the admission of these additional types of hetu was thus a kind of putting a premium on lethargy, for a more patient investigation would have revealed to the Jaina the underlying causal law in each of these cases (or, of course, would have convinced him that these were cases of invalid inference).

87. Of course, not even the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians were entirely oblivious of the problem under consideration, for they too claimed to have provided us with a fool-proof method of testing the validity of a vyāpti. They thus tell us that in all doubting the validity of a valid vyāpti there comes a stage when further doubting lands you in an absurd position and that this discomfiture of yours establishes the validity of the original vyāpti. The difficulty is that these logicians were blissfully vague as to the notion of 'landing oneself in an absurd position', a notion so crucial to their understanding of the nature of vyāpti. As Udayana has formulated the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika case[62]: "You can doubt the validity of a vyāpti only so long as this doubt does not land you in a self-contradictory position, e.g., you cannot concede the possibility that there obtain no causal relationships among things". Now it is difficult to see where lies 'self-contradiction' in this. No doubt, if you concede that a thing possessing an effect must possess the cause of this effect you have no right to concede the possibility that X may possess an effect without possessing the cause of this effect. But in that case it will be more straightforward (and more to the point) to maintain "In case P is an effect of Q we are justified in asserting 'if X possesses P, X possesses Q' ". Similarly, if you concede that thing possessing a causal aggregate must possess the effect of this causal aggregate you can maintain "In case P is a causal aggregate and Q the effect of this causal aggregate we are justified in asserting 'if X possesses P, X possesses Q' ". These two are important—and in our view exclusive—conditions for inferring the existence of one thing at a place from the existence of another thing at that place. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians stoutly refused to enumerate the conditions of valid vyāpti and harped on the assertion that a vyāpti is valid in case a doubt as to its validity lands you in a self-contradictory position.

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Gaṅgeśa, who came after Udayana, argues[63]: "If one feels himself free to suspect the presence of an effect even in the absence of its well-ascertained cause one cannot explain why he invariably requires fire when he wants to have smoke, why he himself takes food when he wants to fill his belly, why he utters words when he wants to make himself understood by others. For in that case the later mentioned events should come about even in the absence of the earlier mentioned ones. Thus the very endeavour to bring about the earlier mentioned events is sufficient to dispel the suspicion that the later mentioned ones might be present there even in the absence of these earlier mentioned ones......... As has been said; 'You are free to entertain only those doubts which do not land you in self-contradictory position. It is not possible that you yourself invariably require fire etc. in order to bring about smoke etc. and you are in a doubt whether the former are a cause of the latter;" Gaṅgeśa thus repeats Udayana's folly. For my doubt concerning the validity of a particular vyāpti will not be removed by telling me that I myself at times take recourse to vyāpti; What I need being told is that the vyāpti in question satisfies the criterion (or, if there are several such criteria, one of the criteria) of valid vyāpti. Nay, Gaṅgeśa has pointedly rejected the suggestion that 'landing in an absurd position' here spoken of derives its validity from certain eternally established (or, as we call them now-a-days, axiomatic) principles like causation, contradictoriness, etc. The opponent's case is that we are justified in taking for granted the principles like, 'If *X* possesses *P*, *X* possesses a *member* (rather the whole) of *P*'s causal aggregate', 'If *X* possesses *Q*'s total casual aggregate, *X* possesses *Q*', 'If *X* possesses *M*, *X* cannot possess M's contradictory', etc., and from this he concludes (*i*) that if one grants that *Q* is a member (or the whole) of *P*'s causal aggregate one cannot concede the possibility of *X* possessing *P* without possessing *Q*, (*ii*) that if one grants that *P* is *Q*'s total causal aggregate one cannot concede the possibility of *X* possessing *P* without possessing *Q*, (*iii*) that if one grants that *N* is *M*'s contradictory one cannot concede the possibility of *X* possessing both *M* and *N*; etc. etc. Gaṅgeśa's objection against this position is that if it is necessary to put to test the validity of all vyāpti whatsoever you cannot exempt from this test the vyāptis like. 'If *X* possesses P, *X* possesses a member (rather the whole) of *P*'s causal aggregate', 'If *X* possesses *Q*'s total causal aggregate, *X* possesses *Q*', 'If *X* possesses *M*'s contradictory, *X* cannot possess *N*', etc. Nor can it be argued, continues Gaṅgeśa, that the latter vyāptis have to be treated as valid because the validity of no other vyāpti can be tested if these vyāptis are not valid; for this argument is itself a case of inference and (on the opponent's view) the vyāpti underlying this argument stands in need of being tested like any other vyāpti[64]. From all

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this Gaṅgeśa concludes that 'landing in an absurd position in the case of doubt or denial' is the only criterion for testing the validity of a vyāpti. We are here reminded of the Mīmāṃsaka's argument against testing the validity of a piece of knowledge. And just as the Mīmāṃsaka was told there (by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician himself) that a normal waking man's practical experience is the ultimate criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge, Gaṅgeśa has to be told here that causal law is the ultimate criterion for testing the validity of a piece of inference and of the vyāpti underlying it.

That this suggestion should not be lost upon. Gaṅgeśa will become evident from a close examination of another polemic he has waged against the Mīmāṃsaka (rather a section among the Mīmāṃsakas). The Mīmāṃsaka is alleged to have maintained that repeated observation is the criterion for testing the validity of a vyāpti. Thus, e.g., on having repeatedly observed that smoke is accompanied by fire and having never observed that smoke is unaccompanied by fire we arrive at the vpāpti: 'If X possesses smoke, X possesses fire'. Now Gaṅgeśa finds this position unacceptable. But why? On Gaṅgeśa's showing, one who says that repeated observation and non-observation constitute the only basis for establishing vyāptis is bound to say that a particular probandum exists only in those places where it has been observed (by the cognizer concerned) to be accompanied by the probans concerned. But in an inference the pakṣa is ex-hypothesi the place which is found to possess the probans but whose possession of the probandum is doubtful. Hence the opponent in question is bound to say that all probandum exists only in a place which is other than pakṣa. But this amounts to saying that inference is an impossibility, for the sole aim of an inference is to prove the existence of the probandum in the pakṣa. On the other hand, Gaṅgeśa's own position is that the basis for establishing vyāptis is repeated observation and non-observation as buttressed by a favourable piece of hypothetical reasoning. This is the meaning of Gaṅgeśa's tersely formulated criticism to the effect that "those who say that repeated observation etc. alone, without being assisted by a favourable piece of hypothetical reasoning, are adequate to establish a vyāpti are bound to concede that 'not being pakṣa' is an invariable concomitant of 'possessing the probandum'; and that in turn will render all inference impossible."[65] Let us try to understand what this criticism amounts to. By hypothetical reasoning Gaṅgeśa means reasoning to the effect that such and such would not have been the case unless such and such was the case. His illustrations (as well as his explanations) also tend to imply that it is only in the case of well-ascertained causal relationships that we are entitled to argue to the effect that this thing would not have been

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there unless that other thing (which is proved to be its cause) was there. Thus Gaṅgeśa is here virtually telling the Mīmāṃsaka that not mere observations and non-observation but observations and non-observations resulting in the establishment of causal relationships are the basis for formulating vyāptis. And as thus understood Gaṅgeśa's position is not much different from that of the Buddhist.

38. But when all is said and done, the fact remains that it was the Buddhist logician's understanding of the causal law that was the most logical of all. For his firm conviction that all worthwhile inference, in order to be valid, must be based on some causal relationship or other enabled him to tackle the problem of causation with the utmost seriousness. The result was that the Buddhist could touch upon a number of problems the modern student of inductive Logic grapples with. The neo-Naiyāyika, in spite of his correct realization that the cause must be an invariable and non-accidental antecedent of the effect, got entangled in his (essentially misconceived) list of "accidentalities"—the so-called 'anyathāsiddhas[66]—, thus failing to emulate the example of his Buddhist predecessors who said a great many true and important things on how to distinguish between the cases of essential concomitance and those of accidental concomitance among things.

Thus what is known as the Buddhist "doctrine of grasping invariable concomitance through five non-cognitions and cognitions (more precisely, through three non-cognitions and two cognitions)" is in fact nothing but the 'doctrine that invariable concomitance (based on a causal relationship) is grasped only through an inductive experiment'. Let us explain. Suppose we have to ascertain whether the object-collocation x, y, z is or is not the cause of the object w; then we ought to conduct the following experiment :—

(i) First of all, see that neither the object-collocation x, y, z nor w is present there.

(ii) Then bring in the object-collocation-x, y, z and see if w follows; if it does not the experiment fails (i.e., in that case the object-collocation x, y, z is not at least the total cause of w), otherwise take the following step.

(iii) See what happens when x is removed but y and z left, when y is removed but x and z left, when z is removed but x and y left. If w disappears in each of these cases it follows that the total object-collocation x, y, z is the cause of w, otherwise the

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element (or elements) whose removal does not lead to the disappearance of *w* must be deemed superfluous.

Here the step (*i*) involves one non-cognition, the step (*ii*) involves two cognitions, while the step (*iii*) two non-cognitions; (the several sub-steps of the step (*iii*) are meant to demonstrate that the non-cognition of the total object-collocation *x*, *y*, *z* can come-about in several—to be precise, three—ways). That is to say, the experiment involves three non-cognitions and two cognitions. Thus we find that what appears to be a single and simple process is in fact a pretty complex one not only in the sense that it involves several steps but also in the sense that one of these steps involves several sub-steps. This aspect of the situation seems to have been overlooked by the anti-Buddhist logicians when they ask the Buddhist as to how a fivefold complex of cognitions and non-cognitions undertaken but once establishes for ever that the object-collocation *x*, *y*, *z* is the cause of *w*. Of course, we do not mean that any inductive experiment is foolproof in the sense that its findings can never be set aside by a future experiment (and if the Buddhist maintained a contrary position he was certainly mistaken). What we are hinting at is that inductive experimentation whose nature was understood by the Buddhist fairly correctly (at least, more correctly than by his other logician colleagues) is the only method of establishing even a tentatively valid causal relationship. Now in order to be able to meet a possible attack from the anti-logician let us also be clear about the exact nature and the source of this tentativeness. The above account of the experiment presupposes that *x*, *y* and *z* are, each of them, devoid of parts. But if *x*, e.g., is made up of parts it might be the case that the removal of one part of *x* results in the disappearance of *w* but not so the removal of its another part. In that circumstance a later experiment can amend—but not totally reject—the findings of an earlier one, for while the earlier experiment had told us that *x* is an element in the causal aggregate of *w* the later one will tell us that *this particular part of x* is such an element. Still later, the same kind of contingency can arise also in the case of that part of *x* which the second experiment has proved to be an element in the causal aggregate of *w*; that is to say, what is being said of *x* here can be amended—but not totally rejected—by a third experiment, and the process can go on *ad indefinitum*. (To have a full idea of the complexity involved in the situation let us recall that *x* is just one of the elements in the causal aggregate of *w*; that is to say, what is being said of *x* here can be said of *y* and *z* as well. A more general difficulty about all inductive experiments is that we cannot be absolutely sure that factors which are

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beyond our control or those which we have left out of notice are not influencing the processes under examination. But the only measure that we can take to counteract this difficulty is to conduct experiments in increasingly better controlled circumstances)[67].

89. The following passage from Dharmakīrti's Hetubindu should give us an idea of the type of considerations the Buddhist logicians have brought to bear upon the problem of causation, considerations broadly acceptable to all the Indian logicians[68] :—

When one thing is used as a hetu for inferring another thing this former thing must be an effect of the latter, for it is only between an effect and its cause that there obtains a relation of invariable concomitance. (In svabhāva-anumāna the hetu and sādhya are not two independent things but two names). One might say : 'If an effect is to act as a hetu for inferring the cause concerned, whatever character this effect is found to possess should act as a hetu for inferring any and every character of the case concerned. For it is the whole being of a cause that produces the whole being of the effect'. To this our reply is that this is not the case; for those characters of an effect which might possibly be there even in the absence of the cause cannot be treated as being due to this cause. Thus (*i*) only those characters which necessarily belong to a cause when it is producing the effect should be treated as belonging to it in case it is being inferred from this effect as hetu (for it is as possessed of these characters alone that this cause is a producer of this effect), and (*ii*) only those characters which necessarily belong to an effect when it is being produced by its cause should be treated as belonging to it in case it acts as hetu for inferring this cause (for it is as possessed of these characters that this effect is being produced by its cause). One might say : 'If that is so, *an effect in its entirety* no more remains the product of *the cause in its entirety*'. To this our reply is as follows : 'Suppose x in general is the cause of y in general. Now in case we happen to know that this particular type of x produces that particular type of y it will be valid to infer the existence of the former from the latter. But it will be invalid to infer the existence of this particular type of x from y in general and that because there obtains no

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relation of invariable concomitance between the two'. (To take an example supplied by the commentator, fire is the cause of smoke. Now in case we know what type of smoke is produced by hay-fire it will be valid to infer the existence of hay-fire from that type of smoke. But it will be invalid to infer the existence of hay-fire from smoke as such).

One might ask: 'Even if one thing is produced by another thing at one place and at one time why should it be the case that a thing belonging to the former type is produced by a thing of the latter type wherever and whenever such production takes place? And if that is not the case, there can obtain between the former thing and the latter neither the relation of concomitance-in-presence nor that of concomitance-in-absence'. To this our reply is that if all y is not an effect of some x y can be treated as an effect of x not even in a single case. For it is only when y is produced by nothing else but x while x produces nothing else but y that x is treated as the cause of y. Thus if in some cases smoke can be produced even without fire etc., it is not the nature of smoke to be produced by fire etc., and in that situation we will be compelled to conclude that smoke is produced by fire, etc. not even in a single case. That is to say, in that situation smoke will become like any other thing which is definitely known not to be a product of fire, etc. Nor shall then we be in a position to say that fire etc., produce smoke, for in that situation it will not be the nature of fire, etc., to produce smoke (just as it is not the nature of other causal aggregates to produce smoke). And certainly, it will not be proper to say that it is the nature of smoke to be produced by fire etc. in some cases and not to be produced by fire etc. in other cases: for a thing can possess but one nature. As a matter of fact, to say that in some cases a thing is produced by something which is by nature the producer of smoke while in other cases it is produced by something which is by nature a non-producer of smoke is to say that this former thing is both smoke and non-smoke by nature. Certainly, the nature of an effect is due to the nature of its cause, and there will arise the contingency of a thing coming into existence uncaused in case it is granted that the nature of this thing is not dependent on the nature of its cause.

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Thus we conclude that whatever is by nature the producer of smoke must be fire etc. and whatever is produced by fire etc. is alone smoke; that is to say, inasmuch as the natures of a cause and its effect are thus mutually determined it is inconceivable that an effect belonging to a particular type should be produced by something not belonging to the same type as the cause concerned. This is why a particular type of effect once found to have been produced by a particular type of cause is never available in the absence of something belonging to this latter type. Hence once we establish causal relationship between two things we are in a position to say that all things of the type of this effect are invariably preceded by something of the type of this cause.

One might say: 'But we find that a thing is sometimes produced even by something which does not belong to the same type as its cause. For example, śālūka (a mushroom plant) is sometimes produced by cowdung (which is different from śālūka-seed that is usually the cause of śālūka)'. To this our reply is that even this is not a case of one type of thing being produced by two types of cause (Dharmakīrti offers this reply by construing the objection as 'But we find that a thing is sometimes produced even by something which does not belong to the same type as the former thing' while his reply to the objection as construed above comes next—K. K. D.) Moreover, there is a difference in nature between a śālūka produced by cowdung and one produced otherwise. As a matter of fact, two things do not become of one nature simply on account of their similar outward appearance. For things similar in outward appearance might possibly possess traits which turn them into things of two different types. To view the same thing from another angle, if it is granted that things different in type can produce things identical in type we will not be in a position to say that things are different or non-different in type according as their causes are different or non-different in type; and in that case there will remain nothing to account for the difference and non-differences we come across in our day-to-day experience. This is to say that if things different in type do not produce things different in type there is no guarantee that things identical in type should produce things identical

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in type. And since there is no third alternative to difference and non-difference if the differences and non-differences obtaining among things remain unaccounted for the entire nature of a thing is unaccounted for. Now to say that the entire nature of a thing is unaccounted for is to say that this thing has got no cause. But a thing having no cause must be either an eternal entity or a non-entity; for the reason why a thing occurs at a particular time rather than at any other is that the cause of this thing is available at this time rather than at any other. If the coming into existence of a thing does not depend on the coming into existence of its cause there is no reason why a particular means should be adopted in order to achieve a particular end. It is because a certain particular type of cause is required to produce a certain particular type of effect that we seek to avail of this type of cause in case we desire to produce this type of effect. This happens because one particular type of things (and no others) have the capacity to produce another particular type of things; and the former type of things are by nature the producers of the latter type of things while the remaining types of things by nature the non-producers of this latter type of things. If a thing can be produced by something which is not by nature the producer of this thing there will remain no rule that one particular type of things (and no others) should have the capacity to produce one particular type of things; and in that case any thing might be expected to produce anything. On the other hand, if we accept the rule that one particular type of things (and no others) have the capacity to produce a particular type of things we can understand why the latter type of things are alone produced by the former type of things. This is how it comes about that an effect is never present there unless something that has been found to be its cause is also present there.

In fairness, let it be admitted that a similar detailed and passionate defence of the principle of causation we come across also in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts (e.g. in the opening section of Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali), but the Buddhist had a clearer and more correct realization of the issues involved here.

90. It was on the question of svabhāva-anumāna that the differences between the Brahmin and the Buddhist logicians were well-nigh

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unbridgeable and this was because the former seldom made a serious effort to understand what the latter was saying (though the latter's own lapses were at least partly responsible for this unfortunate situation). Udayana's passing criticism of svabhāva-anumāna is a good instance of the Naiyāyika's failure to understand the Buddhist case. Here is how it happens.

The Buddhist maintains that each entity is becoming different every moment but that there are moments when an entity becomes a strikingly different entity. Thus, e.g., a fire is becoming a different fire every moment but there comes a moment when this fire starts giving out smoke; similarly, a seed is becoming a different seed every moment but there comes a moment when this seed turns into a sprout. The Buddhist's technical name for the entities that produce entities strikingly different from themselves is 'kurvadrūpa'; thus fire that produces smoke is smoke-kurvadrūpa, seed that produces sprout sprout-kurvadrūpa. Now Udayana seeks to assail the Buddhist's case by arguing that in case an entity belongs to two classes one of these classes must be included in the other. For example, if a fire is both fire and kurvadrūpa either should the class fire be included in the class kurvadrūpa or *vice versa;* similarly, if a seed is both seed and kurvadrūpa either should the class seed be included in the class kurvadrūpa or *vice versa.* This is like maintaining that if a fire is both fire and yellow-coloured either should the class fire be included in the class yellow-coloured or *vice versa* or that if a seed is both seed and round-shaped either should the class seed be included in the class round-shaped or *vice versa.* Udayana thus rules out the possibility that there might be classes that partially include each other. But as a matter of fact, the classes fire and kurvadrūpa are classes that partially include each other; so also are the classes seed and kurvadrūpa, the classes fire and yellow-coloured, the classes seed and round-shaped. It is in this background[69] that we have to take note of Udayana's criticism that if an entity can belong to the class seed and also to the class kurvadrūpa (while neither is the class seed included in the class kurvadrūpa nor vice versa) then an entity may as well belong to the class horse and also to the class cow.[70]

The same misunderstanding leads Udayana to misunderstand the Buddhist's case on svabhāva-anumāna. Thus he argues that if an entity can belong to the class seed and also to the class kurvadrūpa (while neither is the class seed included in the class kurvadrūpa nor *vice versa*) then it is not necessary for an entity belonging to the class śiṃśapā to belong to the class tree (even if it is a fact that the class śiṃśapā is included in the class tree). The idea is that Udayana thinks that the Buddhist has no right

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to make logical use of the fact that a particular class is included in another if he (i.e., the Buddhist) grants the possibility of an entity belonging to two classes neither of which is included in the other. In this connection Udayana has considered a possible defence that the Buddhist might offer in support of his case on svabhāva-anumāna. The defence runs as follows: 'All the traits that make a tree a tree are present in a śiṃśapā; (Udayana's actual words tend to convey the reverse meaning that all the traits of śiṃśapā are present in a tree). Hence to imagine that a śiṃśapā lacks any of these traits is to imagine that this śiṃśapā lacks what makes it a śiṃśapā. Therefore, whatever is śiṃśapā must be a tree'. To this Udayana retorts: 'All the traits that make a śiṃśapā a śiṃśapā are present in it when it is a tree-with-shivering-leaves. Hence to imagine that a tree-with-shivering-leaves lacks any of these traits is to imagine that this tree lacks what makes it a tree-with-shivering-leaves. Therefore, whatever is a tree-with-shivering-leaves must be a śiṃśapā. (But since it is obviously possible for a tree to be a tree-with-shivering-leaves without being a śiṃśapā the defence offered above by the Buddhist must be faulty).' Udayana's retort is a clear evidence of his misunderstanding. For he can convincingly refute the Buddhist only if he succeeds in showing that śiṃśapās-with-shivering-leaves are not a sub-class of śiṃśapās. But he instead seeks to show that trees-with-shivering-leaves are not a sub-class of śiṃśapās, a proposition neither difficult to establish nor relevant. For the class constituted by śiṃśapās and the class constituted by trees-with-shivering-leaves are classes that partially include each other—just as the class seed and the class kurvadrūpa are classes that partially include each other. Hence there is nothing incongruous about an entity being a tree-with-shivering-leaves without being śiṃśapā (or *vice versa*), just as there is nothing incongruous about an entity being a seed without being kurvadrūpa (and *vice versa*). On the other hand, it is palpably impossible for an entity to be a śiṃśapā without being a tree, and that in turn is because śiṃśapās constitute a sub-class of trees.

91. As to the other type of svabhāva-anumāna, the Buddhist's own formulation of the case is partly faulty. Thus he thought that the inference. 'If x is real, x is momentary' ought to be as much self-obvious as the inference 'If x is śiṃśapā, x is tree'. But what actually happens in the cases of the former type is that we have to show that each of the two classes in question is equivalent to a third well-known class, and that is not always an easy task (particularly when the matter relates to such fundamental metaphysical questions as momentarism and the like). Thus in order to demonstrate the validity of the inference 'If x is a rational animal,

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x is a featherless biped' we have to show that each of the classes 'rational animal' and 'featherless biped' is equivalent to the class 'man'. As a matter of fact, this is what the Buddhist himself does while demonstrating the validity of the case cited by him. For he first seeks to show that an entity, in order to be real, must be practically efficient, and then that an entity, in order to be practically efficient, must be momentary; that is to say, he shows that each of the classes 'real' and 'momentary' is equivalent to the class 'practically efficient'. But to be convinced of all this is not a question of Logic alone. Even then to deny, as was done by the Brahmin logicians, that the Buddhist was resorting here to a distinct type of inference was incorrect and this is all that matters to a student of Logic.

(iv) Hetvābhāsas or the Possible Fallacies of Inference.

92. The problem of hetvābhāsa (pseudo-hetu, fallacious probans) is an integral part of the problem of valid inference, just as the problem of erroneous knowledge is an integral part of the problem of valid knowledge. Just as a piece of erroneous knowledge appears to be a piece of valid knowledge but is not so, a hetvābhāsa or pseudo-probans appears to be a valid hetu but is not so. However, it took some time before the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians could directly link the problem of pseudo-hetu with that of valid hetu, and the procedure was in all probability adopted under the influence of a similar practice on the part of the Buddhist. Thus the five types of pseudo-hetus recognized in old Nyāya circles were: savyabhicāra, viruddha, sādhyasama, prakaraṇasama and kālātīta; gradually, the names were changed into anaikāntika, viruddha, asiddha, satpratipakṣa and bādhita, and their definitions properly modified so as to make a pseudo-hetu a result of the violation of this or that condition of valid hetu.[71] As we have seen, the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians would consider the following to be the essential conditions of a valid hetu :—

(i) It must reside in pakṣa,

(ii) It must reside in some sapakṣa,

(iii) It must reside in no vipakṣa (to say, as was often done, that it must not reside in some vipakṣa will not do),

(iv) It must not be such that the absence of its sādhya in pakṣa may be inferred from another hetu,

(v) It must not be such that the absence of its sādhya in pakṣa may be known through perception, verbal testimony, etc., (i.e., through some non-inferential knowledge).

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(The conditions (*ii*) and (*iii*) can be jointly formulated as: The hetu must have with sādhya the relation of vyāpti or invariable concomitance.)

And they pointed out that the five pseudo-hetus recognized in their school result from the violation of these conditions in the following manner :—

(1) *Asiddha* (of two kinds) results from the violation of the condition (*i*);

(2) *Anaikāntika* (of three kinds) results from the violation of the conditions (*ii*) and (*iii*);

(3) *Viruddha* also results from the violation of the conditions (*ii*)-(*iii*);

(4) *Satpratipakṣa* results from the violation of the condition (*iv*);

(5) *Bādhita* results from the violation of the condition (*v*)[72].

The Buddhist, as we have further seen, considered the conditions (*iv*) and (*v*) to be redundant; it was therefore natural for him to reject the satpratipakṣa and bādhita types of pseudo-hetus and accept only the remaining three, viz. asiddha, anaikāntika and viruddha.[73] The neo-Naiyāyika, in spite of his virtual acceptance of the Buddhist amendment to the effect that the necessary conditions of a valid hetu are just two, viz. (*i*) its residence in pakṣa, and (*ii*) its relatedness to sādhya by the relation of vyāpti or invariable concomitance, continued to accept all the five types of pseudo-hetus admitted in the old school and thus involve himself in unnecessary difficulties (these difficulties were particularly acute in the case of satpratipakṣa and bādhita—the types that result from the violation of those two redundant conditons)[74].

93. Let us now see in details how the various types of pseudo-hetus result from the violation of the different conditions of valid hetu :—

(1) *Asiddha* results from the violation of the condition that a hetu must reside in pakṣa. This violation might occur in two ways, one when the hetu does not reside in the pakṣa, the other when the pakṣa is unreal. The former, whose illustration is: 'The lake possesses fire, because it possesses smoke', is called svarūpa-asiddha; the latter, whose illustration is: 'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is lotus', is called āśraya-asiddha. (A third type of asiddha—called vyāpyatva-asiddha—is also sometimes spoken of. It is described in two entirely different ways. Sometimes its defect is said to lie in its not

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having with sādhya a genuine relation of vyāpti, [75] but then it becomes identical with sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika to be described below. At other times its defect is said to lie in its being unreal, or in its having an unreal sādhya, or in its verbal expression containing a superfluous element[76]. Now an unreal hetu or hetu with unreal sādhya will be on a par with a hetu with unreal pakṣa, but superfluous elements in verbal expression should not invalidate an otherwise valid hetu).

(2) *Anaikāntika* results from the violation of the condition that a hetu must be related to sādhya by vyāpti relation. Thus in the inference. 'The mountain possesses fire, because it possesses rocks' the alleged hetu is a pseudo-hetu of the anaikāntika type because there is no relation of vyāpti between rocks and fire. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians in fact divide anaikāntika into three sub-types, viz., sādhāraṇa, asādhāraṇa and anupasaṃhārin, and the illustration given here is a case falling under the first. But the two sub-types asādhāraṇa and anupasaṃhārin are conceived in a confused manner. E. g. a case of asādhāraṇa, whose illustration is 'Word is eternal, because it is word', is deemed invalid because here the hetu has nothing but the pakṣa to reside in; but it is difficult to see how it is a case of violating the condition that hetu must stand related to sādhya by vyāpti-relation. As a matter of fact, if the hetu is here related to sādhya by vyāpti relation the inference in question will become valid in spite of the fact that the hetu has nothing but the pakṣa to reside in. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician might say that to treat anaikāntika as a case of the violation of the vyāpti condition is a Buddhist heresy, but to say that will be folly. In any case, a hetu which has nothing but the pakṣa to reside in is not necessarily a pseudo-hetu and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians know it as is evident from their mutual differences on this question. Thus some of them would say that only those cases of asādhāraṇa are really invalid where hetu and sādhya do not coexist in the pakṣa, [77] but since in these cases pakṣa is the only place where hetu exists this is tantamount to saying that only those cases of asādhāraṇa are really invalid where hetu and sādhya are not related by vyāpti relation. Similarly, about anupasaṃhār-in—the alleged third sub-type of anaikāntika—it is said that its cases arise when either pakṣa or sādhya or hetu is universally

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present [78]; e.g. 'Everything is non-eternal, because it is a produced entity' is such a case, because 'everything' is pakṣa here. But here too it is difficult to see how these are the cases of the violation of the vyāpti-condition. As a matter of fact, these cases violate no condition of valid hetu; nay as we have noted earlier, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician himself posits a type of inference where sādhya is universally present and Gaṅgeśa's main wrath against the *prima facie* definitions of vyāpti is on account of their inapplicability to the cases of this type.

(3) *Viruddha* too results from the violation of the condition that a hetu must be related to sādhya by vyāpti relation. But its mode of doing so is different from that of anaikāntika. Thus while in anaikāntika the sādhya is simply not an invariable concomitant of hetu in viruddha the absence of sādhya is an invariable concomitant of hetu, e.g., the inference 'Word is eternal, because it is a produced entity' is a case of viruddha, because (according to both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist philosophers) whatever is a produced entity is non-eternal.

(4) *Satpratipakṣa* (admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians alone) results from the violation of the condition that a rival hetu), i.e. a hetu which might prove the absence of sādhya in pakṣa, must not be present there in pakṣa. Now it is obvious that two hetus, one of which must prove the existence of a sādhya in a pakṣa and the other the absence of this very sādhya in this very pakṣa, cannot be accepted simultaneously by any sane person. One may no doubt entertain the possibility of either of these hetus turning out to be valid but that will not be a case of using these as hetus proper, i.e., not a case of inference. True, a hetu will turn invalid in case it can be pointed out that there exists a rival hetu to prove the absence of sādhya in pakṣa. But this pointing out will only demonstrate that the alleged hetu (now turned invalid) must be either non-existent in pakṣa or unrelated to sādhya by vyāpti relation, i.e., it must be violating either of the two necessary conditions of valid hetu.

(5) *Bādhita* (admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians alone) results from the violation of the condition that no perception,

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verbal testimony etc., i.e., no non-inferential knowledge must be there to prove the absence of sādhya in pakṣa. Here also the presence of such perception etc., will only demonstrate that the alleged hetu (now turned invalid) must be either non-existent in pakṣa or unrelated to sādhya by vyāpti relation, i.e., it must be violating either of the two necessary conditions of valid hetu.

(3) Verbal Testimony.

94. How words and sentences come to have a meaning was a problem much discussed in Nyāya as well as Mīmāṃsā circles. Both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophers considered it to be a curious phenomenon that certain words and sentences uttered here and now have a meaning irrespective of whether the things meant thereby do or do not exist here and now. Thus the sentence 'There are five fruits on the bank of the river' has a meaning irrespective of whether it is uttered by a person seated on the bank of the river in question or by a man seated elsewhere; as a matter of fact, this sentence has a meaning even in case there are no fruits at all on the bank of the river. Recognition that words can convey information (or misinformation) concerning absent—and even fictitious—things became a source of much confused thinking on the part of the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas[79].

95. The Mīmāṃsaka argued that a word has a natural capacity to express the meaning it does; the Naiyāyika argued that a word comes to have a meaning which has been assigned to it by convention (the ultimate source of this convention being God). But what do we understand by 'meaning'? Words are humanly produced tools by means of which man gives precise expression to his knowledge, just as axes and ploughs are humanly produced tools by means of which man procures things of his daily use. And 'meaning' is the function performed by words, just as 'cutting' is the function performed by axes and 'ploughing' the function performed by ploughs. Thus it is men who 'mean' things by means of words, just as it is men who cut trees by means of axes and plough fields by means of ploughs. That is to say, it is only in a figurative sense that we may say that a word means this or that thing, just as it is only in a figurative sense that we can say that an axe cuts this or that tree or a plough ploughs this or that field. Employment of words enabled man to take ample notice of absent (and even fictitious) things, and this in the long run made him infinitely superior to animals, just as employment of tools enabled man to produce things of his daily use, and this in the long run made him infinitely superior to animals.

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Most of these considerations were absent from the minds of the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas when they undertook an investigation into the nature of words and their capacity to mean things. Hence their bewilderment when they discovered that words can convey information (or misinformation) concerning absent (and even fictitous) things. They failed to realize that a particular case of employment of words is indicative of a particular piece of knowledge possessed by the person employing these words, just as a particular case of employment of tools of production is indicative of a particular type of productive efficiency possessed by the person employing these tools. And words can be employed to convey not only knowledge and half-knowledge but also sheer stupidities, just as tools of production can be employed not only properly and improperly but also uselessly. In this connection the Mīmāṃsaka committed a more serious mistake than did the Naiyāyika. For the Naiyāyika always insisted—and rightly—that employment of words is possible only on the part of a person, whereas the Mīmāṃsaka always talked as if employment of words is possible not only on the part of a person but also on the part of 'nobody'. Thus the Naiyāyika reached an almost correct conclusion that a piece of knowledge conveyed through words is true only in case the person employing these words is trustworthy; the Mīmāṃsaka, on the other hand, reached a preposterous conclusion that a piece of knowledge conveyed through words is true not only in case the person employing these words is trustworthy but also in case these words are uttered by nobody.

However, even the Naiyāyika could not resist the temptation of treating 'employment of words' as an altogether new variety of knowledge (rather than a means of conveying knowledge). In point of fact, the case of one person 'employing words' in the presence of another person is a case of the former person imparting to the latter person a piece of ready-made knowledge which will become a part and parcel of the latter person's knowledge-system only to the extent that he is successful in 'receiving and digesting' the knowledge that is being thus imparted to him. And since the case of 'receiving a piece of knowledge from someone else and then digesting it' is on a par with the case of 'perceiving a mark (i.e., hetu of Indian Logic) and then inferring its invariable concomitant' what is treated as a separate instrument of valid knowledge under the title 'verbal testimony' is in fact a special type of inferential knowledge. Here it is interesting to not that 'verbal testimony' was sought to be brought under inference not only by the Buddhist but also by the early Vaiśeṣika authors, though in the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school this Vaiśeṣika doctrine is always considered to be a *prima facie* rather than final doctrine. To appreciate this point of

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difference between the early Vaiśeṣika authors and the orthodox Naiyāyikas let us examine more closely the nature of verbal testimony.

96. Strictly speaking, it is not the singly pronounced words but full-fledged sentences that are capable of conveying information. That 'capacity to convey information' is the property of sentences not words is what the Naiyāyika submits when he tells us that the proper 'instrument of verbal knowledge' is sentence not words. The same idea is coveyed when the Naiyāyika tells us that a word has while a sentence does not have an 'abhidhāna' and that a sentence has while a word does not have a 'tātparya'[80]. Here if we agree to maintain that a sentance has 'intention' but not 'meaning' we can translate the Naiyāyika's 'abhidhāna' as 'meaning' and his 'tātparya' as 'intention', but if we wish to maintain that sentences have 'meaning' let us be clear that in that case 'meaning' will mean what the Naiyāyika means by 'tātparya' while 'abhidhāna' will need another English equivalent; e.g., we may then say that words have denotation while sentences have meaning, for 'denotation' will stand here for the Naiyāyika's 'abhidhāna' and 'meaning' for his 'tātparya'. Now a sentence is a 'collection of significant words combined in conformity to the grammatical rules of the language concerned'; if we agree to call only significant words 'words' this definition can omit the word 'significant'. By 'significance' of a word we mean a word's conventionally fixed capacity to stand for a thing, action, character (of things or of actions) etc., It is the conventional character of the capacity of a word to stand for things, etc., which explains why a word that is significant for one social group may not be so (and generally is not so) for another group speaking a language different from that of the former. Again, not only are the denotations of different words fixed conventionally but the grammatical rules for forming sentences out of words are also fixed in the same manner; this accounts for the fact that different languages have different grammatical rules. Understood as a 'collection of significant words combined in conformity to the grammatical rules of the language concerned' every sentence has a capacity to convey some information or other; but there might be cases when this information is not simply wrong but downright absurd. For example, the word-collection 'delay eats table-tennis' satisfies the basic condition of sentencehood, and it is capable of conveying the information that the thing signified by the word 'delay' performs the action signified by the word 'eat' while this action has for its object the thing signified by the word 'table-tennis'. But this information is absurd inasmuch as delay is not the type of thing that may perform the action called eating nor table-tennis the type of thing that may be an object of this action. It

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was absurd sentences like this (our stock illustration was 'hundred elephants are seated on the finger-tip') that proved a headache to the Naiyāyika (as to many other Indian logicians) who always sought so to define 'sentence' as to eliminate these awkward cases from his purview.

Thus we were told that the things etc. signified by the words of a genuine sentence have the 'capacity to combine together'. But this was a subjective criterion, for one may have a wrong notion as to whether certain things etc., have the 'capacity to combine together'. At the best, this criterion can help one in dismissing a sentence which is absurd on the very face of it, that is to say, it cannot always enable one to determine whether a particular word-collection is or is not a sentence. The Naiyāyika also at times hit upon a better criterion, but as a general practice he hesitated to insist on it too much. This criterion was the speaker's intention; and certainly the essential function of a word-collection of the nature of a sentence is to convey the speaker's intention. If a sentence has been able to convey to you the speaker's intention it has served its purpose; it is no business of this sentence to tell you whether the speaker intends to describe to you a truth or a falsity (or an absurdity). Those—like the early Vaiśeṣika authors—who wished to treat verbal testimony as a kind of inference only meant to submit that a sentence is the indicative mark of the speaker's intention (for here we can always have vyāpti to the effect 'Whoever utters such and such a sentence intends to convey such and such an information'); those like the orthodox Naiyāyikas who wished to treat verbal testimony as an independent instrument of valid knowledge thought that a sentence does something more. But what more can a sentence do? If the speaker is an authority on what he is speaking his intention is most probably to convey a truth to the hearer; if he is not such an authority his intention is most probably to convey (in good faith or otherwise) a falsity to the hearer. But all this is not revealed to the hearer by the speaker's sentences quâ sentences. It was his failure to realize this that made the Naiyāyika talk as if 'understanding a sentence' is the same thing as 'knowing a sentence to be true'; for otherwise he would not have insisted that verbal testimony (better called 'uttering a sentence') is an independent instrument of valid knowledge. To be an instrument of valid knowledge a sentence has to be uttered by an authoritative person and in a form understandable to the hearer concerned; but this is not the function of a sentence quâ sentence. The Naiyāyika always failed to distinguish between the role of a sentence quâ sentence and the role of a sentence quâ the utterance of an authoritative person.

97. Let us take an example or two. Udayana, while polemizing against the Vaiśeṣika position that verbal testimony is a type of inference rather than an independent instrument of valid knowledge, argues [81]: "What do

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you seek to infer? Is it that the things denoted by the words of this sentence *are* combined together or that they *are capable* of being combined together. Not the former, for that is not true of the sentences uttered by an unauthoritative person. Nor will it do to qualify 'this sentence' as 'this sentence uttered by an authoritative person'. For such qualification of a sentence cannot be ascertained prior to understanding its meaning. Hence what is necessary is somehow to find out that the speaker is under no misconception as to the concerned subject-matter. And this cannot be done without first grasping the concerned combination-of-the-denotations (i.e., the concerned sentential meaning)." 'Soon afterwards the same point is urged against the Prabhākarite Mīmāṃsaka who too is of the view that a sentence uttered by an ordinary person (though not a Vedic sentence) becomes an instrument of valid knowledge only in case it is used as a probans in some inference. "It might be said", remarks Udayana, "that in the case of an ordinary sentence we need to be certain as to the authoritative character of the speaker concerned; but that is not proper, for wirds (i.e., sentences) are found to convey their meaning even in the absence of that (i. e., in the absence of an ascertainment as to the authoritative character of the speaker concerned)"[82]. Now what is the precise nature of this inference which the Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites have in mind when they submit that a sentence, in order to be an instrument of valid knowledge, must be used as a probans in some inference? There is a simple answer to this question. The hearer first makes out as to how the speaker has described a particular situation, and then recollects whether the speaker is or is not an authority concerning the type of situation he is now describing to him; in case the speaker *is* such an authority the hearer draws the conclusion that the situation *is* (rather most probably is) as described by the speaker, while in case the speaker *is not* such an authority the hearer draws the conclusion that the situation *is not* (rather most probably is not) as described by the speaker. Thus the Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākarites will have to grant (and will grant) that on hearing a sentence the hearer must first make out as to how the speaker has described the situation, but they will go on to add—and rightly—that this 'making out' is not what we ordinarily understand by 'knowing through verbal testimony'. Udayana, on the other hand, will have us believe that it is this 'making out' that is what we understand by 'knowing through verbal testimony'. As a matter of fact, as we have just noted, even this 'making out' is a case of inference where the major premis is of the form 'Whoever utters such and such a sentence intends to convey such an information'.

98. Jayanta likewise comes out against the contention that verbal testimony is an inferential knowledge where the authoritativeness of the

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speaker concerned acts as probans. 'It is one thing', he says quoting Kumārila 'to argue that such and such a sentence conveys true knowledge because it is uttered by an authority, but it is quite another thing to grasp the meaning of this sentence. As a matter of fact, grasping the meaning is the pre-condition of the argument in question. Hence the fact that the truth of the knowledge conveyed by a sentence has to be inferred from the authoritativeness of the speaker concerned does not mean that grasping the meaning of a sentence is a case of acquiring inferential knowledge'[83]. Jayanta's rejoinder makes sense only in case 'receiving a piece of knowledge through verbal testimony' is equated with 'grasping the meaning of a sentence uttered by someone'. But the equation is obviously invalid[84]. In the course of refuting the alleged Buddhist position that words are inherently incapable of describing the ultimate reality Jayanta himself says[85]: 'Words are by nature a revealer of things but not a true revealer or a false revealer thereof. ....And the reason why certain words convey true knowledge while certain others do not is that the former words are uttered by authoritative persons while the latter ones by unauthoritative persons. ....Thus if somebody utters words without taking into consideration the concerned state of affairs the fault lies with the speaker and not with the words in question. ....As a matter of fact, words are simply a means of conveying one man's knowledge to another'. Jayanta has to realize that a *means of conveying knowledge* is not an *instrument of valid knowledge*. And then he can see that the position he is defending is not much different from the Vaiśeṣika-*cum*-Prabhākarite position under fire from his side.

99. The following passage from Sālikanātha, the Prabhākarite, should give a fairly clear idea of the arguments of those who would reduce verbal testimony to a case of inference; (only we have to keep in mind that Sālikanātha, after seeking to prove that the ordinary cases of verbal testimony are in fact cases of inference, will go on to add that there is also a case of verbal testimony—viz., the testimony coming from the authorless Vedas—which cannot be so reduced to a case of inference)[86]:—

> So far as humanly uttered words are concerned their status is not, according to us, different from that of inference. In so far as the composition of an ordinary sentence depends on some person it can always be doubted that such a sentence is not true of facts; and this means that such a sentence does not automatically enable us to ascertain facts. It is our common experience that people often compose sentences which describe things as they

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are not; hence it is that the humanly uttered sentences do not enable us to ascertain as to how things in themselves stand in relation to each other. As to why people compose untrue sentences, it may be due to an illusion, to a defective motive, to carelessness, or to incapacity. Thus even while things are capable of standing in such mutual relationship as is depicted by a human sentence we cannot be certain that they in fact stand so related; this is because human sentences are often found to depict things as related in a fashion that is not the case.....................Thus in so far as the validity of a human sentence can always be doubted the mere hearing of such a sentence can never yield true knowledge; what is necessary in this connection is ascertainment on the hearer's part that the speaker concerned has had a perceptual (i. e., first-hand) knowledge concerning things described by his sentence. It is for inferring this perceptual knowledge earlier had (if at all) by the speaker that the sentence uttered by him acts as a probans. In the case of a person who is known to speak only after having had a perceptual knowledge the spoken sentence is invariably accompanied by a prior perceptual knowledge; that is why this sentence becomes a probans for inferring this perceptual knowledge. And since a perceptual knowledge of things is knowledge of things as they are a knowledge of this knowledge also becomes a knowledge of things as they are. Thus in this case a knowledge of things as they are is had through inference while the concerned spoken sentence acts as a mere translator of this knowledge; for orginally this sentence is but a probans for inferring the perceptual knowledge earlier had by the speaker. (Thus a human sentence is a probans for inferring an original knowledge and is also a translator of this knowledge; but in no case is this sentence itself a source of original knowledge.) The reason why a human sentence acts as a probans for inferring a perceptual knowledge is that this sentence is an effect of this knowledge; certainly, it is agreed on all hands that an effect is a valid probans for inferring the cause. Thus a human sentence, in so far as it is a mere translator of some other knowledge, cannot be classed under 'verbal testimony (lit. scripture)'. (The idea is that verbal testimony is to be an original source of knowledge and not a mere translator of some other knowledge.)...........Here it might be said that a human sentence first enables us to

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know the concerned state of affairs itself (rather than the speaker's intention to describe this state of affairs), for otherwise we cannot even have inference to the effect that the speaker intends to describe such and such a state of affairs. ....To this we reply as follows. A human sentence, since its validity can always be doubted, can never yield an ascertained piece of knowledge. It is in this sense that we say that a human sentence yields no knowledge. Otherwise, even without having a prior knowledge of things depicted by the sentence spoken to him an intelligent hearer can always say to himself: 'Here is an authoritative person who is uttering words that denote things which possess (*prima facie*) competence to combine with one another. Hence this person must have had first known these things as thus combined. For this person never intends to describe things as they are not known to him to be: that is, this person is free from defects that are possible in a person.'

Almost the entire stand underlying this passage is substantially sound.

100. It is against these Prabhākarite heresies that Pārthasārathi, the Kumārilite, wages a lively polemic 87. At the very outset he notices that the Prabhākarites (rather the unnamed heretics) argue that even if knowledge imparted through sentences uttered by this person or that is often found to go wrong this is not a case of verbal testimony going wrong, for according to them the knowledge in question is a case not of verbal testimony but of inference, that is of inferring the speaker's intention. As against this, Pārthasārathi offers the following counter-argument: "We have shown elsewhere that a sentence cannot perform two functions, viz., (*i*) to yield a meaning, and (*ii*) to act as a probans for inferring the intention of the speaker concerned. (That is, if a sentence is treated as a probans for inferring the intention of the speaker concerned it remains inexplicable as to what then yields the meaning of this sentence.) As for the fear that words being incapable of getting vitiated by human defects to concede the possibility of erroneous verbal knowledge amounts to declaring that words are inherently vitiated by defects we say that this would be so if the person speaking a sentence is simply manifesting this sentence (and not producing it); but as a matter of fact, a human sentence is produced (not manifested) by the speaker. For it is only letters and words that are eternal while the sentences (in so far as and) inasmuch as they are human, are produced by human beings. Certainly, if it be said about the human sentences that they are eternally present there and are only manifested (by the speaker concerned) that will

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amount to exalting these sentences to the status of the Vedic ones that are by nature authorless. Moreover, if all sentences are eternally present there (and are only manifested by the speaker concerned) a sentence cannot be treated as a probans for inferring the intention of the speaker (rather 'manifestor') concerned, just as Vedic sentences (which are eternally present there and are only manifested by a reader) are not treated as a probans for inferring the intention of the reader concerned. And if it is said that sentences of a person cannot be treated as verbal testimony because they often give false information; one may retort that sentences of a person cannot be treated as probans for inferring the intention of this person because they often fail to reveal the *real* intention of this person. For a man might possibly express through his sentences what he knows not to be the case. Moreover, words are inherently capable of yielding knowledge just as eyes etc. are—so that no difficulty ought to arise owing to the fact that words are often found to yield erroneous knowledge (just as no difficulty arises owing to fact that eyes etc., are often found to yield erroneous knowledge). Take another example. A probans is by definition that which is invariably accompanied by the probandum so that an alleged probans is no probans in case it is not invariably accompanied by the probandum concerned. (Similarly, only those sentences are to be treated as verbal testimony which yield true knowledge.)..........................As a matter of fact, even while inferring the speakers' intention from his sentence one has to determine as to what the words of this sentence denote and as to whether these denotations are capable of combning with each other; but as soon as all this is done the meaning of the sentence becomes obvious to the hearer (who is out to resort to inference as to the speaker's intention)—so that one does not have to wait for an inference in order to make out the meaning of a sentence." . . . . . .

A careful perusal of Pārthasārathi's argument will at once disclose that he is banking on the circumstance that all sentences whatsoever are capable of conveying some information or other. But from the fact that a sentence uttered in whatever circumstance is a sentence that *is capable of conveying* a piece of information it certainly does not follow that a sentence uttered in whatever circumstance *conveys* a piece of information. However, Pārthasārthi must resort to some such fallacious reasoning if he is to demonstrate, that verbal testimony is an altogether new type of instrument of valid knowledge. To this extent Pārthasārathi is repeating the folly of Udayana and Jayanta (whose stand on this question was critically surveyed by us just before.), even if the latter will dissociate themselves from the unanimous Mīmāṃsā position that Vedas are a conglomeration of eternally existing

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sentences which are only manifested when this or that person happens to recite this or that portion thereof.

101. The controversy as to the character of the verbal testimony throws an interesting side-light on our logicians' attitude towards scriptural knowledge. As we have repeatedly emphasized, these logicians were chiefly interested in matters empirical and worldly, but each of them was a member of some one of the several churches into which the laity was divided in India of those days. not unnaturally did the rabidly orthodox theologians harbour towards Logic and its advocates an attitude of unconcealed suspicion, if not of positive hostility. By way of self-defence so to say, the logician deemed it desirable to define his stand *vis-a-vis* scriptures in general and his own scripture in particular. As a general rule, the logician granted that there are certain truths which are not open to sense-perception and inference based thereupon; but which stand incorporated in particular scriptural texts—the Brahmin would add that these texts are Vedas, the Buddhist that they are Piṭakas and the Jaina that are (his) Āgamas. But beyond this the logician would not go, that is he would not concede that scriptures are an authority on all matters whatsoever as was being demanded by rank orthodoxy. Nay, the more independent-minded among the logicians were themselves demanding that scriptures should not speak of matters that go against the findings of sense-perception and inference; this, e.g., was the stand taken by Dharmakīrti who, after conceding that there are certain matters concerning which people would not but rely on the high authority called scripture, expected that the scriptures would contain nothing that stands contradicted by perception and inference[88]. This was perhaps the farthest that an Indian logician could go and did go in the exercise of his freedom in relation to theological matters; the more usual practice was to adopt a more timid and apologetic attitude (and Dharmakīrti himself adopts such an attitude elsewhere).

102. Thus most logicians themselves adduced arguments why scriptures in general and their own scriptures in particular are the repository of a certain higher kind of truths dealt with by the theologians—though never perhaps would a logician grant that scriptures might teach things that stand contradicted by perception and inference[89]. It goes without saying that all this was little but special pleading irrespective of whether the texts sought to be vindicated were Vedas, Piṭakas or Āgamas. But what is important and relevant for our purpose is that this special pleading, sincere but summary, was the price the logician was paying in order to buy freedom to occupy himself exclusively with matters empirical and worldly. This was the case not only with that truly monstrous Mīmāṃsā contention that Vedas are blameless because authorless but also with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

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argument that Vedas tell nothing but truth because they are a divine composition and with the plea offered by the Buddhists and Jainas that their respective scriptures are authoritative because they incorporate the sayings of Masters who came to develop transcendental vision as a result of penance and the like. For the rest the logician's treatment of verbal testimony itself was empirical to the core—as should have become evident to any one who has followed the account given by us above of the various positions adopted in this connection by the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The controversy, as we saw, centred around two points. viz., (*i*) Is verbal testimony an independent type of instrument of valid knowledge or is it but a case of inference? (*ii*) How do words and sentences come to acquire meaning? We have already taken sufficient note of the first point and discussion on it can be summarized in a few words; (the second point will be taken up again at the end of this summarization).

103. That verbal testimony is an unique instrument of valid knowledge was a position the Mīmāṃsaka needed most urgently, for he had qualms about his contention that Vedas are authorless texts. It was only after showing that words have a miraculous power of yielding valid knowledge—a power shared by no other instrument of valid knowledge—that the Mīmāṃsaka could plausibly go on to maintain that words also have an ultra-miraculous powers of automatically, that is, without any author being needed to put them together, assuming the form of Vedic texts. Thus so long as the Mīmāṃsaka stuck to his absurd thesis of authorless Vedic texts it was impossible for anyone to convince him that verbal testimony is not an independent instrument of valid knowledge. As a matter of fact, the Prabhākarite Mīmāṃsaka himself argued that the ordinary, i.e., non-Vedic-cases of verbal testimony are but cases of inference, an argument for which he was severly taken to task by his Kumārilite camp-follower; but no Mīmāṃsaka would ever concede that Vedas are not an unique instrument of valid knowledge.

104. The Naiyāyika was, perhaps, taken in by the Mīmāṃsā casuistry on the question, for even though he was quite convinced of the absurdity of the Mīmāṃsaka's contention that words themselves assume the form of Vedic texts he was as anxious as the latter to safeguard the sanctity of these texts. The Naiyāyika might have thought that one way of doing so was to allow that verbal testimony is an independent instrument of valid knowledge, but the way he argued his case leaves one in no doubt that he could posibly be convinced of his mistake. For the Naiyāyika's account of verbal testimony is uniformly applicable to the Vedic as well as non-Vedic cases, and if it could be shown that the ordinary cases of verbal testimony

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are cases of inference the argument could easily by extended to the case of Vedic testimony. As a matter of fact, the Vaiśeṣika, whose understanding of the character of Vedic texts is absolutely identical with that of the Naiyāyika, finds no difficulty in reducing all verbal testimony to a case of inferential knowledge. The common Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position as regards the Vedic texts is that they are composed by God who is an authority on matters dealt with in these texts, and they agree in maintaining that a verbal testimony yields valid knowledge only in case the speaker concerned is an authority on the matters he is talking about. So the only point of difference between the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika relates to the question whether or not the valid knowledge yielded by verbal testimony is of inferential kind. And on this question we have already found the Vaiśeṣika position (also a Prabhākarite position so far as it concerns ordinary verbal testimony) to be more satisfactory than that upheld by the Naiyāyika.

105. Among the non-Brahmanical logicians the Jaina adopted a position essentially akin to that of the Naiyāyika while the Buddhist one essentially akin to that of the Vaiśeṣika. But here an explanation is required. Since the Buddhist posits no instrument of valid knowledge in addition to perception and inference his critics talk as if, according to him, words have no role to play in the acquisition of knowledge. It was perhaps this realization which led Dharmakīrti, in the very first verse of his magnum opus, to first define valid knowledge as 'cognition that is not untrue (of its object)' and then hasten to add : "This characteristic of 'being not untrue (of its object)' is present also in verbal cognition which imparts information as to the speaker's intention. The hearer becomes cognizant of something as the object of the speaker's intention, and in relation to something as thus understood the speaker's words are an instrument of valid knowledge even if they are not so in relation to the thing as such 90." Elsewhere the same idea is expressed as follows: "Since words are not invariably associated with the corresponding objects they cannot establish the existence of these objects; what they do indicate is the speaker's intention. ....And knowledge acquired through the words of a trustworthy person is treated as inferential because it is true of its object just like a piece of inferential knowledge." At a third place we are told: "The speaker's word is neither the subimplicant nor the effect of the corresponding object, while there is no relation of invariable concomitance except that between a subimplicant and its superimplicant or between an effect and its cause. It might be said that a speaker utters words after having observed the corresponding objects (so that there is a relation of invariable concomitance between these words and these objects), but in that case we shall like it to be explained how two speakers utter mutually contradictory words in relation

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to the same object." And this is how Dharmakīrti defines 'scripture': "A scripture is the utterance of the person whose words are corroborated by the (accredited) instruments of valid knowledge (i.e., by perception and inference)." These passages leave no room for doubt as to the real Buddhist position on the question of verbal testimony. Akalaṅka, the Jaina, misunderstands the Buddhist case in a manner that is typical of the anti-Buddhist logicians. Thus always keeping Dharmakīrti's words in mind he argues in support of the thesis that verbal testimony is an altogether new instrument of valid knowledge. This is how his argument runs 91: "Perception, memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning, inference, etc., are the genuine cases of valid knowledge if they are not contradicted by another piece of valid knowledge while they are the pseudo-cases of valid knowledge if they are so contradicted. The same distinction obtains between the genuine cases and the pseudo-cases of verbal testimony. Verbal testimony is an instrument of valid knowledge not only in relation to the speaker's intention but also in relation to something else (viz. the objects meant by the speaker's words); otherwise how can a hearer (aided by the speaker's words) come to know—with confidence and success—the islands, lands, rivers, mountains, etc., which lie in diverse far-off directions and neither a subimplicant of which nor an effect of which is being taken cognizance of? Even perceptual knowledge is a case of valid knowledge only on the condition that it is non-illusory and true of its object, for otherwise there will arise undesirable contingencies. Why should then one feel dissatisfied if the same condition is inserted while defining verbal testimony? Just as even though there obtains no objective relationship (at least no relationship of the superimplicant-subimplicant or cause-effect type) between the Kṛttikā and Sakaṭa constellations and yet the rise of the former is a valid probans for inferring the rise (in immediate future) of the latter (this is a case of what the Jaina logicians call the pūrvacara type of probans), so also even if there obtains no objective relationship between a word and the corresponding object the former is true of the latter. Certainly, there remains nothing unaccounted for in a piece of knowledge (e.g., the astronomer's forecast) which is proved to be true of its object. If words are declared to be untrue of their objects simply on the ground that they are sometimes untrue of them, where is the guarantee that they will always be a true indicator of the speaker's intention (for sometimes they might possibly fail to indicate the speaker's intention as well)? After all, people are actually found to utter words that are unintended, e. g., the sentences with improper-sounding words and those with an improper sense of imagination are uttered without being intended; (Akalaṅka is here referring to two poetic defects recognized by the rhetoricians-KKD).

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Certainly, the speaker's intentions are not always untrue of their respective objects, for otherwise we can lay down a rule to the effect that whatever is a speaker's intention is untrue of its object. As a matter of fact, when the speaker's words are sometimes found not to be the indicator of his intention, how can it be said that words are a probans for inferring the speaker's intention? To sum up, the Buddhist, who himself claims to establish that Buddha is an authoritative speaker while not so the other religious preachers and who seeks to differentiate between a proper and an improper verbal statement of inference, must be talking nonsense when he says: 'Words invariably indicate the speaker's intention but not also the concerned state of affairs." The critical remarks that we have offered against Udayana, Jayanta and Pārthasārathi apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to Akalaṅka as well.

106. The second point around which controversy raged among these logicians related to the question: How do words and sentences come to acquire meaning? Here also the Mīmāṃsaka needed to say something fantastic and he actually maintained that the words are eternal entities eternally related to their respective meanings. For ordinary commonsense it is difficult to make head or tail of this position, but the Mīmāṃsaka went on zealously arguing in its favour. That words are eternal entities which are only manifested—and not produced—at the time of being uttered by a speaker was a position the Mīmāṃsaka needed only to 'prove' that the Vedas are eternally existing texts which are only manifested when someone utters them; (so far as ordinary verbal testimony is concerned the position has not much use, for to say nothing of the Prabhākarite who frankly reduces such testimony to a case of inference even the Kumārilite would not maintain that here too a certain eternally existing arrangement of words is only being manifested by the speaker concerned). However, the controversy as to whether words are eternal entities is essentially metaphysical in character and we may take leave of it after simply mentioning that from the beginning till end both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika authors opposed the Mīmāṃsā position tooth and nail. But the controversy as to whether the meaning attached to a word is eternally so attached is essentially logical.

Now in our times few would take exception to the position that the meaning of a word is fixed conventionally (hence it is that different words have different meanings in different historico-geographical contexts), but in ancient India this position had to be defended in the midst of constant attacks from the side of the Mīmāṃsaka who would have us believe that a word has an inherent power to yield the meaning it does. The Mīmāṃsā case was of course based on arguments of a most fallacious kind, but even

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the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians, who argued in support of the conventional character of word-meaning, maintained the untenable position that, to begin with, the convention as to the meaning of a word is fixed by God. Pārthasārathi, e. g., argues that the relation between a word and the thing denoted by this word is eternal and natural. A most crucial part of his argument runs as follows[92]: "A person cannot establish such a relation without already having in his possession certain words with definite denotations. For example, if this person wishes to establish relation between the word "cow" and the thing known as 'cow' he will have to say that the word "cow" denotes animals possessing dewlap, etc.; but how can he make such a statement without already knowing that words "dewlap", "animal", etc., denote certain particular things? (That is, the doctrine that the relation between a word and the thing denoted by this word is established by some person must lead to an infinite regress.) Nor is it tenable to maintain that a person establishes this relation by means of gestures etc., for there is no evidence that gestures, etc., can act as such a means." Now it is instructive to note that Jayanta who has exposed a good many Mīmāṃsā sophistries on the present question has given a singularly evasive reply to the argument under consideration. Jayanta's own position is that the relation between a word and its denotation is conventional and is established by God. So he has to say something on how this position avoids the difficulty urged by the Mīmāṃsaka, and this is what he says[93]: "It might be urged: 'But God too must establish this relation (i.e., the relation between a word and its denotation) with the help of another word. Then we ask the same question about this second word. If it is replied that the relation between this second word and its denotation is established with the help of a third word, there will never be an end to this process. Hence God too, in order to establish the relation between a word and its denotation, must need the presence of certain words whose relation with their respective denotations is established by nobody and which have to be learnt from the usage of the elders. But if the usage of the elders has to be admitted in any case why bring in God or the convention (allegedly) promulgated by him?' To this we reply: 'You have learnt to wield the weapon but you do not know its target. For a contingency that arises in the case of ordinary mortals like ourselves does not arise in the case of God. Certainly, who can fathom the skill of the Person who by His mere will is capable of bringing into existence this world with its multiplicity of acts and results?..............Since (according to us) we human beings have not established the relation in question our position is open to no objection. .... This is how it is demonstrated that a word yields the knowledge of its denotation to one who has learnt the convention to that effect from

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the usage of the elders, a usage which is the means of our grasping the relation established by God." Thus we find that both Pārthasārathi and Jayanta rule out the possibility that human beings somehow establish the relation between a word and its denotation, and thereby they rule out the possibility of ever getting at the true origin of this relation. Pārthasārathi explicitly rejects the suggestion that, to begin with, gestures, etc., were made use of by human beings while establishing the relation between a word and its denotation, but in this suggestion there lies the seed of the true solution of the problem under investigation.

107. The Buddhist logician, who was no supporter of the Mīmāṃsā thesis of eternal word-meaning nor a theist, maintained the essentially correct position that the convention as to the meaning of a word is fixed by human beings.[94]. However, the Buddhist always appeared to argue as if human conventions concerning word-meaning are utterly arbitrary and hence unreliable; this impression one forms not only while reading the anti-Buddhist logician's criticism of the Buddhist position but also while reading the Buddhist logician's own arguments in support of some of his most crucial theses. It is only as a result of reading in between the lines that the real Buddhist position emerges before the reader in a correct perspective. Thus the Buddhist repeated *ad nauseum* that a word is indicative of nothing positive but simply of the demarcation of one kind of things from things not of that kind. e. g., the word 'cow' stands for nothing positive but just for a cow's demarcation from things that are not-cows. But one might ask the Buddhist if it is not by virtue of possessing certain positive features in common that the things called 'cow' are demarcated from things not so called: and if the answer is in the affirmative—as it ought to be—there seems to be no sense in insisting that a word indicates nothing positive. As a matter of fact, the Buddhist did not mean to deny to words a positive import—just as the neo-Naiyāyika did not mean to do so in spite of the fact that the Buddhist practice of defining things through a double negation became peculiarly (and at times obnoxiously) favourite with the followers of Gaṅgeśa (e. g., a neo-Naiyāyika can seriously define perception as 'cognition of a type that is different from cognitions that are not perception'). The Buddhist was even correct in repudiating the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā contention that a word indicates (exclusively or among other things) an eternally existing universal; he was equally correct in pointing out that one type of things differ from another type not because these two types are possessed of two different (eternally existing) universals but because they are possessed of two different causal capacities. It was therefore not very difficult for the Buddhist to maintain that a word stands for a particular type

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of things because these things are all of them, possessed of a particular causal capacity : nay, this is actually what he maintained though he preferred to formulate his position in the form : 'a word stands for a particular type of things because these things are different from those not possessing a particular causal capacity'. Here, e. g., is what Dharmakīrti has to say on the question[95] : "Words denote something that is conventionally fixed while this convention is established for the sake of (future) usage. But since the same particular object is not present there at the time of establishing the convention and at the time of the resorting to the usage it follows that the convention in question does not refer to the particular objects. Denotatives (i. e., words) are attached to the objects in order that a man, after knowing things that are practically efficient, might undertake successful practice (in relation to those things). But the universal (posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā philosophers) is devoid of practical efficiency; and if it is suggested that the particular-possessing-the-universal is practically efficient (and hence capable of being denoted by a word) we ask why then the particular itself (rather than the particular-possessing-the-universal) be not denoted by a word. If it is argued that particulars being infinite in number cannot be so denoted by a word we may point out that the same difficulty holds in the case of particulars-possessing-the-universal. Moreover, why not maintain that what is common to the things performing the same function is (not an independently existing entity called 'universal' but) the difference of these things from those not performing things function? It might be feared that the same difficulties which arise in case we treat particulars-possessing-the-universal as the denotation of a word arise also in case we treat particulars-possessing-the-'difference'-just-described as this denotation : to this we reply that even if these difficulties be common to both the positions in question the latter is less objectionable because it does not posit a hypothetical entity like 'universal'." From this it ought to be clear that we are proposing but slight modifications in the Buddhist position as actually defended by its advocates. This slightly modified (perhaps, only properly clarified) Buddhist position should be acceptable also to a Jaina, who too believes in the conventional character of word-meaning and is no theist. Thus Prabhācandra, in the course of commenting on Akalaṅka's earlier quoted texts, endorses the Buddhist contention that the convention as to the denotation of a word is fixed by human beings[96]. And this is how he argues against the Mīmāṃsaka who urges difficulties against this view :[97] "As for your query whether the convention as to the denotation of a word is established by someone at the time of world-creation for each person or for each pronunciation or once for all, we say that it is thoughtless[98]. For as a matter of fact, the usage of words is beginningless. After all,

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neither you nor we believe in the possibility of the utter annihilation of this existing world or in the possibility of its new creation after it has been reduced to nothingness—so that it is not proper for you to raise objections that presuppose belief in an altogether novel world-creation." Prabhācandra's reply betrays the same kind of evasiveness as we have earlier noticed in Jayanta's reply to a similar difficulty urged by the Mīmāṃsaka. But Prabhācandra's reply definitely comes nearer to the correct position because he is determined to do without bringing in God. As for the denotation of a word, Prabhācandra argues [99]: "To say that a word denotes the universal alone is not proper. For it is in accordance with some convention that a word comes to denote something, while a convention is possible in relation to things-possessing-the-universal but not in relation to the universal alone. Certainly, since a universal cannot be made an objective of our endeavours nor is it capable of performing functions like carrying the burden and yielding milk the usage of words in relation to it is an impossibility—which means that the establishment of a convention as to word-meaning will be rendered futile in case the universal alone be admitted to be the denotation of a word. As a matter of fact, the convention as to word-meaning is introduced by one person to another by saying 'By words similar to this you are to mean things similar to this, while in order to mean things similar to this you are to employ words similar to this', that is, the relation in question obtains between words that are similar to one another on the one hand and things that are similar to one another on the other." Prabhācandra thus rightly emphasizes the positive aspect of verbal denotation, an aspect denied its due by the Buddhist. But in his eagerness to dissociate himself from the Buddhist he tends to talk as if his 'universal-of the-nature-of-similarity' is something quasi-entitative, and that is unfortunate.

108. In passing we may also note that according to Indian logicians a word might have meaning either (*i*) in a purely arbitrary fashion, or (*ii*) in accordance with its constituent-parts, or (*iii*) in accordance with its constituent-parts and also somewhat arbitrarily. Thus the word 'paṭa' means cloth in an arbitrary fashion, the word 'pācaka' (lit. one who cooks) means cook because this is the meaning given by the verbal root and the suffix in question, while the word 'jalaja' (lit. water-born) means lotus partly because the nature of lotus is in conformity with what the constituent-parts of the word mean partly arbitrarily (for there are also other things whose nature is in conformity with these constituent-parts but which are not meant by this word). Sometimes a fourth type of words is also recognized; these are the words having two meanings, one falling under (*i*), the

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ether under (*ii*) or (*iii*). An instance will be the word 'udbhid' which means a particular Vedic sacrifice in an arbitrary fashion and means plant in accordance with its etymology[100]. Similarly, Indian logicians have distinguished between the primary or literal meaning and the secondary or figurative meaning of a word (and through it of a sentence), e. g., the literal meaning of the sentence 'The village is situated on the Ganges' is that the village in question is situated in the river-stream, but since this meaning makes no sense we have to search for a figurative meaning which in this case will be that the village in question is situated on the bank of the Ganges. Thus the word 'Ganges' which, like any other river-name, literally stands for a particular river-stream here figuratively stands for a particular river-bank. As a general rule, a word has but one literal meaning but it may have any number of figurative meanings depending on the context. We can therefore roughly define figurative meaning as "the meaning that is somehow related to the literal meaning but is resorted to when the literal meaning makes no sense [101]'. There are again two types of cases of figurative meaning—in one (technically called jahatsvārthā) the literal meaning makes absolutely no sense, in the other (technically called ajahatsvārthā) it makes only partial sense. The above-given is an instance of the former, an instance of the latter will be 'Protect the curd from the crows'. For when this latter sentence is spoken to someone he is to take this as an imploration to protect the curd from crows no doubt but also from cats etc. [102].

109. The nature of sentential meaning as distinct from word-meaning is a topic that has been discussed exclusively in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā circles. It is an unanimous stand of these logicians that words, in order to constitute a sentence, must satisfy the following three conditions : (*i*) they must occur without a temporal gap intervening between any two of them, (*ii*) they must not mean something that is absurd on the very face of it, (*iii*) they must follow the appropriate grammatical rules; (to these three the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians sometimes added a fourth to the effect that they should be able to convey the speaker's intention)[103]. Now the first of these conditions is platitudinous, the second not indispensable, and the third alone necessary (as to the alleged fourth condition it is not so much a *condition* of sentencehood as the *necessary function* of all sentence). That is why we have earlier defined sentence as 'a collection of words combined in conformity to the grammatical rules of the language concerned' and have argued that sentencehood cannot be denied to a particular combination of words simply on the ground that the meaning conveyed by them is absurd on the very face of it. And the intention of the speaker of a particular

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sentence is not something over and above the meaning of this sentence but just identical with this meaning; thus not only when the speaker means to tell a truth but also when he means to tell a palpable lie his intention is that the hearer believes in what is meant by the sentence uttered by the speaker, the only difference between the two cases being that in the former the speaker too believes in what is meant by the sentence uttered by him. (Here we should again distinguish between a sentence that *is meant to be true* and one that *is true*: a sentence is meant to be true when the speaker believes in what is meant by it, a sentence is true when what is meant by it is also the case).

Let us study in some details the confusions that have resulted from our logicians adopting the doctrine of "three conditions of sentencehood". We have earlier seen that in the course of his polemic against the Vaiśesika logician Udayana has pointed out that one cannot say about each and every given sentence that the denotations of its words must stand mutually combined, for that is not true of the words of an unauthoritative person's sentence. That is understandable, for certainly an unauthoritative person's sentence is not true of the corresponding state of affairs. But Udayana next submits that we can also not say about each and every sentence that the denotations of its words are capable of getting combined. The submission appears to be rather odd. For each and every genuine sentence does seem capable of conveying a piece of information (in Udayana's phraseology, the word-denotations of each and every genuine sentence seem to be capable of getting combined). Udayana's objection against this contention of ours will be that a sentence that is absurd on the face of it does not satisfy our description. The objection is untenable. For nothing prevents an absurd sentence from being capable of conveying an absurd piece of information. What is worse, by talking thus Udayana side-tracks the main issue. For even granting for argument's sake that an absurd sentence is no genuine sentence, can we not say about each and every non-absurd sentence that it is capable of conveying a piece of information? While answering this question Udayana avers that even if some sentence is capable of conveying a piece of information it is not necessary that it should actually convey this information. But this consideration is irrelevant, for it is nobody's contention that a sentence conveys a piece of information simply by virtue of being capable of conveying this information. Thus Udayana has to be told two things, viz., (1) that absurd sentences are also sentences and (2) that a sentence's mere capacity to covey a piece of information is significant in its own right; (Udayana's reluctance to pursue an enquiry into a sentence's capacity to convey information is rooted in his implicit identification of "non-absurdity" with "capacity to convey a piece of information", an

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identification that is misconceived)[104]. The later Naiyāyikas seem to be partly convinced of the cogency of the type of criticism we are levelling against the official Nyāya theory. For some among them maintained that 'knowledge of non-absurdity' which is necessary for the grasping of sentential meaning might be either certain or doubtful; this was as good as saying that such knowledge is not a necessary condition of grasping sentential meaning. Others maintained that even that sentence which is actually absurd yields a meaning provided its absurdity has not been detected by the cognizer concerned; thus according to them not "cognition of non-absurdity" but "non-cognition of absurdity" is one of the conditions of grasping sentential meaning. However, these half-way house positions too will not do, and one will have to grant unconditionally that all sentences convey some meaning or other[105]. And then it will become easier to study in details the precise manner in which a sentence becomes capable of conveying a piece of information. In a nutshell, we can say that a sentence conveys a meaning by virtue of being a set of words joined in conformity to the grammatical rules of the language concerned so that once we are able to recall the meanings of the particular words constituting a sentence and to ascertain the concerned grammatical rules the meaning of this sentence (which meaning constitutes the speaker's intention) automatically occurs to us, just as once we ascertain the minor premise and the major premise of a syllogism its conclusion automatically occurs to us.

110. Here it will be useful to follow how the Indian logicians have discussed the problem of the relation between a sentence and its meaning. Three chief theories have been propounded in this connection. They are (*i*) the Kumārilite theory that "different words (of a sentence) possess different denotations which are combined with a view to yielding sentential meaning" (=abhihita-anvaya-vāda), (*ii*) the Prabhākarite theory that "words (of a sentence) jointly possess a denotation which is sentential meaning (rather sentential denotation)" (=anvita-abhidhāna-vāda), and (*iii*) the Nyāya theory that "different words (of a sentence) possess different denotations which as combined with each other are what the sentence seeks to mean (not to denote—as in the Prabhākarite theory) (=anvita-pratyāyana-vāda). (In this presentation there seems to be no difference between (*i*) and (*iii*), but, as we shall see later on, the two theories differ on the question as to what precisely is the manner in which word-denotations bring about sentential meaning.) The following passage from Jayanta brings out certain precise points of difference between these three theories on the nature of sentential meanings [106] :—

(*i*) The Kumārilite argues: "So what happens is that the respective denotations of the words constituting a sentence get combined (in

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order to yield sentential meaning); that is so because the grasping of the meaning of a sentence necessarily requires a prior grasping of the meanings of the words constituting this sentence. Certainly, one who does not know the meanings of the different words constituting a sentence fails to grasp the meaning of this sentence. But if we accept the Prabhākarite view that a word denotes something as combined with what is denoted by the other words of a sentence it becomes impossible to determine as to what is denoted by this or that word. As a matter of fact, even if the verbal usage is learnt from the sentences uttered by the elderly persons what is learnt is the denotation of words rather than that of a sentence. For otherwise we will have to learn denotation sentence by sentence, and since that is impossible all verbal usage too will become an impossibility. Moreover, if denotative power belongs not to individual words but to words-as-joined-in-the-form-of-a-sentence even one word should suffice to convey the meaning that is sought to be conveyed by all the words constituting a sentence. And if the Prabhākarite says that a word, in order to convey meaning, requires the help of the other words constituting the sentence we ask him whether these other words help this one word by their mere presence or in some other way. That the mere presence of other words by the side of one word does not convey a meaning is evident from the fact that words constituting a hymn (meant to be chanted ritually) do not convey a meaning. But if other words help the one word by means of their respective denotations it amounts to accepting our thesis that 'different words (of a sentence) possess different denotations which are combined with a view to yielding sentential meaning'. Thus only those words which are proximate to each other and whose denotations need being combined and are competent to be combined with each other constitute a sentence and convey a sentential meaning. On the other hand, since according to the Prabhākarite words of a sentence possess a combined denotation (which denotation is sentential meaning) he should be ready to grant that words constituting even a senseless sentence like "Hundred elephants are sitting on the finger-tip" possess a combined denotation (and that is an undesirable contingency inasmuch as the word-denotations of a senseless sentence are incapable of being combined together)."

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(*ii*) To this the Prabhākarite replies: "A word does not convey meaning unless the word-meaning relation is learnt, while this relation is learnt from the usage of the elderly persons. But the elderly persons resort to word-usage by employing sentences rather than single words. Hence what is learnt is the relation between a sentence and its meaning. And what is a sentence? A sentence is but words as combined together and thus conveying a meaning—so that the words should not combine together to convey a meaning if that operation be possible on the part of one single word. Just as fuel etc.—which constitute the causal aggregate of cooking—jointly undertake the operation called 'cooking' so also do all the words of a sentence jointly undertake the operation called 'conveying the sentential meaning'. It might be objected: 'But if one single member of a causal aggregate can by itself bring about the effect concerned it should be futile to utter the remaining words of a sentence when one of these words has been uttered.' To this we reply that such is not the case; for one single word of a sentence cannot convey the sentential meaning in the absence of the remaining words. It might be urged: 'But then it is not proper to say that one single member of a causal aggregate brings about the total effect.' In reply we clarify our position thus: Since the total effect is brought about only when each and every member of the causal aggregate is operative till the end we say that each single member of the causal aggregate brings about the effect. It might be said: 'But if the function of a word is to convey its own meaning, it follows that a word has meaning in isolation from the other words of a sentence.' To this we reply that it is not so because a word is employed only in an aggregate—though, of course, we are in a position to recognize a single word's own function as well. As for the absurd sentences like 'Hundred elephants etc.,' we ask the opponent as to what is his explanation thereof. The opponent might say: 'In these sentences the word-meanings lack the capacity to combine together, while this capacity to combine together is one of the three necessary conditions of sentencehood.' But then we can similarly say that a word conveys a meaning only when accompanied by the words which are so situated that they fulfil the three conditions in question which is not the case with a word occurring in the absurd sentences like 'Hundred elephants etc.' The opponent might say: 'But

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since according to you a word denotes what is combined with the denotation of the remaining words there should be no word-denotation in the absurd sentences because the word-denotations are here incapable of combining together. This difficulty does not arise in our position according to which words separately possess denotations; thus in an absurd sentence each of the words possesses a denotation but the denotations thus yielded are incapable of combining together.' To this we reply: 'As a matter of fact, even in an absurd sentence there is a combined denotation, for here too we have a cognition of a substratum, a superstratum, an action etc., (as combined in a particular fashion). So what is contradicted here is not the combined denotation but something else.' "

(*iii*) Here Jayanta remarks: "Neither of the above two views is to our liking. It might be asked: 'But how then do words convey a meaning?' To this we reply that the words of a sentence function together, and it is they as functioning together which convey the sentential meaning; however, this is not a case of combined denotation. It might be asked: 'But how then do words function together?' To this we reply that there is joint functioning of the words and yet there is no combined denoting; the words of a sentence jointly bring about something combined but they do not denote something combined. It might be asked: 'But what is this manner of talking? For you are saying that the words of a sentence bring about something combined but they do not denote something combined.' To this we reply that the words express something combined but they do not denote something combined. What the words of a sentence denote is not a combined something, for each of them has got its own specific denotation to be learnt by observing its occurrence and non-occurrence in different sentences; but the *intention* of these words is these denotations-as-combined."

This controversy should make it clear that these Indian logicians were groping towards determining the qualitative difference that obtains between the role of words singly taken and the role of sentences. The Prabhākarite was seeking to emphasize the fact that the entire use of learning verbal usage lies in our being able to utter and follow words as occurring in this or that sentence. But from this he drew the rather untenable conclusion

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that the entire significance of a word (technically speaking, the denotation of a word) lies in the role it plays in a particular sentence. Now the same word plays different roles in different sentences and so the Prabhākarite was in effect saying that a word has no one fixed denotation, in other words, he was telling us that a word has different denotations in different sentences. Of course, when forced by logic the Prabhākarite made a distinction between the total denotation of a word and its part-denotation, and by 'part-denotation' he practically meant the exclusive denotation of a word. For this part-denotation of a word is what is common to all the (alleged) denotations of this word, that is, it is that part of its denotation which is attached to it invariably. But then the exclusive denotation of a word too is what is attached to it invariably. Thus what the Prabhākarite meant by 'recalling the part-denotation of a word' was the same as we ordinarily understand by 'recalling the proper denotation of a word'. But strictly speaking, the Prabhākarite position was open to two obvious objection *viz.*, (1) it is not proper to say that a word has no fixed denotation of its own, and (2) on the Prabhākarite's understanding all the words of a sentence will have to be treated as possessing one and the same denotation (rather on his understanding denotation will properly belong to a sentence while the same will be attributed vicariously to each and every word of this sentence). The Naiyāyika amended the Prabhākarite theory on two counts, for (1) he maintained that a word has a fixed denotation of its own, and (2) he pointed out that what the words of a sentence jointly bring about is not the denotation of this sentence but the 'intention' of this sentence. Thus while the Prabhākarite illogically talked of 'each word of a sentence playing its proper role in bringing about the denotation of this sentence' the Naiyāyika logically talked of 'each word of a sentence playing its proper role in bringing about the intention of a sentence'. For the latter theory was rendered logical by avoiding the former's folly of not attributing a denotation to a word and its folly of attributing a denotation to a sentence. At the same time this latter theory did justice to the fact that the entire use of learning verbal usage lies in our being able to utter and follow sentences when the need arises. The Kumārilites criticized the Prabhākarite on the ground that each and every word has got a denotation of its own, and in this respect they agreed with the Naiyāyika. But they had a peculiar theory (not mentioned in the above passage from Jayanta) as to how the words of a sentence bring about sentential meaning. The theory contained two main points, viz., (1) an assertion to the effect that the sentential meaning is brought about not by the words of a sentence (neither by these words directly—as was thought by the Prabhākarite, nor by them through word-denotations--as was thought by the Naiyāyika) but by the corresponding

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word-denotations themselves, and (2) an assertion to the effect that the word-denotations bring about the sentential meaning not owing to a literal capacity but owing to a figurative capacity. Both these assertions involved a serious confusion of thought. Thus in support of the first assertion it was argued that since we can at time arrive at a sentential meaning without employing any words at all but only as a result of observing entities that are denoted by words the proper instrument of sentential meaning ought to be word-denotations rather than words. In this connection an illustration offered by Kumārila has become sufficiently notorious. For he says[107]: "When one sees a patch of sub stratumless white colour and hears the sound made by neighing and by the clattering of hoofs one comes to acquire (sentential) knowledge to the effect that a white horse is running over there, and this without any employment of a sentence; on the other hand, we never acquire (sentential) knowledge in the absence of entities-denoted-by-words." The performance needs no comment. One can indeed sympathise with Jayanta when he asks in despair: "Does the sentence 'The white bull goes there' yield no meaning unless a white bull is actually seen going there (Kim pratyakṣena śuklo gaur gacchan na drayate sa kim śuklo gauḥ gacchatīti vākyasya artho na bhavati)?[108]". (Kumārila's confusion is rooted in the intriguing ambiguity of the Sanskrit word 'padārtha' which means both a word-denotation and a real entity.) In support of the second assertion noted above it was argued that since a word-denotation is necessarily something universal while a sentential meaning must be a particular state of affairs we should grant that certain word-denotations yield a certain sentential meaning not through a literal capacity but through a figurative capacity[109]. Here too it is difficult to make sense of this argument. For we can well speak of the literal and figurative capacities of a word, but it is nonsensical to speak of the literal and figurative capacities of a word-denotation. Maybe the Kumārilite intended to maintain that a word's role in a sentence is somehow related to its specific denotation but has to be different from this specific denotation, for 'figurative meaning' of a word is defined as a meaning that is somehow related to its specific denotation but has to be different from it. This rather imaginary difficulty can be remedied by maintaining the plausible position that the denotation of a word is not a universal as such but an individual quâ the possessor of this universal, but in any case there seems to be no sense in attributing the meaning-yielding capacity—figurative or otherwise—to word-denotations rather than words. To sum up, on the question of a word's role in yielding sentential meaning the Kumārilite position is faulty on one count while the Prabhākarite position is so on another, whereas the Naiyāyika has criticized both on substantially right

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lines110. In passing let us note that all the three theories as presented here take it for granted that absurd sentences are somehow no sentences (though at one stage the Prabhākarite has toyed with the idea that even absurd sentences are sentences), but on this question we have to add nothing to what has already been said.

(4) The Remaining Instruments of Valid Knowledge

111. In view of what has been said by now it should be clear that there can be no instruments of valid knowledge in addition to perception and inference. When as a result of sense-object contact we identify the object concerned or a character in this object we are said to acquire perceptual knowledge, when as a result of observing an object (or an objective character) at a place and remembering that this object (or objective character) has another object (or objective character) for its invariable concomitant we surmise that the place in question must also possess this latter object (or objective character) we are said to have acquired inferential knowledge. These seem to be the only two modes of acquiring valid knowledge concerning objects and objective characters. Nay, we can go even further and argue that the so-called perceptual knowledge too is a case of inferential knowledge. For in acquiring perceptual knowledge we first undergo a sensory experience or a number of such experiences and then, remembering that this sensory experience is a sure mark of the presence over there of that objective character or that these sensory experiences are a sure mark of the presence over there of that object, we surmise the existence over there of that objective character or of that object; now this process which we have described thus far as 'identifying an objective character or an object' and have treated as a distinctive ingredient of perceptual knowledge is essentially akin to what is distinctive of inferential knowledge. This is our ground for proposing that the so-called perceptual knowledge is a case of inferential knowledge (though there is also not much harm in maintaining that the knowledge of observed objects and objective characters be treated as perceptual while that of unobserved objects and objective characters as inferential). As for verbal testimony we have already seen how certain logicians propose to treat it as an independent instrument of valid knowledge and also how others propose to reduce it to a case of inferential knowledge; moreover, we have seen how the latter of these proposals is more convincing.

It is, therefore, but logical that we should find it impossible to justify the claim of any more processes to be treated as independent instruments of valid knowledge. But as a matter of historical fact, Indian logicians have

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advanced on behalf of a number of processes the claim that they be treated as independent instruments of valid knowledge. Thus 'analogy' has been treated as an independent instrument of valid knowledge by the Naiyāyikas (though not by the Vaiśeṣikas) and Mīmāṃsakas (both Prabhākarites and Kumārilites), 'implication' by the Mīmāṃsakas (both Prabhākarites and as Kumārilites), 'non-cognition' by the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsakas, and memory recognition and hypothetical reasoning by the Jainas. In what follows we propose to consider the claims of these alleged additional instruments of valid knowledge; we take them one by one.

(i) *Analogy.*

112. There is considerable difference between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā concepts of the alleged instrument of valid knowledge called 'upamāna' (only roughly translatable as 'analogy') but both are considerably misconceived. Let us make our contention clear with the help of a concrete example.

113. The Naiyāyika says that the seed of upamāna is laid when an urban man asks a forester as to what the gavaya (the Sanskrit name for an Indian animal akin to cow) is like and the forester replies that it is like a cow. When this urban man goes to the forest and comes across a gavaya he observes the gavaya's similarity with the cow and recalls what the forester had told him earlier. On the basis of this observation of similarity and of the recollection of the information supplied earlier the urban man comes to attain the knowledge expressible in the form 'Here is the object gavaya and this is what the word "gavaya" stands for'. To put it in a general form, when on the basis of the observation of x's similarity with y and of the recollection of an earlier supplied information that x is like y a man comes to attain the knowledge expressible in the form 'Here is the object x and this is what the word "x" stands for' we have the case of knowledge attained through upmāna-pramāṇa.

Now to the question as to what an object is like the most natural reply is 'That object is of such and such a description' while replies in terms of this object's similarity with another object are few and far between. But the Naiyāyika bases his entire treatment of upamāna on these rather unusual replies of the latter type. However, even granting the validity of such replies the fact remains that the new knowledge attained by the questioner is always of the form: 'Here is an object similar to y; that particular expert has told me that x is similar to y, hence this object is (or rather may be) x'. And it is obvious that this is a rather

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weak form of inferential knowledge. This would have been a strong form of inferential knowledge if the knower concerned could say: 'Whatever is similar to *y* is *x*; here is an object similar to *y*; therefore this object is '*x*'. But this latter piece of knowledge will be very much liable to error, and that is because a mere similarity, unless specified, can form the basis of no invariable concomitance. Thus on seeing a sparrow I should not say: 'Whatever is similar to crow is nightingale; here is an object similar to crow; therefore this object is nightingale'. The Naiyāyika's upamāna-pramāṇa is obviously open to a misuse of this type.

114. The Mīmāṃsaka's upamāna-pramāṇa, on the other hand, yields an information which is invariably true but one which is too trivial to be called by a special name. On the Mīmāṃsaka's showing, when on observing a gavaya's similarity with cow one says that his cow at home is similar to this gavaya this statement is expression of a type of knowledge attainable through nothing but upamāna-pramāṇa. But even a tyro in Logic knows that similarity is a symmetrical relation so that if *x* is similar to *y* *y* must be similar to *x*.

115. A modern student of Logic might wonder how a logician—even if he is an ancient Indian—can maintain positions so odd as these. We therefore give below the Mīmāṃsā case as pleaded by Pārthasārathi, the Kumārilite, and the Nyāya case as pleaded by Udayana and Jayanta.

Thus Pārthasārathi says[111]: Upamāna "consists in viewing an object—observed earlier and recalled now as similar to another object that is under observation now. Thus when on seeing a gavaya's similarity with a cow a man comments that the cow earlier seen by him in the town is similar to this gavaya it is only because this man is taking recourse to *upamāna*. This is not a case of sense-perception, because the cow (which is the object of the resulting knowledge) does not here come in contact with the man's sense-organs. Nor is it a case of inference. For one might suppose that our man is inferring 'The cow must be similar to gavaya, because the gavaya is similar to cow, it being an universal rule that if *A* is similar to *B*, *B* is similar to *A*'; but this supposition will be illegitimate inasmuch as the type of knowledge we are describing can possibly be acquired even by a man who has not seen a cow and a gavaya together but has seen a cow earlier in the town and is seeing a gavaya now in the forest. Thus if on seeing the gavaya's similarity with cow this man finds it possible to have knowledge to the effect that the cow earlier seen by him in the town is similar to this gavaya this is because he has taken recourse to an altogether new instrument of valid knowldge, called 'upmāna'." Comment is superfluous.

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And substantially thus runs Udayana's defence of upamāna-pramāṇa :[112] "There are cases when the relation between a word and its denotation cannot be grasped through perception etc., but only through upamāna-pramāṇa. For example, when a forester tells an urban man 'The gavaya is similar to cow' and this urban man comes across a gavaya later on he watches this gavaya's similarity with cow, recalls the information supplied earlier by the forester and then says to himself. 'This type of animal is denoted by the word "gavaya" '. Here the urban man's knowledge concerning the denotation of the word 'gavaya' is produced neither by perception nor by verbal utterance but by upamāna. That this knowledge is not produced by perception alone or by verbal utterance alone is obvious, but nor is it produced by perception assisted by verbal utterance. For if this be a case of knowledge produced by perception assisted by verbal utterance (and hence a case of perceptual knowledge) even inference will have to be treated as a case of perceptual knowledge (for inferential knowledge is produced by 'perception of hetu' assisted by 'memory or vyāpti'). We do not mean to deny that a piece of knowledge of one type can produce another piece of knowledge of the same type, e.g., that one piece of perceptual knowledge can produce another piece of perceptual knowledge (for indeterminate perceptual knowledge does produce determinate perceptual knowledge). Our point is that a particular type of knowledge requires the presence of its own specific cause e.g., preceptual knowledge, requires constant operation of the sense-organ concerned (and this is not the case either with inference or with upamāna). Here it will not do to point out that the gavaya has to be kept in sight constantly if we are to have the knowledge-produced-by-upamāna in question. For there are also cases when a mere memory of the earlier cognized gavaya's similarity with cow (assisted, of course, by the memory of the earlier conveyed information that gavaya is similar to cow) leads to the knowledge-produced-by-upamāna in question." Immediately afterwards Udayana goes on to undertake an elaborate refutation of the position that the knowledge in question is inferential in character. But this point is neatly clinched by Jayanta in the following passage (slightly summarized by us) :[113] "In both (i.e., inference and upamāna) start has to be made by perception—in inference by the perception of hetu in pakṣa, in upamāna by the perception of a body that is similar to a well-known body. Again, in inference the recollection of the earlier grasped relation of invariable concomitance acts as an accessory to the perception of hetu; in upamāna the recollection of an earlier conveyed information that a body is similar to another well-known body acts as an accessory to the perception of the former of these bodies. Lastly, in inference the earlier general knowledge that hetu is never unaccompanied

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by sādhya becomes specific in the form that this particular locus of hetu is not unaccompanied by sādhya; in upamāna the earlier vague knowledge that some body (called by a particular name) is similar to a well-known body becomes definite in the form that this type of body is similar to that well-known body and is called by this particular name. Yet upamāna cannot be treated as a case of inference; for in upamāna, unlike in inference, there is for example, no establishment of a relation of invariable concomitance between two mutually independent characters. Thus knowledge to the effect that a particular type of body similar to a well-known body is called by the name it bears is a product of upamāna and of no other instrument of valid knowledge." Here again nothing need be added to what has already been said.

116. However, it might be interesting to note two points. First, the Naiyāyika's criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka's concept of upamāna almost tallies with our criticism of the same, and so also does the Mīmāṃsaka's criticism of the Naiyāyika's concept of upamāna tally with our criticism of the same. Secondly, the neo-Naiyāyika misses here an excellent opportunity of learning from the Buddhist logician without appearing to be heretical. For the position that upamāna (just like verbal testimony) is not an independent instrument of valid knowledge was maintained not only by the Buddhists but also by the old Vaiśeṣikas, and the old Vaiśeṣikas were certainly a respectable authority for the neo-Naiyāyika. But the neo-Naiyāyika chose to adopt the faultier course of siding with the old Naiyāyika and went on supplying curious arguments by way of defending a position that was so transparently misconceived.

(*ii*) *Implication.*

117. Arthāpatti (only roughly translatable as 'implication') is posited as an independent instrument of valid knowledge by both the Prabhākarite and the Kumārilite Schools of Mīmāṃsā and by them alone, but the two schools have conceived it in ways somewhat different from one another. There is one common feature of all the usual cases of arthāpatti quoted in the Mīmāṃsā literature on Logic: it is that here we have knowledge to the effect that a particular situation can obtain only in several definite alternative ways and also knowledge to the effect that all these alternatives except one are absent with the help of which two pieces of knowledge we arrive at the knowledge that the one remaining alternative describes the situation in question, e.g., (*i*) since we know that a man must be either dead or present inside his house or present outside his house, when we come to know about

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a certain person that he is neither dead nor present inside his house we are entitled to say that he is present outside his house; (*ii*) since we know that a man must either eat during day-time or eat during night-time or be lean and thin, when we come to know about a certain person that he is neither lean and thin nor eats during day-time we are entitled to say that he eats during night-time. The first of these cases is put by the Mīmāṃsaka in the form: 'knowledge to the effect that alive Devadatta is not present inside his house leads to the knowledge to the effect that he is present outside his house', the second in the form: 'knowledge to the effect that fat Devadatta does not eat during day-time leads to the knowledge to the effect that he eats during night-time'.

118. Now the Kumārilite says that in both these cases the former piece of knowledge remains unaccounted for until and unless the latter piece of knowledge is posited, and it is his submission that the former piece of knowledge is used here as an independent instrument of valid knowledge called 'arthāpatti' in order to arrive at the latter piece of knowledge. But can this not be said of all the cases of inference? For in all cases of inference the person who possesses the knowledge of vyāpti between hetu and sādhya (i.e., knowledge to the effect that hetu cannot exist unaccompanied by sādhya) finds that his knowledge to the effect that pakṣa possesses hetu remains unaccounted for until and unless he posits knowledge to the effect that pakṣa possesses sādhya. The Kumārilite cannot altogether ignore the force of this criticism, but he says that this becomes the case only when the vyāpti concerned is known in the form 'Whatever possesses hetu possesses sādhya' and not when it is known in the form 'Things possessing hetu have been found to possess sādhya', that is to say, the Kumārilite will grant that the latter is a case of inference but will go on insisting that the former is a case of arthāpatti. But since a vyāpti must be expressed in the form 'Whatever possesses hetu possesses sādhya' and not in the form 'Things possessing hetu have been found to possess sādhya' the conclusion is inevitable that what the Kumārilite calls the cases of inference are not at all such cases while what he calls the cases of arthāpatti are actually the cases of inference. It is on these lines that the Naiyāyikas have sought to criticize the Kumārilite concept of arthāpatti and have urged that the cases of arthāpatti, in so far as they are valid, are all of them, case of inference.

119. The Prabhākarite seems to be convinced of this criticism levelled by the Naiyāyika against the Kumārilite and he himself levels the same criticism against the Kumārilite. E. g., according to him, the true account

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of the first case considered above is not that knowledge to the effect that alive Devadatta is not present inside his house remains unaccounted for until and unless we posit knowledge to the effect that Devadatta is present outside his house but that the knowledge that Devadatta is not present inside his house renders unaccounted for (i.e., doubtful) our conviction that Devadatta is alive and that this conviction is restored only by positing that he is present outside his house. Now this Prabhākarite understanding of arthāpatti has difficulties of its own and the Kumārilite is not slow to point them out. For knowledge to the effect that alive Devadatta is not present inside his house will lead to knowledge to the effect that Devadatta is present outside his house only in case we throughout remain firm in our conviction that Devadatta is alive. Thus if the Kumārilite defence of arthāpatti as an independent instrument of valid knowledge suffers from one defect the Prabhākarite defence suffers from another, and the conclusion is inescapable that arthāpatti is not an independent instrument of valid knowledge.

120. Here too it will be instructive to listen to the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite cases from the mouths of their own advocates.

Thus Pārthasārathi in effect avers:[114] "In case a piece of validly acquired knowledge remains inexplicable except on a further supposition this further supposition is a new type of valid knowledge called 'arthāpatti-pramā' while the piece of knowledge that remained inexplicable except on this supposition is called 'arthāpatti-pramāna' (For example, if I somehow come to know that Devadatta is not dead and yet not present inside his house this knowledge of mine will remain inexplicable except on the supposition that Devadatta is present somewhere outside his house. Here the supposition that Devadatta is present somewhere outside his house is valid knowledge of the type called 'arthāpatti-pramā' while my till-now-inexplicable knowledge that Devadatta is not dead and yet not present inside his house is the 'arthāpatti-pramāṇa' ".

Against this the opponent argues: "If this be the nature of arthāpatti then inference of fire from smoke will also become a case of arthāpatti; for here also the knowledge that a place is smoky remains inexplicable except on the supposition that this place is fiery". To this Pārthasārathi replies: "In the case of inferring fire from smoke the knowledge of 'what is inexplicable', i. e., of smoke, leads to the knowledge of 'what explains this inexplicable', i. e., of fire. But in the case of the arthāpatti in question the

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resulting knowledge, i. e., the knowledge that Devadatta is present somewhere outside his house—is itself inexplicable without the knowledge which leads to this resulting knowledge, i.e., without the knowledge that Devadatta is not dead and yet not present inside his house". (Let us note that Pārthasārathi is here trying to create a difference where no difference exists, for he is having in mind the fact that the invariable concomitance 'If x possesses smoke, x possesses fire' is irreversible while the invariable concomitance 'If x is not dead nor present inside his house, x is present outside his house' is reversible. But that is an accidental difference, e.g., the invariable concomitance 'If x possesses smoke, x possesses fire and wet fuel' is reversible, the reason being that we can infer a total causal aggregate from the effect concerned and *vice versa* while we can infer a partial cause from the effect concerned *but not vice versa*.)

In this connection Pārthasārathi first shows how the Prabhākarite version of arthāpatti is vulnerable and then goes on to argue in defence of his own version of the same. Here is Pārthasārathi's presentation of the Prabhākarite case: "When we find that Devadatta who was generally found to be present inside his house is not present inside his house we become doubtful whether he is alive or dead: it is this doubt of ours which is dispelled by our presuming that Devadatta is present somewhere outside his house. This is not a case of inferring 'Devadatta's presence outside his house' from 'Devadatta's not being dead', for here we are doubtful whether—and not certain that—Devadatta is not dead: or can it be a case of inferring 'Devadatta's presence outside his house' from 'Devadatta's non-presence inside his house', for the latter can also be due to 'Devadatta's death'." And the following is the criticism to which the Prabhākarite case is open: "The doubt whether Devadatta is alive or dead renders impossible our presuming that he is present outside his house, for a doubt is removed when the cause of this doubt is done away with. Now we are told that the doubt as to Devadatta's being alive is created by our finding that Devadatta who is usually present inside his house is not present there. But as a matter of fact, if Devadatta's mere non-presence inside his house is sufficient to create in us a doubt whether he is alive or dead, the presumption that Devadatta is present outside his house should rather accentuate this doubt and not remove it, for this presumption confirms Devadatta's non-presence inside his house—a non-presence which, according to the Prabhākarite, is the cause of our doubting whether Devadatta is alive or dead. That is to say, if on observing Devadatta's non-presence inside his house we have really become doubtful whether he is alive or dead then in order to be

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entitled to presume his presence outside his house we must first somehow become certain that he is not dead."

After this comes Pārthasārathi's defence of his own version of arthāpatti and it runs as follows: "Neither a mere knowledge that Devadatta is not present inside his house nor a mere knowledge that Devadatta is not dead will lead to the knowledge that Devadatta is present outside his house. But these two pieces of knowledge taken together do lead to this third piece of knowledge. However, it is not a case of this third piece of knowledge being inferred from the first two pieces, for here the third piece of knowledge ensues as soon as the first two pieces are had (while in an inference the conclusion does not ensue as soon as the hetu is observed, and that is because the recollection of vyāpti between hetu and sādhya is the other indispensable condition of arriving at the conclusion there). What actually happens is that the knowledge that Devadatta is not dead and the knowledge that he is not present inside his house are contradictory of each other while their contradiction is resolved by our having the knowledge that he is present outside his house. For to say that Devadatta is alive and yet not present inside his house without at the same time positing that he is present outside his house amounts to saying that Devadatta who is not present inside his house is present either inside his house or outside it. But that is not possible, for a thing cannot be both present and absent at the same place. Thus the general feature of the cases of arthāpatti is that here we come to have two pieces of knowledge which are contradictory of each other while this contradiction remains unresolved unless a third piece of knowledge is had. ....It might be said: 'Let arthāpatti be an independent instrument of valid knowledge, but it should include inference. Thus suppose we have the knowledge that whatever possesses smoke possesses fire and the knowledge that a particular mountain possesses smoke; now in this case if the mountain does not possess fire either the knowledge that this mountain possesses smoke or the knowledge that whatever possesses smoke possesses fire will be false so that both these pieces of knowledge are rendered true by our positing that the mountain possesses fire; and all that turns this to be a case of arthāpatti.' To this we reply that this contingency will arise only in case while inferring fire on the mountain we already somehow happen to know through some instrument of valid knowledge other than inference that whatever (i.e., whatever particular place) possesses smoke possesses fire. But that is not the case. For here we only know that in such and such places smoke has been found to be accompanied by fire but not that whatever possesses smoke possesses fire; it is inference which

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enables us to know that whatever possesses smoke possesses fire. And certainly, one who has knowledge merely to be effect that in such and such places smoke has been found to be accompanied by fire faces no contradiction, to eliminate which he might be forced to posit knowledge to the effect that whatever possesses smoke possesses fire; hence it is that to infer the existence of fire at a place found to possess smoke is not a case of arthāpatti." (This last stage of Pārthasārathi's argument clearly shows that his former talk of 'contradiction between two pieces of knowledge being resolved through a new piece of knowledge' was mythical. For in all genuine inference the major premise is of the form 'All smoky places are fiery places' and the minor premise of the form 'This mountain is smoky', while from these premises there follows the conclusion in the form 'This mountain is fiery'. But Pārthasārathi will have us believe that it is a case of contradiction between the major premise and minor premise being resolved by the conclusion (and hence a case of arthāpatti rather than inference). On the other hand, what Pārthasārathi concedes to be the cases of inference are no such cases, for nowhere in an inference do we have the major premise in the form 'In such and such places the probans has been found to be accompanied by the probandum'. The question—incidentally touched upon here by Pārthasārathi—as to how, that is, through inference or otherwise we arrive at a universal judgment is absolutely irrelevant in the present context.)

The following are the salient portions of the Prabhākarite case as presented by Rāmānujācārya (not to be confused with his more illustrious namesake)115 :—

"When the relation between three facts, x, y and z is such that x renders y unaccounted for unless z is posited x is arthāpatti pramāṇa for cognizing z. For example, when we come to know—through perception or through words received from someone—that Devadatta is not present inside his house this absence-inside-house is our x. Now Devadatta's absence-inside-house renders unaccounted for his being alive unless his presence-outside-house is posited. Hence Devadatta's absence-inside-house is arthāpatti-pramāṇa for cognizing Devadatta's presence-outside-house. By 'rendering unaccounted for' we understand 'rendering doubtful'. Thus on having ascertained that Devadatta is absent inside his house we become doubtful whether he is alive or dead, and this doubt of ours persists till—and only till—it is not posited that Devadatta is present outside his house.

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One might argue: 'Positing Devadatta's presence-outside-house on having observed his absence-inside-house is a case of inference. For we can say "Devadatta is present outside his house, because he is alive and yet absent inside his house, the reason being that whoever is alive and yet absent inside Devadatta's house is present outside Devadatta's house, just like myself". But the argument is not valid, for Devadatta's being alive is here rendered doubtful.

One might ask: 'But how can a validly yielded knowledge concerning Devadatta's being alive be rendered doubtful?' To this our reply is that there is nothing incongruous about all this. For even after having valid knowledge concerning something we become doubtful when the thing is found to be different from what it was known to be. A similar thing happens in the present case. Up till now our knowledge that Devadatta is alive was knowledge that Devadatta is alive and is present inside his house. But now having come to know that Devadatta is absent inside his house and not having posited that he is present outside his house we become doubtful whether he is alive or dead. Thus we say to ourselves 'Formerly Devadatta was found to be inside his house. Now he is absent inside his house. There is no knowing whether he is alive or dead'. Here one might plead: 'By positing that Devadatta is outside his house we become sure that he is alive. And then Davadatta's being alive can well act as a probans.' To this our reply is that in that case there will remain nothing to be inferred. For what was sought to be proved was Devadatta's presence outside his house, but when this very presence-outside-house is posited nothing remains to be inferred. Nor can bare 'absence-inside-house' act as a probans here, for such absence is possible even in the case of a dead man or a man not yet born.

Thus there is no scope for inference in the case under consideration. This is how we defend our position that a fact that renders another fact doubtful is arthāpatti-pramāṇa (in case this doubt is removed by positing a third fact). Certainly, in the case of fire being inferred from smoke there is no such evocation of doubt as we find in the case of arthāpatti."

And the following is how Rāmānujācārya takes exception to the Kumārilite version of arthāpatti: "Others have maintained that in the

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case under consideration absence-inside-house itself remains unaccounted for until presence-outside-house is posited. This is how they treat absence-inside-house as arthāpatti-pramāṇa for cognizing absence-outside-house. But that is an incorrect position. For there is nothing unaccounted for in Devadatta's absence-inside-house. In their defence these people might say that absence-inside-house is never present there unless presence-outside-house is present there, and that this is how absence-inside-house remains unaccounted for unless presence-outside-house is posited. But then it becomes a simple case of vyatireka-vyāpti (i.e., the relation of invariable concomitance stated negatively) which is an assertain to the effect that 'hetu is never present there unless sādhya is present there'. And since vyatireka-vyāpti is known through (rather is but another way of expressing) anvaya-Vyāpti (i.e. the relation of invariable concomitance stated positively) which is an assertion to the effect that 'sādhya is present there wherever hetu is present there our opponents' understanding of arthāpatti will reduce it to an ordinary case of inference."

121. Rāmānujācārya's criticism is doubtless valid, but since his own version of arthāpatti is open to valid criticism the conclusion should be that arthāpatti is a case of inference rather than an independent instrument of valid knowledge, a conclusion correctly drawn by the Naiyāyika, e.g., the following are some of the vital points urged by Udayana against the Mīmāṃsaka's thesis on arthāpatti[116]:

(1) Arthāpatti does not differ from inference, because we nowhere come across a case that illustrates one and not the other. An alleged illustration of arthāpatti is the alive Caitra's absence-inside-his-house which, since it remains unaccounted for in the absence of his presence-outside-his-house, brings about the cognition of his presence-outside-his-house. Now we ask: What is unaccounted for in the alive man's absence-inside-his-house? Certainly, it is not the case that x is unaccounted for without y unless it be the case that x is determined by y; for otherwise there arises an undesirable contingency (inasmuch as in that case you can say about any x and y that the former is unaccounted for without the latter). It might be replied: 'Absence-inside-house is certainly not produced by presence-outside-house, for the former is not an effect of the latter; but the very being of absence-inside-house is impossible without the being of presence-outside-house.' But that too simply means that absence-inside-house is by nature determined by presence-outside-house: for this is just how we negatively

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formulate a case of invariable concomitance. And how does presence-outside-house account for absence-inside-house? Certainly, the being of y does not account for the being of x unless it be the case that x is determined by y, for otherwise there arises an undesirable contingency (inasmuch as in that case you can say about any x and y that the being of the former is accounted for by the being of the latter). It might be said: 'It is the nature of absence-inside-house that it must be accompanied by presence-outside-house.' But this is just how we positively formulate a case of invariable concomitance. It might be said: 'We do not deny that some kind of invariable concomitance is present there also in the cases of arthāpatti, but the mere presence (i.e., uncognized presence) of invariable concomitance will not turn the cases of arthāpatti into those of inference'. To this we reply that the unaccountability in question must be taken cognizance of; for otherwise there will arise undesirable contingencies. Moreover, in that case there will be no occasion for a pseudo-arthāpatti; for a case of pseudo-arthāpatti arises when a situation that is accounted for one way is mistaken to be unaccounted for (and hence accounted for) another way. One might ask: 'But in what precise manner do we grasp the relation of invariable concomitance in the case under consideration?' To this we reply that here we have the following very obvious relation of invariable concomitance: 'Whenever I am here I am nowhere else, whenever I am somewhere else I am not here.' What more is required there?

(2) It might be said: 'When two instruments of valid knowledge yield mutually contradictory results, arthāpatti reconciles the two. This is not what happens in the cases of inference. But that is not true; for when there arise two mutually contradictory pieces of knowledge—e.g. the same thing's identification as rope and as snake—one of them must be cancelled. Certainly, two mutually contradictory pieces of knowledge cannot be both valid, nor can two pieces of valid knowledge be mutually contradictory, e.g., 'It is fat' and 'It is one'—these are two pieces of knowledge about the same thing and are not mutually contradictory; similarly, 'This is Caitra' and 'That is Maitra'—these are two pieces of knowledge about two things and are not mutually contradictory. It might

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be said: 'In the case under consideration since presence-somewhere includes presence-inside-house also, the knowledge that Caitra is present somewhere and the knowledge that he is absent inside his house are two mutually contradictory pieces of knowledge about the same thing.' To this we reply that these two pieces of knowledge are not mutually contradictory, just as the knowledge that x is present somewhere and the knowledge that x is absent somewhere are not mutually contradictory. It might be said that here too the two pieces of knowledge are mutually contradictory. But in that case one of these must be cancelled. It might be said that neither of these is cancelled because arthāpatti reconciles the two. But we ask: What was unaccounted for here (so that arthāpatti had to intervene)? It might be answered that the mutual contradiction itself remains unaccounted for unless it is posited that the two pieces of knowledge in question pertain to two different objects (i.e., two different places). But we ask: Why is it not posited that the two pieces of knowledge in question pertain to the same object? It might be answered that since something is posited here with a view to removing a mutual contradiction between two pieces of knowledge and since the contradiction arose on granting that the two pieces of knowledge pertain to the same object, how can this contradiction be removed by positing that the two pertain to the same object?; certainly, the same poison which has made somebody unconscious is not administered to him with a view to bringing him back to consciousness. But we ask: 'Why is it that mutual contradiction between the two pieces of knowledge in question arose on granting that they both pertain to the same object?' It might be answered that it is so because we always find a thing to be present at one place and absent at a different place. But then we say that this is the very relation of invariable concomitance whose presence the opponent was till now denying. Moreover, on the opponent's logic the observation of smoke too should yield the knowledge of fire through arthāpatti rather than inference; for the presence of smoke is unaccounted for without the presence of fire, and here there is also a mutual contradiction between the knowledge that 'there is fire here, because there is smoke here' and the knowledge that 'there is no fire here, because no fire is being seen here.' Again, arthāpatti comes here to establish that the non-cognition in question pertains to

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the front part of the place in question while the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire to its concealed part. And if this be the explanation of the situation there will be available no cases of inference.

In this connection it is interesting to recall that the Jaina logicians actually formulated their thesis on vyāpti in terms of anyathā-anupapatti (i.e., otherwise unaccountability); they thus said that P is hetu and Q its sādhya in case x's possession of P remains unaccounted for unless it is granted that x possesses Q.)

(iii) Non-cognition.

122. The ontological status of 'absence' or 'non-existence' was a problem of much animated discussion among Indian philosophers and most divergent possible stands were taken on the question by different camps. But this was an essentially metaphysical controversy which should not directly concern us at present. However, it had a logical aspect too and that deserves consideration. The Kumārilites particularly raised the question as to whether an 'absence' can be known through the same instruments of valid knowledge which yield the knowledge of positive entities, and they come out with an answer in the negative; thus they posited 'non-cognition' as an independent instrument of valid knowledge solely to be employed for knowing an 'absence'. And criticism against this stand of theirs came from two sides: the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians who themselves agreed with the Kumārilites in treating 'absence' as something existing side by side with the positive entities, argued that the ordinary instruments of valid knowledge are competent to grasp an 'absence' and that therefore it is unnecessary to posit 'non-cognition' as an additional instrument of valid knowledge alleged to be solely competent to grasp an 'absence'; the Buddhists and Prabhākarites, who repudiated the idea of treating 'absence' as something existing side by side with the positive entities, were even more emphatic in their rejection of 'non-cognition' as an additional instrument of valid knowledge alleged to be solely competent to grasp an 'absence'.

However, one position was common to all the participants in the controversy: it was that the mere fact of our not cognizing a thing at a place (or a character in a thing) is no warrant for our asserting that this thing is absent at this place (or this character in this thing), the idea being that such a warrant exists only when the conditions obtain there which should enable us to cognize this thing at this place (or this character in this thing) provided it is present there and yet it is not being cognized. As it

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was technically put, not all non-cognition but only 'competent non-cognition' enables us to assert the non-existence of the thing not cognized. The difference arose when the Kumārilites maintained that this 'competent non-cognition' is an independent instrument of valid knowledge solely competent to grasp an 'absence', the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians that this 'competent non-cognition' acts as an accessory to the ordinary instruments of valid knowledge, while the Buddhists and Prabhākarites that this 'competent non-cognition' results in a mere usage as to the absence of this or that thing at this or that place (or of this or that character in this or that thing.) To us it appears that the Buddhists and Prabhākarites could take an essentially sound stand on account of their denying an entitative character to 'absence' while the Kumārilites and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas took a more or less confused stand on account of their attributing an entitative character to 'absence'; (may be it was because of his siding with the Buddhist no so crucial an issue that the orthodox circles nicknamed Prabhākara as 'a friend of Buddha[117]').

123. The following free rendering of a passage from Pārthasārathi should give to a modern student of Logic a fairly clear idea of the issues that were raked in the course of this controversy[118] :—

There are Mīmāṃsakas, viz., Prabhākarites, who think that 'absence' is not an independent entity nor 'non-cognition' an independent instrument of valid knowledge. We ask these Mīmāmsakas as to what is the object of the knowledge which arises in the wake of a competent non-cognition of jar on the floor and is expressible in the form 'there is no jar on the floor'. The floor cannot be this object, for then the knowledge in question should arise even when the floor in question happens to possess a jar.

But the Prabhākarite might deny that we at all have cognition of the type 'There is "absence of jar" on the floor'. To this we reply that in that case a Prabhākarite might as well deny that we at all have cognition of the type 'There is floor there'; for our cognition of 'absence of jar' is as much patent as our cognition of floor. We ask the Prabhākarite as to what is the couse of our usage to the effect 'There is "absence of jar" on the floor'; if he says that this cause is our knowledge of more floor at a time when a jar could have been seen as well, he will be forced to grant that we cannot have the usage to the effect 'There is "absence of jar" on the floor' in case a piece

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of cloth (say) is placed on this floor (for the floor ceases to be 'mere floor' as soon as anything is placed on it). And if the Prabhākarite says that in the case under consideration by 'mere floor' he understands 'floor devoid of jar' we would ask him what he means by 'being devoid of jar'; for if 'being devoid of jar' means 'being floor' the Prabhākarite will be forced to grant that the floor always remains devoid of jar while if it means 'possessing "absence of conjunction-with-jar" ' the Prabhākarite is forced to attribute independent existence to at least one 'absence', viz. 'absence of conjunction-with-jar'.

(The Prabhākarite might say that he does not deny the possibility of usage concerning 'absence' even if 'absence' is not an independent entity; but the question is as to what makes this 'usage' possible.) The Prabhākarite cannot say that whatever makes possible the 'knowledge of absence' for the Kumārilite makes possible the 'usage concerning absence' for the Prabhākarite; for with a Kumārilite 'absence of cognition of a thing (under conditions which would have made this cognition possible had the thing been there)' makes possible the knowledge of 'absence of this thing', but the prabhākarite, who is out to deny the reality of all 'absence'. is forced to deny the reality of 'absence of cognition' as well. The Prabhākarite might think that even a Kumārilite maintains that we first have cognitions of 'mere floor' while this cognition is followed by the knowledge of 'floor possessing "absence of jar" ', and owing to this he might form the impression that the 'mere floor' he spoke of above is the same as the 'mere floor' the Kumārilite is speaking of here. But this will be a misimpression. For with a Kumārilite cognition of 'mere floor' is equivalent to "cognition of floor coupled with the absence of both 'cognition of jar' and 'cognition of absence of jar' " while a Prabhākarite has no right to speak of "absence of both 'cognition of jar' and 'cognition of absence of jar' "; certainly, if you are ready to attribute reality to 'absence of cognition' you should also attribute it to 'absence of jar'. Nor can the Prabhākarite say that a positive entity which is found to be present at one place is (automatically) treated as absent at every other place; for then he will be forced to grant that 'cowness' which is found to be present in one cow should be treated as absent in every other

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cow. (It should be noted that this criticism cannot be levelled against the Buddhist, in whose eyes particulars are alone real while the so-called 'universals' mythical entities. According to the Buddhist, a particular exists at one place-and-time and at no other.—KKD.). Similarly untenable will be the Prabhākarite's contention that 'knowledge of floor' coupled with 'memory of jar' leads to the talk of 'floor being devoid of jar'; for even when both the floor and the jar are cognized (i.e., not only when the floor is cognized and the jar remembered) we may have knowledge of 'floor being devoid of jar' (and that in turn is because a jar occupies but one spot on the floor while the remaining spots are occupied by 'absence of jar').

Here the Prabhākarite raises a new set of difficulties, and this as follows: 'When we are having direct prception of a jar now on the floor it should be logically impossible for us to have knowledge of a past absence of this jar on this floor. For 'absence of cognition' is alleged to be the cause of the knowledge of 'absence' while in the case under consideration since there is no "absence of 'cognition of jar' " there should also be no knowledge of 'absence of jar'. And it cannot be said that here we do have "absence of 'cognition of jar-as-related-to-a-past-moment' " (which 'absence of cognition' should cause the knowledge of a past absence-of-jar); for it is only when a body is capable of being cognized that absence of this body's cognition leads to the knowledge of this body's absence, while 'jar-as-related-to-a-past-moment' is not capable of being cognized at this moment. Nor will it do to say that the jar-as-related-to-a-past moment was capable of being cognized at that past moment and that it is the 'absence of jar'—which was certainly present at that moment but was not known at that moment—that we are recalling now; for it is impossible to recall at this moment what was not known at a past moment. And the past "absence of 'cognition of jar' " cannot cause the knowledge of the past absence-of-jar; for in the present case (since it is given that we are having direct preception of the jar now) this past "absence of 'cognition of jar' " is destoryed by our present 'cognition of jar'. Certainly, a destroyed 'absence of cognition' cannot cause the knowledge of 'absence of jar' just as an eye extracted from body cannot perceive colour. It will be of no avail to argue that the memory of even a destroyed

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'absence of cognition' can cause the knowledge of 'absence of jar' just as the memory of smoke seen-yesterday-but-destroyed-by-now can cause the inference of fire-as-existing-when-this-smoke-existed. For the case of 'absence of cognition' causing the knowledge of 'absence' is not on a par with the case of fire being inferred from smoke, and that is because it is the *mere presence (and not also cognition)* of 'absence of cognition' which is supposed to cause the knowledge of 'absence' while it is the *cognition (and not mere presence)* of smoke which causes the inference of fire. Certainly, if the cognition of 'absence of cognition' were necessary in order that 'absence of cognition' might cause the knowledge of 'absence' we would find ourselves faced with an infinite regress; for in that case the cognition of 'absence of cognition' would have been caused by the cognition of 'absence of cognition-of-cognition' this latter cognition in turn would have been caused by the cognition of 'absence of cognition-of-cognition-of-cognition', and so on ad infinitum.'

To this we reply: 'It is certainly true that 'absence of cognition' causes the knowledge of 'absence' by its mere presence (for otherwise the infinite regress just referred to would have been unavoidable). But even about a jar that is being cognized now it is possible to say that a competent non-cognition is taking place concerning it-as-related to a past moment, and that in turn is because in our account 'absence of cognition' stands for both 'absence of knowledge' and 'absence of memory'. Thus in the case under consideration it is "absence of 'memory of jar-as-related-to-a-past-moment' " (and not "absence of knowledge of jar-as-related-to-a past-moment' ") which causes the knowledge of jar's absence-at-that-past-moment. And just as it is not a mere 'absence knowledge' but 'absence of knowledge under conditions when knowledge is possible' which causes the knowledge of 'absence' so also it is not a mere 'absence of memory' but 'absence of memory under conditions when memory is possible' which causes the knowledge of 'absence'. Thus in the case under consideration there is "absence of 'memory of jar' " at a time when such a memory is possible, for even about a jar that is being cognized now we can say: 'Had it been there at that particular moment it would have been known then, and had it been known then it

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would have been recalled now. But as a matter of fact it is not being recalled now'; this 'absence of memory' taking place now produces the knowledge of 'absence of jar-as-related-to-that-past-moment', and there is nothing incomprehensible in all this'.

At this stage the Prabhākarite urges another difficulty. He says: 'It is not mere *presence* but *cognition* of 'absence of cognition under the conditions when cognition is possible' which causes the knowledge of 'absence'. For there are cases where such 'absence of cognition' is present but mistaken to be absent, and in those case there results no knowledge of 'absence'; similarly, theree are cases where such 'absence of cognition' is absent but mistaken to be present, and in those cases there results a knowledge of 'absence'. And since the position that "cognition of 'absence of cognition' " causes the knowledge of 'absence' leads to an infinite regress we should reject the suggestion that 'absence of cognition' is a new type of instrument of valid knowledge meant in order to have a knowledge of 'absence'.'

To this we reply: 'We have already proved that 'absence' is an independent entity (and that it cannot be known by those instruments of valid knowledge which are employed when we seek to know positive entities). And we also grant that it is the mere *presence* (and not also *cognition*) of 'absence of cognition' which causes the knowledge of 'absence'. However, in the cases where competent 'absence of cognition', even if present, is mistaken to be absent and hence where there arises no knowledge of 'absence (as also in the cases where competent 'absence of cognition', even if absent, is mistaken to be present and hence where there arises a knowledge of 'absence') the mistake lies not in wrongly cognizing the 'absence of cognition' (for the cognition of 'absence of cognition' is not at all required here) but in a failure to realize whether or not this 'absence of cognition' is competent, i.e., whether it is taking place under the conditions when the cognition in question is possible. This is because the cause of the knowledge of 'absence' is competent 'absence of cognition' where the competence in question is a cause (not by its mere presence but as known so that sometimes this competence is present there but is not known and that prevents the

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knowledge of 'absence' from arising, while at other times this competence is absent there but is mistaken to be present and that gives rise to a mistaken knowledge of 'absence'. But so far as 'absence of cognition' is concerned it is a cause of the knowledge of 'absence' by its mere presence and not as known—so that the infinite regress feared by the opponent does never arise.'

Lastly, we consider the position adopted by the Naiyāyika who, though a believer in the independent existence of 'absence', thinks it unnecessary to posit 'non-cognition' as an independent instrument of valid knowledge through which alone we know this 'absence'). Our argument against this position runs as follows: " 'Absence' is not known through sense-perception, because we can know 'absence' even in such cases where no employment of sense-organs has taken place. For suppose somebody asks me now in the noon whether I had seen a man of such and such description there in the morning; also suppose that I had not seen the man of that particular description there in the morning. Under these conditions my negative reply to the question put to me will be a result of no employment of sense-organs on my part. Certainly, I cannot now employ my sense-organs to perceive 'that man's absence there in the morning', but nor shall I be recalling 'that man's absence there in the morning' (and that is because I had no perception of 'that man's absence there in the morning'). The only possible explanation of my knowledge of 'that man's absence there in the morning' will be that this knowledge is caused by "absence of memory of 'that man's presence there in the morning' under conditions when such memory is possible". This explanation can now be extended even to those cases where sense-preception of some sort is actually taking place. For example, when I am seeing empty floor I am having a knowledge of 'absence of jar on the floor', but this knowledge of 'absence of jar' is caused not by my eyes but by my "absence of 'perception of jar' under conditions when such perception is possible"."

Nor will it be correct to treat the cases of knowledge of 'absence' as cases of inferential knowledge. For an 'absence' cannot be known as the

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invariable concomitant of a probans (and hence cannot be the object of a piece of inferential knowledge) unless it is capable of being known otherwise as well. Thus one should not think that he can argue :—

*Wherever there is presence of a cognizable entity (i.e., an entity capable of being cognized and just now being sought to be cognized) there is cognition of this entity,

*Here there is no cognition of such and such a cognizable entity,

*Here there is no presence (or here there is absence) of this entity.

For in order to have a vyāpti of the form "wherever there is no cognition of a cognizable entity there is absence of this entity" we must first somehow have the knowledge of the particular places where "absence of cognition (of the cognizable entity)" and 'absence of the cognizable entity' have been found to go together; again, the inference in question requires also the knowledge of the place in question as possessed of 'absence of cognition'. That is to say, the formulation of this inference is preceded by many a case of knowledge of 'absence'. Now this knowledge cannot come about through sense-preception while we will be faced with an infinite regress if another inference becomes necessary in order to arrive at it. For in this new inference the very same difficulty will arise as has done in the original inference under consideration. The only way out of these difficulties is that 'absence of cognition (or non-cognition)' be treated as an independent instrument of valid knowledge which by its mere presence produces the knowledge of 'absence'."

124. This Kumārilite account of the phenomenon of non-cognition suffers from two defects, viz. (*i*) it posit 'absence' as an independently existing entity, and (*ii*) it posits 'non-cognition' as an independent instrument of valid knowledge alleged to be solely competent to grasp an 'absence'. The Kumārilite does not deny that we often come to know an 'absence through inference, etc., i.e., through instruments of valid knowledge other than perception—but it is his submission that there are also certain cases where we know an 'absence' without at all resorting to inference, etc. So has main thesis amounts to maintaining that perception is inherently incapable of grasping an 'absence. In this connection the Kumārilite chiefly relies upon the cases where after having tried to recall 'a thing's presence at a place in the past' and failed we declare that thing to have been absent.

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at that place in the past; it is his contention that in these cases we know 'absence' neither through preception nor through inference, etc., but through 'non-recall', and from this he concludes that even in the cases of an allegedly perceptual knowledge of 'absence' we really know an 'absence' through 'non-perception'. As a matter of fact, when we seek to *recall* 'a thing's presence at a place in the past' and fail as also when we seek to perceive 'a thing's presence at a place now' and fail we resort to an inference before we declare the thing to be absent (and that without being compelled to posit 'absence' as an independently existing entity)[119]. Now this correct criticism of the Kumārilite position came from the side of the Prabhākarite and still more clearly from that of the Buddhist while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians sought to demolish the Kumārilite case by trying to prove that a sense-organ is capable of coming in contact with an 'absence' and thus producing perceptual knowledge thereof. This ought to be clear from Udayana's polemic against the Kumārilite which we reproduce below[120] :—

(1) The cases of inferential and verbal knowledge of 'absence', i.e., the cases of an indirect knowledge of 'absence' are those of knowledge had through a cognized instrument. For words (which are the instrument of verbal knowledge) as well as probantia (which are the instrument of inferential knowledge) act as instrument of knowledge only when cognized. But there are also cases of a direct knowledge of 'absence' where the concerned instrument of cognition is not cognized; hence they must be treated as the cases of a qualitatively different type of knowledge. And since knowledge had through sense-object contact is the only type where the concerned instrument of cognition is not cognized the cases in question must be those of knowledge of 'absence' had through sense-object contact.

(2) The Mīmāṃsaka argues that a sense-organ cannot take cognizance of an 'absence' because at the time of the cognition of an 'absence' this sense-organ is otherwise engaged. But we ask the Mīmāṃsaka as to what it is that keeps the sense-organ otherwise engaged when an 'absence' is being taken cognizance of. (*a*) It cannot be said that at the time of the cognition of an 'absence' the sense-organ is engaged in cognizing the locus of the 'absence' in question; for there are cases where the sense-organ cognizing an 'absence' is different from the one cognizing the locus of this 'absence'. For example, " 'absence of colour' residing in air" is cognized by the visual sense-organ

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but has for its locus air that is not cognized by the visual sense-organ. (b) Nor can it be said that at the time of the cognition of an 'absence' the sense-organ is engaged in cognizing other entities; for such cognition of other entities serves no purpose. Moreover, there are cases where the sense-organ cognizing an 'absence' cognizes nothing else. For example, when in darkness we feel by touch the absence of some tangible entity the the tactile sense-organ cognizes nothing save this entity's absence. Again, if a sense-organ becomes competent to cognize an 'absence' simply by virtue of cognizing other entities a man who is seeing the things lying in front of him should be able to see "absence of black colour" residing in an entity lying at his back. And if it is said that it is also a necessary condition of the cognition of an 'absence' that the locus of the 'absence' cognized should lie in front of the cognizer, we shall like to say that it is also a necessary condition of the cognition of an 'absence' that the 'absence' cognized should come in contact with the sense-organ cognizing this 'absence'. For example, the fact that 'absence of colour' cannot be taken cognizance of in darkness is proof that the sense-organ for which light acts as an accessory (i.e., the visual sense-organ) comes in contact with "absence of colour" when it is cognized. For otherwise, when I am feeling by touch the presence of an entity lying in front of me (but not visible to me) it should be possible for me to cognize "absence of colour" residing in this entity. (c) Nor can it be said that at the time of the cognition of an 'absence' the sense-organ is engaged in rendering the absent entity an object of competent (rather than incompetent) non-cognition. (By competent non-cognition of an object is meant its non-cognition at a time when all the conditions of its cognition are available.) For a sense-organ has to do nothing in order to render an entity an object of competent non-cognition; this, in turn, is because the mere presence of the concerned conditions of cognition renders a non-cognition competent. Thus at the time of the perceptual cognition of an 'absence' that sense-organ must be active whose activity is necessary for the cognition of the concerned absent entity. But if this operativeness on the part of the sense-organ is called its 'being otherwise engaged' we should as well maintain that at the time of the perception of an entity the concerned sense-organ is 'otherwise engaged' (for in this perception too this

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sense-organ must be operative). And from this should follow the corollary that perception requires an instrument other than sense-organ (just as we are being asked here to concede that the cognition of an 'absence' requires an instrument other than sense-organ). (*d*) Nor can it be said that at the time of the cognition of an 'absence' the sense-organ is engaged in cognizing some other property of the locus of this 'absence'. For there are cases where this sort of engagement is impossible. For example, the visual sense-organ, when it takes cognizance of the " 'absence of colour' residing in air", does not at all cognize any property whatsover of air. The Mīmāṃsaka might like to submit that " 'absence of colour' residing in air" is cognized through inference rather than perception. But we ask him as to what will be the precise form of that inference. It cannot be "Air possesses 'absence of colour', because there is absence of cognition of colour-in-air". For according to the Mīmāṃsaka, 'cognition' is an inherently impreceptible entity (and hence an entity whose 'absence' cannot be known directly). Similar difficulties will arise when 'absence of cognition' too is treated as an object of inference where 'absence of cognizedness' is the probans for this 'absence of cognizedness' is as much unproved as 'absence of colour' itself. Nor can it be said that 'absence of cognizedness', though a probans for inferring 'absence of cognition', is itself uncognized; for it is only a cognized probans that can act as a ground for inferring the probandum concerned (otherwise there will arise undesirable contingencies). As a matter of fact, if it is the Mīmāṃsaka's contention that 'non-cognition of an entity' grasps this entity's absence only in case some property of the locus of this 'absence' is being cognized he will be forced to maintain that' " 'absence of colour' in air" is either not grasped at all or grasped through something other than a mere 'non-cognition of colour-in-air'. The Mīmāṃsaka might contend that 'absence of colour-in-air' is inferred with 'non-cognition of colour-in-air' acting as probans, and in support of this contention he might argue that 'non-cognition' conceived as an 'independent instrument of valid knowledge (for cognizing an 'absence') requires that some property of the locus of this 'absence' is being cognized, but that 'non-cognition' conceived as a probans (for inferring an 'absence') does not require that some property of the locus of this 'absence'

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is being cognized; just as *perception* of a man's "pure birth" requires a sense-organ's activity but not so the *inference* concerning this "pure birth". But this argument is invalid. For perception is a means of direct knowledge while inference is a means of indirect knowledge, and hence it is understandable why perception requires a sense-orgain's activity but not so inference; on the other hand, both inference and 'non-cognition' (the new instrument of valid knowledge posited by the Mīmāṃsaka) are means of indirect knowledge, and hence it is difficult to see why the latter should require 'sensuous perception of some property of the locus of the concerned "absence" ' but not so the former. And it will be arbitary to posit between these two cases of indirect knowledge a difference that we never experience.

(3) It is a rule that knowledge had through an uncognized instrument must be knowledge has through a sense-organ. Now one might contend that this rule applies only to the cases of cognition of positive entities (and not to the cases of cognition of 'absences'). But there is no force in this contention. For then one might as well contend that rules of inference too apply only to the cases of inference of positive entities (and not to the cases of inference of 'absences'). Of course, the directness of perceptual knowledge equally forces us to posit the operation of a sense-organ but the non-cognition of the instrument concerned does so even earlier. As a matter of fact, the rule in question is so universal in its application that memory which, being an indirect type of cognition, is so much unlike sense-perception is conceived as a type of cognition had through a sense-organ simply on the ground that its instrument (viz. manas) is uncognized. Impressions too are, no doubt, posited as uncognized entities, but they are posited not as instruments of memory but as objects of memory (and that in turn is because a sense-organ cannot produce knowledge without coming in contact with its object).

(4) Again, there is another universal rule to the effect that manas cannot produce knowledge without having for its accessory a positive entity. Thus in producing inferential knowledge manas has 'probans (which is a positive entity) for its accessory in producing verbal knowledge it has words (which, again, are positive entities) for its accessories, and so on and so forth.

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From this it follows that manas cannot produce knowledge with only 'non-cognition' acting as its accessory. Hence the knowledge of 'absence' not had through inference, verbal testimony etc., must be a knowledge had through a sense-organ. Certainly, it is not proper to disregard a well established rule. (By suggesting that *manas* needs the assistance of a positive entity in producing the knowledge of positive entities but not in producing that of 'absences').

(5) Another universal rule is to the effect that an instrument of knowledge that produces knowledge concerning a particular entity also produces knowledge concerning the 'absence' of this entity. Thus inference, verbal testimony etc., produce knowledge concerning positive entities as also concerning their respective 'absences'. It is therefore only natural to expect that sense-organs too should produce knowledge not only concerning positive entities but also concerning their respective 'absences'.

(6) A sense-organ's contact with a particular 'absence' *immediately* results in knowledge concerning this 'absence'. Hence this sense-organ must be the instrument of this knowledge concerning 'absence'. However, even if it is granted that in these cases there also takes place the concerned sense-organ's contact with the locus of the concerned 'absence' the fact remains that the sense-organ is here the instrument of the ensuing knowledge concerning 'absence'; for it is the definition of an instrument that it produces the effect concerned by first producing an 'operation' that directly produces this effect. That is to say, the "sense-organ's contact with the locus of an 'absence' " is the 'operation' involved in this sense-organ's production of the knowledge concerning this 'absence.'

(7) Defects in sense-organs are often responsible for a defective knowledge concerning an 'absence'. (Thus a short-sighted person cognizes 'absence of jar' even at a place where there exists a jar.) But if defects in x are responsible for a defective production of y x must be a cause of y. Hence there must be cases where the knowledge concerning 'absence' is produced by a sense-organ.

(8) The knowledge to the effect that the floor is devoid of jar (where floor is the qualificand and 'absence of jar' the qualifier) must be treated as born of sense-organs; otherwise the Mīmāṃsaka

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will be compelled to posit a seventh instrument of valid knowledge to account for this case. For the Mīmāṃsaka has argued: "When we see the floor and cognize " 'absence of jar' on the floor" this cognition of 'absence' cannot be a product of the visual sense-organ, and that is because the visual sense-organ is here engaged in cognizing the floor which is a qualificand of the 'absence' in question". Against this we can offer a counter-argument: "When we fail to cognize jar and then cognize " 'absence of jar' on the floor" this cognition of 'absence' cannot be a product of "non-cognition (of jar)", and that is because this "non-cognition" is here engaged in cognizing 'absence of jar' which is a qualifier of the floor in question". The Mīmāṃsaka cannot contend that the knowledge concerning " 'absence of jar' on the floor" is a product of both "non-cognition" and the visual sense-organ; for these are (according to him) two instruments of valid knowledge that differ both as to their nature and as to their object. Certainly, it is impossible for two mutually independent causes to produce a common effect, e.g., it is impossible for a potter working on the wheel and a weaver working on the loom to produce one common effect. And granting that the "knowledge of 'absence' " in question is a product of both "non-cognition" and the visual sense-organ, why should the Mīmāṃsaka deny that sense-organs are competent to cognize 'absence'? For what is incompetent to produce x connot be even a co-producer of x (otherwise a similar contingency will arise elsewhere too). Nor should it be wondered why P and Q *both* should be required to produce x in case both of them are competent to produce x; for what is meant here is that P and Q are together competent to produce x. What actually happens is that the visual sense-organ, aided by non-cognition, produces the knowledge concerning " 'absence of jar' on the floor", just as the visual sense-organ, aided by the memory of a past olfactory perception, produces the knowledge to the effect that 'sandal is fragrant'.

(9) The Mīmāṃsaka argues: "The 'absence of jar' is a qualifier and the floor its qualificand while the knowledge of qualifier must precede the knowledge of the qualificand-as-qualified. However, it should not be necessary that 'absence of jar' be known by

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the same instrument whereby the floor is known; e.g., fragrance is a qualifier and sandal its qualificand and yet fragrance is cognised by one sense-organ, viz.. the olfactory sense-organ, and sandal by another, viz., the visual sense-organ. Hence it is possible that there be an instrument of valid knowledge specially meant to grasp 'absence'. Again, all perceptual knowledge first arises in the form of an indeterminate perception and then develops into a determinate perception; but it is in the very nature of things impossible for us to have indeterminate knowledge of an 'absence'; (this is because all knowledge of 'absence' is preceded by a knowledge of the counterpositive of this 'absence', while an indeterminate perception is preceded by no other knowledge). From this it follows that knowledge concerning 'absence' is never perceptual. Moreover, no conceivable contact can take place between a sense-organ and an 'absence'; (this is because neither 'saṃyoga'-relation nor 'samavāya'-relation obtains between an 'absence' and its locus, while 'viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya'-relation cannot obtain between two entities unless there already obtains between them either 'saṃyoga'-relation or 'samavāya'-relation). From this also it follows that knowledge concerning 'absence' is never perceptual. Lastly, since in the cases under consideration the occurrence of non-cognition has to be conceded in any case it is but proper to treat this non-cognition itself as the concerned instrument of valid knowledge here." To all this we reply as follows: "Only that qualifier of a qualificand is first known all alone and then as a qualifier which is demarcated from everything else by knowledge concerning itself; (this for example is the case with entities like jars, pots, etc.,). On the other hand, those qualifiers (like absence, samavāya, cognition, etc., that have got a necessary reference to things other than themselves) which are just revealed by knowledge concerning themselves (but not demarcated from everything else by this knowledge) are not first known all alone and then as a qualifier. (There is something anomalous about this argument, for as a matter of fact, it seems to be true for all values of x that 'knowledge concerning x demarcates x from all non-x'.—KKD). Similarly, only that qualifier of a qualificand is first known by indeterminate perception (and then by determinate perception) which has itself got no qualifier. But since an 'absence' has itself got a qualifier in the form of its

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counterpositive there is no possibility of our knowing an 'absence'—which is doubtless a qualifier of its locus—first by indeterminate perception and then by determinate perception. As for the objection that an 'absence' cannot qualify its locus unless there already obtains either saṃyoga-relation or samavāya-relation between this 'absence' and its locus, we reply that this rule is not universally valid. Thus jar's colour qualifies the jar as a result of residing in it by samavāya-relation, but this does not mean that an 'absence' must also qualify its locus as a result of residing in it by samavāya-relation (or saṃyoga-relation). (Udayana says here that positing another relation in the case of 'absence' will lead to an infinite regress. It is difficult to see how—on Udayana's logic.—KKD). Again, if it is insisted that an 'absence' cannot be perceived unless it is first known by indeterminate perception the corollary will be that an 'absence' cannot be known at all. For all knowledge—be it inferential, verbal, or of any other type—is ultimately rooted in indeterminate perception, and hence if an 'absence' cannot be an object of perceptual knowledge it cannot be an object of any type of knowledge. (The mention of 'indeterminate perception' instead of 'perception' renders anomalies this step of udayana's argument.—KKD) As a matter of fact, we ask the Mīmāṃsaka how "non-cognition" takes cognizance of it. If he maintains that "non-cognition" is competent to yield an indeterminate knowledge of an 'absence' we might remind him that for reason already stated there can be no direct indeterminate knowledge of an 'absence'; and if there can be a direct indeterminate knowledge of an 'absence' why should the Mīmāṃsaka insist that a sense-organ is incompetent to yield such an indeterminate knowledge? Lastly, we ask the Mīmāṃsaka as to what according to him is the relation between an 'absence' and its locus; for on his showing too here seems to be no such relation. The Mīmāṃsaka would reply that the relation is one of 'identity', but this bold assertion of his is unsubstantiated by logic. (That is to say, if the Mīmāṃsaka is serious about his thesis that an 'absence' cannot qualify its locus unless there already obtains some other relation between the two he must not rest content by merely positing "non-cognition" as an independent instrument of valid knowledge but should seek to determine the precise nature of this alleged relation between an 'absence' and its locus.) We can certainly concede to the Mīmāṃsaka that in

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all perception of 'absence' non-cognition acts as an accessory to the sense-organ concerned. But if the necessary presence of non-cognition in all knowledge of 'absence' renders all such knowledge a product of "non-cognition" all knowledge whatsoever should become a product of "non-cognition". For in all knowledge of x there is present non-cognition of 'absence of x'.

125. As noted above, both the Mīmāṃsaka and the Naiyāyika are guilty of positing 'absences' as an independent type of entities. Hence the Naiyāyika's thesis that sense-organs are competent to take cognizance of 'absences' is almost as much misconceived as the Mīmāṃsaka's thesis that they are not so competent. But particularly objectionable is Udayana's contention that we can take cognizance of an 'absence' without having cognized the locus of this 'absence' and without having cognized something positive corresponding to this 'absence'. What actually happens is that on having cognized a substance at some place we become justified in saying about every other substance that it is absent from this place; similarly, on having perceived a sensory quality in some substance we become justified in saying about every other sensory quality of that type that it is absent from this substance. For example, if a mango exists on this table now I can say about every thing other than this mango that it is absent from this table (rather from this particular portion of the table) now; similarly, if I find that this mango is yellow in colour, sweet in taste, soft in touch, and fragrant in odour I can say about every colour other than yellow, every taste other than sweet, every touch other than soft, and every odour other than fragrant that they are all absent from this mango. Or to take Udayana's own example, on having felt the presence of a particular air at a place we can say that all other airs are absent from this place. We can also say that such and such a touch is absent from this air (and that is because we can feel some touch or other in this air), but it will be senseless to say that such and such a colour is absent from this air (and that is because we can see no colour whatsoever in this air). And to say that "colour is absent from air" is possible precisely because we are in a position to take note of a non-visual sensory property, viz., touch in air.

126. A concise presentation of the Prabhākarite thesis on the question of "non-cognition" is given by Rāmānujācārya; it runs as follows[121] :—

Certain philosophers have accepted "absence (better known as non-cognition)" as a separate instrument of valid knowledge. For in their opinion 'absence' being an entity quite different in nature from positive entities the instruments—themselves of

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the form of positive entities—employed for cognizing positive entities are incompetent to cognize an 'absence'; and "absence (or non-cognition)" is the name of that instrument of valid knowledge which (according to these philosophers) is of the form of 'a non-origination of the remaining (five) types of instruments of valid knowledge' and is to be employed in order to cognize an 'absence'. To this we take exception, for 'absence' which is thus alleged to be the special object of a new instrument of valid knowledge is no real entity.

The above-mentioned philosophers argue their case in the following manner: "Why is 'absence' not a real entity? For when we say 'there is no jar here on this floor' we have direct awareness of 'absence'. Now what is the object of this awareness? Is it 'floor's own nature' or 'empty floor'? And in the latter case, is 'emptiness' floor's own nature or a property of floor? If floor's own nature is the object of the awareness in question we should have this awareness even when a jar is placed on this floor; similarly, if empty floor is the object of this awareness while emptiness is floor's own nature then also we should have this awareness even when a jar is placed on this floor. And if empty floor is the object of this awareness while emptiness is a property of this floor you are admitting the existence of 'absence' as an independent entity.

Moreover, when you freely move about on a thornless floor, is this behaviour of yours due to a cognition of floor as such or is it due to a cognition of empty floor? In the latter case, is it due to a cognition of floor as empty or is it due to a cognition of floor that is empty? If this behaviour of yours is due to a cognition of floor as such it should be possible even when thorns are placed on this floor. If it is due to a cognition (even if possibly faulty) of floor as empty it should be possible even when minute (and hence invisible) thorns are present on this floor; moreover, in this case there should arise in the cognizer no desire to have a closer look at the floor with a view to ascertaining that it is really free from thorns. Lastly, if the behaviour in question is due to a cognition of floor that is empty you have admitted the existence of 'absence' as an independent entity; in that case it is understandable how a cognition of 'absence of thorns' makes possible our free movement on a thornless floor as also how there arises in us a desire to ascertain that the floor is really free from thorns.

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Again, if 'absence' is not a real entity "is not" becomes a meaningless phrase. And then one may even seek to infer horns on a hare's head. (For in that case 'there are no horns on a hare's head' will be a meaningless jumble of words.) Similarly, there will then be no cancellation of the illusory cognition of shell as silver. (For in that case 'this is not silver' will be a meaningless jumble of words.) On the other hand, if we admit the existence of 'absence' as an independent entity these contingencies just do not arise; similarly, on this view it is understandable how the object of a particular inference should stand cancelled by a subsequent inference. (From all this it follows that 'absence' is an entity distinct from positive entities). ...."

To this we reply: "Cognition of things like floor etc., is of two kinds, one takes place when a thing is viewed as accompanied by some other thing the other when a thing is viewed as existing alone. The latter cognition is again of two kinds, one takes place when we have in mind a counterpositive of perceptible nature the other when we have in mind a counterpositive of imperceptible nature. It is our cognition of a thing as existing alone plus our having in mind a counterpositive of perceptible nature that is called "absence (of cognition) of this counterpositive". Hence "absence" is not merely a cognition of something as existing alone; for that would not enable us to distinguish between one 'absence' and another. It is only when we have a counterpositive of perceptible nature in mind that we cognize an 'absence'. Thus when some thing is cognized and a particular counterpositive of perceptible nature is had in mind the cognition of this thing is called "absence (of cognition) of this counterpositive". So when a man says "there is no jar here on this floor" what he means is that he is seeing the mere floor while it was possible for him to have seen a jar as well."

One might ask: "What do you mean by this 'perceptibility' of a counterpositive'?" In reply we point out that our opponent understands by it 'possible presence here at this place of a thing earlier seen at another place'; for otherwise, all denial will become a denial of the impossible. We are ready to accept this position but shall like to add that such 'perceptibility" is simply a matter of knowledge (and not a matter

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of existence). As a matter of fact, even those who admit the existence of 'absence' as an independent entity concede that knowledge of something as 'existing alone' is necessary in order that we have the knowledge of an 'absence'; for they are of the view that the knowledge of an 'absence' is caused by the knowledge of a locus plus "possible of presence of the concerned counterpositive". Now we ask the opponent as to what kind of locus it is whose cognition causes the cognition of an 'absence'. Is it a locus accompanied by the concerned counterpositive? Or is it a locus accompanied by the absence of the concerned counterpositive? Or is it a locus existing all alone? The first alternative is unacceptable, for its acceptance will mean the possilibity of cognizing 'absence of jar' even at a place where a jar is present. To accept the second alternative will be to commit the fallacy of "self-causation"; for we are told here that the cogniton of 'absence of jar' is caused by the cognition of 'floor accompanied by the absence of jar'. (Certainly, there is involved a fallacy of "self-causation" if 'cognition of x' is treated as a part of the cause of 'cognition of x'.) There thus remains only the third alternative according to which the cognition of a locus as existing all alone causes the cogntion of an 'absence'; that is to say, on this alternative the existence of 'absence' as an independent entity is not necessary in order to cognize an 'absence'. Thus if usage concerning 'absence' is possible even without positing 'absence' as an independent entity why posit 'absence' as an independent entity? Certainly, we do not perceive an 'absence' as we perceive colours like blue, yellow, etc., As for the cognitions "airy atoms are non-blue", "watery atoms are devoid of smell", etc., they are inferential cognitions concerning airy atoms alone, watery atoms alone, etc.

In one word, when one cognizes an empty locus i.e., something that our opponent calls "a locus containing some absence of one of the four types" and has in mind a counterpositive of perceptible nature there ensues, according to us, an "absence (of cognition) of this counterpositive". The phrase "is not" is indicative of a locus of this description; this is why it is said that Prabhākarites regard the word 'not' as connotative of the nature of the concerned locus.

Free movement on a thornless floor is also due to the cognition of this floor as existing alone. And on our view it is quite

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understandable why here there should be a desire to ascertain that the concerned counterpositive—viz., thorns—is of perceptible nature. Similarly, the cancellation of a perception and the cancellation of an inference are due either to the cognition of something as existing alone or due to the cancellation of some usage. Thus what is cancelled is the usage of silver in relation to shell or the usage of probans in relation to a pseudo-probans. That is to say, on the Prabhākarite view what is cancelled is never a knowledge but always a usage.

One might ask us: "If 'absence' is not an independent entity how is it that we sometimes cognize a thing first as accompanied by some other thing and then as existing all alone?" In reply we ask the opponent as to what is his explanation of the phenomenon. The opponent might reply that the stick's blow, etc., (i.e. the causes of destruction) are responsible for this state of affairs. But then the same will be our explanation of how there takes place cognition concerning this or that thing as existing all alone. Similar will be our explanation of how there takes place cognition concerning floor as existing all alone when a previously existing jar is taken away from this floor; (here the jar's earlier presence at this floor is itself a cause of the cognition in question).

One might ask us: "If 'absence' is not an independent entity why should we not have cognition concerning floor-as-accompanied-by-jar even after a previously existing jar has been broken into potsherds and we have had cognition concerning floor-as-existing-all-alone?" In reply we ask the opponent as to what is his explanation of the phenomenon. The opponent might reply that the destruction of a previously existing jar is responsible for this state of affairs. But then the same will be our explanation of the phenomenon in question. The opponent might point out that this will mean our accepting 'absence' (as an independent entity). To this our reply will be that we do accept "destruction" (as a fact) but that the coming about of a destruction is always the emergence of a positive entity [and not the coming into existing of an independent entity called '(posterior) absence']. The only entities that exist are positive ones, but a positive entity may either exist as accompanied by some other entity or it may exist all alone. Thus the word 'destruction' stands for the

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emergence into being of a positive entity as existing all alone. We have already shown that even our opponent cannot escape this position. Our explanation easily applies to the cases of "destruction without leaving a trace". For example, a cognition vanishes without leaving a trace but the subsequent knowledge of this cognition's locus (i.e. of the soul wherein this cognition arose) is at the same time a knowledge of the "destruction of this cognition".

Lastly, even those who accept "non-cognition" as a separate instrument of valid knowledge cannot maintain that a mere non-origination of cognition leads to knowledge of 'absence'; for such non-origination takes place even during deep sleep. Again, when after first having not cognized a particular thing at a particular place we subsequently cognize this thing at this place we say "this thing was not (then) at this place". Here the knowledge of 'absence' must be due to the past non-cognition recognized as distinct from the present non-cognition; for the present non-cognition is now destroyed by the present cognition (while the past non-cognition remains as it was). All this goes to show that non-cognition as known (and not merely non-cognition as an existent fact) causes knowledge of 'absence'. But non-cognition is itself an 'absence'. Hence if the opponent maintains that all knowledge of 'absence' is caused by non-cognition he will land himself in an infinite regress. [For if knowledge of an 'absence' requires a non-cognition (as known), the knowledge of this non-cognition will require another non-cognition (as known), the knowledge of this second non-cognition will require a third non-cognition (as known), and so on ad infinitum.]—

127. This Prabhākarite account already voices some of the criticisms we have levelled against the Kumārilite and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians. But for a more detailed—and forthright—treatment of the problem on right lines let us acquaint ourselves with the arguments of Dharmakīrti who has pleaded the Buddhist case as follows[122] :—

Non-cognition of an object liable to be cognized is the ground either of absence or of the usage concerning absence. (Here are some points of clarification supplied by the commentator. non-cognition of an object under the conditions that would enable one to cognize this object in case it is present there is the ground of the usage concerning 'absence' of this object.

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In certain cases one object's 'absence' can be used as a probans for inferring another object's 'absence', and in these cases there also ensues usage concerning this latter object's 'absence'. As we shall see below, these are the cases where "absence of cause" is used as a probans for inferring "absence of effect", or where "absence of superimplicant" is used as a probans for inferring "absence of subimplicant". Thus the following is what is meant here: "Non-cognition of an object liable to be cognized is the ground either of the usage concerning absence or of both the absence and the usage concerning absence".)

Here "cognition" may be understood in two senses:—

(*i*) When treated as the character of a cognizer "cognition" stands for the fact that this cognizer is having a piece of cognition.

(*ii*) When treated as the character of an object "cognition" stands for the fact that this object is capable of producing cognition concerning itself (which in turn means that this object is producing cognition concerning itself—for what is capable of doing a thing must do this thing).

But in neither of these cases does "non-cognition" denote bare negation; what it denotes is negation-with-a-positive-substitute. Thus in the first case "non-cognition of x" stands for the fact that a cognizer is having a piece of cognition other than 'cognition of x', while in the second case it stands for the fact that an object other than x is producing cognition concerning itself. This is like our saying that a particular object is un-edible (when we want to say not that this object is not at all edible but that it is not to be eaten under certain conditions) or that a particular person is un-touchable (when we want to say not that this person is not at all touchable but that he is not to be touched under certain conditions).

Now in case one object's cognition is invariably accompanied by another object's cognition (this will happen when the former object's cognition is conditioned by those very factors which condition the latter object's cognition) these two objects are to be treated as "mutually related" inasmuch as both are related to the same cognition; and if two such objects are present at a particular place it is in the very nature of things impossible for a man to cognize one of them and leave uncognized the

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other. Therefore, when we maintain that "non-cognition of the object x" means "cognition of some non-x" we do so under the assumption that the objects x and this non-x are "mutually related" (i.e., those very factors which condition our cognition of x also condition our cognition of this non-x). (For in case two different factors condition our cognition of x and our cognition of a non-x it will be unwarranted to deduce "absence of x" from our cognition of this non-x.)

Thus in the present enquiry a non-x (i.e., an object other than x) stands not for any and every object that is not x but for an object which, though not x, is cognized through the same means which make us cognize x. It is our cognition of such a non-x which is equivalent to our non-cognition of x. And it is such a non-x (or our cognition of this non-x) which is the ground of our usage concerning "absence of x"; in some cases "absence of x" may be used as a probans for inferring "absence of y" (and in those cases there also ensues usage concerning "absence of y").

One might ask: "How can a positive non-x stand for 'absence of x'? And if that is impossible you cannot make a positive object (or its cognition) the ground either for another object' absence or for usage concerning another object's absence." To this we have already replied by saying that 'absence of x' stands for 'presence of a non-x-unaccompanied-by-x' while 'non-cognition of x' stands for 'cognition of a non-x-unaccompanied-by-x'. For a bare 'absence' (or a bare 'non-cognition') can prove or disprove nothing; that is because a bare 'absence' (or bare non-cognition) is itself incapable of being known any how—so that if you seek to treat it as the ground for our usage concerning 'absence' there arises the contingency of this usage remaining unaccounted for. As a matter of fact since to know that there exists at a place 'a non-x-unaccompanied-by-x' is to know that x is absent at that place we maintain that "a non-x-unaccompanied-by-x" *means* "absence of x". It might be said that it makes no difference if (as in our view) a validly known non-x (or a valid knowledge of non-x) is directly made the basis of our usage concerning 'absence' or if (as on the opponent's view) it simply proves 'absence' which in turn forms the basis of our usage concerning 'absence' (this being the opponent's reply to our objection that a bare 'absence' is itself incapable of

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being known). With this argument in mind one might ask us: "Why do you not treat 'a non-x (or its cognition)' as a probans for inferring 'absence of x'? That is to say, why do you maintain that a non-x *means* 'absence of *x*'?" To this our reply is that we nowhere find 'absence of *x*' over and above 'a non-xx'. Moreover, since no relation is conceivable between 'a non-*x*' and 'absence of *x*' the former cannot act as a probans for inferring the latter.

Here is our explanation for not treating 'a non-*x*' as a probans for 'absence of *x*': *x* can act as a probans for *y* only in those cases where a mere knowledge of *x* does not yield the knowledge of *y*; (smoke, e.g., is a probans for fire). But in the case under consideration we find that a mere knowledge of 'a non-*x*' yields the knowledge of 'absence of *x*'. For to know 'a non-*x*' is to known it as unaccompanied by *x* (keeping in mind that the conditions for knowing this non-*x* are the same as those for knowing x). Moreover, no relation is conceivable between 'a non-*x*' and 'absence of *x*' while there must obtain some relation between a probans and the probandum. One such relation is 'inherence in one common substratum'. This, for example, is the relation that obtains between 'being a produced entity' and 'being a transient entity', which are two properties inhering in one common substrutum, viz., smoke—say. Other such relations are "superstratum-substratum relation" and "cause-effect relation". But none of these relations obtains between a positive entity and an 'absence', from which it follows 'that 'a non-x' cannot act as a probans for 'absence of *x*'. (The relations in question are, all of them, recognized by non-Buddhist logicians).

One might say: "The relation between 'a non-x and absence of x' is "subject-object relation", just like the relation between a word and what this words stands for". Now "that a word has to be employed in order to express what it denotes goes to prove that obtains between a word and what it denotes either the 'relation of cause and effect' or the 'relation of invariable co-presence' "—this seems to be the opponent's case. (The opponent's case is that there obtains "subject-object relation" between a word and its denotation because there obtains between them either the 'relation of cause and effect' or the 'relation of invariable co-presence'.) The position is open to

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the following difficulty. If you can prove that 'a non-x' is a probans for 'absence of x you may say that subject object relation obtains between them. But you cannot prove the former unless there is a relation (i.e., either of the two relations in question) between 'a non-x' and 'absence of x'. And since neither of these relations obtains between' a non-x' and 'absence of x' we fail to see how "subject-object relation" can be said to obtain between them. On the other hand the argument that one of these relations obtains between 'a non-x' and 'absence of x' because 'subject-object' relation obtains between them is vitiated by the fallacy of 'mutual dependence'. (For 'one of the two relations' is the probans for 'subject-object relation' while 'subject-object relation' is the probans for 'one of the former two relations'.)

Moreover, in an inference we seek to prove the existence of the probandum in a locus on having observed the existence of the probans in this locus. But there is no such locus when we seek to prove 'absence of x' on having observed 'a non-x'. Nor can it be said that in the present case the probans serves to prove the probandum as such (and not the probandum as residing in a locus), for that will amount to saying that 'absence jar' (which might be the probandum in a case of the present type) exists always and everywhere. The opponent might say: "We want to prove the existence of 'absence of jar' in floor, etc., which are devoid of jar. This inference does not lack a common locus for the probans and the probandum (inasmuch as floor tec., are such loci) Nor is there a lock of relation between this locus and the probans (for the relation between the probans—'being floor etc., devoid of jar'—and floor etc.,—the locus of probans—is one of 'tādātmya (identity)')." To this our reply is that these floor, etc., are themselves the non-x in question (i.e., non-jar). For a place where x does not exist and which is therefore unaccompanied by x is a non-x. And as soon as such a place is observed there arises thought to the effect that "x (say jar) is absent from this place". How can then 'a non-x' be the probans and floor etc., the locus of this probans?

Nor can it be said that in the opponent's inference a particular non-x is the locus of probans and 'non-x-ness in general' the probans. For as soon as a particular non-x is recognized as such it is also recognized as possessing 'absence of x' 'and

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hence there remains no scope for inferring 'absence of x' from 'non-x-ness in general'). And it will not be proper to argue that whatever is this particular non-x possesses 'absence of x', for a particular non-x found at one place and time cannot be found at another place and time. Moreover, in this argument the probans is already a part or the thesis sought to be proved (for the thesis in question is "this particular non-x possesses 'absence of x' " while the prabans in question is 'being this particular non-x'). Nor can it be said that whatever is nothing but floor possesses 'absence of jar' (for that will be unwarranted inasmuch as even the floor, possessing a jar is nothing but floor) One might think that one can say: "Whatever floor is empty in this particular fashion possesses 'absence of jar' ". But to think so will be mistaken, for here 'emptiness in this particular fashion" can mean nothing save 'being devoid of jar'. And if by taking note of the particular type of emptiness belonging to the floor we have already thus taken note of 'absence of jar' belonging to the floor there remains nothing else to be proved. Then there is no use looking for a probans and no use seeking to establish a relation of invariable concomitance. Hence we conclude that 'a non-x' is no probans for 'absence of x'.

One might suggest that the relation between 'a non-x' and 'absence of x' is that of opposition. But we ask as to what is the opposite of 'a non-x'. To say that x is the opposite of 'a non-x' will lead to an absurdity. For the opponent seeks to maintain that in his inference the relation between the probans and the probandum is that of opposition, but if 'a non-x' is his probans and x the opposite of 'a non-x' his probandum ought to be x (and not 'absence of x'). On the other hand, if 'a non-x' is the opponent's probans and 'absence of x' his probandum he should desist from insisting that the relation between his probans and probandum is one of opposition. For we find 'a non-x' and 'absence of x' existing together while two opposites can never exist together). Thus there obtains no relation whatsoever between 'a non-x' and 'absence of x'. Here too it cannot be said that we seek to infer in a *particular* non-x "absence of x" *in general*; (for to know a non-x as non-x is to know it as devoid of all x whatsoever).

A non-x's 'being all alone there' means x's 'being absent there', and that is why 'a non-x' *means* 'absence of x'. Thus to know

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'a non-x' as a non-x is at the same time not to know x. As a matter of fact, if a non-x were not demarcated from x it (i.e., this non-x) would not have been known at all; for not to demarcate a non-x from x means not to distinguish what *is* a thing's nature from what *is not* this thing's nature. And in that case it would have been impossible for us to act in relation to a thing-either with a view to acquiring this thing or with a view to discarding it—on having observed this thing. For example, in that case (i.e., if to know a non-x is not to demarcate it from all x) one who will see fire will not be seeing fire alone (i.e., fire as demarcated from all non-fire)—with the result that even in case he is desirous of water he might move towards fire with a view to acquiring it (for now there will be no knowning that fire is not also water). One might say: "On seeing fire a man also comes to know of 'absence of water' through "non-cognition" (—a separate instrument of valid knowledge according to Kumārila). "But what is this 'non-cognition'? If 'non-cognition of x' stands for 'absence of cognition of x' we ask how a bare absence of one thing's cognition can be—or be a cause of—some other thing's cognition. Moreover, how are we to know this 'non-cognition' (understood as 'absence of cognition') itself? If it is said that an 'absence' can be known even without knowing the non-cognition in question—in fact, without knowing anything else whatsoever we ask why then we do not have knowledge of 'absence' during deep sleep etc. (For during deep sleep we are having no knowlledge of x" and if this be sufficient for our cognizing 'absence of x' we should have this cognition during deep sleep.) All this we have considered in Pramāṇa-viniścaya.

Thus if on observing fire one does not decide "Here is fire and not water" he would neither be in a position to stay where he is nor in a position to make a move towards this fire. (He will not stay where he is, because he is desirous of water and is not certain that the thing lying before him is not water. He will not make a move, because he is desirous of water and is certain that the thing lying before him is fire.) And this will be a matter of insurmountable trouble for the cognizer concerned.

One might say: "To know a non-x as 'standing all alone' is to know 'absence of x'. " But we ask him how one thing's cognition

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can make you cognize the absence of another thing. The opponent might reply: " 'Cognition of a non-x as standing all alone' is by nature competent to make us cognize 'absence of *x*'. " But then we will tell the opponent that this precisely is our position and that it is this position which he has been seeking to refute all along. This is like your sending a bird from the ship to ascertain if there is a bank nearby and this bird returning back without finding any trace of a bank. That is to say, it is no use our opponent seeking for the problem's solution in a direction where no such solution exists.

One might ask: "If to know a non-x is to know 'absence of *x*' why say that this *x* should be of such a nature that the conditions of cognizing this *x* and those of cognizing the non-x in question are the same? For in that case this non-x will be excluding *all x whatsoever*. Nor should it be said that non-cognition of x will serve as ground for cognizing 'absence of x' only in case this *x* is of such a nature that had it been present there it would have been cognized there. For a non-x excludes *all x whatsoever* (and not only those *x* which are liable to be cognized under the conditions)."

To this we reply: "To know *x* as *x* is to know it as distinct from non-*x*, for knowledge is always of one definite object; this is owing to the fact that it is impossible for *x* and non-*x* to have one and the same nature. Had *x* not excluded all non-*x* it would have been impossible for us either to undertake action or to desist from action in relation to this *x*. And since *x* is known as occurring at one definite place and time and as possessing one definite nature the knowledge of this *x* is at the same time a knowledge that this *x* does not occur at a different place and time nor possesses a different nature. Thus it is by an exclusion of other places, times, and natures that an entity is known as occupying one place and time and possessing one nature; moreover, it is then known that it is this entity alone—and no other entity—that occupies this place and hence possesses this nature. This is how a piece of knowledge has for its object an object demarcated from every other entity. Thus a piece of cognition divides all entities into too mutually exclusive and exhaustive grougs, and the entire utility of this cognition lies in its enabling us to take note of such inclusions and exclusions. That is to say, by enabling us to take note of *x* the cognition of *x* enables us to exclude

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from our purview *all non-x;* this in turn means that there can be no entity that is neiher x nor non-*x*. Were it not the case (i.e., were there an entity which is neither *x* nor non-*x*) *x* could not have been demarcated from all non-x; and in that case too it would have been impossible for as to cognize (as *x*).

Thus all knowledge of *x* is a cognition that *x* is present there, that no non-*x* is present there, and that everything must be either *x* or a non-*x;* (these are three aspects of the same act of knowledge). All knowledge of *x* excludes this *x* from all non-x inasmuch as it is this x that is being cognized here; similarly, all knowledge of x excludes all non-*x* from this *x* inasmuch as no non-x is being cognized here. In this way this very knowledge tells us that there is no possibility of a thing being neither *x* nor non-x. For when *x* is the object of a piece of knowledge each thing that is not *x* is determined as a non-*x* while the thing that is not a non-x is determined as *x*.

These very considerations apply to the pair of characters like "succession" and "non-succession". (That is to say, just as an entity is either *x* or a non-*x* and never neither *x* nor a non-*x*, similarly an entity performs an act either simultaneously with another act or non-simultaneously with it and never neither simultaneously nor non-simultaneously with it. Thus we may cognize not only absence of this or that entity at a place and time but also absence of this or that character in an entity.)

Thus to cognize *x* is no doubt to cognize 'absence of all non-x' but it is not necessary that a non-*x* must occupy a place and time different from that of *x*. That is to say, it is possible for an object of knowledge to a non-*x* and yet occupy the same place and time as *x*. For example, the colour of an entity is not its taste and its taste is not its colour, but this colour and this taste occupy the same place and time.

From this we conclude that non-cognition of *x* will serve as ground for cognizing 'absence of *x*' only in case it fulfils the conditions laid down earlier (i.e., only in case the non-*x* that is being cognized is cognizable through the same means as is *x*). (Thus to cognize a mango at a place is to cognize 'absence of all non-mango' at this place, but 'non-mango' here stands for any and every *thing* other than mango. Similarly, to cognize

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the yellow colour of mango is to cognize 'absence of all non-yellow' at the place occupied by this mango, but 'non-yellow' here stands for any and every *colour* other than yellow. Lastly, to cognize the sweet taste of a mango is to cognize' 'absence of all non-sweet' at the place occupied by the mango, but 'non-sweet' here stands for any and every *taste* other than sweet. That is to say, we are not entitled to say "since the colour of a mango is not this mango nor the taste of this mango, the colour of a mango cannot exist at a place where this mango and the taste of this mango exist". For in this context, a non-mango must be an object cognized through the same means as is a mango, a non-yellow an object cognized through the same means as is a yellow colour, and a non-sweet an object cognized through the same means as is a sweet taste.)"

Similarly we no doubt grant that the cognition of a non-x serves as ground for the cognition of 'absence of x', but this 'cognition of a non-x' cannot serve as a probans for inferring' 'absence of x'. For if 'absence of x' is treated as an independently existing entity there arises the question as to what is the relation between the 'cognition of a non-x' in question and this 'absence of x'. Moreover, as a matter of fact, *as soon as* you cognize this alleged probans, viz., 'cognition of a non-x'—you come to cognize the alleged probandum, viz., 'absence of x' (but such is not the case in a genuine inference). That is to say, it does not happen here that we first have 'cognition of a non-x', then observe this', then remember the relation of 'concomitance in presence' and 'concomitance in absence' obtaining between this 'cognition of a non-x' and 'absence of x' and lastly infer 'absence of x'. For as a matter of fact, to cognize 'a non-x' *is* to cognize 'absence of x', and this is because on having observed a non-x we say 'it is a non-x and not x'. One thing serves as a probans for another thing when there are cases where these two things are jointly present as also the cases where they are jointly absent, but such is not the case with 'cognition of a non-x' and 'absence of x'. For we cannot say "wherever there is this 'cognition of a non-x' there is 'absence of x' ", and that is because 'this cognition of a non-x' can occur at but one place and time. Nor can we say "whatever is of the nature of this 'cognition of a non-x' is accompanied by 'absence of x' ", and that is because on the present supposition there is not a single illustration where

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'cognition of a non-x' is found to have been accompanied by 'absence of x' (for the opponent's case is that 'absence of x' is always *inferred* from 'cognition of a non-x'). Thus we conclude that 'absence of x' is not inferred from a probans. What happens is that for those not much-versed in Logic perceptual cognition of 'a non-x'—a cognition that can well be called non-cognition serves as *ground for the usage* concerning 'absence of x'; (as for those well-versed in Logic the perceptual cognition of 'a non-x'—a cognition that can well be called non-cognition (in the sense defined)—serves as *ground for the usage* concerning 'absence of x'; (as for those well-versed in Logic the cognition of 'a non-x' is *at the same time* the cognition of 'absence of x').

This non-cognition (which serves as ground either for 'absence' or for the usage concerning 'absence') is of three types: (*i*) non-cognition of x where x is known to be the cause of y (this serves as ground for the cognition of and usage concerning 'absence of y'); (*ii*) non-cognition of x where x is known to be the superimplicant of y (this serves as ground for the cognition of and usage concerning 'absence of y'); (*iii*) simple non-cognition of x (this serves as ground for the usage concerning 'absence of x').

As for 'absence of a cause x' or 'absence of a superimlicant x', usage concerning them is established on the ground of 'cognition of something other than this cause x' and 'cognition of something other than this superimplicant x' respectively. Thereafter, 'absence of a cause x' is used as a probans for inferring 'absence of the effect concerned' and for establishing the usage concerning this latter 'absence'; similarly, 'absence of a superimplicant x' is used as a probans for inferring 'absence of the subimplicant concerned' and for establishing the usage concerning this latter 'absence'. On the other hand, simple 'non-cognition of x' only establishes the usage concerning 'absence of x'.

One might ask: "Cognition of something other than a cause x establishes the usage concerning 'absence of this cause x' only when this x is liable to be cognized; similarly, cognition of something other than a superimplicant x establishes the usage concerning 'absence of this superimplicant x' only when this x is liable to be cognized. How can then these 'absences' be

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said to be accompanied by 'absence of the effect concerned' and 'absence of the subimplicant concerned' at places which are not present before our eyes? (i.e., How can then we say "wherever there is 'absence of a cause' there is 'absence of the effect concerned' " or "wherever there is 'absence of a superimplicant' there is 'absence of the subimplicant concerned' "?) To this our reply is that neither 'absence of a cause x' nor 'absence of a superimplicant x' (taken by itself, that is, without an accompanying awareness of the concerned relation of invariable concomitance) is a genuine means for deducing the existence of something at places which are not before our eyes; for all knowledge of 'absence' in relation to such places must be uncertain. What happens is that in case we already know that x is the cause of y it is sometimes useful to be told that 'y is absent wherever x is absent'; similarly, in case we already know that x is the superimplicant of y it is sometimes useful to be told that 'a thing is not y if it is not x.

128. Dharmakīrti thus clearly—and correctly—lays down the conditions under which we speak of the absence of a particular thing at a place or of the absence of a particular character in a thing. For on his showing, to be aware of the presence of a particular thing at a place is to be aware of the absence of everything else at this place, while to be aware of the presence of a particular character in a thing is to be aware of the absence of every other character in this thing. However, in the latter case we have to make a reservation and that to the following effect. To be aware of the presence of a particular character in a thing is to be aware of the absence not of every other character in this thing but only of such characters as are observed through those very means which are needed in order to observe the character under notice; e.g., to be aware of a particular colour in a thing is to be aware of the absence of every other colour in this thing, to be aware of a particular taste in it is to be aware of the absence of every other taste in it, and so on and so forth. In a way, these considerations are relevant also to the other case cited above. Really speaking, this case offers two possibilities, for one might be interested in saying either that the very same spot which possesses one particular thing is devoid of everything else or that the field of observation possesing one particular thing is devoid of everything else. Now the former of these statements is unconditionally correct, but the latter is incorrect as it stands. For a field of observation can be said to be devoid only of those things which are not being noticed and are yet capable of being observed through those very means which are

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needed in order to observe the particular thing that is under notice in this field; it is this type of cases with which Dharmakīrti is chiefly concerned in his above account. For it is his contention that a place which is seen to possess a particular thing is automatically declared to be devoid of everything else that is not seen and is yet capable of being observed through those very means which are needed in order to observe the thing that is being seen. Dharmakīrti lays all-out emphasis on the fact that the declaration in question is automatic, but his real motive in doing so is to deny that 'absence' is an independently existıng entity rather than to deny that some kind of cogitation takes place before this declaration is made. Thus Dharmakīrti tells us that the non-cognition (meaning 'competent non-cognition') of a thing is the ground of our usage concernng the absence of this thing: this *is* a case of inference in the sense that we are here entitled to say: "Wherever there is the competent non-cognition of a particular thing there may be usage concerning the absence of that thing: and here there is the competent non-cognition of this thing", but it *is not* a case of inference in the sense that we are here entitled to say: "Wherever there is the competent non-cognition of a particular thing there exists an entity called 'absence of that thing; and here there is the competent non-cognition of this thing". This explains why the Buddhist logicians (not excluding Dharmakīrti) often treat non-cognition as a third type of probans in addition to svabhāva and kārya which we have examined earlier. And what Dhamarkīrti calls the cases of inferring 'absence' are really the cases of asserting absence on the basis of a vyatirekavyāpti of the svabhāva or the kārya type; that is, Dharmakīrti calls them the cases of inferring absence not because he would grant that 'absence' is an independently existing entity here but just because he finds that a real vyāpti is made use of in these cases. It is with a view to dispelling a possible misunderstanding of nis position that Dharmakīrti has thought it proper to remark that a vyatireka-vyāpti tells us nothing over and above what we already know through the corresponding anvayavyāpti.

(iv) *Memory, Recognition and Hypothetical Reasoning.*

129. In view of what has already been said concerning memory recognition and hypothetical reasoning in connection with the discussion on definition of valid knowledge not much need be added here. But these are being taken up once again for consideration because the Jaina logicians have assigned them a place in their list of instruments of valid knowledge.

130. Thus the instruments of valid knowledge recognized in Jaina Logic are perception, memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning,

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inference, and verbal testimony (of which the first is characterized as 'pratyakṣa'—roughly meaning immediate or direct—and the latter five as 'parokṣa'—roughly meaning mediate or indirect—, a classification reminiscent of the Buddhist who characterizes perception as 'pratyakṣa' knowledge and inference as 'parokṣa' knowledge). A significant thing about this list is that an earlier moment is here somehow or other presupposed and made use of by a later member; thus memory presupposes perception, recognition presupposes memory, hypothetical reasoning presupposes recognition, inference presupposes hypothetical reasoning;[123] (that verbal testimony presupposes inference is correct but will not be much emphasized by the Jaina—for the fear of verbal testimony being submerged in the sphere of inference). But this very fact renders doubtful the propriety of the Jaina classification of instruments of valid knowledge. For valid knowledge (which is necessarily a new piece of information) concerning things and characters that are being experienced through sense-organs is given by perception while valid knowledge concerning things and characters that are not being experienced is given by inference—and these two are the only instruments of valid knowledge; on the other hand, memory, recognition and hypothetical reasoning, even if they are presupposed and made use of in the course of acquiring inferential knowledge (and in a way also in acquiring perceptual knowledge—a circumstance which makes us hesitant to assign even to perceptual knowledge a place independent of inferential knowledge), are not themselves independent instruments of valid knowledge as is inference. However, the Jaina thinks that processes which are indispensable for the acquisition of a piece of valid knowledge (of the inferential kind) cannot be denied the status of an instrument of valid knowledge. But the position is unsound. We have seen earlier that four *stages* in the generation of perceptual knowledge are treated by the Jaina as four *varieties* of perceptual knowledge. The same kind of muddle is involved in his general classification of the instruments of valid knowledge.

131. Before commenting further on these Jaina doctrines let us follow Hemacandra's account of memory, recognition, and hypothetical reasoning. This is how it runs[124] :—

> Memory is caused by the revival of past impressions and is expressed in the form 'That was such and such an object'.
>
> (Past impressions, even when they have existed there for a long time, do not cause memory unless they are revived; hence it is said memory is caused by the revival of past impressions.
>
> And such memory is a case of valid knowledge, for it is true of its object as is evident from the fact that we succeed in finding

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out at a later occasion things which we had kept somewhere at an earlier occasion. It might be asked: 'But how can memory, which on account of the earlier experienced object being absent there is devoid of an object, be a case of valid knowledge?' To this we reply that memory is not devoid of an object, for the earlier experienced object is its object also; otherwise, even perception whose object is an earlier experienced thing will have to be treated as not a case of valid knowledge. Certainly, its own object is manifested in memory as in any other type of valid knowledge. It might be asked: 'But how can an extinct object cause memory? And since it is thus uncaused by its object memory is not a case of valid knowledge'. But in reply we ask the opponent whether in the case of the other types of valid knowledge also he has formed the mistaken notion that they are true of their respective objects because they are caused by these objects. This notion is certainly mistaken, for just as a lamp produced by its appropriate causal aggregate reveals certain objects without being caused by those objects so also does a piece of cognition (produced by its appropriate causal aggregate) reveals its object (without being caused by this object). As for the contention that 'whatever is not invariably present and absent (when the effect is present and absent) is no cause, while whatever is no cause (of a piece of cognition) is no object (of this piece of cognition)', it is an unsubstantiated gossip; for nobody (for example) doubts that a yogin's cognition of the past and the future objects is true of these objects without being caused by these objects. Moreover, if memory is not a case of valid knowledge, inference will have to be treated as an impossibility; for inference does not arise unless vyāpti is made an object of memory (i.e., unless vyāpti is recalled), it being a unanimous position (of the logicians) that inference is caused by the observation of the probans and the memory of the vyāpti-relation. Hence we argue that memory is a case of valid knowledge, because otherwise the validity of inferential knowledge remains unaccounted for.)

Recognition is caused by perception and memory and it takes joint cognizance of two objects in the form 'This is that', 'This is like that', 'This is unlike that', 'This is thus related to that (rather this stands thus in comparison to that).

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(Those who posit upamāna as the type of valid knowledge which cognizes similarity will have to posit another type of valid knowledge for cognizing dissimilarity etc.

It might be said: 'In this case knowledge about 'this' is caused by perception while knowledge about 'that' by memory, apart from which two, i.e., perception and memory, here there comes in play no new type of valid knowledge called recognition. But to say so is not proper, for neither perception nor memory can grasp what is the proper object of recognition. The proper object of recognition is a substance possessing the same form at an earlier and at a later occasion; such an object cannot be grasped by memory whose object is always an earlier experienced thing, nor by perception whose object is always a present state of something. Nor can it be said that there is no other type of knowledge apart from perception and memory, for a new type of knowledge arising in the wake of perception and memory is actually introspected. And what is introspected should not be dismissed, for that will lead to undesirable contingencies.

Some people say that the knowledge in question is but perceptual. But that is not the case, for perception only grasps what is present before us now. ....Hence perception is incapable of grasping the identity between a past and a present object Nor can it be said that the sense-organ assisted by memory produces the perceptual knowledge of the past and the present object as identical; for the sense-organ whose capacity is limited to the sphere of its own appropriate objects cannot go beyond that sphere even after receiving the best assistance. Certainly, even when assisted by the memory of the flower-smell the visual sense-organ is incapable of grasping smell etc., that are not its proper objects............... Hence recognition is an independent instrument of valid knowledge—different from *pratyakṣa* and a sub-species of *parokṣa*—with a special object of its own.)

Hypothetical reasoning is the knowledge-of-vyāpti produced as a result of observation and non-observation.

(By 'observation' we mean not merely perception but any instrument of valid knowledge whatsoever; for such cases are possible where the probans is an inferred entity there being no difficulty

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in formulating a vyāpti in relation to inferred entities just as there is no difficulty in doing so in relation to the perceived ones................ .

It should not be thought that this grasping of vyāpti is done by perception itself; for perception is incapable of undertaking such huge operations as determining that wherever and whenever there is smoke it is an effect of fire and of nothing else. That, in its turn, is because perception grasps only what is immediately present and because it involves no cogitation.

Nor should it be thought that vyāpti is grasped by inference, for inference too is incapable of bearing that much heavy burden about which they say 'the cognizer verily behaves like a yogin when he graps a vyāpti'. And even if inference is so capable we ask whether a vyāpti is grasped by the same inference which employs it on by some other inference. If the former alternative is accepted there will arise a case of mutual dependence, if the latter a case of infinite regress.

It might be said (by the Buddhist) that even if indeterminate perception does not grasps vyāpti because it involves no cogitation the post-perceptual thought must be in a position to do so. But that too is not correct; for if indeterminate perception does not grasp vyāpti post-perceptual though also cannot, it being the case that the object of a piece of post-perceptual thought is the same as that of the preceding indeterminate perception. And granting that post-perceptual thought has an object that is different from that of the preceding indeterminate perception we ask whether this post-perceptual thought is or is not a case of valid knowledge. If the former alternative is adopted you here have an instrument of valid knowledge in addition to perception and inference, if the latter then to expect post-perceptual thought to grasp vyāpti will be as naive as to expect a son from the eunuch.............. .

The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that vyāpti is grasped by the thought-of-the-form-of-cogitation resulting from perception. But if this result of perception is either perceptual knowledge or inferential knowledge it cannot grasp vyāpti (for reasons stated above), while if it is something else you here have a new instrument of valid knowledge. It will not be proper to say that the

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thought-concerning-vyāpti, being of the nature of a result, cannot be treated as an instrument of valid knowledge: for the thought-concerning-vyāpti, even if itself a result, is also the cause of inferential knowledge and hence an instrument of valid knowledge, just as knowledge-of-the-qualifier which is a result in relation to sense-object contact is the cause of knowledge-of-the-qualificand (and hence an instrument of valid knowledge).

The Naiyāyikas maintain that perception itself, when assisted by hypothetical reasoning, grasps vyāpti. But if they grant that not perception alone but perception assisted by hypothetical reasoning grasps vyāpti let them be bold enough to say that vyāpti is grasped by hypothetical reasoning itself.............. It might be argued that hypothetical reasoning being no instrument of valid knowledge is not what grasps vyāpti. But why is hypothetical reasoning not an instrument of valid knowledge? Certainly, it is true of its object just like any other instrument of valid knowledge, and it has got a specific object of its own in the form of vyāpti. Hence hypothetical reasoning is an independent instrument of valid knowledge that grasps vyāpti which no other instrument of valid knowledge does.)

132. Certain points clearly emerge even from a cursory perusal of this account. Hemacandra rightly dispels the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā logicians' insinuation that there is some thing invalid about all memory whatsoever; he also rightly refutes the Buddhist who would have us believe that recognition is not a single psychological process but an amalgam of bare sensory experience and memory. But Hemacandra's insistence that even the bare recalling of a past event be treated as a case of knowledge is misplaced. Similarly untenable is his contention that recognition is not but a special type of perceptual knowledge. As a matter of fact, we always perceive an object either as similar to an earlier perceived object or as identical with an earlier perceived object; the former covers what are usually called the cases of perceptual knowledge, the latter the cases of recognition Hemacandra feels that recognition is an independent type of knowledge because neither bare sensory experience nor bare memory is competent to view an object as *identical* with and earlier perceived object; but he has to realize that nor is either bare sensory experience or bare memory competent to view an object as *similar to* an earlier perceived object. Hemacandra's confusion is rooted in his understanding that 'similarity' obtains only

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between such two object as are called by two different names; and since he has granted that such 'similarity' is grasped by 'recognition' rather than perceptual knowledge he feels that his position is open to no objection. He has to realize that the observation of similarity between objects called by different names and the observation of similarity between those called by the same name are not qualitatively different psychological processes, and then it will be easy for him to see that recognition is but a special type of perceptual knowledge. That is to say, he will then be able to see that perceptual knowledge may have for its object either (*i*) an object identical with an earlier perceived object or (*ii*) an object belonging to the same class as an earlier perceived object. Interestingly, those logicians who posit upamāna as an independent instrument of valid knowledge are criticized by Hemacandra not on the ground that the alleged cases of upamāna are but cases of perception but on the ground that these do not cover the cases where dissimilarity etc., rather than similarity between two objects are taken note of. As a matter of fact, if we understand Hemacandra aright his 'recognition' should cover all those cases where a relation is observed to obtain between two objects. But the correct position seems to be that all our knowledge of the relations between objects—just like all our knowledge of the objects themselve—is either perceptual or inferential. Lastly, let us evaluate Hemacandra's account of hypothetical reasoning. He rightly suggests that neither perception nor inference is competent to grasp vyāpti. For vyāpti is the name for a universal relationship obtaining between two things, a relationship not grasped by perception which necessarily grasps only particular relationships nor by inference which itself involves the employment of a universal relationship. Hemacandra thus scores a point against the remaining Indian logicians who do not posit an independent instrument of valid knowledge for the sake of grasping vyāpti. However, the problem of grasping vyāptis is in essence the problem of induction, and we have already made a comparative estimate of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mimāṃsā, Buddhist and Jaina stands on the question; that is to say, the mere fact that the Jaina posits an independent instrument of valid knowledge supposed to yield the knowledge of vyāpti does not mean that the Jain's understanding of the nature of vyāpti is the least faulty of all.

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FOOTNOTES, SANSKRIT QUOTATIONS

AND

APPENDICES

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Footnotes

1. The Buddhist logicians who usually define valid knowledge as 'knowledge' which leads to the acquisition of the object concerned, make it a point to add: "That a piece of valid knowledge leads to the acquisitio of the object concerned really means that it demonstrates this object, while that it demonstrates this object really means that it makes us take cognizance of this object"—so that the confusion in question will remain there even if our words for 'acquisition' and 'cognition' are not the same. To follow the usage of Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā (on 1.1), arthaprāpaṇa = arthapradarśana = arthādhigamana.

2. प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवत् प्रमाणम्——न्यायभाष्य, पृ० १
सम्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति तद् व्युत्पाद्यते——न्यायबिंदुटीका, १.१

3. तद्वति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रमा, तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानमप्रमा

4 प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम्——प्रमाणवार्तिक १.१
तस्माद् दृढं यदुत्पन्नं न विसंवादमृच्छति।
ज्ञानान्तरेण विज्ञानं तत् प्रमाणं प्रतीयताम्।। श्लोकवार्तिक, चोदनासूत्र, ८०

5. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 1.*

6. ननु अद्वैते किं प्रमाणम्?———श्रुतिरेवाद्वैते प्रमाणमिति ब्रूमः। ———एवं च सति यत्रैव गत्वा बाधबुद्धिपरंपरा विच्छेदो विषयान्तरसंचारोच्छेदभयात् अनवस्थाभयाच्चाभ्युपेयः तस्यामेव बुद्धौ पदमारोप्य अद्वैतश्रुतिः सर्वं तद् विषयविषं प्रवाहमद्वैते स्थापयन्ती न केनापि प्रमाणेन क्वचिदपि विषये बाधितुं शक्या।——खंडनखण्डखाद्य, पृ० ४७, ४६, ५५-५६।

7. बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम्। सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च। संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः। तद्भिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवः। स द्विविधः यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्चेति। तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः। यथा अयं घट इति ज्ञानम्। सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते। तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः।————
अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः——संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात्। एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः। यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति। मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः। यथा शुक्तौ इदं रजतम्। व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः। यथा यदि वह्निर्न स्यात् धूमोऽपि न स्यात्।——तर्कसंग्रह।

8. शंका चेदनुमाऽस्त्येव न चेच्छंका ततस्तराम्।
व्याघातावधिराशंका तर्कः शंकाऽवधिर्मतः।।——न्यायकुसुमांजलि–३.७
सकृद्दर्शनेऽपि क्वचिद् व्याप्तिग्रहात्।——यत्र तु भूयोदर्शनादपि शंका नापैति तत्र विपक्षे बाधकस्तर्कोऽपेक्षितः।——यत्र स्वत एवं शंका नावतरति तत्र न तर्कापेक्षापीति तदिदमुक्तम्——तर्कः क्वचिच्छंकानिवर्त्तकः।——न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका, १३७।

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*Sanskrit quotations are given on *pp.* 195—222.

14 Edn.—.22.

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9. संस्कारमात्रजंज्ञानं स्मृतिः——तर्कसंग्रह
   ......स्मृतिः पुनः। पूर्वविज्ञानसंस्कारमात्रजं ज्ञानमुच्यते ।।——प्रकरणपंचिका ६.२

10. तथा हि किमत्र घटोऽवस्थितः इति पृष्टः कथयति——अस्मिन् क्षणे मयोपलब्ध इति। तथा प्रातरारभ्यैतावत्कालं मयोपलब्धः। कालभेदे त्वगृहीते कथमेवं वदेत्। तस्मादस्ति कालभेदपरामर्शः। तदवधिकाच्च सिद्धमुत्तरेषां प्रामाण्यम् ।।——शास्त्रदीपिका, पृ० ४५-४६।

11. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 2.

12. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 3.

13. अनुभूतिः प्रमाणं सा स्मृतेरन्या——प्रकरणपंचिका ६.२

14. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 4.

15. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 5.

16. प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः सांख्याः समाश्रिताः।
    नैयायिकास्ते परतः सौगताश्चरमं स्वतः।।
    प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिनः।
    प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम् ।।——सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः, पृ० १०४।

17. Jayanta however ridicules this stand without attributing it to Jainas or to anyone in particular. See Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. I, p. 160.

18. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 6.

19. Here it might be suggested that a man is impelled to undertake activity not only by a feeling of attachment or by a feeling of aversion but sometimes also by a feeling of neutrality. As a matter of fact, real neutrality must result in one's refraining from activity in relation to the object concerned. In any case Udayana's illustration must preclude the possibility of a third type of activity that is undertaken neither by a feeling of attachment nor by a feeling of aversion—corresponding to which there might be a type of knowledge which is neither valid nor invalid.

    यथा प्रवृत्तौ द्वोषाभावहेतुकत्वे निवृत्तौ रागाभावहेतुकत्वे सत्यपि उपेक्षाज्ञानादपि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्यातामिति रागद्वेषयोः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतुत्वमित्येकैकाभावोऽन्यथासिद्धः, तथा प्रमाऽप्रमयोरपि गुणदोषौ न तु दोषाभावगुणाभावौ।——कुसुमांजलिप्रकाश, पृ० २१७।

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20. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 7.

21. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 8.

22. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 9.

23. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 10.

24. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 11.

25. Hemacandra's *prima facie* argument against the doctrine of extrinsic validity is literally borrowed from Nyāyavārtikatātparya-ṭīkā (p. 3). But what is more significant is that Hemacandra's counter-argument too, even if much less elaborate, is substantially the same as (at places even literally the same as) that of Vācaspatimiśra (*ibid.* pp. 8-9). Durvekamiśra, a sub-commentator of Dharmakīrti, has likewise argued :

प्रापणशक्तिरेव ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यम्।......शक्तिनिश्चयस्त्वर्थक्रियानिर्भासस्य सर्वस्यानुमानस्य च स्वतः एव। प्रवर्तकाध्यक्षस्य च कस्यचित् स्वतः एव यदभ्यासेन परितो निरस्तविभ्रमाशंकम्........। कस्यचित्तु परतोऽर्थक्रियानिर्भासात्मकात् स्वतः प्रमाणादन्यतो वा यतः कुतश्चिन्नान्तरीयकार्थदर्शनान्मध्यकालवर्तिभ्रान्तिशंकापनोदेन निश्चयित इति।––धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप, पृ० १९।

26. For the Buddhist view in question see Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā no. 1.21.

For the corresponding Jaina view see Laghīyastraya 1.3 Autocommentary and Prabhācandra's Commentary.

27. अव्यभिचारिणीमसंदिग्धामर्थोपलब्धिं विदधती बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम्। ––न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० १२।

28. ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्––न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका ५२।

29. तया रहितं तिमिराशुभ्रमणनौयानसंक्षोभाद्यनाहितविभ्रमं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्––न्यायबिन्दु १.६ (तया कल्पनास्वभावेन रहितं शून्यम्––टीका)।

30. ......न प्रमा नापि भ्रमः स्यान्निर्विकल्पकम्॥ १३५
प्रकारतादिशून्यं संबंधानवगाहि तत्॥––न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

31. This is an implication of the neo-Nyāya position that indeterminate perception grasps an object and the corresponding universal separately while determinate perceptual knowledge grasps the former

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as qualified by the latter. For to view a universal (as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika authors) quâ universal seems to be impossible without a prior act of memory, cogitation etc. For reference see the following passage from Nyāyasidhānta-muktāvali (on kārikā-58) :

> चक्षुःसंयोगाद्यनन्तरं घट इत्याकारकं घटत्वादिविशिष्टं ज्ञानं न संभवति, पूर्वं विशेषणस्य घटत्वादेर्ज्ञानाभावात्। विशिष्टबुद्धौ विशेषणज्ञानस्य कारणत्वात्। तथा च प्रथमतो घटघटत्वयोर्वैशिष्ट्यानवगाह्येव ज्ञानं जायते। तदेव निर्विकल्पकम्।

On this question the old Nyāya-Vaiśesika logicians seem to hold an ambiguous position. For sometimes their words tend to support the same view as was later on adopted by the neo-Naiyāyika, while at other times they tend to support the correct view that indeterminate perception grasps a thing (which is doubtless possessed of the universal as well as particular features) as such while determinate perceptual knowledge grasps it as similar to certain earlier known things (in more usual cases also as called by the same name as certain earlier known things).

(*i*) For the first type of position see the following passage from Vācaspatimiśra :

> अविकल्पिकायाः पदम् अव्यपदेश्यमिति, सविकल्पिकायाश्च व्यवसायात्कमिति। ......सर्वंहि सविकल्पकं विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन वस्तुषु प्रवर्त्तते। अविद्यमानं व्यपदेश्यं यस्मिंस्तदव्यपदेश्यं जात्यादिस्वरूपावगाहि न तु जात्यादीनां मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यभावावगाहीति यावत्।—न्यायवार्त्तिकतात्पर्यटीका, पृ० १०८।

However, Vācaspati attributes a role to memory while maintaining even this position, e. g., he says :

> गृहीतसंकेतस्य प्रथममिंद्रियार्थसंनिकर्षादालोचनेन शब्दसंसर्गरहितेनालोचितेऽर्थमात्रे तस्यार्थस्य शब्दभेदेन संबंधात् शब्दविषयः संस्कारः प्रबोध्यते, स प्रबुद्धः शब्दस्मृतिं जनयति। तेन व्युत्पन्नस्य निर्विकल्पात् परांचः प्रत्ययाः शब्दानुपाया अपि शब्दपुरःसरा जायन्ते। ......तस्माद् व्युत्पन्नस्यापि नामधेयस्मरणस्य पूर्वमेषितव्यो विनैव नामधेयमर्थप्रत्ययः।—तत्रैव, पृ० १११।

But pretty obviously, by memory Vācaspati here understands the memory of the relevant word. Now word-memory is certainly the last step in the multi-stepped process preceding perceptual knowledge, but to lump together under one title 'indeterminate perception' the remaining steps of this process was misleading.

(*ii*) For the second type of position see the following passage from the same Vācaspatimiśra :—

> प्रथममालोचितोऽर्थः सामान्यविशेषवान् संकेतसमयवर्त्तिनीमात्मनोऽवस्थां स्मारयन् तत्कालभाविनं शब्दमपि स्मारयत्यवर्जनीयतया, न त्विंद्रियजविकल्पोत्पादं प्रत्युपयोगः कश्चिच्छब्दस्मरणस्य। अन्यथा बालमूकादीनां नेन्द्रियजं स्याद् विकल्पः, शब्दस्मरणाभावात्। संकेतसमयवर्त्यवस्थास्मरणं तूपयुज्यते .....।—तत्रैव, पृ० ११७।

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Here Vācaspati is discussing the case of our recognizing an individual quâ that individual, but these considerations ought to be valid also for the case of our recognizing an individual quâasa member of some class. However, from the Jaina logician's criticism of Vācaspati's Position it appears that Vācaspati wanted to attribute a role to memory only in the case of our recognizing an individual quâ that individual. If that be his real intention his position is open to criticism, for memory plays an essentially similar role in the case of our recognizing an individual quâ that individual and in the case of our recognizing it as a member of some class. As we shall see later on, the Jaina logicians themselves make an illegitimate distinction between these two types of cases—though with a view to arriving at the conclusion that the former is a case of an altogether new type of knowledge called "recognition" while the latter that of perceptual knowledge.

32. Historically speaking, Kumārila was perhaps the first among the Brahmin logicians to have admitted the existence of indeterminate repception and to have understood its nature in an essentially correct fashion. E.g. Kumārila maintained that indeterminate perception grasps an entity as such while determinate perception the same as possessed of these and those generic and specific features. He also clearly emphasized that memory, thought etc., precede the emergence of determinate perceptual knowledge—the necessary characteristic of perceptual knowledge being the constant operativeness of a sense-organ and not the presence or otherwise of thought. In the Nyāya circles the distinction between indeterminate perception and the determinate seems to have begun with Vācaspati (or with his preceptor Trilocana whom Vācaspati specially recalls in this connection—as if while proceeding to traverse a hitherto untrodden path). Thus Vācaspati says :—

तदेतदतिस्फुटत्वात् शिष्यैर्गम्यत एवेति भाष्यवार्तिककाराभ्यामव्याख्यातम्।
अस्माभिः।
त्रिलोचनगुरून्नीतमार्गानुगमनोन्मुखैः।
यथामानं यथावस्तु व्याख्यातमिदमीदृशम् ।।—न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका—
पृ० ११४।

अस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ।। ११२

ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया।
बुद्ध्यावसीयते साऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ।। १२०

तेनेन्द्रियार्थसंबंधे विद्यमाने स्मरन्नपि।
विकल्पयन् स्वधर्मेण वस्तु प्रत्यक्षवान् नरः ।। १२३

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तच्चैतदिन्द्रियाधीनमिति तैर्व्यपदिश्यते ।
तदसंबंधजातं तु नैव प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते ।। १२४
—श्लोकवार्त्तिक, प्रत्यक्षसूत्र

33. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 12.

34. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 13.

35. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 14.

36. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 15.

37. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 16.

38. ...... विशदः प्रत्यक्षम्—प्रमाणमीमांसा १.१.१३

39. प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षया प्रतिभासो वैशद्यम्—तत्रैव, १.१.१४ (सूत्रांश)

40. न हि शब्दानुमानादिवत् प्रत्यक्षं शब्दलिंगादिज्ञानं प्रमाणांतरमपेक्षते—तत्रैव, १.१.१४ वृत्ति

41. इदन्तया प्रतिभासो वा वैशद्यम्—तत्रैव, १.१.१४ (सूत्रांश)

42. न्यायसूत्र ४.२.४२, ४६; वैशेषिकसूत्र ९.१.१३–१५

43. .....यत्र सिद्धिर्नास्ति तत्र सिषाधयिषायां सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता, यत्र च सिषाधयिषाऽस्ति तत्र सिद्धौ सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता, यत्र सिद्धिरस्ति सिषाधयिषा च नास्ति तत्र न पक्षता ...... । —न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका ७० ।

44. स्वरूपेणैव स्वयमिष्टोऽनिराकृतः पक्ष इति । —न्यायबिन्दु ३.३८
सिषाधयिषितमसिद्धमबाध्यं साध्यं पक्षः ।—प्रमाणमीमांसा १.२.१३

45. In the course of his Vārtika on Nyāya-bhāṣya 1.1.5 Uddyotakara hints that the Bhāṣyakāra implicity endorses the doctrine of five characters. The first three characters have come to light in the earlier part of the discussion (i.e. when on p. 144, Uddyotakara has told us that in the kevala-anvayi type of inference the probans possesses the characters (1) and (2) but not (3) while in the kevala-vyatireki type it possesses the characters (1) and (3) but not (2), and hence they need not be recapitulated. But of the remaining two characters Uddyotakara explicitly mentions only (5). So Vācaspati in his commentary on the Vārtika makes it a point to explicitly mention the character (4) and remark that it is implicitly endorsed by the Vārtikakāra.—(p. 146).

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46. For a clear-cut formulation of the positive Buddhist doctrine see Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā 2.5. In Hetubindu Dharmakīrti refutes three alleged characters of hetu which he considers to be redundant; of these, the first two broadly correspond to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician's characters (5) and (4) respectively. cf. Hetubinduṭīka, pp. 205-20. For a frivolous criticism of the Buddhist doctrine see Nyāya-vārtika;

pp. 163-66.

47. Nyāyabindu 3. 3-7, 3.32; cf. Pramāṇmīmāṃsā 2.1 3-6.

48. For the orginal Sanskrit text see quotation 17.

49. साधकतमं कारणं करणम् ।

50. व्याप्यस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वयोः परामर्श उच्यते ॥
.... व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य पक्षेण सह वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानमनुमितौ जनकम् .....।
——न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका ६८ उत्तरार्द्ध ।

51. This is an implication of the contention (mentioned below and acceptable to the majority of neo-Naiyāyikas) that vyāpti-jñāna is the karaṇa and parāmarśa the vyāpàra required in the production of anumāna. For both vyāpti-jñāna and hetu-jñāna are required to produce parāmarśa (and through it anumiti) and if the former is treated as the more efficient of the two the latter must be treated as the less efficient of the two.

52. यदि तु व्याप्तिप्रकारकं पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं च स्वतंत्रं कारणमित्युच्यते तदा कार्यकारणभावद्वयं, वह्निव्याप्यो धूम आलोकवांश्च पर्वत इति ज्ञानादप्यनुमितिः स्यात् ।
——न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका ६८ पूर्वार्द्ध ।

53. Nyāyabindu 3.34; Nyāya-sūtra 1.1. 32-39; Sāstra-dīpik p. 64; Prakarana-pañcika pp. 83-85. cf. Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā 2.1.9-10; 2.1.11 ff.

In the appendix A an attempt has been made to work out the figures and Moods of Syllogism that would be valid according to the explicit findings of the Buddhist logicians. The scheme will be implicitly endorsed by all the schools of Indian Logic.

54. In the Appendix B the neo-Naiyàyika's technical terminology is introduced and his definitions of vyāpti are expressed with the help thereof.

55. Nyāyabindu 2.19-24.

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56. हेतुना यः समग्रेण कार्योत्पादोऽनुमीयते ।
अर्थान्तरानपेक्षत्वात् स स्वभावोऽनुवर्णितः ।।
——प्रमाणवार्त्तिक, स्वार्थानुमानपरिच्छेद, कारिका ६

57. एकसामग्र्यधीनस्य रूपादे रसतो गतिः ।
हेतुधर्मानुमानेन धूमेंधनविकारवत् ।। ——तत्रैव, कारिका ११

For a formidable list of such cases as considered by the Buddhist see Dharmottra-pradīpa pp. 115-16.

58. अस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि समवायि विरोधि च ।

59. अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च ।

60. Jayanta, for example, explicitly rejects the above account--which is, in fact, the account given by Vātsyāyana—of the third type of hetu, and avers that this type of hetu is just one which is neither the cause nor the effect of its sādhya. Thus he says :

सामान्यतोदृष्टंन्तु यदकार्यकारणभूताल्लिंगात् तादृशस्यैव लिंगिनोऽनुमानम् । ......
.....यत्पुनर्भाष्यकारेण......उदाहृतं तदयुक्तम् । ——न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० ११६ ।

Jayanta's fear is that Vātsyāyana's understanding of this type of hetu will reduce its cases to those based on casual considerations.

61. For illustrations of these six types see Jainatarkabhāṣā, p. 16, line 20—p. 17, line 8. Hemacandra in Pramāṇamīmāṃsā 1.2.12 proposes to bring the last three types under the title "ekārthasamavāyi (i.e., co-inherent in one locus)"; it is difficult to follow the logic of the proposal. The Jaina logicians sometimes (e.g., Vādidevasūri in Syādvādaratnākara 3.13) tend to dismiss as futile the entire endeavour to classify hetus into types; this tendency is similar to that evinced by the later-Naiyāyikas.

62. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 18.

63. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 19.

64. This is an expanded version of Gaṅgeśa's argument. His actual words are as follows :—

यत्त्वनादिसिद्धकार्यकारणभावविरोधादिमूलाः केचित्तर्का इति तन्न, तत्र प्रमाणानुयोगेऽनुमान एव पर्यवसानात् । न च व्याप्तिग्रहान्यथानुपपत्त्यैव तर्कस्यानादिसिद्धव्याप्तिकत्वज्ञानमिति वाच्यम्, अनुपपत्तेरप्यनुमानत्वात् ।
——तत्त्वचिंतामणि, तर्कप्रकरण, पृ० ४२-४३ ।

65. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 20.

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66. For the list of these anyathāsiddhas *see* Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali, pp. 71-78.

67. Here is the Buddhist case as tersely formulated by Dharmakīrti :—

> येषामुपलंभे तल्लक्षणमनुपलब्धं यदुपलभ्यते, तत्रैकाभावेऽपि नोपलभ्यते, तत् तस्य कार्यम्। ——प्रमाणवार्तिक, स्वार्थानुमानपरि०, कारिका ३६, स्ववृत्ति।

Unfortunately, Karṇagomin's commentary on this portion has not come down to us. But the Buddhist position on the question as presented in a Nyāyakumuda-candra passage (quoted below) can somewhat serve as such a commentary. The author there describes, with the help of a concrete example, the experiment suggested by the Buddhist (without however giving us an idea of the complexity that arises owing to the multiplicity of elements in a causal aggregate, a complexity Dharmakīrti clearly seems to have in mind). Here is the passage in question :

> प्रत्यक्षानुपलंभपंचकसाधनो हि कार्यकारणभावो बौद्धैरिष्टः, प्रथमं हि कार्यकारणयोरनुपलंभः शुद्धभूतलोपलंभलक्षणः, तदुत्तरकालं वह्नेः उपलंभः तदनन्तरं च धूमस्य, तदुत्तरकालं वह्नेरनुपलंभे धूमस्यानुपलंभः, तदित्यत्रानुपलंभत्रयेण उपलंभद्वयेन च वह्निधूमयोः तद्भावो गृह्यते।
>
> पृ० १२।

It can be seen that the account as it stands is not correct though it becomes correct if 'fire' is replaced by 'fire and wet-fuel'. Thus we will be enquiring here whether the object-collocation containing just two elements—viz., fire and wet-fuel—is or is not the cause of another object, viz., smoke. The experiment will no doubt succeed, but it will only prove that wherever there is fire and wet-fuel we have a right to expect smoke. However, it will leave open the possibility that not everything that goes to constituete fire or wet-fuel is required to produce smoke—so that a later experiment can well describe the causal aggregate of smoke in a different fashion. Even then the proper thing to say will be that this second experiment amends the findings of the first experiment and not that it totally rejects them; as a matter of fact, it is through such amendments that man's understanding of the particular causal relationships gains in maturity.

68. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 21.

69. For the background of Udayana's argument against svabhāva-anumāna *see* the following passage from Ātmatattvaviveka :—

> सा खलु जातिविशेषः शालिसंग्राहको वा स्यात् तत्प्रतिक्षेपको वा? आद्ये कुशलस्यस्यापि शालेः कथं न तद्रूपत्वम्? द्वितीये तु अभिमतस्यापि शालेः कथं तद्रूपत्वम् एवं शालित्वमपि तस्य संग्राहकं तत्प्रतिक्षेपकं वा? आद्येऽशालेस्तत्वप्रसंगः। द्वितीये तुशालेरेवातत्वप्रसंगः।
>
> पृ० २५।

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Here by 'jāti-viśeṣa' Udayana means kurvadrūpatva while the illustrated universal is paddyness. And the four alternatives that are successively considered are—

(i) kurvadrūpatva includes paddyness,

(ii) kurvadrūpatva excludes paddyness,

(iii) paddyness includes kurvadrūpatva,

(iv) paddyness excludes kurvadrūpatva.

That is to say, the alternative that paddyness and kurvadrūptva partially include each other is totally left out of consideration.

70. For this and for the following argument involving a criticism of svabhāva-anumāna see *Quotation* 22. We have re-shuffled the steps of Udayana's argument, but that does no violence to its spirit.

71. Our surmise is based chiefly on two considerations which can be summed up as follows :—

(1) In some cases it is difficult to see a connection between the early discussion of the nature of a particular hetvābhāsa and its later account (sometimes even between its original name and its later account). The most obvious case of this kind is that of kālātīta (later on known as bādhita), but the difficulty arises elsewhere too.

(2) In the course of his Vārtika on the sūtra (1.2.4) which enumerates the five hetvābhāsas Uddyotakara has made an interesting experiment. He there tries to frame an exhaustive catalogue of all possible cases of inference—valid and otherwise. But the interesting point to note is that the rules that guide him in this connection are not the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians' five rules as we know them but the three rules so clearly formulated in the Buddhist texts on Logic (and ridiculed by Uddyotakara himself elsewhere). Thus he in effect shows us how a case of valid inference arises as a result of adhering to the following three rules (and how a case of invalid inference as a result of violating one, two or all of them) :—

(i) The hetu must reside in all pakṣa.

(ii) The hetu must reside either in some sapakṣas or in all sapakṣas.

(iii) The hetu must reside in no vipakṣa.

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The only new thing about Uddyotakara's account is that he conceives a type of cases—in fact, of doubtful validity—where there is no real sapakṣa or no real vipakṣa or neither real sapakṣa nor real vipakṣa. Thus whereas the Buddhist will allow the validity of just two cases, viz., (*i*) where hetu resides in all pakṣa, in some sapakṣas, and in no vipakṣa, and (*ii*) where it resides in all pakṣa, in all sapakṣas, and in no vipakṣa—Uddyotakara allows the validity of three additional cases, viz., (*i*) where hetu resides in all pakṣa and in some sapakṣas, while there is no real vipakṣa, (*ii*) where it resides in all pakṣa and in all sapksas, while there is no real vipakṣa, and (iii) where it resides in all pakṣa and no vipakṣa, while there is no real sapakṣa. Of these three additional cases, the first two are technically called kevala-anvayi the last one kevala-vyatireki. After framing his catalogue and discussing it in brief Uddyotakara remarks that each of the cases of inference mooted earlier, except the five that are those of valid inference, yields a type of hetvābhasa—so that one should not be misled into thinking that the types of hetvābhasa as just those five which we find enumerated in the Nyāyasūtra. As he himself puts it:

त एते हेत्वाभासाः संक्षेपेणैतावता भेदेन भेदवन्तः, तेषां संग्रहार्थम् हेत्वाभासानां विभागोद्देशार्थम् सूत्रम्।——लक्षणत एवं पंचत्वं गम्यत इति चेत् —— (न) व्यवच्छेदकं लक्षणं न पुनर्नियमार्थम्।

पृष्ट ३७२।

Uddyotakara himself makes no conscious effort to connect this account with the subsequent discussion of the five types of hetvābhāsas occurring in Nyāya-sūtra and Bhāṣya (as a matter of fact, no such connection was on the whole, possible). But the need must have been felt by the later generations of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians and the result was the doctrine of hetvābhāsa as we find it formulated in Vācaspti, Jayanta, Udayana, etc.

72. For a general Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of pseudo-probans *see* Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali kārikās 71-78.

73. For the Buddhist account of pseudo-probans *see* Nyāyabindu 3.57-109. The Jaina logicians who on this question broadly agree with the Buddhists must offer a different and essentially faulty explanation of the type asiddha. This is bacause of their refusal to treat "presence in pakṣa" as a necessary character of hetu. Hemacandra, e.g., tells us that a hetu which lacks "otherwise unaccountability" is asiddha. But since, as we have seen, "otherwise unaccountability" is but another name for 'invariable concomitance' Hemacandra's statement amounts to saying that a hetu which

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is not related to sādhya by vyāpti relation is asiddha; as a matter of fact, this would be a description of the anaikāntika rather than asiddha type of pseudo-probans. For a general Jaina account of pseudo-probans see Pramāṇamīmāṃsā 2.1.16-21.

74. For difficulties on the types satpratipakṣa and bādhita *see* the relevant portions of Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali on kārikā 71.

75. सोपाधिको हेतुर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः। साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वमुपाधिः– तर्कसंग्रहः।

Vyāpyatva-asiddha as thus understood is the same fallacy which was discussed by Udayana and Jayanta under the title anyathā-siddha (or a-prayojaka) and which was considered by them to be somehow the most fundamental fallacy of reasoning. Thus Udayana defends the validity of inference by arguing in great details that a piece of inferential knowledge based on a vyāpti which is not vitiated by any upādhi (i.e., not vitiated by the fallacy anyathā-siddha, in other words, not based on accidental considerations) is necessarily valid. However, not realizing that the fallacies resulting from 'absence of pakṣa-dharmatā in hetu' ought to be brought under asiddha while those resulting from 'absence of vyāpti-relation between hetu and sādhya' under anaikāntika, he treats anyatha-siddha as a variety of asiddha. Jayanta's case is even more revealing. For he finds that there are invalid cases of inference which nevertheless fulfil all the five conditions of valid inference demanded by his school. However, instead of closely re-examining these conditions Jayanta feels inclined to posit a sixth type of fallacious hetu which allegedly fulfils all of these conditions but has no bearing on the presence or otherwise of the sādhya concerned; (as a matter of fact, a hetu that has no bearing on the presence or otherwise of the sādhya concerned, cannot really fulfil the two vyāpti-conditions, but this escapes Jayanta's notice owing to his school's faulty understanding of these vyāpti-conditions). Jayanta tentatively suggests that this new type of fallacious hetu should be included in asiddha, but as soon as it is pointed out to him that asiddha must result from 'absence of pakṣa-dharmatā in hetu' he declares it to be a sixth type. But then arises the danger of being dubbed a heretic. Jayanta first makes bold to declare that he would rather go against the established tradition of his school than repudiate what is obvious on the face of it; however, he soon retraces his steps and suggests that anyathā-siddhi should be treated as a defect that is present in all the cases of fallacious reasoning though as additional defect of this or that type gives rise to the five fallacies admitted by his school.

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These heart-searchings are indicative of how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians were gradually veering around the Buddhist position that all valid inference must be based on some causal consideration or other, a position virtually adopted by Gaṅgeśa while propounding his thesis on tarka. (For Udayana's discussion : Nyāya-kusumāñjali, pp.336-68; For Jayanta's discussion : Nyāya-mañjarī, Vol.II, pp.163-67.)

Among the Brahmin logicians Kumārila was perhaps the first to have clearly hinted at the problem of a prayojaka hetu and his position is virtually the same as was later on adopted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika circles. Of the following two verses crucial in this connection Udayana (in Nyāya-Kusumāñjali, p. 365, autocommentary on 3.7) has quoted the second in this very context :—

व्याप्तेश्च दृश्यमानायाः कश्चिद्धर्मः प्रयोजकः ॥१३
अस्मिन् सत्यमुना भाव्यमिति शक्त्या निरूप्यते ।
अन्ये परप्रयुक्तानां व्याप्तीनामुपजीवकाः ॥१४
तैर्दृष्टैरपि नैवेष्टा व्यापकांशावधारणा ।

—श्लोकवार्तिक, अनुमानपरिच्छेद ।

76\. .... साध्याप्रसिद्ध्यादयस्तु व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिमध्येऽन्तर्भूताः ।
साध्ये साध्यतावच्छेदकस्याभावः साध्याप्रसिद्धिः ।
......एवं हेतौ हेतुतावच्छेदकस्याभावः साधनाप्रसिद्धिः ...... ।
एवं वह्निमान् नीलधूमादित्यादौ गुरुतया नीलधूमत्वस्य हेतुतानवच्छेदकत्वमपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरित्यपि वदन्ति ।

—न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका ७१

77\. असाधारणः साध्यासमानाधिकरणो हेतुः । (*Ibid*)

(Later on this is characterized as the view upheld by the moderns.)

78\. Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali (on k. 73), however, explicitly denies that inference with a universally present pakṣa is a case of anupasaṃhārin : according to it, the inference with a universally present sādhya is alone a case of anupasaṃhārin.

79\. Typical in this connection is Kumārila's remark that words have a capacity to yield knowledge concerning even such things as are utterly non-existent. Since immediately after this remark he recalls his basic thesis that all knowledge is by nature valid provided no defects are detected in it the suggestion seems to be that verbal testimony is the most powerful of the

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instruments of valid knowledge— so powerful as to be able to impart knowledge concerning even supersensuous entities like dharma and adharma. To quote Kumārila's own words :—

अत्यंतासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्दः करोति हि।
तेनोत्सर्गे स्थिते तस्य दोषाभावात् प्रमाणता ।।६
—श्लोकवार्तिक, चोदनासूत्र

80. पदानां हि द्वयी शक्तिरभिधात्री तात्पर्यशक्तिश्च, तत्राभिधात्री शक्तिरेषां पदार्थेषूपयुक्ता तात्पर्यशक्तिश्च वाक्यार्थे पर्यवस्यति इति।
—न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० ३५८

81. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 23.

82. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 24.

83. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 25.

84. The same fallacy vitiates the following piece of reasoning advanced by Vācaspati :—

न च क्लेशेन कयाचित् प्रणाल्या पक्षधर्मतां कल्पयित्वा लोकः पदेभ्यः वाक्यार्थमवगच्छति अपितु स्वतंत्रेभ्य एवं तेभ्य इति सिद्धः शब्दस्य प्रमाणस्यानुमानाद् भेदः। आप्तोक्तत्वं तु स्वर्गादि प्रतिपादकस्यागमस्य प्रामाण्ये लिंगमेव न चैतावता तदर्थं आनुमानिको भवति।
—न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका, पृ० ५३८।

85. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 26.

86. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 27.

87. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 28.

88. नायं पुरुषोऽनाश्रित्यागमप्रामाण्यमासितुं समर्थः. . . . . तत्सति प्रवर्तितव्ये वरमेवं प्रवृत्त इति परीक्षया प्रामाण्यमाह।—
कः पुनरस्याविसंवादः ?
प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन द्विविधेनाप्यबाधनम्।
दृष्टादृष्टार्थयोरस्या विसंवादस्तदर्थयोः।। २१८
—प्रमाणवार्तिक, स्वार्थानुमानपरिच्छेद।

89. By way of contrast, we might note the basic attitude of the non-Advaita schools of Vedānta. These schools too were vehemently anti-illusionist, but their understanding of the nature and role of Logic was rather

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perverse. Thus, even if themselves staunch theists, they would painstakingly seek to refute all the arguments offered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers in support of God's existence. And be it noted that they did not mean to substitute for these arguments those of their own, for their final contention was that the only source capable of yielding knowledge concerning God's existence are scriptures. These remarks are true even of an author like the Madhvite Vyāsatīrtha who wrote his voluminous Tarkatāṇḍava by way of polemizing against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians in general and Gaṅgeśa in particular and who was a thoroughly competent student of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā texts on Logic; (he was, however, a man with few original ideas, for his positions—not excluding his arguments against God—are, in most cases, bodily borrowed from the Kumārilite arsenal and then worded in the inimitable style of Gaṅgeśa).

90. For the original Sanskrit text of this and of Dharmakīrti's arguments subsequently quoted in this passages see *Quotation* 29.

91. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 30.

92. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 31.

93. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 32.

94. अर्थज्ञापनहेतुर्हि संकेतः पुरुषाश्रयः।——प्रमाणवार्तिक, स्वार्थानुमानपरिच्छेद का० २२९।

95. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 33.

96. किं च संकेतः पुरुषाश्रयः। ——न्यायकुमुदचन्द्र, पृष्ठ ५४७।

97. For the original Sanskrit text see *quotation* 34.

98. Prabhācandra is having in mind Kumārila's Kārika.

समयः प्रतिमर्त्यं वा प्रत्युच्चारणमेव वा।
क्रियते जगदादौ वा सकृदेकेन केनचित्॥१६

——श्लोकवार्तिक, संबंधाक्षेपपरिहारवाद।

99. For the orginil Sanskrit text see *quotation* 35.

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100. The technical names for these four are rūdha, yaugika, yogarūdha and yaugikarūdha respectively. And this is how Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī on k. 81. defines each :—

(१) यत्रावयवशक्तिनिरपेक्षया समुदायशक्त्या (अर्थो) बुध्यते तद्रूढम्।
(२) यत्रावयवार्थ एव बुध्यते तद्यौगिकम्।
(३) यत्र तु अवयवशक्तिविषये समुदायशक्तिरप्यस्ति तद्योगरूढम्।
(४) यत्र तु यौगिकार्थरूढ्यर्थयोः स्वातंत्र्येण बोधस्तद्यौगिकरूढम्॥

101. लक्षणा शक्यसंबंधस्तात्पर्यानुपपत्तितः। —न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, का० ८२।

102. काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यादौ काकपदस्य दध्युपघातके लक्षणा सर्वतो दधिरक्षायास्तात्पर्यविषयत्वात्। —इयमेवाजहत्स्वार्था लक्षणेत्युच्यते।
—न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, का० ८२।

103. न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, कारिका ८२—८४।

104. Here are the relevant portions of Udayana's argument :—

एते पदार्था मिथः संसर्गवन्तः इति संसृष्टा एवेति नियमो वा साध्यः, संभावितसंसर्गा इति वा? न प्रथमः। अनाप्तोक्तपदकदम्बस्मारितैरनैकान्तात्। —नापि द्वितीयः योग्यतामात्रसिद्धावपि संसर्गानिश्चयात् वाक्यस्य च तदेकफलत्वात्। योग्यतामात्रस्य प्रागेव सिद्धेः। अन्यथा तदसिद्धावासन्नसाकांक्षपदस्मारितत्वादित्येव हेतुः स्यात्। तथा चाग्निना सिंचेदित्यादिना स्मारितैरनैकान्तः, तथाविधानां सर्वथा संसर्गायोग्यत्वात् इति।

—न्यायकुसुमांजली, पृ० ३९१-७२।

105 Here is how Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali (on kk. 82-83) presents these positions :—

नन्वेतस्या योग्यताया ज्ञानं शब्दबोधात् प्राक् सर्वत्र न संभवति—इति चेद् न—तत्तत्पदार्थस्मरणे सति क्वचित् संशयरूपस्य क्वचिन्निश्चयरूपस्य योग्यताज्ञानस्य संभवात् नव्यास्तु योग्यताज्ञानं न शाब्दबोधे कारणम्। वह्निना सिंचतीत्यादौ वह्निकरणकत्वाभावरूपायोग्यतानिश्चयेन प्रतिबंधान्न शाब्दबोधः तदभावनिश्चयस्य लौकिकसंनिकर्षाजन्यदोषवशाजन्यतज्ज्ञानमात्रे प्रतिबंधकत्वाच्छाब्दबोधं प्रत्यपि प्रतिबंधकत्वं सिद्धम्। योग्यताज्ञानविलंबात् च शाब्दबोधविलंबोऽसिद्धः इत्याहुः।

106. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 36.

107. पश्यतः श्वेतमारूपं हेषाशब्दं च शृण्वतः।
खुरनिक्षेपशब्दं च श्वेतोऽश्वो धावतीतिधीः॥३५८
दृष्टा वाक्यविनिर्मुक्ता न पदार्थैर्विना क्वचित्।
—श्लोकवार्तिक, वाक्याधिकरण

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108. न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० ३५९।

109. तस्मात्पदाभिहितैः पदार्थैर्लक्षणया वाक्यार्थः प्रतिपाद्यते। तत्र गामानयेत्यानयतिरानयनसामान्यमभिधाय तद्व्यक्तिं लक्षयति, गोपदमपि स्वार्थद्वारेणानयनमेव गोकर्मकत्वाकारेण तत्सम्बंधिस्वरूपेण लक्षणया प्रतिपादयति।

—शास्त्रदीपिका, पृ० १५०—६० (कुत्रचित्)।

वयं तु पदार्थाः लक्षणयेव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीति ब्रूमः। वाच्यार्थानुपपत्त्या हि लक्षणा भवति। अत्र च पदैः स्मार्यमाणगवादिपदार्था यद्यन्योन्यान्वयं विना सामान्यरूपा एवावतिष्ठेरन् तर्हि पदानां व्युत्पत्तिसमयावधृतमेकविशिष्टार्थबोधतात्पर्यं विरुध्येत इति सामान्यरूपस्य वाच्यस्यानुपपत्तेरन्योन्यान्वयरूपे विशेषे एव पदार्थाः पर्यवस्यन्ति।

—मानमेयोदय, पृ० ९४।

Further references :—

110. न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० ३५६—५९, 'पदार्थानां वाक्यार्थबोधे हेतुत्वम्' इति प्रकरणम्।
न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० ४०५—१४।

111. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 37.

112. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 38.

113. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 39.

114. For the original Sanskrit text of Pārthasārathi's entire case see *Quotation* 40.

115. For the original Sanskrit text of Rāmānujācārya's entire case see *Quotation* 41.

117. गुरुर्धियमभावस्य स्थाने स्थानेऽभिषिक्तवान्।
प्रसिद्ध एवं लोकेऽस्मिन् बुद्धबंधुः प्रभाकरः॥

—खण्डनखण्डखाद्य, पृ० ४३५।

118. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 43.

119. अमूढस्मृतिसंस्कारस्यातीतस्य वर्त्तमानस्य च प्रतिपत्तृप्रत्यक्षस्य निवृत्तिरभावव्यवहारप्रवर्तनी

—न्यायबिन्दु, २.२८।

120. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 44.

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121. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 45.

122. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 46.

123. अवग्रहेहावायधारणास्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानानां क्रमेणोपजायमानानां यद्यत् पूर्वं तत्तत्प्रमाणं यद्यदुत्तरं तत्तत्फलरूपं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। .....ईहाफलापेक्षया अवग्रहः प्रमाणम्। ततोऽपीहा प्रमाणमवायः फलम्। पुनरवायः प्रमाणं धारणा फलम्। ......ततो धारणा प्रमाणं स्मृतिः फलम्। ततोऽपि स्मृतिः प्रमाणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं फलम्। ततोऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणमूहः फलम्। ततोऽप्यूहः प्रमाणमनुमानं फलमिति प्रमाणफलवि भाग इति।

—प्रमाणमीमांसावृत्ति, १.१.३९।

124. For the original Sanskrit text see *Quotation* 47.

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SANSKRIT QUOTATIONS

१। (१) सम्यक्परिच्छेदः प्रमेत्यपि न युक्तम्। ......ननु सामस्त्यं सम्यक्त्वमिष्टम्। ...... तदिह समीचोऽर्थस्य परिच्छेदः सम्यक् परिच्छेदः। ......मैवम्। सामस्त्यमर्थस्य किं सर्वावयवसहितत्वमथ वा सर्वधर्मसहितत्वम्। नाद्यः अनवयवपदार्थपरिच्छेदस्यैव सावयवपदार्थपरिच्छेदस्यापि मध्यमभागाद्यविषयस्याप्रमात्वापातात्। नापि द्वितीयः, असर्ववित्परिच्छित्तीनां सर्वासामप्रमात्वापत्तेः।

(२) (विशेषसहितधर्मिपरिच्छित्तिः सम्यक् परिच्छित्तिरिति व्याख्याने) विशेषपदेन विशेषमात्राभिधाने रजतत्वादिना विशेषेण सहैव शुक्तिव्यक्त्यादेर्भ्रमेणावगाहनात् तस्यापि प्रमात्वं स्यात्। ......यत्तु कश्चिदवोचत् विशेषपदेन तेऽभिधीयन्ते यद्दर्शने भ्रमसंशयावकाशः, तदयुक्तम्। न तदेवंविधो विशेषोऽभिधातुं शक्यो यदवगमस्य न भ्रमत्वादिसंभवः। ......नहि परिदृश्यमानपदार्थगोचरं तदस्ति किंचिदनुभूयमानं यत्स्वप्ने वा वाक्याभासे वा प्रतिपत्तुमशक्यम्।

(३) नापि (यादृगर्थस्तादृगेव ज्ञानमिति) तृतीयः, ज्ञानार्थभेदवादे सर्वाकारेण तत्साम्यानुपपत्तेः। अभेदवादे तु भ्रमस्यापि तथाभ्युपगन्तव्यत्वप्रसंगेन विशेषणवैयर्थ्यापातात्।

(४) अबाधितानुभूतिः प्रमेत्यपि निरस्तम्। तदानीं बाधाविरहस्यातिप्रसंजकत्वात्। कालान्तरेऽपि च बाधाविरहस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात्।—खंडनखण्डखाद्य, पृ० १५४—५५, १५५—५७, १६०, १६६।

२। (१) नह्यधिगतेऽर्थे अधिगतिरेव नोत्पद्यते, कारणानामप्रतिबंधात्।

(२) न चानधिगतार्थत्वमेतत्तं तन्निमित्तं......धारावहनबुद्ध्यव्याप्तेः। न च तत्तत्कालकलाविशिष्टतया तत्राप्यनधिगतार्थत्वमुपपादनीयम्, क्षणोपाधीनामनाकलनात्।

(३) ज्ञाततैवोपाधिरिति चेत्। न, ...स्मृतेरपि तथैव प्रामाण्यप्रसंगात्।

(४) गतमिदानीं वेदप्रामाण्यप्रत्याशा। न ह्यनादौ संसारे स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति वाक्यार्थः केनचिन्नावगतः।......न चैकजन्मपरिभाषभेदं लक्षणम्, तत्राप्यनुभूतविस्मृतवेदार्थं प्रति अप्रामाण्यप्रसंगात्।

(५) कथन्तर्हि स्मृतेर्व्यवच्छेदः? अनुभवत्वेनैव। यथार्थो ह्यनुभवः प्रमेति प्रामाणिकाः पश्यन्ति। ......ननु स्मृतिः प्रमैव किं न स्यात्, यथार्थज्ञानत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुभूतिवत्, इति चेत्। न। सिद्धे व्यवहारे निमित्तानुसरणात्, न च स्वेच्छाकल्पितेन निमित्तेन लोकव्यवहारनियमनम्। न च स्मृतिहेतौ प्रमाणाभियुक्तानां महर्षीणां प्रमाणव्यवहारोऽस्ति, पृथगनुपदेशात्।

(६) यदियमनुभवैकविषया सती तन्मुखनिरीक्षणेन तद्यथार्थयथार्थत्वे अनुविधीयमाना तत्प्रामाण्यव्यवस्थाप्य न यथार्थतया व्यवहर्तुं शक्यते। व्यवहारेऽपि पूर्वानुभव एव प्रमितेरनपेक्षात्वात्। न तु स्मृतिः, नित्यं तदपेक्षणात्।

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(७) यदि स्मृतिर्न प्रमितिः पूर्वानुभवे किं प्रमाणम्? ......माभूत् पूर्वानुभवसिद्धिः किं नश्छिन्नमिति चेत्। न तर्हि स्मृत्यनुभवयोः कार्यकारणभावसिद्धिरिति। न। तद-प्रामाण्येऽपि पूर्वापरावस्थावदात्मप्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रामाण्यादेव तदुपपत्तेः।

—न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० ४५१—५८।

३। ननु च परिच्छिन्नमर्थं परिच्छिन्दता प्रमाणेन पिष्टं पिष्टं स्यात्। तथा च गृहीतग्राहिणां धारावाहिज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यप्रसंगः। ततोऽपूर्वार्थनिर्णय इत्यस्तु लक्षणम्, यथाहुः—स्वा-पूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् (परीक्षामुख १.१) इति तत्रापूर्वार्थविज्ञानम् इति च। तत्राह—ग्रहीष्यमाणग्राहिण इव गृहीतग्राहिणोऽपि नाप्रामाण्यम्। १.१.४।

अयमर्थः—द्रव्यापेक्षया व गृहीतग्राहित्वं विप्रतिषिध्येत पर्यायापेक्षया वा? तत्र पर्यायापेक्षया धारावाहिज्ञानानामपि गृहीतग्राहित्वं न संभवति, क्षणिकत्वात् पर्यायाणाम्, तत्कथं तन्निवृत्यर्थं विशेषणमुपादीयेत? अथ द्रव्यापेक्षया, तदप्ययुक्तम् द्रव्यस्य नित्यत्वादेकत्वेन गृहीतग्रही-ष्यमाणयोर्न भेदः। ततश्च कं विशेषमाश्रित्य ग्रहीष्यमाणग्राहिणः प्रामाण्यम्, न गृहीत-ग्राहिणः? ....

स्मृतेश्च प्रमाणत्वेनाभ्युपगताया गृहीतग्राहित्वमेव सत्त्वम्। यैरपि स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यमिष्टं तैरप्यर्थानुत्पाद एव हेतुत्वेनोक्तो न गृहीतग्राहित्वम्, यदाह—

न स्मृतेरप्रमाणत्वं गृहीतग्राहिताकृतम्।
अपि त्वनर्थजन्यत्वं तदप्रामाण्यकारणम्।। (न्यायमंजरी)

इति। —प्रमाणमीमांसा, पृ० ४-५।

४। यत्पुनरर्थक्रियाज्ञानस्यापि पूर्वस्मात् को विशेषः, तस्यापि चान्यतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चया-पेक्षायामनवस्थेत्युक्तं तदपि सकलप्राणभृत्प्रतीतिसाक्षिकव्यवहारविरोधित्वादसंबद्धाभिधानम्, अपरी-क्षणीयप्रामाण्यत्वादर्थक्रियाज्ञानस्य। ......विशेषदर्शनाद् वा फलज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः। कः पुनर्विशेष इति चेद्, योऽयं शौचाचमनमज्जनामरपितृतर्पणपटचालनश्रमतापनोदनविनोदनाधनेक-प्रकारनीरपर्यालोचनप्रबंधः न ह्ययमियान् कार्यकलापो मिथ्याज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तस्य क्वचिदपि दृष्टः। स्वप्नेऽप्यस्य प्रबंधस्य दर्शनमस्तीति चेद् न, स्वप्नदशा विसदृशविस्पष्टजाग्रदवस्थाप्रत्ययस्य संवे-द्यत्वात्। एषोऽस्मि जागर्मि न स्वपिमीति स्वप्नविलक्षणमनिद्रायमाणः प्रत्यक्षमेव जाग्रत्समयं सबलो जनश्चेतयते, न च तस्मिन्नवसरे सलिलमन्तरेणैताः क्रिया वर्त्तमाना दृश्यन्ते इति तद्विशेष-दर्शनात् सुज्ञानमर्थक्रियाज्ञानप्रामाण्यम्। —न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० १५६।

५। यद्यर्थक्रियाधिगमे पूर्वकं प्रमाणं सोऽप्यर्थक्रियाधिगमः प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा? अप्रमाणेनार्थ-क्रियाधिगमाभावात् प्रमाणं तत्। ततस्ततोऽप्यर्थक्रियाधिगमः परोऽन्वेषणीय इत्यनवस्था।

नेदं साधीयः।
उत्तरार्थक्रियाभावात् पूर्वस्य यदि मानता।
तदैवार्थक्रियाभावादुत्तरस्य कथं न सा।।
यत्रार्थक्रियास्थितिरपरोपकल्पिता तद् यावत् प्रमाणम्,

यत्र तु स्वतस्तदैवार्थक्रियानुभवस्तत्सुतरामेव प्रमाणम्।

—प्रमाणवार्तिकालंकार, पृ० ४।

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६। ज्ञानत्वेऽप्यतिरिक्तदोषानुप्रवेशादप्रमेति चेत्। एवं तर्हि दोषाभावमधिकमासाद्य प्रमाऽपि जायेत, नियमेन तदपेक्षणात्। अस्तु दोषाभावोऽप्यधिको भावस्तु नेष्यते इति चेत्। भवेदप्येवं यदि नियमेन दोषैर्भावरूपैरेव भवितव्यम्, न त्वेवम्। ......

तस्माद्यथा द्वेषरागाभावाविनाभावेऽपि रागद्वेषयोरनुविधाननियमात् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयत्नयो रागद्वेषकारणकत्वं, न तु निवृत्तिप्रयत्नो द्वेषहेतुकः प्रवृत्तिप्रयत्नस्तु सत्यपि रागानुविधाने द्वेषाभावहेतुक इति विभागो युज्यते, विशेषाभावात्, तथा प्रकृतेऽपि।

—न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० २१३—१८।

७। द्विविधं कार्यं भवति सम्यगसम्यग्वा, तत्र गुणवता कारणेन सम्यक् कार्यमुत्पद्यते दोषवता त्वसम्यक् इति।

निर्दोषं निर्गुणं वाऽपि न समस्त्येव कारणम्।
अतएव तृतीयस्य न कार्यस्यास्ति संभवः।।

सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पादकं कारकधर्मि स्वरूपातिरिक्तस्वगतधर्मसापेक्षं कार्यनिर्वर्त्तकमिति साध्यो धर्मः, कारकत्वात्, मिथ्याज्ञानोत्पादककारकवत्। —न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड-१, पृ० १५०—५८।

८। स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम्।
न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्त्तुमन्येन शक्यते ।। ४७

आत्मलाभे च भावानां कारणापेक्षता भवेत्।
लब्धात्मनां स्वकार्येषु प्रवृत्तिः स्वयमेव तु ।। ४८

(टीका—घटो हि मृत्पिंडादिकं स्वजन्मन्येवापेक्षते नोदकाहरणेऽपि। तथा ज्ञानमपि स्वोत्पत्तौ गुणवदितरद् वा कारणमपेक्षतां नाम, स्वकार्ये तु विषयनिश्चयेऽनपेक्षमेवेति।)

जातेऽपि यदि विज्ञाने तव नार्थोऽवधार्यते।
यावत्कारणशुद्धत्वं न प्रमाणान्तराद् भवेत् ।। ४९
तत्र ज्ञानान्तरोत्पादः प्रतीक्ष्यः कारणान्तरात्।
यावद्धि न परिच्छिन्ना शुद्धिस्तावदसत्समा ।।५०
तस्यापि कारणे शुद्धे तज्ज्ञाने स्यात् प्रमाणता।
तस्याप्येवमितीच्छंश्च न क्वचिद् व्यवतिष्ठते ।।५१
यदा स्वतः प्रमाणत्वं तदान्यन्नैव गृह्यते।
निवर्तते हि मिथ्यात्वं दोषाज्ञानादयत्नतः ।।५२

(टीका—ज्ञायमाना हि दोषाः प्रामाण्यं विघ्नन्तीति तदज्ञानादेव तदपवादकं मिथ्यात्वं निवर्तते, तदज्ञानं चायत्नसिद्धमिति न काचिदनवस्थेति।)

तस्माद् बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता।
अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानादपोद्यते ।।५३

—श्लोकवार्तिक, चोदनासूत्र।

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९। विषयान्तरसदृशमालम्ब्य अगृहीतविवेकं यत् ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं तत्सदृशविषयान्तरे स्मृतिहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यते स्मरामीति ज्ञानशून्यस्य। उपपन्नानि तावत् शुक्तिकादिषु रजतादिज्ञानानि ......।

(टीका—तत्र यदि यथाज्ञानमेव वस्तु न तर्हि विपरीतत्वम्। अथ विपरीतत्वं न तर्हि यथाज्ञानमेवालंबनम्। उत्तरम् ......। विषयान्तरं रजताच्छुक्तिकां रजतसदृशीमालम्ब्येद-मित्यगृहीतविशेषं रजतात् भेदावगमहेतवो ये शुक्तिकायां विशेषास्तानिन्द्रियदोषेण सतोऽप्य-गृहीत्वा साधारणानेव शुक्तिकाया धर्मान् गृह्णतो यत् ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं तत्सदृशान्तरे स्मृतिज्ञानहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यते। दोषवशात् खण्डितशुक्तिके मनस्यनुभूतावमर्शाभावेन स्मरामीति ज्ञानशून्यस्य। तेन गृह्यमाणस्मर्यमाणयोर्भेदो नावसीयते। विज्ञानद्वयं चैतत्, इदमिति प्रत्यक्षं रजतमिति स्मरणम्, अन्यथा रजतावगत्यसंभवात्। नहि तदिन्द्रियजम्, तेन सम्प्रयोगाभावात्। असंयुक्तं चेन्द्रियं विज्ञानं न जनयति। अंधस्यानुत्पादात्। स्मरणमेवेदम्। उपपन्नानि तावच्छुक्तिकादिषु रजतादिज्ञानानि स्मृतिरूपतया ......।)

—बृहती, पृ० ५०-५१।

१०। एवं प्रामाण्यं परतो ज्ञायते, अनभ्यासदशायां सांशयिकत्वात्, अप्रामाण्यवत्। यदि तु स्वतो ज्ञायेत कादाचिदपि प्रामाण्यसंशयो न स्यात्, ज्ञानत्वसंशयवत्। निश्चिते तदनवकाशात्। न हि साधकबाधकप्रमाणमवधूय समानधर्मादिदर्शनादेवासौ, तथा सति तदनुच्छेदप्रसंगात्। अथ प्रमाणवदप्रमाणेऽपि तत्प्रत्ययदर्शनाद् विशेषादर्शनाद् भवति शंकेत्यभिप्रायः, तत्किं प्रमाणज्ञानोपलंभेऽपि न प्रामाण्यमुपलब्धं प्रमाणज्ञानमेव वा नोपलब्धम्? आद्ये कथं स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहः, प्रत्ययप्रतीतावपि तदप्रतीतेः, द्वितीये कथं तत्र शंका, धर्मिण एवानुपलब्धेरिति। यदपि झटिति प्रचुरतरसामर्थ्यप्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या स्वतः प्रामाण्यमुच्यते, तदपि नास्ति। अन्यथैवोपपत्तेः। झटिति प्रवृत्तिर्स्तर्हि झटिति तत्कारणोपनिपातमन्तरेणानुपपद्यमाना तमाक्षिपेत्, प्रचुरप्रवृत्तिरपि स्वकारणप्राचुर्यात्, इच्छा च प्रवृत्तेः कारणम्, तत्कारणमपीष्टाभ्युपायताज्ञानम्, तदपि तज्जातीयत्व-लिंगानुभवप्रभवम्, सोऽपीन्द्रियसंनिकर्षादिजन्मा, न तु प्रामाण्यग्रहस्य क्वचिदुपयोगः। उपयोगे वा स्वत एवेति कुत एतत्? ततः समर्थं प्रवृत्तिप्राचुर्यमपि प्रामाण्यप्राचुर्यात् तद्ग्रहणप्राचुर्याद् वा। स्वतस्त्वं तु तस्य क्वोपयुज्यते? न हि पिपासूनां झटिति प्रचुरा समर्था च प्रवृत्तिरम्भसीति पिपासोपशमशक्तिस्तस्य प्रत्यक्षा स्यात्।

—न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० २२०—३०।

११। ननु अस्तूक्तलक्षणं प्रमाणम्, तत्प्रामाण्यं तु स्वतः परतो वा निश्चीयेत? न तावत् स्वतः, तद्धि स्वसंविदितत्वात् ज्ञानमित्येव गृह्णीयात्, न पुनः सम्यक्त्वलक्षणं प्रामाण्यम्, ज्ञानत्वमात्रं तु प्रमाणाभाससाधारणम्। अपि च स्वतः प्रामाण्ये सर्वेषामविप्रतिपत्तिप्रसंगः। नापि परतः, परं हि तद्गोचरगोचरं वा ज्ञानम् अभ्युपेयेत, अर्थक्रियानिर्भासं वा, तद्गोचरनान्तरीयकार्थदर्शनं वा? तच्च सर्वं स्वतोऽनवधृतप्रामाण्यमव्यवस्थितं सत् कथं पूर्वं प्रवर्तकं ज्ञानं व्यवस्थापयेत्? स्वतो वाऽस्य प्रामाण्ये कोऽपराधः प्रवर्तकज्ञानस्य येन तस्यापि तत्र स्यात्? न च प्रामाण्यं ज्ञायते स्वत इत्ययुक्तमेव, परतस्त्वनवस्थेत्याशंक्याह-प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स्वतः परतो वा।।१.१.८।

प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः क्वचित् स्वतः यथाऽभ्यासदशापन्ने स्वकरतलादिज्ञाने, स्नानपानावगाहनो-दन्योपशमादावर्थक्रियानिर्भासे वा प्रत्यक्षज्ञाने, नहि तत्र परीक्षाकांक्षाऽस्ति प्रेक्षावताम्, तथाहि जलज्ञानम् ततो दाहपिपासार्तस्य तत्र प्रवृत्तिः, ततस्तत्प्राप्तिः, ततः स्नानपानादीनि, ततो दाहोदन्यो-पशम् इत्येतावतैव भवति कृती प्रमाता, न पुनर्दाहोदन्योपशमज्ञानमपि परीक्षते इत्यस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यम्। अनुमाने तु सर्वस्मिन्नपि सर्वथा निरस्तसमस्तव्यभिचाराशंके स्वत एव प्रामाण्यम्, अव्यभिचारिलिंगसमुत्थत्वात्, न लिंगाकारं ज्ञानं लिंगं बिना, न च लिंगं लिंगिनं विनैति।

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क्वचित् परतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः. यथा अनभ्यासदशापन्ने प्रत्यक्षे। नहि तत् अर्थेन गृहीताव्यभिचारमिति तदेकविषयात् संवादकात् ज्ञानान्तराद् वा, अर्थक्रियानिर्भासाद् वा, नान्तरीयार्थदर्शनाद् वा तस्य प्रामाण्यं निश्चीयते। तेषां च स्वतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयान्नानवस्थादिदोस्थ्यावकाशः।

—प्रमाणमीमांसा, पृ० ५-६।

१२। अनवगतशब्दार्थसंबंधोऽप्यभिनवानेकपदार्थसन्निपाते तेषामनुगतं च व्यावृत्तं च पश्यत्येव रूपम्।अतः.... निर्विकल्पकवेलायामेव व्यावृत्तवदनुगतरूपावभासान्न सामान्यापह्नवो युक्तः।

—न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० २८३।

१३। (१) तत्र वृद्धनैयायिकास्तावदाचक्षते, यदिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षादुत्पन्नं सद्विषयनामधेयेन व्यपदिश्यते रूपज्ञानं रसज्ञानमिति तद्व्यपदेश्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षफलं मा भूदित्यव्यपदेश्यम्।।

(२) व्यवच्छेद्यान्तरमव्यपदेश्यपदस्य वर्णयांचक्रुराचार्याः-शब्दार्थेषु स्थविरव्यवहारतो व्युत्पद्यमानो जनः संशयावगमसमये संज्ञोपदेशकादयं पनस उच्यते इति वृद्धोदीरिताद् वाक्यात् पुरोऽवस्थितशाखादिमन्तमर्थं पनसशब्दवाच्यतया जानाति, तदस्य ज्ञानमिन्द्रियजमपि न केवलेन्द्रियकरणकं भवितुमुचितम्, असति संज्ञोपदेशिनि शब्दे तदनुत्पादात्, तेन शब्देन्द्रियाभ्यां संभूय जनितत्वादुभयजमिदं ज्ञानं व्यपदेशाज्जातमिति व्यपदेश्यमुच्यते, तदव्यपदेश्यपदेन व्युदस्यते।

(३) तदेतद् व्याख्यातारो नानुमन्यन्ते। यद्युभयजं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यपदेन व्युदस्यते तदपि प्रमाणं भवत्कस्मिन्ननुविशतामिति चिन्त्यम्।

ननु शाब्दमिदं ज्ञानं तद्भावानुविधानतः।
भवत्वक्षजमप्येतत्तद्भावानुविधानतः।।
शाब्दं चोभयजं चेति विरुद्धमभिधीयते।।

वस्तुस्थित्या तु निरूप्यमाणमिन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वादिदं विज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षफलतामतिवर्तते।

तस्मादुभयजज्ञानव्युदासानुपपत्तितः।
व्याख्या भंग्यन्तरेणास्य पदस्येयं विधीयते।।

असंभवदोषव्यवच्छेदार्थमव्यपदेश्यपदोपादानम्। एवं हि परो मन्यते, सति लक्ष्ये लक्षणवर्णनमुचितम्, इह तु लक्ष्यमाणं प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नं नाम न किंचिदस्ति, गौरित्यादिज्ञानानां शब्दावच्छिन्नवाच्यविषयत्वेन शाब्दत्वात्। .... इति असंभवदोषमाशंक्याह सूत्रकारः अव्यपदेश्यमिति। यदिदमविदितपदपदार्थसंबंधस्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते विदितसंबंधस्यापि वा यत्प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातसमये एव ज्ञानमनुल्लिखितशब्दकं—तद् शाब्दम् अशब्दावच्छिन्नविषयमव्यपदेश्यमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षकरणमविकल्पं प्रत्यक्षम्। .... तस्माद् गौरित्यादिज्ञानानां शाब्दत्वेऽपि तथाविधस्य ज्ञानस्य लक्ष्यस्य सद्भावान्न व्यर्थं लक्षणम्।

—तदेतदाचार्या न क्षमन्ते। न गौरित्यादिज्ञानमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नमपीदं शाब्दमिति वक्तुं युक्तम्।—

शब्दस्मरणसापेक्षं यस्योत्पादकमिन्द्रियम्।
तदेव यदि ते शाब्दमहो नैयायिको भवान्।।
अर्थासंस्पर्शिनः शब्दान् कथयन् दुष्टसौगतः।
प्रत्यक्षास्त्रेण भेतव्यः स कथं हन्यते त्वया।।

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—अत्र पुनः प्रवराः प्राहुः, नन्वेवं गौरित्यादिबोधेषु वाचकावच्छिन्नवाच्यप्रतिभासे सर्वप्रकारमपाक्रियमाणे प्रथमाक्षसंनिपातसमयमासादितसद्भावनिर्विकल्पकवेदनवैलक्षण्यं कथमेषां भवेत्, नहि विषयातिशयमन्तरेण प्रतिभासातिशयो भवितुमर्हति।....

—तदेतदाचार्याः प्रतिसमादधते, न विषयभेदादेव प्रतिभासभेदः किंतूपायभेदाद् भवत्येव।—

—अन्ये मन्यन्ते, यदि संकेतग्रहणकाले भाविनः संज्ञोपदेशकवचनजनितस्योभयजज्ञानस्य व्यवच्छेदकमिदं वर्ण्यते पदं तदा तदव्यवहारकालेऽपि यदयं गौरिति, संकेतग्रहणकालानुभूतदेवदत्ताद्युदीरितसंज्ञोपदेशकवचनस्मरणपूर्वकं विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदप्युभयजमेवेति कथमनेन न व्युदस्यते।—

एवमस्त्विति चेच्छान्तमेवं सति तपस्विनाम्।
नैयायिकानामुत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षं सविकल्पकम्॥

नैयायिकानां च सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षमयाः प्राणाः। ———तस्माद्वरं जरन्नैयायिककथितशब्दकर्मतापन्नज्ञानव्यवच्छेद एवाश्रीयताम्।....

—अपर आह, सविकल्पस्य शब्दसंकल्पकस्य शब्दसंसर्गसापेक्षजन्मनः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य शब्दतां पूर्ववदाशंक्य तस्यैवाशाब्दतां दर्शयत्यव्यपदेश्यपदेन सूत्रकारः, प्रत्यक्षमेव तज्ज्ञानमिन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वादव्यपदेश्यमशाब्दमित्यर्थः।

—न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड-१, पृ० ७३—८२।

१४। तत्र पक्षधर्मस्य साध्यधर्मिणि प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानतो वा प्रसिद्धिः। (प्रत्यक्षतो) यथा प्रदेशे धूमस्य।

सधूमं हि प्रदेशमर्थान्तरविविक्तरूपमसाधारणात्मना दृष्टवतः स्मार्तं यथादृष्टभेदपरमार्थविषयं लिंगज्ञानमुत्पद्यते।

तत्र यदाद्यमसाधारणविषयं दर्शनं तदेव प्रमाणम्। तस्मिन् तथाभूते दृष्टे सति तदसाधारणतामभिलपन्ती अतद्व्यावृत्तिविषया स्मृतिरुत्पन्ना प्रत्यक्षबलेन न प्रमाणम् —(प्रतिषेधविकल्पस्य) अपूर्वार्थाधिगमाभावात्। — अदृष्टस्य पुनस्तत्साधनस्य (—अर्थक्रियासाधनस्य) (विधि–) विकल्पेनाप्रतिपत्तेरनुमानवत्।

—— न —— सामान्यं स्वलक्षणप्रतिपत्तेरूर्ध्वं तत्सामर्थ्योत्पन्नविकल्पविज्ञानग्राह्यं कांचिदर्थक्रियामुपकल्पयति। यथा नीलं दृष्ट्वा नीलमिति ज्ञाने। तदेव हि नीलस्वलक्षणं तथाविधसाध्यार्थक्रियाकारि। तच्च तेनात्मना दृष्टमेव।

न च तत्स्वलक्षणग्रहणोत्तरकालभाविनो नीलविकल्पस्य विषयेण नीलसाध्यार्थक्रिया क्रियते।—

अधिगते तु स्वलक्षणे तत्सामर्थ्यजन्मा विकल्पस्तदनुकारी ——— स्मृतिरेव।

—हेतुबिन्दु, पृ० ५३, पंक्ति ६—२५।

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१५। (१) ———इति ब्रुवता (कुमारिलेन)——सौगतानामेवायं लिंग-धर्मितत्संबंधाग्रहणलक्षणो दोषो येषामविकल्पकमेव प्रत्यक्षम्, नास्माकं सविकल्पकमपि प्रत्यक्षमिच्छताम् इत्युक्तं भवति। ततस्तदुपवर्णितदोषप्रतिविधानायाह——सधूमं हि इत्यादि। अयमत्र समुदायार्थः-प्रत्यक्षं हि पुरोवस्थितमौत्तराधर्येण धूमप्रदेशादिकम् विधिरूपेण सकलसजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्तं च स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थितेः सर्वासामर्थमात्राणां परस्परमसंकीर्णरूपत्वात् तत्सामार्थ्यभावि यथास्थानमनुकुर्वत् पाश्चात्यविधिप्रतिषेधविकल्पद्वयं जनयति येन धूमप्रदेशाख्यौ धर्मधर्मिणौ तयोश्चौत्तराधर्यम् एवमेतत् नान्यथा इति विकल्पयति। यथानुभवमभ्यासपाटवादिप्रत्ययान्तरसहकारिणां विकल्पानामुदयात्। ततो धर्मधर्मिणोः स्वरूपनिश्चयः संबंधनिश्चयश्च प्रत्यक्षनिबंधनः सम्पद्यते।

(२) द्विविधो विकल्पः प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभावी वस्तुतः पुनर्निर्विषय एव। ततो यदाह——सामान्यस्याननुभूततया।

स्मार्तमेतदभेदेन विज्ञानमिति यो वदेत्।
तस्य बंध्यासुतेऽप्यस्ति नूनं स्मरणशक्तता॥

इति तदप्यपास्तमिति।

(३) ———अपरं कुमारिलेनाभिहितम्——स्वलक्षणविषयं प्रत्यक्षं सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानम् इति वचनात् धूमादिसामान्यमनुमानग्राह्यमेव। तत्र चानवस्था लिंगग्राहिणोऽप्यनुमानस्य तदन्यलिंगबलेनोत्पत्तेः। तस्य च सामान्यरूपतया तदन्यानुमानविषयत्वात् तथा तदन्यस्यापीति कस्यचिदेकस्यापि लिंगिनः प्रतिपत्तिः युगसहस्त्रैरपि न संभवति। इत्याशंक्याह——यस्यानुमानमन्तरेण सामान्यं न प्रतीयते भवतु तस्यायं दोषः, अस्माकं तु प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविनाऽपि विकल्पेन प्रकृतिविभ्रमात् सामान्यं प्रतीयते, लिंगविकल्पस्य च स्वलक्षणदर्शनाश्रयत्वात् परंपरया वस्तुप्रतिबंधादविसंवादकत्वम्, मणिप्रभायामिव मणिभ्रान्तेः।

(४) यत्तूक्तम्-सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानम् इति तत्र नैवमवधार्यते——सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानमेवेति। प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविनो विकल्पस्यापि तद्विषयत्वात् तदन्यस्य च विकल्पस्य। किन्तु सामान्यलक्षणविषयमेवानुमानमित्यवधार्यते स्वलक्षणविषयत्वनिषेधार्यमिति।

(५) तत्र सह धूमेन वर्तते सधूमः। पक्षधर्मताप्रतिपादनार्थमेतदुक्तम्। विधिविकल्पस्य चैतदेव बीजम्। तं सधूमं प्रदेशं दृष्टवतः प्रत्यक्षेणेति संबंधः। कीदृशम्? अर्थान्तरविविक्तरूपम् अर्थान्तरैः सजातीयविजातीयैर्विविक्तमसंकीर्णं रूपमस्येति विग्रहः सर्वभावानां स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थितेः स्वभावसांकर्याभावात्। अन्यथा सर्वस्य सर्वत्रोपयोगादतिप्रसंगः। अनेन प्रतिषेधविकल्पस्य निमित्तमाख्यातम्, सामान्योत्प्रेक्षायाश्च बीजम्। ——— तथा हि-अर्थान्तरव्यावृत्ति परस्परव्यावृत्तानामपि समानामुत्पश्यतो भिन्नमेषां रूपं तिरोधायाभिन्नं स्वभावमारोपयन्ती कल्पनोत्पद्यते।

(६) असाधारणात्मना इति अर्थान्तरव्यावृत्तेन स्वभावेन। न तु यथा कुमारिलो मन्यते-अर्थान्तरविवेकोऽभावप्रमाणग्राह्यो न प्रत्यक्षावसेयः इति। नहि वस्तुबलभाविना प्रत्यक्षेण अन्यथादर्शनसंभवो भ्रान्तताप्रसंगात्। तेनात्मना दृष्टवतः सतः पुरुषोऽनन्तरं स्मार्तं लिंगज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति संबंधः। स्मृतिरेव स्मार्तम्। लिंगप्रतिभासिज्ञानं लिंगज्ञानम्। अनेन प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविनि विकल्पे यत्सामान्यमाभाति तस्य लिंगव्यवस्थामाह।

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(७) तत्र तेषु दर्शनविधिप्रतिषेधविकल्पेषु ——— यद् दर्शनं तद् एव प्रमाणं न विधिप्रतिषेधविकल्पावपि। तस्यैव प्रमाणलक्षणयोगादितरयोश्च तदसंभवात्। तथा हि-अनधिगतविषयत्वमर्थक्रियासाधनविषयत्वं च प्रमाणलक्षणम्। तद् दर्शनस्यैव।

(८) तत्र प्रतिषेधविकल्पस्य तावत् प्रत्यक्षगृहीतार्थविषयतया स्मृतित्वं प्रतिपादयन्नाह——तस्मिन् असाधारण तथाभूते अर्थान्तरैरसंकीर्णरूपै——दृष्टे सति। ———ततः अर्थान्तराद् भेदं वैलक्षण्यमन्यरूपमिदं न भवतीति अभिलपन्ती अभिमुखयन्ती दृष्टवैलक्षण्ये प्रवर्तमानतया स्मृतिरुत्पन्ना प्रत्यक्षबलेन।तदुक्तप्रमाणलक्षणविरहं दर्शयन्नाह-प्राग आलोचनाज्ञानोदयकाले असाधारणम् असंकीर्णरूपं दृष्ट्वा असाधारणमर्थान्तररूपं न भवतीति अभिलपतः विकल्पयतः प्रतिषेधविकल्पस्यापूर्वार्थाधिगमाभावाद् अपूर्वार्थविज्ञानताविरहात्। अपूर्वार्थविज्ञानं च प्रमाणं भवतोच्यते इति भावः।

(९) यद्युक्तेन प्रकारेण प्रतिषेधविकल्पो न प्रमाणं विधिविकल्पस्तर्हि प्रमाणं भविष्यति। न हि तस्यापूर्वार्थविज्ञानत्वाभावः संभवति। तत्प्रतिभासिनोऽनुगतस्य सामान्याकारस्यासाधारणरूपावलंबिना दर्शनेनानधिगमात् ———। तदेतत् ——— अपनुदन्नाह ——— यद्यपि तेनानधिगतम् सामान्यमधिगम्यत इति वर्ण्यते तथाऽपि तद् अर्थक्रियासाधनं न भवति इति तदधिगन्ता तैमिरिकादिज्ञानप्रख्यो विधिविकल्पो न प्रमाणम्। ——— अनुमानवद इति वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः। यथा प्रत्यक्षेणार्थक्रियासाधने प्रदेशाख्ये धर्मिण्यधिगतेऽप्यनधिगतस्याग्नेरर्थक्रियासाधनस्यासामान्याकारेण (० धनस्य सामान्यकारेण इत्यपि पाठः) परोक्षस्य स्वलक्षणाकारेण प्रतिपत्तुमशक्यत्वात् प्रतिपत्तिर्नैवं विधिविकल्पेन सामान्याकारेणानधिगतमर्थक्रियासाधनमधिगम्यते, तस्यालोचनाज्ञानेनैवाधिगमात्। तस्मिन् स्मृतिरेवासौ न प्रमाणम्।

(१०) तदेवं विधिविकल्पस्यानर्थक्रियासाधनविषयतयाऽनधिगत सामान्याधिगमेऽपि प्रामाण्यं निराकृत्य ......प्रतिषेधविकल्पेन साधारणमप्रामाण्यकारणं दर्शयन्नाह ——— अधिगते तु स्वलक्षणे आलोचनाज्ञानेन तत्सामर्थ्यजन्या स्वलक्षणाधिगमबलभावी विकल्पस्तदनुकारी ——— दृश्यविकल्पयोश्चैकीकरणादेवमुच्यते। वस्तुतस्तु न किंचिदसावनुकरोति। स स्मृतिरेव। —— तथाहि-स्मृतेरप्यनुभूतस्वलक्षणांशविषयाया न परमार्थतस्तद्विषयत्वम्। स्वलक्षणस्येन्द्रियबुद्धाविव स्फुटरूपतया स्मृतावप्रतिभासनात्। ......तच्च विधिविकल्पेऽपि समानमिति कथमसौ स्मृतिर्न स्यादिति।

—हेतुबिंदुटीका, पृ० २२, २३, २३-२४, २४, २४, २४,
२५, २५, २५—२७, २७—२८, ३३-३४।

१६। (१) इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तोऽवग्रहेहावायधारणात्मा सांव्यवहारिकम्॥१.१.२०

(२) अक्षार्थयोगे दर्शनानन्तरमर्थग्रहणमवग्रहः॥ १.१.२६

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....योगः संबंधो नातिदूरासन्नव्यवहितदेशाद्यवस्थानलक्षणा योग्यता। .... तस्मिन्नक्षार्थयोगे सति दर्शनम् अनुल्लिखितविशेषस्य वस्तुनः प्रतिपत्तिः । तदनन्तरम् इति.... । एतेन दर्शनस्यावग्रहं प्रति परिणामितोक्ता, न ह्यसत एव सर्वथा कस्यचिदुत्पादः, सतो वा सर्वथा विनाश इति दर्शनमेवोत्तरं परिणामं प्रतिपद्यते। अर्थस्य द्रव्यपर्यायात्मनोऽर्थक्रियाक्षमस्य ग्रहणम् सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः इति सामान्यलक्षणानुवृत्तेर्निर्णयो न पुनरविकल्पकं दर्शनमात्रम् अवग्रहः।

न चायं मानसो विकल्पः, चक्षुरादिसंनिधानापेक्षत्वात् प्रतिसंख्यानेनाप्रत्याख्येयत्वाच्च। मानसो हि विकल्पः प्रतिसंख्यानेन निरुध्यते, न चायं तथेति न विकल्पः।

अवगृहीतविशेषाकांक्षणमीहा ॥१.१.२७

अवग्रहगृहीतस्य शब्दादेरर्थस्य किमयं शब्दः शांखः शाङ्र्गो वा इति संशये सति माधुर्यादयः शांखधर्मा एवोपलभ्यन्ते न कार्कश्यादयः शाङ्र्गधर्माः इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकरूपविशेषपर्यालोचनरूपा मतेश्चेष्टा ईहा। इह चावग्रहेहयोरन्तराले अभ्यस्तेऽपि विषये संशयज्ञानमस्त्येव आशुभावात्तु नोपलक्ष्यते। न तु प्रमाणम्, सम्यगर्थनिर्णयात्मकत्वाभावात्। ......

ईहा च यद्यपि चेष्टोच्यते तथापि चेतनस्य सेति ज्ञानरूपैवेति युक्तं प्रत्यक्षभेदत्वमस्याः न चानिर्णयरूपत्वादप्रमाणत्वमस्याः शंकनीयम्, स्वविषयनिर्णयरूपत्वात्, निर्णयान्तरासादृश्ये निर्णयान्तराणामप्यनिर्णयत्वप्रसंगः।

ईहितविशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः॥ १.१.२८

ईहाक्रोडीकृते वस्तुनि विशेषस्य शांख एवायं शब्दो न शाङ्र्गः इत्येवंरूपस्यावधारणम् अवायः।

स्मृतिहेतुर्धारणा॥१.१.२९

स्मृतेः अतीतानुसंधानरूपाया हेतुः परिणामिकारणम्, संस्कार इति यावत्, संख्येमसंख्येयं वा कालं ज्ञानस्यावस्थानं धारणा। अवग्रहादयस्तु त्रय आन्तर्मौहूर्तिकाः।

संस्कारस्य च प्रत्यक्षभेदरूपत्वात् ज्ञानत्वमुन्नेयम्, न पुनर्यथाहुः परे—ज्ञानादतिरिक्तो भावनाख्योऽयं संस्कारः इति। अस्य ह्यज्ञानरूपत्वे ज्ञानरूपस्मृतिजनकत्वं न स्यात्, न हि सत्ता सत्तान्तरमनुविशति। अज्ञानरूपत्वे चास्यात्मधर्मत्वं न स्यात्, चेतनधर्मस्याचेतनत्वाभावात्।

—प्रमाणमीमांसा, पृ० १९, २१-२२।

१७। ननु चासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकहेत्वाभासनिराकरणार्थं हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वम्, सपक्षे सत्त्वम्, विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिरिति त्रैलक्षण्यमाचक्षते भिक्षवः। ——— तदयुक्तम्, अविनाभावनियमनिश्चयादेव दोषत्रयपरिहारोपपत्तेः। अविनाभावो ह्यन्यथानुपपन्नत्वम्। तच्चासिद्धस्य विरुद्धस्य व्यभिचारिणो वा न संभवति। त्रैरूप्ये सत्यप्यविनाभावाभावे हेतोरगमकत्वदर्शनात् ———। अथ विपक्षान्नियमवती व्यावृत्तिस्तत्र न दृश्यते ततो न गमकत्वम्, तर्हि.....सैव प्रधानलक्षणमस्तु। तत्सद्भावेऽपरद्वयरूपनिरपेक्षतया गमकत्वोपपत्तेश्च, यथा सन्त्यद्वैतवादिनोऽपि प्रमाणानि इष्टानिष्टसाधनदूषणान्यथानुपपत्तेः। न चात्र पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्वं चास्ति, केवलमविनाभावमात्रेण गमकत्वोपपत्तिः।

—प्रमाणमीमांसा, पृ० ३९-४०।

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१८। तदेव ह्याशंक्यते यस्मिन्नाशंक्यमाने स्वक्रियाव्याघातादयो दोषा नावतरन्तीति लोकमर्यादा। न हि हेतुफलभावो न भविष्यतीति शंकितुमपि शक्यते।

—न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० ३४५—४७

१९। यदि हि गृहीतान्वयव्यतिरेकं हेतुं विना कार्योत्पत्तिं शंकेत तदा स्वयमेव धूमार्थं वह्नेः, तृप्त्यर्थंभोजनस्य, परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं शब्दस्य चोपादानं नियमतः कथं कुर्यात्? तेन विनाऽपि तत्संभवात्। तस्मात्तदुपादानमेव तादृशशंकाप्रतिबंधकम्। ......तदिदमुक्तं —"तदेव ह्याशंक्यते यस्मिन्नाशंक्यमाने स्वक्रियाव्याघातो न भवतीति, नहि संभवति स्वयं वह्न्यादिकं धूमादिकार्यार्थं नियमत उपादत्ते, तत्कारणं तन्नेत्याशंक्यते च" ति।

—तत्त्वचिंतामणि, तर्कप्रकरण, पृ० २७—३४।

२०। ये चानुकूलतर्कं विनेयसहचारादिदर्शनमात्रेण व्याप्तिग्रहं वदन्ति तेषां पक्षेतरत्वस्य साध्यव्यापकत्वग्रहेऽनुमानमात्रमुच्छिद्येत।

—तत्त्वचिंतामणि, तर्कप्रकरण, पृ० ४५-४६।

२१। अर्थान्तरे गम्ये कार्यं हेतुः, अव्यभिचारात्। कार्यकारणभावेन गमकत्वे सर्वथा गम्यगमकभावः स्यात् सर्वथा जन्यजनकभावात्। न सर्वथा जन्यजनकभावः। तदभावे भवतः तदुत्पत्तिनियमाभावात्। तस्मात् कार्यं स्वभावैर्यावद्भिरविनाभाविकारणे तेषां स हेतुः। तत्कार्यत्वनियमात्। तैरेव च धर्मैर्ये तैर्विना न भवन्ति। अंशेन जन्यजनकभावप्रसंग इति चेत्। न। तज्जन्यविशेषग्रहणेऽभिमतत्वात्। अविशिष्टसामान्यविवक्षायां व्यभिचार इति गमकत्वं नेष्यते।

कस्यचित् कदाचित् कुतश्चिद्भावेऽपि सर्वस्तादृशस्तथाविधजन्मेति कुतः, तथा च नान्वयव्यतिरेकौ इति चेत्। न। अतद्भाविनस्तस्य सकृदपि ततोऽभावात्। परस्परापेक्षया जन्यजनकस्वभावलक्षणे कार्यकारणे। तत्र यदि धूमोऽग्न्यादिसामग्र्या अन्यतोऽपि भवेत् तदा तस्य तज्जन्यस्वभावो न भवतीति सकृदपि ततो न भवेत्। अर्थान्तरवत्। नापि सामग्री तं जनयेत्, अतज्जननस्वभावत्वात्। सामग्र्यन्तरवत्। न च धूमस्य तदतज्जन्यः स्वभावो युक्तः। एकस्वभावत्वात्। धूमाधूमजननस्वभावात् भवतो धूमाधूमस्वभावः स्यात्। कार्यस्वभावानां कारणस्वभावकृतत्वात् अकारणापेक्षणे च अहेतुकत्वप्रसंगात्।

तस्माद् यो धूमजननः स अग्न्यादिसामग्रीविशेषो भवतीति अग्न्यादिसामग्रीविशेषेण यः जनितः स एव धूमो भवतीति कार्यकारणयोरेवं स्वभावस्य नियमात् तद्विजातीयादुत्पत्तिर्न भवति।

तत् यादृशं कार्यं कारणाद् दृष्टमेकदा तत् तत्र व्यभिचरति। तेन सिद्धे कार्यकारणभावे कार्यस्य कारणेन व्याप्तिः सिद्धा भवति।

ननु विजातीयादपि किंचिद् भवद् दृष्टं तद्यथा गोमयादेः शालूकादिः। न विजातीयादुत्पत्तिः। तथाविधमेव हि तादृशाम् आदिनिमित्तम् इति न कारणभेदः। ......अस्ति च गोमयेतरजन्मनोः स्वभावभेदः रुपस्याभेदेऽपि। नहि आकारतुल्यतैव भावानां तत्त्वे निमित्तम्। अभिन्नाकाराणामपि केषांचित्तदन्यतो विशेषाज्जातिभेदो दृश्यते। अन्यथा हि विलक्षणाया अपि सामग्र्या अविलक्षणकार्योत्पत्तौ न कारणभेदाभेदाभ्यां कार्यभेदाभेदावित्यहेतुकौ विश्वस्य भेदाभेदौ स्याताम्। तथा हि न भेदाद्भेद इति अभेदादपि नाभेदः। तद्व्यतिरिक्तश्च न कश्चिद्भावस्वभाव इत्यहेतुकत्वाद्भावानां नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा स्यात्। अपेक्षया हि भावाः कादाचित्काः

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भवन्ति। व्यवस्थावांश्च साध्येषु साधननियोगो न स्यात्। कारणशक्तिप्रतिनियमे हि किंचिदेव कस्यचिदेव साधनाय उपादीयेत, नापरम्, तस्यैव तत्र शक्तेः, अन्यस्य चाशक्तेः, तयोस्तज्जननेतरस्वभावत्वेन भेदात्। तज्जननस्वभावविलक्षणादपि तस्योत्पत्तौ न तज्जननशक्तिप्रतिनियम इति यत् किंचित् यतः कुतश्चित् स्यात्। तज्जननशक्तिसाम्ये तु तदैवेति न कार्यं दृष्टं कारणं व्यभिचरति इति। ——हेतुबिन्दु, पृ० ६३, पंक्ति १६, पृ० ६४, पं० २१।

२२। एवं विधिरूपयोर्व्यावृत्तिरूपयोर्वा जात्योर्विरोधे सति न समावेशः, समाविष्टयोश्च परापरभावनियमः। ......परस्परपरिहारवत्योश्च समावेशे गोत्वाश्वत्वयोरपि तथाभावप्रसंगात्। ......

तर्हि कर्म्पाशिंशपयोः परस्परपरिहारवत्योर्न समावेशः स्यात्। दृश्यते तदिति चेत्। गोत्वाश्वत्वयोर्न द्रक्ष्यते इति का प्रत्याशा? ... ततो विपक्षे बाधकाभावात् स्वभावहेतुरप्यपास्तः।

नन्वस्ति तत्। वृक्षजनकपत्रकाण्डाद्यन्तर्भूता शिंशपासामग्री। सा वृक्षमतिपत्य भवन्ती स्वकारणमेवातिपतेत्। ......स कथं तमतिपत्यात्मानमासादयेत्। एवं तर्हि शिंशपासामग्र्यन्तर्भूता चलनसामग्री, ततस्तमतिपत्य चलनादिरूपता भवन्ती स्वकारणमेवातिपतेत्। ....स कथं तमतिपत्यात्मानमासादयेदिति तुल्यम्।

——न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० १८७——९३।

२३। एते पदार्था मिथः संसर्गवन्त इति संसृष्टा एवेति नियमो वा साध्यः संभावितसंसर्ग इति वा? न प्रथमः। अनाप्तोक्तपदकदम्बकस्मारितैरनैकान्तात्। आप्तोक्त्या विशेषणीयमिति चेन्न। वाक्यार्थप्रतीतेः प्राक् तदसिद्धेः। ......ततोऽस्मिन्नर्थेऽयमभ्रान्त इति केनचिदुपायेन ग्राह्यम्। न चैतत् संसर्गविशेषमप्रतीत्य शक्यम्।

——न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० ३९१-९२।

२४। लोके वक्तुराप्तत्वनिश्चयोऽपेक्षणीय इति चेन्न। तद्रहितस्यापि स्वार्थप्रत्यायने शब्दस्य शक्तेरवधारणात्।

——न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० ४०२।

२५। अन्यदेव हि सत्यत्वमाप्तवादत्वहेतुकम्।
वाक्यार्थश्चान्य एवेह जातः पूर्वतरं च सः॥
ततश्चेदाप्तवाक्येन सत्यत्वमनुमीयते।
वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययस्यात्र कथं स्यादनुमानता॥

——न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० १४३
(श्लोकवार्तिक, वाक्याधिकरण, श्लोक २४४-४५)।

२६। प्रकाशत्वमात्रमेव शब्दस्य स्वरूपं न यथार्थत्वमयथार्थत्वं वा, ...प्रकाशात्मनस्तु शब्दस्य वक्तृगुणदोषाधीने यथार्थेतरत्वे ———

पदार्थानां तु संसर्गमसमीक्ष्य प्रजल्पतः।
वक्तुरेव प्रमादोऽयं न शब्दोऽत्रापराध्यति॥

....पुरुषो हि स्वदर्शनं शब्देन परेषां प्रकाशयति।

——न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० १४६।

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२७। श्रूयतामवधारेन गतिर्नरगिरामपि।
अनुमानात्पृथग्भावं तासां नेच्छन्ति पूरयः ॥१८
वाक्यं हि पुरुषाधीनरचनं लौकिकं सदा।
शंक्यमाना यथार्थत्वं नार्थनिश्चायकं स्वतः ॥१९
अन्योन्याननन्वितार्थानि पदान्यपि हि मानवाः।
रचयन्तो विलोक्यन्ते तेन नान्वयनिश्चयः ॥२०
केचित्तावद् भ्रमेणैव केचिदाशयदोषतः।
प्रमादात्केऽप्यशक्तेश्च केऽप्यनन्वितवादिनः ॥२१
तदुक्तानां पदार्थानां यद्यप्यन्वययोग्यता।
तथाप्यनन्वितस्यापि दृष्टेनान्वयनिश्चयः ॥२२
शंक्यमाना यथार्थत्वरचनं तेन पुंवचः।
श्रुतमात्रकमेवार्थे न तावन्निश्चयावहम् ॥२४
यावद् वक्तुरविज्ञातं पूर्वाभावि प्रमान्तरम्।
विवक्षितार्थविषयमिन्द्रियार्थनिबंधनम् ॥२५
तस्य ज्ञानं च लिंगेन वाक्यभूतेन गम्यते।
ज्ञात्वैवार्थं ब्रवीतीति य एवमवधारितः ॥२६
तस्य ज्ञानेन नियतं वाक्यं ज्ञानानुमापकम्।
ज्ञानं चार्थाविनाभावि तेनार्थेऽपि विनिश्चयः ॥२७
ततोऽर्थे निश्चिते पश्चात् सोऽर्थो वाक्येन गम्यते।
तस्यां दशायां वाक्यस्य तस्य स्यादनुवादता ॥२८
पूर्वं च लिंगभूतत्वं वक्तुर्ज्ञानावधारणे।
वक्तुर्ज्ञानप्रसूतं हि वाक्यं तत्कार्यमिष्यते ॥२९
कार्यात्कारणसिद्धिश्च सर्वेषामनुमानतः।
पौरुषेयमतो वाक्यं न शास्त्रमभिधीयते ॥३०
नन्वर्थ एव प्रथमं पुंवाक्येभ्योऽवगम्यते।
अन्यथा हि कथं वक्तुर्धीर्विशिष्टाऽनुमीयते ॥३५
अत्र ब्रूमोऽयथार्थत्वशंकयाऽर्थो न निश्चितः।
अनिश्चितेश्च न ज्ञातः इति तावद् व्यवस्थितम् ॥३७
किन्त्वज्ञातेऽपि शब्दार्थे पदजाते श्रुते सति।
विमर्शो जायते श्रोतुरीदृशो मतिशालिनः ॥३८
अन्योन्यान्वययोग्यार्थं पदजातं ब्रवीत्ययम्।
आप्तस्तेनामुना नूनं ज्ञातस्तेषां समन्वयः ॥३९
न कदाचिदसंबंधानर्थानेष विवक्षति।
न वाऽप्रतीतसंबंधानिति दोषो न कश्चन ॥४०

—प्रकरणपंचिका, द्वितीय प्रकरण।

२८। केचित्त्वाहु :-न लोकेऽपि शब्दस्यायथार्थत्वमस्ति तदभावात्, नहि लोके शाब्दं प्रमाणमस्ति वक्त्रभिप्रायानुमापकत्वात् पुरुषवचसाम्, तेनानुमानस्यैवायं व्यभिचारो न शब्दस्य। ....तदिदमसारम्। ......न ह्यभिप्रायानुमानक्षीणस्य शब्दस्यार्थं प्रति वाचकत्वे प्रमाणमस्तीत्युक्तम् .....। यच्च व्यभिचाराभ्युपगमे स्वाभाविकमप्रामाण्यं भवति पुरुषकोषस्य शब्देऽनवतारादिति, स्यादेतदेवं यदि यदीयं यद् वाक्यं तत् स पुरुषोऽभिव्यंज्यात् तत्तु तेनैव क्रियते, वर्णा नित्याः पदानि च, वाक्यानि तु पुरुषैरेव क्रियन्ते पौरुषेयत्वादेव। यथावस्थितानि व्यज्यमानानि

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वेदवाक्यवदपौरुषेयाण्येव स्युः। ..... तद्यथाऽध्येतृभिर्व्यज्यमानानि वेदवाक्यानि नाध्येतृणामभिप्रायं सूचयन्ति तथा पुरुषवाक्यान्यपि न सूचयेयुः। यदि हि व्यभिचाराशंकया लोके शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं न संभवतीत्युच्यते तर्हि तद्वक्त्रभिप्रायानुमानेऽपि तुल्यम्। अन्यथासंविदानस्याप्यन्यथावाक्यरचनादर्शनात्। किं च शब्दस्य चक्षुरादिरिव स्वसामर्थ्येन बोधकत्वाद् व्यभिचारेऽपि न बोधकत्वहानिः। लिंगस्याव्यभिचारिण एव गमकत्वमिति व्यभिचारिणोऽलिंगत्वमुपपन्नम्। ... . अवश्यं हि बुद्धिविशेषमनुमित्सता प्रथमं पदार्थास्तेषां चान्वययोग्यताऽऽलोचयितव्या, ते वालोच्यमाना प्रागेव वाक्यार्थम् बोधयन्तीति नानुमानं प्रतीक्षन्ते।

—शास्त्रदीपिका, पृ० २४।

२९। (१) प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम् ......।

अविसंवादनं शब्देऽप्यभिप्रायनिवेदनात् ॥१
वक्तृव्यापारविषयो योऽर्थो बुद्धौ प्रकाशते।
प्रामाण्यं तत्र शब्दस्य नार्थतत्त्वनिबंधनम् ॥२

—प्रमाणवार्त्तिक, प्रमाणसिद्धिपरिच्छेद।

(२) नान्तरीयकताऽभावाच्छब्दानां वस्तुभिः सह।
नार्थसिद्धिस्ततस्ते हि वक्त्रभिप्रायसूचकाः॥२१६
आप्तवादाविसंवादसामान्यादनुमानता।२१९
(३) नायं स्वभावः कार्यं वा वस्तूनां वक्तरि ध्वनिः।।३३९
न च तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य विद्यतेऽव्यभिचारिता।
प्रवृत्तिर्वाचकानां च वाच्यदृष्टिकृतेति चेत् ॥३४०
परस्परविरुद्धानां कथमेकत्र सा भवेत्।३४१
(४) यस्य प्रमाणसंवादि वचनं तत्कृतं वचः॥३१८
स आगम इति प्राप्तम् ......।३१९

—प्रमाणवार्तिक, स्वार्थानुमानपरिच्छेद।

३०। (१) प्रत्यक्षस्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानादिभिः अविसंवादसिद्धेः अर्थेषु तत्प्रामाण्यम्, अन्यथा तदाभासव्यवस्था। तथैव श्रुतज्ञान-तदाभासव्यवस्था।

(२) श्रुतज्ञानं वक्त्रभिप्रायादर्थान्तरेऽपि प्रमाणम्, कथमन्यथा द्वीपदेशनदीपर्वतादिकम् अदृष्टस्वभावकार्यं विधिविभागेन देशान्तरस्थं प्रतिपत्तुमर्हति निरारेकमविसंवादकं च।

(३) नहीन्द्रियज्ञानम् अभ्रान्तमव्यभिचारीति वा विशेषणान्तरमन्तरेण प्रमाणमतिप्रसंगात्। तथाविशेषणे श्रुतज्ञाने कोऽपरितोषः? यथा कृत्तिकादेः शकटादिज्ञानं स्वभावप्रतिबंधमन्तरेण तथैव अदृष्टप्रतिबंधार्थाभिधानं ज्ञानमविसंवादकम्। न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नम् नाम। क्वचिद् व्यभिचाराद् साकल्येनानाश्वासे वक्त्रभिप्रायेऽपि वाचः कथमनाश्वासो न स्यात्, तत्रापि व्यभिचारसंभवात्? तथानिच्छतः श्रुतिकल्पनादुष्टादेः उच्चारणात्।

(४) न हि पुरुषार्थाभिसंधयः सर्वेऽर्थान् व्यभिचरन्ति, अन्यथा वागर्थव्यभिचारैकान्तसंभवात्। वाचोऽभिप्रायविसंवादे कुतस्तदनुमानम्? सुगतेतरयोः आप्तेतरव्यवस्थां कुतश्चित् साधनासाधनांगव्यवस्थां वा स्वयमुपजीवन् 'वक्तुरभिप्रेतं तु वाचः सूचयन्ति अविशेषेण नार्थतत्त्वमपि' इति यकमविक्लवः?

—लघीयस्त्रयविवृति, कारिका २५, २६, २७, २८।

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३१। अशक्यं च कर्तुं सर्वशब्दानां संबंधकरणम्। यदा न कश्चिदपि शब्दः केनाप्यर्थेन संबद्धं आसीत् तदा कथं संबंधः क्रियेत, संबंधं हि कुर्वताऽवश्यं केनचिद् वाक्येन स कर्त्तव्यः गौः सास्नादिमानित्यादिना। न चाप्रसिद्धमर्थंप्रतिपादकत्वेन सास्नादिशब्दमर्थप्रतिपादनाय शक्नोति कर्तोच्चारयितुम्, तथा हस्तसंज्ञादयोऽपि, प्रतिपादकत्वासिद्धेः।

—शास्त्रदीपिका, पृ० ११७।

३२। नन्वीश्वरोऽपि संबंधं कुर्वन्नवश्यं केनचिच्छब्देन करोति, तस्य केन कृतः संबंधः? शब्दान्तरेण चेत्तस्यापि केन कृतस्तस्यापि केनेति न कश्चिदवधिस्तस्मादवश्यमनेन संबंधं कुर्वता वृद्धव्यवहारसिद्धाः केचिदकृतसंबंधा एव शब्दा अभ्युपगन्तव्याः, अस्ति चेद् व्यवहारसिद्धिः किमीश्वरेण किं वा तत्कृतेन समयेनेत्यनाद्यपक्ष एव श्रेयान्।

उच्यते—

अस्त्रमायुष्मता ज्ञातं विषयस्तु न लक्षितः।
अस्मदादिषु दोषोऽयमीश्वरे तु न विद्यते॥
नानाकर्मफलस्थानमिच्छयं वेदृशं जगत्।
स्रष्टुः प्रभवतस्तस्य कौशलं को विकल्पयेत्॥

....वयं तु न कर्तार एव संबंधस्य यत एवमनुज्येमहि। ......तस्मादीश्वरविरचित-संबंधाधिगमोपायभूतवृद्धव्यवहारलब्धतद्व्युत्पत्तिसापेक्षः शब्दोऽर्थमवगमयतीति सिद्धम्।

—न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० २२५।

३३। शब्दाः संकेतितं प्राहुर्व्यवहाराय स स्मृतः।
तदा स्वलक्षणं नास्ति संकेतस्तेन तत्र न॥९४
अपि प्रवर्तेत पुमान् विज्ञायार्थक्रियाक्षमान्।
तत्साधनायेत्यर्थेषु संयोज्यन्तेऽभिधायकाः॥९५
तत्रानर्थक्रियायोग्या जातिस्तद्वानलं स च।
साक्षान्न योज्यते कस्मात् आनन्त्याच्चेदिदं समम्॥९६
तत्कारिणामतत्कारिभेदसाम्ये न किं कृतः।
तद्दोषस्य साम्याच्चेदस्तु जातिरलं परा॥९७

—प्रमाणवार्तिक, स्वार्थानु०।

३४। यद्यपि तदनित्यत्वे प्रतिपुरुषम् इत्यादि दूषणमुक्तं तदप्यसमीक्षिताभिधानम्, अनादित्वात् शब्दव्यवहारस्य। नहि सर्वथा सतो जगतो निर्मूलनाशलक्षणो महाप्रलयः असतश्चात्मलाभलक्षणा सृष्टिः अस्माकं भवतां वा प्रसिद्धा येन अपूर्वसृष्टिप्रादुर्भावाश्रयेण समयः प्रतिमर्त्यं वा इत्याद्युक्तं शोभेत।

—न्यायकुमुदचन्द्र, खण्ड-१, पृ० ५५०

३५। यत्तावदुक्तम् - सामान्यमेव हि शब्दानां गोचर इत्यादि तदसमीक्षिताभिधानम्, संकेतानुसारेण शब्दस्य वाचकत्वोपपत्तेः। संकेतश्चास्य तद्वत्येव प्रतिपन्नो न पुनः सामान्यमात्रे, प्रवृत्त्याद्यगोचरतया वाहदोहाद्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वविकलतया च केवलेऽस्मिन् शाब्दव्यवहारासंभवतः संकेतप्रतिपत्तेर्निष्फलत्वात्। एवंविधाद्धि शब्दादेवंविधोऽर्थः त्वया प्रतिपत्तव्यः, एवंजातीयके चार्थे शब्दोऽप्येवंजातीयकः प्रयोक्तव्यः इति सदृशपरिणामापन्नयोरेव वाच्यवाचकयोः संकेतयित्रा संकेतं प्रतिपाद्यो ग्राहितः।

—न्यायकुमुदचन्द्र, खण्ड २, पृ० ५६८।

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३६। (१) किं तावत्प्राप्तमभिहितान्वय इति, पदार्थप्रतिपत्तिपूर्वकत्वाद् वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तेः। न ह्यनवगतपदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थसम्प्रत्ययो दृश्यते। ......पदान्तरार्थोपरक्ते तु तस्मिन्नभिधीयमाने तदर्थेऽपतेव नावधार्यते, ...। ...... वृद्धव्यवहारेषु च वाक्यादपि भवन्ती व्युत्पत्तिः पदपर्यन्ता भवति, इतरथा हि प्रतिवाक्यं व्युत्पत्तिरपेक्षते, सा चानन्त्याद् दुरुपपादेति शब्दव्यवहारोच्छेदः स्यात्। ......

अतश्चैवं पदान्तरोच्चारणवैफल्यप्रसंगादेकस्मादेव पदात् तदुपरंजकद्वितीयपदार्थावगतिः सिद्धैव, तदपि पदमन्यानुरक्तस्वार्थवाचीत्यनेनैव न्यायेनैकमेव पदमखिलपदाभिधेयार्थवाचि सम्पन्नमिति तेनैव व्यवहारोऽस्तु न चासौ सम्पद्यते।......

पदान्तरसंनिधानंनियमहेतुरिति चेत्, किं स्वरूपमात्रेणार्थप्रतिपादनेन वा? स्वरूपमात्रेण जपमन्त्रपदानामिव संनिधानं भवदप्यसंनिधानान्न विशिष्यते......अर्थप्रतिपादनेन तु पदान्तरं यदि नियमहेतुः सोऽयमभिहितानामर्थानामन्वय उक्तो भवति....। पदेभ्यः प्रतिपन्नास्तावदर्था आकांक्षासंनिधियोग्यत्ववशेन परस्परमभिसंबध्यन्ते, यो येनाकांक्षितो यश्च संनिहितो यश्च संबन्धुं योग्यः स तेन संबध्यते नातोऽपरः। अत एवांगुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते इति नास्ति संबंधः, योग्यत्वाभावात्, अन्विताभिधानवादिनां तु अनन्वितस्यानभिधानात्तत्राप्यन्वयः प्राप्नोति।

(२) एवं प्राप्ते अभिधीयते—न व्युत्पत्तिनिरपेक्षः..... शब्दोऽर्थमवगमयतीति, व्युत्पत्तिश्च वृद्धव्यवहारात्, वृद्धानां च व्यवहारो वाक्येन न पदेन।......

सेयं वाक्यस्य वाक्यार्थे व्युत्पत्तिः। वाक्यं च किमुच्यते? संहत्यार्थमभिदधति पदानि वाक्यम्...... एवं न संहत्यार्थमभिदध्युः पदानि यद्येकस्यैव पदस्य व्यापारः। यथा हि बाह्यानि करणानि काष्ठादीनि पाके व्याप्रियन्ते ...... तथा सर्वाण्येव पदानि वाक्यार्थमवबोधयन्ति।......

नन्वेवमेकैकस्य कृत्स्नकारित्वे सत्येकस्मादेव कृत्स्नसिद्धेः पदान्तरोच्चारणं व्यर्थमित्युक्तम्। नैतत्, पदान्तरेण विनैवेकस्मात्कृत्स्नकारित्वसम्पत्त्यभावात्। न तह्र्येव कृत्स्नकारीति चेन्नैवम्, एकैकस्य कृत्स्नफलपर्यन्तव्यापारपतितत्वादेवैकस्मिन् सति कृत्स्नफलपर्यन्तो व्यापारो निर्वर्तते एकैकेन बिना न निर्वर्तते इत्येवमेकैकं कृत्स्नकारि भवति।......

ननु यदि पदानां पदार्थप्रतिपादनं स्वकार्यं शुद्धस्तर्हि पदस्यार्थः। न शुद्धः पदार्थः संघातकार्ये एव प्रयोगात्, तत्र प्रयुक्तानामप्येषां स्वकार्यं न नावगम्यते।......

आह—

अंगुल्यग्रादिवाक्येषु कथं तव समन्वयः।

उच्यते,

उक्तानामपि संसर्गे कथं तव समन्वयः॥

आह—

नन्वत्र योग्यताभावादसंसर्ग उपेयते।
आकांक्षादित्रयाधीनः संसर्गो हि मयेष्यते॥

उच्यते—

मयापि योग्यासन्नादिसंसृष्टस्वार्थवाचिता।
पदानां दर्शिता सा च तेषु नास्तीत्यनन्वयः॥

14 Edu.—24.

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आह, अन्विताभिधानवादी हि भवान्, ततश्च
भवतो नाभिधानं स्यादन्वयासंभवादिह।

अहं त्वभिहितान्वयवादी, तेन
मम ह्यनन्वितत्वेऽपि नाभिधानं विरुध्यते ।।

उच्यते—
तत्रांगुल्यग्रवाक्येऽपि शब्दोऽस्त्येव समन्वयः।

आधाराधेयक्रियानिर्देशस्यात्र प्रतीयमानत्वात्। ......अत्रापि अन्विताभिधानं न विरुद्धं, बाधकस्त्वन्यविषय एव।

(३) मतद्वयमपीदं तु नास्मभ्यं रोचतेतराम्।
कुतोऽन्विताभिधानं वा कुतो वाऽभिहितान्वयः।। ......

कथं तर्ह्ययमाभिधानिको व्यवहारः? ......उच्यते, ...संहत्यकारीणि हि पदानीत्युक्तम्, समुदितैः पदैरेको वाक्यार्थः प्रत्याय्यते। ......नेदमन्विताभिधानम्। कथं तर्हि संहत्यकारिता पदानाम्? उच्यते, संहत्यकारिताऽप्यस्ति न चान्विताभिधानम्। अन्वितमर्थं पदानि संहत्य संपादयन्ति न त्वन्वितमभिदधति। .... का तर्हीयं वाचोयुक्तिः संहत्यकारीणि पदानि न चान्वितमभिदधतीति? इयं वाचो युक्तिः—पदान्यन्वितं प्रत्याययन्ति नान्वितमभिदधति। नाभिधात्री शक्तिरन्वितविषया किं त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकावगतनिष्कृष्टस्वार्थविषयैव, तात्पर्यशक्तिस्तु तेषामन्वितावगमपर्यन्ता।

—न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० ३६४—७१।

३७। पूर्वदृष्टे स्मर्यमाणेऽर्थे दृश्यमानार्थसादृश्यज्ञानमुपमानम्। याऽसावस्माभिर्नगरे दृष्टा गौः सानेन गवयेन सदृशीति। ...... न चेदमुपमानं प्रत्यक्षान्तर्गतम्, अनिन्द्रियसंनिकृष्टत्वान्नगरस्थस्य गोः। न चानुमानम् .... एवं किलानुमीयेत गौर्गवयसदृशां गवयसादृश्यप्रतियोगित्वात्, यद्यत्सादृश्यप्रतियोगि तत्तत्सदृशं दृष्टम् ....। न चेदं युक्तम्। यो हि द्वावर्थौ मिथः सदृशौ युगपन्न दृष्टवानेकमेव तु गामुपलभ्य नगरे वने गवयं पश्यति सोऽपि गां गवयसादृश्यविशिष्टामुपमिनोत्येव तस्मान्नानुमानम्। ...... अतः प्रमाणान्तरम्।

—शास्त्रदीपिका, पृ० ७४—७६।

३८। संबंधस्य परिच्छेदः संज्ञायाः संज्ञिनः सह।
प्रत्यक्षादेरसाध्यत्वादुपमानफलं विदुः।।

यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति श्रुतातिदेशवाक्यस्य गोसदृशं पिण्डमनुभवता स्मरतश्च वाक्यार्थमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इति भवति मतिः। सेयं न तावद् वाक्यमात्रफलम् ......। नापि प्रत्यक्षफलम् ......। नापि समाहारफलम् ......। फलसमाहारे तु तदन्तर्भावे अनुमानादेरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसंगः। तत्किं तत्फलस्य तत्प्रमाणबहिर्भाव एव? अन्तर्भावे वा कियती सीमा? तत्तदसाधारणेन्द्रियादिसाहित्यम्। अस्ति तर्हि सादृश्यादिज्ञानकाले विस्फारिताक्षस्य चक्षुषो व्यापारः। न, उपलब्धगोसादृश्यविशिष्टगवयपिण्डस्य वाक्यतदर्थस्मृतिमतः कालान्तरेऽप्यनुसंधानबलात् समयपरिच्छेदोपपत्तेः।

—न्यायकुसुमांजलि, प० ३७७-७८।

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३९। यथा प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धमपि धरणिधरकुहरभुवि धूमदर्शनमनिन्द्रियविभावसुबोधसाधनत्वादनुमानम् एवं गोसारूप्यविशेषितविपिनगतगवयपिण्डदर्शनमध्यक्षफलमपि तदनवगतसंज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधबोधविधानादुपमानमुच्यते। यथा च तत्र पूर्वावगतधूमाग्निप्रतिबंधस्मरणम् सहकारितामुपैति तथा इहापि पूर्वश्रुतारण्यकवाक्यार्थस्मरणम्। यथा तत्र व्याप्तिवेलायामनालीढविशेषा बुद्धिरधुना पक्षधर्मताबलाद् विशेषे व्यवतिष्ठते अत्राग्निरिति तथाऽत्राप्यनवगतवाच्यविशेषाद् वाक्याद् बुद्धिरिदानीं वाच्यविशेषे दृष्टे निरुपप्लवा जायते अयं स गवयशब्दाभिधेय इति। नैतावताऽनुमानमेवेदमित्याशंकनीयम्, अनपेक्षितधर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकादिसामग्रीकस्य तत्प्रत्ययोत्पादात्।

तस्मादयं स गवयो नामेत्येवंविधा मतिः।
उपमानैकजन्यैव न प्रमाणान्तरोद्भवा॥

—न्यायमंजरी, खण्ड १, पृ० १३१।

४०। प्रमितस्यार्थस्यार्थान्तरेण विनाऽनुपपत्तिमालोच्य तदुपपत्तये याऽर्थान्तरकल्पना साऽर्थापत्तिः।

(१) यद्यनुपपन्नादुपपादककल्पनाऽर्थापत्तिः अनुमानमेव तर्हि, तत्रापि वह्निमन्तरेणानुपपन्नाद्, धूमाद् वह्निः कल्प्यते। स्यादेवं यद्यनुपपन्नं नाम गमकं स्यात्, इह तुयन्नोपपद्यते तदेव गम्यम्। गृहाभावेन हि विना बहिर्भावो नोपपद्यते। ......

(२) अथोच्यते.....यस्य हि जीवनं गृहसंबंध्येव प्रायशोऽवगतं तस्य गृहाभावे दृष्टे जीवनं सांशयिकं भवद् बहिर्भावकल्पनया समाधीयते। ततश्च प्राग्बहिर्भावकल्पनाया जीवनस्य संदिग्धत्वान्न लिंगत्वम्। .....जीवनरहितं च गृहाभावमात्रं मृतेऽपि सद्भावादनैकान्तिकं न बहिर्भावमनुमापयितुमलम्। अतोऽनुमानासंभवात्प्रमाणान्तरमेवेदम्। .....तदिदमसंबद्धम्। नहि संदिग्धे जीवने बहिर्भावः शक्यते कल्पयितुम्। .....सर्वत्र हि संशयस्य निदानोच्छेदादुच्छेदो भवति। ....जीवनस्य प्रायेण गृहसंबधित्वात्तद्विपर्ययोऽत्र संशयहेतुत्वेनोपन्यस्तः, न चासौ बहिर्भावे कल्पिते समुच्छिद्यते प्रत्युत विपर्यय एव दृढमवस्थाप्येत। .....न ह्येवं संभवति यस्माद्देवदत्तो गृहे नास्ति तस्माज्जीवतीति, प्रत्युत पूर्वनिश्चितमेव जीवनं गृहाभावादेव संदिग्धं कथं तत एव निर्णीयते। .....तस्माज्जीवनं संदिग्धं तत्तावदन्यतो निश्चित्य पश्चाद् बहिःसंबंधः कल्पयितव्यः।

(३) अत्राभिधीयते—न तावद्गृहाभावमात्रं लिंगम्, मृतेऽपि संभवात्, न जीवनमात्रं गृहेऽपि सद्भावात्, अतो जीवनसंसृष्टो गृहाभावो लिंगमिति वक्तव्यम्। प्रथमं च लिंगमवगम्य पश्चाल्लिंग्यनुमानेन भवितव्यम् न तु लिंगावगमसमय एव लिंग्यवगमः। अत्र च न बहिर्भावावगममन्तरेण गृहाभावो जीवनं च संसृष्टं प्रत्येतुं शक्यते, विरोधात्। जीवता ह्यवश्यं गृहे वा बहिर्वा स्थातव्यमित्यसंदिग्धम्। अतश्च बहिर्भावमनन्तर्भाव्य जीवनगृहाभावौ समुच्चित्य प्रतिपद्यमानस्येदृशी प्रतिपत्तिरापद्यते देवदत्तो गृहेऽनवस्थितो गृहे वा बहिर्वाऽवस्थित इति। न चैवं संभवति, भावाभावयोरेकत्र देशे समुच्चेतुमशक्यत्वात्। .....तेन प्रमाणसिद्धयोर्द्वयोरर्थयोः परस्परं प्रतिघातोऽर्थान्तिरकल्पनया समाधेयत्वेनालोच्यमानोऽर्थापत्तेः कारणम्। ....भवत्वर्थापत्तिः प्रमाणम् अनुमानं त्वर्थापत्तावेवान्तर्भवति। तथा हि यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निरित्यवगतम्, पर्वतस्य च धूमवताऽवगता। यदि च पर्वतेऽग्निर्न स्यात् तदा धूमवत्ता वा मिथ्या स्यात् सर्वधूमवतां वाऽग्निमत्वं मिथ्या स्यात्, कथं तदुभयमप्यमिथ्या स्यादित्यग्निमत्वं कल्प्यते इत्यर्थापत्तिरेषा। स्यादेवं यदि सर्वधूमवतामग्निमत्त्वमनुमानादन्येनावगतं स्यात्, नत्वेवमस्ति।

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दृष्टान्तधर्मिष्वेव हि धूमस्याग्निनियमोऽवगतो न सर्वत्र। अनुमानात्तु सर्वधूमवतामग्निमत्तावगतिरित्युक्तम्। न च दृष्टान्तधर्मिष्वेवावगतस्याग्निनियमस्य सर्वधूमवदग्निमतां बिना कश्चिद् विरोधो येनार्थापत्तिः स्यात्।

——शास्त्रदीपिका, पृ० ७६——७९।

४१। (१) अर्थान्तरकल्पनायामसत्यां योऽर्थान्तरमनुपपन्नं कुरुते तत्रार्थापत्तिः प्रवर्तते। यथा जीवन् देवदत्तो गृहे नास्ति इत्यत्र गृहाभावे दृष्टे श्रुते वा। तत्रासति बहिर्भावकल्पने गृहाभावो जीवनमनुपपन्नं कुर्वन् बहिर्भावं कल्पयति। अनुपपत्तिश्चात्र सन्देहः। बथाहि—अकल्पिते बहिर्भावे गृहाभावे च निर्णीते जीवति वा न वा इति सन्देह एव भवति। कल्पिते तु तस्मिन् स प्रशाम्यति। ......

ननु गृहभावदर्शनाद्बहिर्भावकल्पनमनुमानमेव। तथाहि——देवदत्तो बहिरस्ति गृहे अविद्यमानत्वे सति जीवनवत्वात्। यो जीवंस्तत्र नास्ति स ततोन्यत्रास्ति यथाहम् इति चेत् मैवं——जीवनांशे सन्दिग्धत्वात्। ननु जीवनं प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नं कथं सन्दिग्धम्। सत्यम्। प्रमिते हि वस्तुनि पूर्वप्रतिपन्नरूपाद्रूपान्तरप्राप्तौ सन्देहो भवत्येव। पूर्वं हि जीवनं गृहसम्बद्धमेव प्रमितम्। सम्प्रति तत्सम्बन्धे निवृत्ते बहिर्देशसम्बन्धे चाकल्पिते जीवने सन्देहो भवत्येव। पूर्वं जीवन् देवदत्तो गृह एव दृष्टः। इदानीं स गृहे नास्ति। जीवति वा न वा इति। तर्हि बहिर्देशसम्बन्धकल्पनादसन्दिग्धं जीवनं लिंगमिति चेत्, अनुमेयाभावः। बहिर्देशसम्बन्ध एव अनुमित्सितः। स तु निर्णीतश्चेदनुमेयं नावशिष्यते। केवलगृहाभावोऽपि न लिंगम्। मृतजनिष्यमाणयोर्व्यभिचारात्। अतोऽत्र नानुमानावकाशः। अतस्सन्देहापादकोऽर्थोऽर्थापत्तिरिति स्थितम्। न हि धूमादिकं कस्यचिदर्थस्य संशयापादनद्वारेण लिंगमिति ततो वैषम्यम्।

(२) केचित्तु गृहाभाव एवान्यथानुपपद्यमानस्सन् बहिर्भावकल्पनायां प्रमाणमित्याहुः। तदयुक्तम्। तत्र गृहाभावस्य काऽनुपपत्तिः। असति बहिस्सत्वे स्वस्याभाव इति चेत् तर्हि साध्याभावे हेत्वभावरूपो व्यतिरेक एव। स च हेतुसद्भावे साध्यसद्भावलक्षणेनान्वयेनावगम्यत इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकमुखेन. प्रवर्तमानत्वादिदमनुमानमेवेति नार्थापत्तेः पृथक्प्रामाण्यसम्भवः।

——तंत्ररहस्य, पृ० १२——१४।

४२। न चार्थापत्तिरनुमानतो भिद्यते, लोके तदसंकीर्णोदाहरणाभावात्। ....

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जीवंश्चैत्रो गृहे नास्तीत्वनुपपद्यमानमसति बहिःसद्भावे तमापादयतीत्युदाहरन्ति। तत्र चिन्त्यते——किमनुपपन्नं जीवतो गृहाभावस्येति, न ह्यनियम्यस्यानियामकं विना किंचिदनुपपन्नम्। अतिप्रसंगात्। ननु स्वरूपमेव तद् न तावद् बहिःसत्वेन कर्त्तव्यं, तदकार्यत्वात् तस्य, स्थितिरेवास्य तेन बिना न स्यादित्यस्य स्वभाव इति चेत्। एवं तर्हि तन्नियतस्वभाव एवासौ व्याप्तेरेव व्यतिरेकमुखनिरूप्यायास्तथा व्यपदेशात्। कथं वा बहिःसावमस्योपपादकम्? न हि अनियामको भवन्ननियम्यमुपपादयति, अतिप्रसंगादेव। स्वभावोऽस्य यदनेन बहिःसत्त्वेन गेहासत्त्वं क्रोडीकृत्य स्यातव्यमिति चेत्। सेयं व्याप्तिरेवान्वयमुखनिरूप्या तथा व्यपदिश्यते इति। न वयमविनाभावमर्थापत्तावप्रजानीमहे किन्तु तज्ज्ञानम्, न चासौ सतामात्रेण तदनुमानत्वमापादयतीति चेत्। न। अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसंधानस्यावश्यमभ्युपगंतव्यात्। अन्यथा त्वतिप्रसंगात्, अर्थापत्त्याभासानवकाशाच्च। यदा ह्यन्यमेवोपपन्नमन्यथानुपपन्नमिति मन्यते तदाऽस्य विपर्ययो, न त्वन्यथा। तथापि कथमत्र व्याप्तिर्ग्राह्येति चेत्। यदाऽहमिह तदा नान्यत्र, यदाऽन्यत्र तदा नेहेति सर्वप्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेतत्, का तत्रापि कथंता? ....

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प्रमाणयोर्विरोधे अर्थापत्तिरविरोधोपपादिका, न त्वेवमनुमानमित्यपि नास्ति। विरोधे हि रज्जुसर्पादिवदेकस्य बाध एव स्यान्न तूभयोः प्रामाण्यम्। प्रामाण्ये वा न विरोधः। स्थूलमिदमेकमितिवत् सह संभवात्। चैत्रोऽयमयं तु मैत्र इतिवद्वा विषयभेदात्। प्रकृते क्वाप्यस्तीति सामान्यतो गेहस्यापि प्रवेशादेकविषयताऽप्यस्तीति चेत्, यद्येवं क्वचिदस्ति क्वचिन्नास्तीतिवन्न विरोधः। अत्रापि विरोध एवेति चेद्, एकं तर्हि भज्येत। न भज्येत, अर्थापाया उभयोरप्युपपादनमिति चेत्। किमनुपपद्यमानम्? विरोध स्वान्यथानुपपद्यमानो विभिन्नविषयतया व्यवस्थापयतीति चेत्। अथाभिन्नविषयतयैव किं न व्यवस्थापयेत्? व्यवस्थापनमविरोधापादनम् एकविषयतयैव चानयोर्विरोधः, स कथं तमेव शमयितव्यः, न हि यो यद्विषमूर्छितः स तेनैवोत्थाप्यते इति चेत्। एक विषयतयैवानयोर्विरोध इत्येतदेव कुतः? विभिन्नदेशस्वभावतयैव सर्वत्रोपलंभादिति चेत्। नन्वियं व्याप्तिरेव। तथा च घटकुट्यां प्रभातमिति। धूमोऽपि वा अनुपपद्यमानतयैव वह्निं गमयेत्, न हि तेन विना असावुपपद्यते। विरोधोऽपि, धूमाद्वह्निना भवितव्यम्, अनुपलब्धेश्च न भवितव्यमिति। तथा चानुपलब्धेरर्वाग्भागव्यवस्थापनं, धूमस्य च व्यवधानेनानुपलभ्यवह्निविषयत्वस्थितिरर्थापत्तिरिति कुतोऽनुमानम्?

——न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० ४१६——२४।

४३। यस्तु नास्तित्वमपह्नुत्य प्रमेयाभावात् षष्ठं प्रमाणं नास्तीत्याह तस्य दृश्यादर्शनान्तरं नास्तीह भूतले घट इत्येवमुपजायमानस्य ज्ञानस्य किमालंबनम्। न भूतलम्। सत्यपि घटे प्रसंगात्। ....

यस्तु वैयात्यात् भूतलप्रतीतिव्यतिरेकेण घटो नास्तीत्येवंविधा प्रतीतिरेव नास्ति इति वदति स भूतलादिप्रतीतिमपि अपह्नुवीत, अविशेषात्। घटोऽत्र भूतले नास्तीति व्यवहारस्य किं कारणम्। दृश्ये घटे यद्भूतलमात्रविषयं ज्ञानं तदस्य कारणमिति चेत्, तथा सति पटवद्भूतलोपलंभे घटो नास्तीति व्यवहारो न स्यात्। भूतलमात्रोपलंभाभावात्। घटविविक्तभूतलोपलंभ इति चेत् कोऽयं घटविवेकः। यदि भूतलरूपमेव घटवत्यपि प्रसंगः। घटसंयोगाभावश्चेत्, अंगीकृतस्तर्ह्यभावः।

स्यान्मतम्——यदभाववादिनोऽभावज्ञानस्य कारणं तदेवास्माकं व्यवहारकारणं भवत्विति। नैवं वक्तुं शक्यम्। मम हि दृश्यादर्शनमभावज्ञानकारणम्, अदर्शनं च दर्शनाभावो न चासौ भवतांगीकृतः। ....'स्वरूपमात्रं दृष्ट्वा चे' त्यादिषु मात्रशब्देन हि घटतदभावावेदनयोरभाव उच्यते, भूतलमात्रं ज्ञायते न घटस्तदभावो वेत्यर्थः। तेन यदि भवानपि घटादिज्ञानाभावयुक्तं भूतलज्ञानमंगीकुर्यात् ततो ज्ञानाभावांगीकारात् घटाभावोऽप्यंगीकर्त्तव्यः। ......अथ भावे देशान्तरस्थे देशान्तर ग्रहणं कारणमिति मतं ततः शावलेये स्थितं गोत्वं धावलेये नास्तीति व्यवह्रियेत ......। स्मर्यमाणे घटे भूतलवेदनं नास्तीतिव्यवहारकारणमिति चेत्, न गृह्यमाणस्यापि पार्श्वदेशेऽभावव्यवहारात्। ....

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ननु भवन्मते प्रमीयमाणस्य घटस्य कथं प्राक्कालीनाभावज्ञानम्? भावप्रमाणाभावो ह्यभावज्ञान-कारणम्, न च प्रमीयमाणे प्रमाणाभावः संभवति। संप्रति प्रमीयमाणोऽपि घटः प्राक्कालसंबंधितया न प्रमीयते अतः प्राक्कालसंबंधगोचरप्रमाणानुदयात् तत्कालीनाभावज्ञानं युक्तमेवेति चेत्, न, अयोग्यत्वात्। नहि प्राक्कालसंबंधोऽधुना प्रमातुं योग्यः, योग्यप्रमाणाभावश्चाभावज्ञानकारणम् न प्रमाणाभावमात्रम्। प्राक्काले तु योग्यस्यैव प्रमाणस्यानुदय आसीत्, न हि तदानीं घटाभावः सन्नपि प्रमितः—अतएव घटाभावोऽधुना स्मर्यते इति न युक्तम्। अप्रमितस्य स्मरणायोग्यात्। यश्चायं प्राक्कालीनः प्रमाणानुदयः सोऽधुना प्रमाणोदयेन नष्टो नाभावज्ञानमुत्पादयितुमर्हति, उद्धृतमिव नेत्रं रूपबुद्धिम्। अथ नष्टोऽपि प्रमाणानुदयः संप्रति परामृश्यमानोऽभावज्ञानं जनयेत्, ह्यस्तन इव धूमो विनष्टोऽपि संप्रति स्मर्यमाणो ह्यस्तनाग्निज्ञानम्। स्यादेवं यदि प्रमाणाभावो ज्ञायमानतया प्रमेयाभावं बोधयेत् लिंगमिव लिंगिनम्। न च तथा संभवति अनवस्थाप्रसंगात्। प्रमेयाभावं हि ज्ञातुं प्रमाणाभावो ज्ञातव्यः। सोऽपि चाभावत्वादन्येनाभावज्ञानेन ज्ञातव्यः, सोऽप्यन्येनेति न जन्मसहस्रेणापि घटाभावोऽवधार्येत।——

उच्यते—सत्तामात्रेण ज्ञानाभावो ज्ञेयाभावं बोधयति इति सम्यगुक्तम्, अस्त्येव त्वधुना दृश्यमानस्यापि घटस्य प्राक्कालसंबंधगोचरयोग्यज्ञानानुदयः। स हि प्राक्कालसंबंधितया स्मर्तुं योग्यः सन्नपि न स्मर्यते, न चावश्यं प्रमाणाभाव एवाभावस्य बोधकः स्मरणज्ञानस्यापि योग्यत्वे सत्यनुदयोऽभावं बोधयत्येव। तेन संप्रति दृश्यमानोऽपि घटो यदि प्रागप्यासीत्ततोऽवश्यं तत्र स्थितेन प्रमितः स्यात्, प्रमितश्चाधुना स्मर्तव्यः स्यात्, एवं सत्यपि न स्मर्यते सोऽयं स्मर्तव्यविषय स्मरणानुदयः संप्रति विद्यमानः संप्रतितमं प्राक्कालीनाभावविषयं विज्ञानं जनयतीति न किंचिदनु-पपन्नम्।——

ननु न सत्तामात्रेण योग्यानुपलब्धेरभावबोधकत्वं युक्तम्, सत्यामपि तस्यां कदाचिदभाव-बुद्ध्यनुदयात्, असत्यामपि कदाचिदुदयात्। ......तस्माज्ज्ञाततैव योग्यानुपलब्धिरभावज्ञान-कारणमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। तथा चानवस्थाप्रसंगः।——

तदभिधीयते—घटाद्यभावोऽस्ति प्रमेयम्। योग्यप्रमाणानुदयश्च तस्य सत्तामात्रेणैव—बोधको न ज्ञाततया——। यत्तु सत्यामपि योग्यानुपलब्धावभावानवधारणम् असत्यां चावधारणमिति तत्तु योग्यत्वाज्ञानकृतम्। योग्यानुपलंभो हि कारणं, तत्र योग्यत्वं ज्ञाततयैव कारणं न सत्तामात्रेण, ततः सदेव योग्यत्वं कदाचिदज्ञातं नाभावमवधारयति कदाचित्त्वविद्यमानमेव योग्यत्वं भ्रान्त्या निश्चित्या-भावमवधारयति। उपलब्ध्यभावस्तु सन्मात्रतया कारणं न ज्ञाततया, तेन नानवस्थापत्तिरिति सर्वमवदातम्।

न च तदैन्द्रियकम्, इन्द्रियव्यापाराभावेऽपि तज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिदर्शनात्। योऽह्नि प्रातःकाले गृहेऽवस्थितो मध्यंदिने पृच्छ्यते 'किमस्मिन् गृहे प्रातःकाले माथुरः कश्चित्पुरुषः शुक्लवासा दीर्घतमो लोहितवर्णः समागतः'? इति स तदानीमेव योग्यस्मरणानुदयात्तस्याभावं प्रातःकालीन-मवधारयति विनैवेन्द्रियव्यापारेण। ——— एवं च यत्रापीदानीमेवानुपरतेन्द्रियव्यापारेणैव संनिहितदेशकालवर्त्यभावः प्रतीयते तत्रापि योग्यज्ञानानुदयस्यैव क्लृप्तसामर्थ्यस्य कारणत्व-संभवान्नेन्द्रियस्य कारणत्वं कल्पयितुं शक्यम्। तस्मान्न प्रत्यक्षोऽभावः।

नाप्यनुमेयः, अज्ञातेन तेन कस्यचिल्लिंगस्य संबंधग्रहणासंभवात्। यदत्र कैश्चिदुच्यते दृश्यस्य सत्ता दर्शनव्याप्ता, तेन व्यापकीभूतदर्शननिवृत्त्या व्याप्यस्य दृश्यस्य निवृत्तिरवसीयते इति तन्निरस्तम्। व्यापकनिवृत्त्या व्याप्यनिवृत्तिमनुमिमानेनावश्यं दृष्टान्तधर्मिषु निवृत्तिद्वयमवगम्य

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तयोश्च नियममवधार्य साध्यधर्मिणि च साधनभूतां दर्शननिवृत्तिं केनचित्प्रमाणेनावगम्य ततो दृश्यनिवृत्तिरनुमातव्या, निवृत्तेश्चाभावात्मिकाया न प्रत्यक्षेण ग्रहणं संभवति, निवृत्यंतरेण तदनुमाने तदपि निवृत्तिरूपत्वान्निवृत्यन्तरेणानुमातव्यम्, तदपि तथेत्यनवस्थापत्तिः। अतोऽवश्यं क्वचित्प्रमाणान्तरभूततयाऽनुपलब्ध्याऽभावः प्रत्येतव्यः। —शास्त्रदीपिका, पृ० ८३—८७।

४४। (१) या हि साक्षात्कारिणी प्रतीतिः सेन्द्रियकरणिका —। तथेह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यपि। साक्षात्कारित्वमस्या असिद्धमिति चेन्न। एकजातीयत्वे ज्ञाताज्ञातकरणत्वानुपपत्तेः। —·— तस्माज्ज्ञातानुपलब्धिजन्यस्यासाक्षात्कारित्वात् तद्विपरीतकारणकमिदं तद्विपरीतजातीयमिति न्याय्यम्।

(२) अनन्यत्रोपक्षीणेन्द्रियव्यापारानन्तरभावित्वाच्च। (अ) अधिकरणग्रहणे तदुपक्षीणमिति चेन्न। — वायौ त्वगिन्द्रियोपनीते रूपाभावप्रतीत्यनुदयप्रसंगात्। — (आ) स्यादेतत्, तथापि वस्त्वंतरग्रह एव तस्योपयोग इति चेन्न। तस्य तं प्रत्यकारणत्वात्, कारणत्वे वा महान्धकारे करपरामर्शेन स्पर्शवद्द्रव्याभावं न प्रतीयात्। प्रतीयाच्च पुरोविस्फारिताक्षः पृष्टलग्नस्याश्यामत्वम्। आर्जवावस्थानमप्यधिकरणस्योपयुज्यते इति चेत्। तर्हि नयनसन्निकर्षोऽप्युपयोक्ष्यते, तदेकसहकारिप्रभासंनिकर्षापेक्षणात्। अन्यथा वातायनविवरविसारिकरपरामृष्टेऽप्यधिकरणे तदुपलंभप्रसंगाच्च। — (इ) तथापि योग्यताऽऽपादनोपक्षीणं चक्षुः। यदितरसामग्रीसाकल्ये अनुपलभ्यमानस्याभावो निश्चीयते। — इति चेत्। ननु परिपूर्णानि कारणान्येव साकल्यम्। तथा च किं कुत्रोपक्षीणम्? अथान्योन्यमेलकं मिथःप्रत्यासत्यादिशब्दवाच्यं तदुपक्षयः, न तर्हि क्वचिच्चक्षुः कारणं स्यादिति। न हि रूपाद्युपलब्धिमप्यसन्निकृष्टमेतदुपजनयति। — (ई) अथाधिकरणसमवेतंकिंचिदुपलंभोऽपि तद्विषयाभावग्रहेऽनुपलब्धेरपेक्षणीयः, ततस्तत्रैवं चरितार्थम्, वाय्वादिषु तु रूपाद्यभावप्रतीतिरानुमानिकी। तथा हि अनुपलब्ध्या ह्यनुमीयते—अयं नीरूपो वायुरिति। न, असिद्धेः। न ह्युपलंभाभावो भवतामभावोपलंभः, उपलंभस्यातीन्द्रियत्वाभ्युपगमात्। प्राकट्याभावेनानुमेय इति चेन्न। वायो रूपवत्ताप्राकट्यस्याभावस्याप्यसिद्धेः, रूपाभावेन समानत्वात्। — न च प्राकट्याभावः सत्तामात्रेणोपलंभाभावभावेदयतीति युक्तम्। लिंगाभावस्य तथात्वेऽतिप्रसंगात्। — अपि च प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियेणाधिकरणधर्मप्रतीतिरनुपलब्धेरंगमिति—तथासति वायौ रूपाभावप्रत्ययस्तामाक्षिपेत् — अनाक्षेपे वा न तत्कारणको भवेद् न वा भवेत्। ततो न भवत्येव, लिंगात्तदुत्पत्तिरिति चेत्। ननु लिंगमपि सैव न तत्त्वान्तरम्। यथा योनिसंबंधोऽलिंगदशायामिन्द्रियसंनिकर्षमपेक्षते लिंगदशायां तु तदनपेक्ष एव, तथैतत् स्यादिति चेन्न। कार्यजातिभेदानवुपपत्तेः, प्रकृते च तदनभ्युपगमात्। पारोक्ष्यापरोक्ष्ये विहायान्यथाप्यसौ भविष्यतीति चेन्न। अनुपलंभात्।

(३) अज्ञातकरणत्वाच्च। — तथापि भावविषये इयं व्यवस्था — इति चेन्न। उत्सर्गस्य बाधकाभावेन संकोचानुपपत्तेः। अन्यथा सर्वव्याप्तीनां भावमात्रविषयत्वप्रसंगोऽविशेषात्। — यद्यपि साक्षात्कारिताऽपि तत्रैव पर्यवस्यति, तथापि प्रथमतोऽनुपलभ्यमानकरणत्वमेव प्रयोजकं चक्षुरादिकल्पने। — अत एव असाक्षात्कारित्वेऽपि स्मृतेर्मन एव करणमुपागमन् धीराः। संस्कारस्त्वर्थविशेषप्रत्यासत्तावुपयुज्यते, इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यकारित्वव्यवस्थापनात्।

(४) भावावेशाच्च चेतसः। सर्वत्र हि बाह्यार्थानुभवे जनयितव्ये भावभूतप्रमाणाविष्टमेव चेत् उपयुज्यते नातोऽन्यथेति व्याप्तिः। —— न ह्यनुपलब्धिमात्रसहायं तदभावेऽप्यनुभवमाधातुमुत्सहते। शब्दलिंगादेरपेक्षादर्शनात्। न च यत्र यदपेक्षं यस्य जनकत्वमुपलब्धं तदेव तस्यैव तदनपेक्षं जनकमिति न्यायसहम्।

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(५) यद्धि प्रमाणं यद्भावावगाहि तत् तदभावावगाहि, यथा लिंगं शब्दो वा, घटाद्यवगाहि चेन्द्रियमिति।

(६) ग्राह्यतु वाश्रयमिन्द्रियं, तथापि न तेनेदं व्यवधीयते, व्यापारत्वात्।

(७) अस्ति च भावाभावविपर्ययः। सोऽयं यस्य दोषमनुविधत्ते तदेवात्र करणमिति न्याय्यम्। ——— तथा च प्रयोगः—इन्द्रियमभाव प्रमाकरणं, तद्विपर्ययकरणत्वात्, यद् यद्विपर्ययकरणं तत् तत्प्रमाकरणम्।

(८) अघटं भूतलमिति हि विशिष्टधीरवश्यमिन्द्रियकरणिका स्वीकर्त्तव्या प्रमाणांतरं वा सप्तममास्थेयम्। यथा हि विशेष्यमात्रोपक्षीणमिन्द्रियमकरणमत्र तथा विशेषणमात्रोपक्षीणा अनुपलब्धिरपि न करणं स्यात्। स्वस्वविषयमात्रप्रवृत्तयोः प्रमाणयोः समाहारः कारणमिति चेन्न। विषयभेदे फलवैजात्ये च तदनुपपत्तेः। न हि मृत्सु तन्तुषु च व्याप्रियमाणयोः कुलालकुविन्दयोः समाहारः स्यात्। ———भावे वा करंबित एव कार्ये द्वयोरपि शक्तिरभ्युपगन्तव्या दर्शनबलात् न हि नियतविषयेण सामर्थ्येन करंबितकार्यसिद्धिः। अन्यत्रापि तथा प्रसंगात्। ननूभयोरप्युभयत्र सामर्थ्ये कोऽर्थः सन्निधानेनेति चेन्न। तत्सहितस्यैव तस्य तत्र सामर्थ्यात्। एतेन सुरभि चन्दनमित्यादयो व्याख्याताः।

(९) स्यादेतत्, नागृहीते विशेषणे विशिष्टबुद्धिरुदेति, तत्कार्यत्वात्। न च विशिष्टसामर्थ्यं केवलविशेषणेऽपि सामर्थ्यम्, केवलसौरभेऽपि चक्षुषो वृत्तिप्रसंगात्। अतो भावविशेषणग्रहणाय मानान्तरसंभवः। अपि च कथमनालोचितोऽर्थ इन्द्रियेण विकल्प्येत? —अप्राप्तेश्च। न ह्यभावेनेन्द्रियस्य संयोगादिः संभवति। न च विशेषणत्वं, संबंधान्तरपूर्वकत्वात् तस्य। अवश्याभ्युपगंतव्यत्वाच्चानुपलब्धेः —इति चेत्। उच्यते। —स ह्यर्थविशेषणीभविष्यन् केवलोऽपि विस्फुरेद् यस्यावच्छेदकं ज्ञानं न व्यंजकम्। स च विकल्पयितव्य आलोच्यते यो विशेषणज्ञाननिरपेक्षेणेन्द्रियेण विज्ञायते। यस्तुतत्पुरःसर एव प्रकाशते तत्र तस्य विकल्पसामग्रीसमवधानवत एव सामर्थ्यान्नायं विधिः। स्वभावप्राप्तो सत्यामप्यधिका प्राप्तिः प्रतिपत्तिबलेन रूपादावभ्युपगता, इह त्वनवस्थादुस्थतया न तदभ्युपगमो, न तु स्वभावप्रत्यासत्तिरेतावतैव विफलायते। न चेदेवं प्रमाणान्तरेऽपि सर्वमेमव दुर्घटं स्यात्। तथाहि-सर्वभेद भानं साक्षात् परंपरया वा निर्विकल्पकविश्रान्तम्। न ह्यनुमानादिकमप्यानालोचनपूर्वकम्। ततोऽनालोचितोभावः कथमनुपलब्ध्याऽपि विकल्प्येत। न च तया तदालोचनमेव जन्यते, प्रतियोग्यनवच्छिन्नस्य तस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्, शक्यत्वे वा किमपराद्धमिन्द्रियेण? तथा संबंधान्तरगर्भत्वनियमेन विशेषणत्वस्य मानान्तरेऽपि कः प्रतिकारः? तदभावस्य तदानीमपि समानत्वात्। परस्य तादात्म्यमस्तीति चेत्। ननु यद्यसावस्ति अस्त्येव, न चेन्नैव। न ह्यभ्युपगमेन अर्थाः क्रियन्ते, अनभ्युपगमेन वा निवर्तन्ते इति। अवश्याभ्युपगन्तव्यत्वे कारणत्वं सिद्ध्येद् न तु मानान्तरत्वम्। अन्यथा भावोपलंभेऽप्यभावानुपलब्धिरेव प्रमाणं स्याद्, नेन्द्रियम्। अभावोपलंभे भावानुपलंभवद् भावोपलंभे अभावानुपलंभस्यापि वज्रलेपायमानत्वादिति।

—न्यायकुसुमांजलि, पृ० ४७-४८।

४५। अभावाख्यं षष्ठं प्रमाणमभावग्रहणाय कैश्चिदंगीक्रियते। अभावस्य भावविलक्षणतया भावरूपप्रमाणेन तद्ग्रहणाशक्तेः पंचप्रमाणानुत्पत्तिरूपमभावरूपं प्रमाणमेषितव्यमिति। तदयुक्तम्। प्रमेयाभावात्।

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ननु कथं तदभावः। इह भूतले घटो नास्ति इति तावदस्ति प्रतीतिः। सा किं भूतलस्वरूपविषया। अथ केवलतद्विषया। अत्रापि चिन्तनीयं किमिदं कैवल्यं नामेति। किं भूतलस्वरूपमथ तद्धर्म इति। नाद्यः। घटवत्यपि प्रसंगात्। न द्वितीयः। पूर्वोक्तादोषानतिवृतेः। द्वितीये स्वभावांगीकारः।

किं च कण्टकादिविरहिणि भूतलादौ निश्शंकः पदन्यासादिव्यवहारस्तावत्किं भूतलमात्रपरिच्छेदनिबन्धनः अथ केवलभूतलपरिच्छेदनिबन्धनः। तत्रापि विकल्पनीयम्। कैवल्यं परिच्छेदस्य विशेषणमुत भूतलस्येति। नाद्यः। कण्टकादियोगिन्यपि प्रसंगात्। द्वितीये तु केवलपरिच्छेदो नाम यथाकथंचित्परिच्छेदः। तथा च सूक्ष्मकण्टकादिष्वनवगतेष्वपि निश्शंकव्यवहारः स्यात्। प्रयत्नपूर्विका तज्जिज्ञासा च निह्नुता स्यात्। द्वितीये स्वभावाख्यं प्रमेयमंगीकृतं स्यात्। तदानीं हि तत्परिच्छेदनिबन्धनो व्यवहारो युक्तः। प्रतियोगिपरामर्शार्थं जिज्ञासा च।

किं चाभावानंगीकारे नास्ति शब्दो निरर्थकः स्यात्। शशादीनां शृंगानुमानं स्यात्। इदं रजतम् इत्यस्य बाधश्च न स्यात्। तदंगीकारे तु सार्थकः। बाधितविषयत्वं चानुमानस्य युक्तम्।—

अत्रोच्यते—द्विविधा तावद्भूतलादीनामवगतिः। एका संसृष्टविषया अपरा तदेकविषया। साऽपि द्विधा-प्रतियोगिन्यदृश्ये दृश्ये च। तत्र दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनि या तदेकविषया बुद्धिस्सैव तस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽभाव इत्युच्यते। न हि तदेकविषयबुद्धिमात्रमभावः। विशेषानवगमात्। किंतु दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनि। ततश्च यस्मिन् प्रतियोगिनि दृश्ये या तदेकविषया बुद्धिः सा तदभाव इति विशेषव्यपदेशलाभः। तेन इह भूतले घटो नास्ति इत्युक्ते घटे दृश्ये भूतलमात्रमबोधीत्युक्तं भवति।

ननु किमिदं प्रतियोगिनि दृश्यत्वं नाम। अन्यत्र प्रमितस्य अन्यत्र प्रसक्तिरिति त्वन्मतस्थितिः। अन्यथा अप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधापातात्। सैवास्तु दृश्यता। अस्माकं तु ज्ञानविशेषः। योऽप्यभावाख्यं तत्त्वमंगीकुरुते तेनापि तदेकविषयां बुद्धिमंगीकृत्यैवाभावप्रतीतिरिष्यते। अधिकरणप्रतीतेः प्रतियोगिप्रसक्तेश्च तत्प्रतीतिकारणत्वात्। तत्र कीदृशस्याधिकरणस्य प्रतीतिस्तत्कारणमिति चिन्तनीयम्। किं सद्वितीयस्य अथाभावविशिष्टस्य अथानपेक्षस्यैकाकिन इति। नाद्यः। घटघटितेऽप्यधिकरणे प्रतीते तदभावप्रतीतिप्रसंगात्। न द्वितीयः। आत्माश्रयात्। अभावं हि प्रतीत्य तद्विशिष्टमधिकरणं बुद्ध्वा पश्चात्स एवाभावः प्रतिपत्तव्य इत्यभावावगतिरेवाभावावगमकारणं यतः। अतोऽप्रतीतेऽप्यभावे स्वरूपमात्रप्रतीतिरंगीकार्येति तृतीयः पक्षः परिशिष्यते। तावतैवाभावव्यवहारोपपत्तौ किमतिरिक्ततत्त्वान्तराभ्युपगमेन। नीलपीतादिवत्तादृशतत्त्वान्तरानुपलम्भात्। वायुपरमाणवोऽनीलरूपाः, सलिलपरमाणवो गन्धशून्याः इत्यादिष्वनुमानात्मिका तदेकविषया बुद्धिः।

अयं भावः—चतुर्विधेष्वभावेषु यस्य यस्याभावस्य यद्यदधिकरणे त्वन्मते दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनि तत्तदधिकरणमात्रगोचरा बुद्धिरेवास्माकमभाव इति। नास्तिशब्दश्च तादृशाधिकरणमात्रवाचकः। नञ शब्दश्च स्वरूपमात्रपर इति हि प्राभाकराः।

निश्शंकपदन्यासादिव्यवहारोऽपि तदेकविषयबुद्धिमात्रनिमित्तकः। जिज्ञासाऽपि दृश्यत्वापत्तये युक्तैव। तथा प्रत्यक्षबाधो लिंगबाधश्च तदेकविषयबुद्धिमात्रनिमित्तको व्यवहारबाधमात्रनिमित्तको वा। शुक्तिकायां रजतव्यवहारो लिंगाभासे लिंगव्यवहारश्च बाध्यते। न हि ज्ञानं बाध्यते। किन्तु व्यवहार एवेति प्राभाकराः।

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ननु यद्यभावोऽपरो नास्ति तर्हि यत्र प्राक्संसर्गबुद्धिरासीत् तत्र कथं तदेकविषया बुद्धिराविर्भवति । त्वन्मते वा कथं तत्राभावप्रतीतिः। मुद्गराभिघातादिवशादिति चेत्--ततएवास्माक मपि तदेकविषया बुद्धिर्जन्यते। एतेन देशान्तरं नीतस्य घटस्य तत्र स्थितिरेव तदेकविषय बुद्धिनिमित्तमिति व्याख्यातम् ।

ननु यद्यभावोऽपरो नास्ति तर्हि मुद्गराभिघातादिना कपालमालोत्पत्तौ यत्र तदेकविषया बुद्धिस्तत्र पश्चात्संसृष्टविषयाऽपि किमिति न स्यात्। त्वन्मते वा किमिति न स्यात्। तत्र भावविनाशादिति चेत्, अस्माकमपि तथा स्यात्। तर्ह्यभावांगीकार इति चेत्, वयमपि विनाशमंगीकुर्मः। स तु भावान्तरोदय एव। भाव एव त्वेकाकी सद्वितीयश्चेति द्वयीमवस्थां लभते। तत्रैकाकी भावोदय एव विनाशशब्दवाच्यः। त्वन्मतेऽपि तादृश्यवस्थाऽवश्यांगीकार्येत्यधस्ता-दुक्तम्। एवं निरन्वयविनाशिष्वपि बुद्धिप्रभृतिषु धर्मिणः स्वरूपावस्थानमेव भावान्तरोदयोऽव-गन्तव्यः।

किं च प्रमाणान्तरवादिनोऽप्यनुपलब्धिलक्षणा प्रमाणानुत्पत्तिर्न सत्तयाऽभावबोधिका। स्वापादौ सर्वाभावप्रतीतिप्रसंगात्। किं च कस्यचिद्वस्तुनः कुत्रचित्पूर्वमदृष्टस्य पुनस्तस्मिन्नेव देशे दृश्यमानस्य दर्शनसमानकालीनोऽभावोऽवसीयते इदमिह पूर्वं नासीत् इति। ततश्च तस्य दर्शनाद्दर्शनाभावो निवृत इति प्राक्कालीन एव दर्शनाभावोऽनुसन्धीयमानोऽभावप्रतीतिकारणमिति वक्तव्यम्। ततश्च विदितैवानुपलब्धिरभावप्रतीतिकारणमिति वक्तव्यम्। तथा चानुपलब्धेरप्यभावरूपतया तद्भान-मप्यनुपलभ्यमित्यनवस्था। —तंत्ररहस्य, पृ० १७—१९।

४६। उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य अनुपलब्धिः अभावस्य अभावव्यवहारस्य वा हेतुः।

अत्र उपलब्धेः उपलभमानधर्मत्वे तज्ज्ञानमुपलब्धिः। तस्मादन्या उपलब्धिरनुपलब्धिः विवक्षितोपलब्धेरन्यत्वात्, अभक्ष्यास्पर्शनीयवत् पर्युदासवृत्त्या। उपलभ्यमानधर्मत्वे स्वविषय-विज्ञानजननयोग्यतालक्षणो विषयस्वभावो भवति। योग्यतायाः भावस्वरूपत्वात्। तस्मादन्य उपलम्भजननयोग्य एव अनुपलब्धिः। पूर्ववत्। यत्र यस्मिन्नुपलभ्यमाने नियमेन यस्योपलब्धिः स तत्संसृष्टः, एकज्ञानसंसर्गात्। तयोः सतोर्नैकरूपनियता प्रतिपत्तिरसम्भवात्। तस्माद् योग्यतारूपं परस्परापेक्षमेव अन्यत्वमिहाभिप्रेतम्, प्रत्यासत्तेराश्रयणात्।

स केवलः तदपेक्षया तदन्यश्चेदुच्यते तदा तज्ज्ञानं तत्स्वभावो वा ज्ञातृज्ञेयधर्मलक्षणाऽनुपलब्धिः। सा अभावम् अभावव्यवहारं वा साधयति।

कथमन्यभावस्तदभावो येन भावरूपानुपलब्धिरभावमभावव्यवहारं वा साधयेद् इति चेत्। उक्तमत्र यथा पर्युदासवृत्त्या अपेक्षातः तद्विविक्तोऽर्थस्तज्ज्ञानं वाऽभावोऽनुपलब्धिश्चोच्यत इति। न प्रतिषेधमात्रम्, तस्य साधनासिद्धेरभावव्यवहारासिद्धिप्रसंगात्। तस्यासंसृष्टरूपस्य भावसिद्धिरेव अपरस्याभावसिद्धिरिति अन्यभावोऽपि तदभाव इति व्यपदिश्यते। अन्यभावलक्षणोऽभावः स्वयं प्रमाणसिद्धः सन् अभावव्यवहारं साधयेत्, तत्सिद्धिसिद्धो वेति न कश्चिद्विशेषो येनानुपलब्ध्याऽभाव-व्यवहारसिद्धेर्विरोधः स्यात्। स एव अन्यभावस्तद्विषया चोपलब्धिरभावस्य किं न साधनमिष्यते? किं पुनरभावस्य सिद्धिरेव तदभावसिद्धिः? इति चेत्। अपृथक्सिद्धेरन्यभावात्, सम्बन्धा-भावाच्च न लिंगलिंगिता।

अन्यभावस्तावन्न साधनम्-यत्सिद्धौ यस्य न सिद्धिः तत् तस्य लिंगं भवति। धूमाग्निवदिति। अन्यभावसिद्ध्यैव तदभावः प्रसिध्यति, तस्य तदन्यासंसृष्टरूपस्य तत्त्वव्यवस्थापकप्रमाणत एव सिद्धेः।

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संबंधाभावाच्च। तल्लिंगत्वे तत्र सम्बन्धः कश्चित् स्यात्। तच्च तस्य एकार्थसमवायः—यथा कृतकत्वस्यानित्यत्वेन धूमलक्षणे एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवायः, आधाराधेयभावो वा जन्यजनकभावो वा। नैवं कश्चिद् भावाभावयोः सम्बन्धः येनास्यान्यभावः साधनं स्यात्।

अस्ति विषयविषयिभावः, शब्दार्थसम्बन्धवदिति चेत्। शब्दार्थयोः तत्प्रतिपादनाभिप्राये सति तत्प्रयोगात्—कार्यकारणलक्षणोऽविनाभावलक्षणो वा सम्बन्धः स्यात्। अयं चात्र न सम्भवति, यतः (ततः?) कथं विषयविषयिभावः स्यात्। सिद्धे हि तदुभयोः साध्यसाधनभावे तन्मुखेन विषयविषयिभावः स्यात्। स एव चासति सम्बन्धे न सिध्यति। अन्यथेतरेतराश्रयमिदं स्यात्।

अन्यभावाच्चाभावसिद्धौ असमुदायश्च साध्यः स्यात्। तथा च तदन्यभावात्घटाभावः इति घटस्य सर्वत्र सर्वदा चाभावः प्रसज्येत। घटाभावेन विशिष्टः प्रदेशादिधर्मी साध्यते न तु केवलः। ततो नासमुदायस्य साध्यता। न च लिंगलिंगिनोरसम्बन्धदोषः प्रसज्यते, अन्यभावस्य प्रदेशादिना सम्बन्धाद् इत्ययुक्तं मन्यते चेत्। न प्रदेशादेरेव अन्यभावत्वात्। यत्रैव हि प्रदेशादौ यन्नास्ति इति स एव तेनासंसृष्टोऽन्यभावः। तद्दर्शनादेवास्य 'घटो नास्ति, इति विकल्पो भवति। इति कथं तस्यैव लिंगलिंगिभावः।

न चात्र सामान्यविशेषभावकल्पना संभवति येन सामान्यं हेतुर्भवेत्, तद्विशेषप्रतिपत्तेरेव तदभावस्य प्रतीतेः। तस्यान्यत्रान्वयस्याभावात्, प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशत्वाच्च न हेतुता। न च यत्र प्रदेशमात्रं तत्र घटाभावः। तादृशे केवले प्रदेशे सर्वत्राभाव इति चेत्। ननु तस्यैव कैवल्यं घटविरहः। स च तत्प्रतिपत्तौ एव सिद्ध इति कस्य तल्लिंगम्? अन्वयस्यानुगमनमपि निरर्थकम्। तस्मादन्यभावो न साधनमभावस्य।

अस्ति विरोधः सम्बन्ध इति चेत्, "केन कस्य विरोधोऽन्यभावेन प्रतियोगिनः।" किं नु वै प्रतियोगी प्रमातुमिष्टो येन लिंगलिंगिनोर्विरोधः सम्बन्धः स्यात्। अभावस्तु प्रतियोगिनो घटस्य भावेनाविरुद्धः, सहावस्थानात्। तत् लिंगलिंगिनोः कथं विरोधः। तस्मात् सम्बन्धाभावः। अत्रापि न सामान्यसाध्यत्वम्।

तस्य कैवल्यमेवापरस्य वैकल्यमिति तदन्यभाव एव तदभावः। ततश्च तत्प्रतिप्रत्तिरेव च तदप्रतिपत्तिः। अन्यथा तस्य अव्यवच्छेदे तत्परिच्छेद एव न स्यात्। तदतद्रूपयोरविवेकात्। य एव व्यवहारः कस्यचित् क्वचिद्देशे दर्शनात् प्राप्तिपरिहारार्थः स न स्यात्। न हि अयं अनलं पश्यन्नपि अनलमेव पश्यति इति कथं सलिलार्थी तत्र न प्रवर्तेत? अनुपलम्भेन सलिलाभावः प्रतिपद्यते चेत्। कोऽयमनुपलम्भो नाम। यदि सलिलोपलम्भाभावः तदा कथमभावः कस्यचित् प्रतिपत्तिः प्रतिपत्तिहेतुर्वा? तस्यापि कथं प्रतिपत्तिः तस्य ततो वाऽन्यस्य कस्यचिदपि अप्रतिपत्तौ अपि यद्यभावः प्रतीयते तदा स्वापाद्यवस्थास्वपि किन्न प्रतीयते? इत्येतच्च विचारितं प्रमाणविनिश्चये।

तस्मादयम् अनलं पश्यन्नपि अनलोऽयं न सलिलम् इति नाध्यवस्यति इति न तिष्ठेत् नापि प्रतिष्ठेत्। ततश्च दुस्तरं व्यसनं प्रतिपत्तुः स्यात्।

तत एवैकस्य केवलस्य दर्शनादन्याभावगतिश्चेत्। कथमेकं दर्शनमन्याभावं प्रत्याययति। तस्यैव केवलस्य दर्शनाद् इति चेत्। इदमेवास्माभिः प्रागभिहितं कस्मात् तवात्र परुषमिवाभाति? तस्मात् तीरादर्शिनेव शकुनिना दूरं गत्वापि प्रत्यागच्छता किमनयाऽविद्यमानप्रतिष्ठानया दिशः प्रतिपत्त्या प्रयोजनम्?

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यद्यैकपरिच्छेदादेव अन्यव्यवच्छेदः सिध्यति तदा सर्वस्याविशेषेण तत्राभावसिद्धिर्भवेत्। न तु तुल्ययोग्यावस्थस्यैव। उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य अनुपलब्धिरभावसाधनीति च विशेषणं न वक्तव्यम् अनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तानामपि तत्र व्यवच्छेदात्।

एकात्मपरिच्छेदात् तस्य तदन्यात्मव्यवच्छेदो भवति तदात्मनियतप्रतिभासज्ञानात्। न हि तदात्मा तदन्यस्य आत्मा भवति। अन्यात्माव्यवच्छेदे प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्योरभावप्रसंगः। तं च देशकालस्वभावावस्थानियतं तदात्मनोपलभमाना बुद्धिः तथात्वप्रच्युतिमस्य व्यवच्छिनत्ति। एवं हि अन्यदेशतादेः पृथक्करणे सति तद्देशादिनियतः परिच्छिन्नो भवति, तथात्वं च तस्यैव भवति नान्यस्येति अन्यथाभूतात्तथाभूतं व्यवच्छिन्दत्येव तत् परिच्छिनत्ति। एवम् एकप्रमाणवृत्तिः सर्वभावान् द्वैराश्ये व्यवस्थापयति। तस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकबुद्धिजनकत्वेनैव साफल्यात्। तद्व्यतिरिक्ताशेषव्यवच्छेदेन व्याप्तिसाधनादेव प्रकारान्तरस्याभावः सिध्यति। तस्य तदन्यतया व्याप्त्यभावे तेन तदर्थान्यवच्छेदात् पुनरपि भावस्यापरिच्छेदप्रसंगात्।

तस्मात् क्वचित् प्रमाणं प्रवृत्तं तत् परिच्छिनत्ति, तदन्यद् व्यवच्छिनति, तृतीयप्रकाराभावं च सूचयति इति एकप्रमाणव्यापार एषः। तथाहि क्वचित् प्रमाणं प्रवृत्तं तदेव तदन्यस्मात् व्यवच्छिनत्ति, तस्यैव परिच्छेदात्। तदन्यदेव च तस्मात् व्यवच्छिनत्ति, तदन्यस्यापरिच्छेदात्। अतस्तद् एव प्रमाणं प्रकारान्तराभावं साधयति। तस्मिन् दृष्टतदन्यत्वेन सर्वस्यैव व्यवस्थापनात्, अतदन्यस्यैव च तत्वेन व्यवस्थापनात्।

एतेन क्रमाक्रमादयोऽन्योन्याव्यवच्छेदरूपा अपि व्याख्याताः।

तदेवम् एकस्योपलम्भात् तस्य तदन्यात्मनो व्यवच्छेदः। न तद्देशकालयोः सर्वस्यान्यस्य भावस्य व्यवच्छेदः। तस्मादतदात्मा च स्यात् तद्देशकालश्च, रसरूपादिवत्।

तस्माद् यथोक्तादेवानुपलम्भात् क्वचित् कदाचित् कस्यचिदभावसिद्धिः।

अन्यभावविषयस्योपलब्धिरपि तदभावस्य साधिकेष्टैव न तु लिंगत्वेन। तत्रापि अभावस्य पृथक्साध्यत्वे सम्बन्धाभावस्य तुल्यत्वात्। लिंगाविर्भावकाल एवं तदभावसिद्धेश्च। न हि अन्यस्य भावं प्रतिपद्य तत्प्रतिपत्तेस्तदभावेनान्वयव्यतिरेको प्रसाध्य तदभावं प्रतिपद्यते। किन्तर्हि? तदन्यं प्रतिपद्यमान एव तदभावं प्रतिपद्यते। दर्शनान्तरम्इदमस्ति, इदं तु नास्तीति व्यवस्थापनात्, तच्च तस्य लिंगं भवति यस्यान्वयिव्यतिरेकि च, दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः। न हि एवं शक्यं दर्शयितुं यत्र अन्यभावोपलब्धिः तत्र तदभावः इति। तदेकोपलब्धेः क्वचिदपि अभावात्। सामान्येन प्रदर्शने दृष्टान्तेऽपि प्रमाणान्तरं नास्तीति। तस्मात् नैव कुतश्चिल्लिंगात् तदभावसिद्धि रिति। सोऽन्यभावः प्रत्यक्षलक्षणेनानुपलम्भेन सिद्धः सन् मूढप्रतिपत्तो अभावव्यवहारं साधयेद् इति सुचर्चितमेव।

सेयमनुपलब्धिस्त्रिधा। सिद्धे कार्यकारणभावे सिद्धाभावस्य कारणस्यानुपलब्धिः, व्याप्यव्यापकभावसिद्धौ सिद्धाभावस्य व्यापकस्यानुपलब्धिः, स्वभावानुपलब्धिश्च।

तत्र कारणव्यापकयोरपि अभावव्यवहारः तदन्यभावसिद्धयेव सिध्यति। कारणव्यापकाभावः तथासिद्धः सन् कार्यव्याप्ययोरभावम् अभावव्यवहारं वा साधयति। स्वभावानुपलब्धौ तु अभावव्यवहार एव साध्यते।

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यदि कारणव्यापकौ तदन्यभावसिद्धया अनुपलब्ध्या सिद्धासद्व्यवहारो अन्यस्य अभावम् अभावव्यवहारं च साधयतः। सा च तयोरुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तावेवासद्व्यवहारस्य साधिका इति कथं तयोः कारणव्यापकानुपलब्ध्योः परोक्षेऽर्थे प्रयोगः? नैव प्रयोगः प्रमाणतया, लिंगस्यानिश्चयात्। केवलं कारणव्यापकयोर्हि सिद्धसंबन्धयोर्यद्भावः परस्यापि अवश्यं नियमेनाभावः इति एतस्य दर्शनार्थमेते क्वचित् प्रयुज्येते इति।

—हेतुबिन्दु, पृ० ६४, पंक्ति—२३, पृ० ६८, पंक्ति—२१।

४७। (१) वा स नो द्बो ध हे तु का त दि त्या का रा स्मृ तिः॥१.२.३

-----चिरकालस्थायिन्यपि वासनाऽनुद्‌बुद्धा न स्मृतिहेतुः —इति वासनोद्बोधहेतुका इत्युक्तम्।—

सा च प्रमाणम्, अविसंवादित्वात् स्वयं निहितप्रत्युन्मार्गणादिव्यवहाराणां दर्शनात्। नन्वनुभूयमानस्य विषयस्याभावान्निरालंबना स्मृतिः कथं प्रमाणम्? नैवम्, अनुभूतेनार्थेन सालंबनत्वोपपत्तेः, अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुभूतार्थविषयत्वादप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्येत। स्वविषयावभासनं स्मृतेरप्यविशिष्टम्। विनष्टो विषयः कथं स्मृतेर्जनकः?, तथा चार्थजन्यत्वान्न प्रामाण्यमस्या इति चेत्, तत्किं प्रमाणान्तरेऽप्यर्थजन्यत्वमविसंवादहेतुरिति विप्रलब्धोऽसि? मैवं मुहः, यथैव हि प्रदीपः स्वसामग्रीबललब्धजन्मा घटादिभिरजनितोऽपि तान् प्रकाशयति तथैव —संवेदनं विषयमवभासयति। नाननुकृतान्वयव्यतिरेकं कारणं नाकारणं विषयः इति तु प्रलापमात्रम्, योगिज्ञानस्यातीतानागतार्थगोचरस्य तदजन्यस्यापि प्रामाण्यं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेरभावात्। किं च स्मृतेरप्रामाण्येऽनुमानाय दत्तो जलांजलिः, तया व्याप्तेरविषयीकरणे तदुत्थानायोगात्, लिंगग्रहणसंबंधस्मरणपूर्वकमनुमानमिति हि सर्ववादिसिद्धम्। ततश्च स्मृतिः प्रमाणम्, अनुमानप्रामाण्यान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति सिद्धम्।

(२) दर्शनस्मरणसंभवं तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादिसंकलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्॥ १.२.४।

—येषां तु सादृश्यविषयमुपमानाख्यं प्रमाणान्तरं तेषां वैलक्षण्यादिविषयं प्रमाणान्तरमनुषज्येत।

ननु तत् इति स्मरणम् इदम् इति प्रत्यक्षमिति ज्ञानद्वयमेव, न ताभ्यामन्यत् प्रत्यभिज्ञानाख्यं प्रमाणमुत्पश्यामः। नैतद्युक्तम्, स्मरणप्रत्यक्षाभ्यां प्रत्यभिज्ञाविषयस्यार्थस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्। पूर्वापराकारैकधुरीणं हि द्रव्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य विषयः। न च तत् स्मरणस्य गोचरस्तस्यानुभूतविषयत्वात्। —नापि प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः तस्य वर्त्तमानविवर्तमात्रवृत्तित्वात्। न च दर्शन स्मरणाभ्यामन्यद् ज्ञानं नास्ति, दर्शनस्मरणोत्तरकालभाविनो ज्ञानान्तरस्यानुभूतेः। न चानुभूयमानस्यापलापो युक्तः, अतिप्रसंगात्।

ननु प्रत्यक्षमेवेदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् इत्येके। नैवम्, तस्य सन्निहितवार्तमानिकार्थविषयत्वात्। —ततो नातीतवर्तमानयोरेकत्वमध्यक्षज्ञानगोचरः। अथ स्मरणसहकृतमिन्द्रियं तदेकत्वविषयं प्रत्यक्षमुपजनयतीति प्रत्यक्षरूपताऽस्य गीयते इति चेत्, न, स्वविषयविनियमितभूतेरिन्द्रियस्य विषयान्तरे सहकारिशतसमवधानेऽप्यप्रवृत्तेः। नहि परिमलस्मरणसहायमपि चक्षुरिन्द्रियमविषये गंधादौ प्रवर्तते। —तत् स्थितमेतत् विषयभेदात प्रत्यक्षादन्यत् परोक्षान्तर्गतं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति।

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(३) उपलंभानुपलंभनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ।। १.२.५ ।

उपलंभः प्रमाणमात्रमत्र गृह्यते न प्रत्यक्षमेव, अनुमेयस्यापि साधनस्य संभवात्, प्रत्यक्षवदनुमेयेष्वपि व्याप्तेरविरोधात् ।—

न चायं व्याप्तिग्रहः प्रत्यक्षादेवेति वक्तव्यम् । नहि प्रत्यक्षं यावान् कश्चिद् धूमः स देशान्तरे कालान्तरे वा व्यापकस्यैव कार्यं नार्थान्तरस्येतीयतो व्यापारान् कर्तुं समर्थम्, सन्निहितविषयबलोत्पत्तेरविचारकत्वाच्च ।

नाप्यनुमानात्, तस्यापि व्याप्तिग्रहणकाले योगीव प्रमाता सम्पद्यते इत्येवंभूतभारासमर्थत्वात् । सामर्थ्येऽपि प्रकृतमेवानुमानं व्याप्तिग्राहकम्, अनुमानान्तरं वा? तत्र प्रकृतानुमानात् व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तावितरेतराश्रयः । —अनुमानान्तरात्तु व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तावनवस्था ।—

ननु यदि निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षमविचारकं तर्हि तत्पृष्ठभावी विकल्पो व्याप्तिं ग्रहीष्यतीति चेत्, नैतत्, निर्विकल्पकेन व्याप्तेरग्रहणे विकल्पेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् निर्विकल्पकगृहीतार्थविषयत्वाद् विकल्पस्य । अथ निर्विकल्पकविषयनिरपेक्षोऽ र्थान्तरगोचरो विकल्पः, स तर्हि प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा? प्रमाणत्वे प्रत्यक्षानुमानातिरिक्तं प्रमाणान्तरं तितिक्षितव्यम् । अप्रामाण्ये तु ततो व्याप्तिग्रहश्रद्धा षण्ढात्तनयदोहदः ।

वैशेषिकास्तु प्रत्यक्षफलेनोहापोहविकल्पज्ञानेन व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तिरित्याहुः । तेषामप्यध्यक्षफलस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरन्यतरत्वे व्याप्तेरविषयीकरणम्, तदन्यत्वे च प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसक्तिः । अथ व्याप्तिविकल्पस्य फलत्वान्न प्रमाणत्वमनुयोक्तुं युक्तम्, न, एतत्फलस्यानुमानलक्षणफलहेतुतया प्रमाणत्वाविरोधात् सन्निकर्षफलस्य विशेषणज्ञानस्येव विशेष्यज्ञानापेक्षयेति ।

यौगास्तु तर्कसहितात् प्रत्यक्षादेव व्याप्तिग्रह इत्याहुः । तेषामपि यदि न केवलात् प्रत्यक्षाद् व्याप्तिग्रहः किन्तु तर्कसहितात् तर्हि तर्कादेव व्याप्तिग्रहोऽस्तु । —अथ तर्कः प्रमाणम् न भवतीति न ततो व्याप्तिग्रहणमिष्यते । कुतः पुनरस्य न प्रमाणत्वम्? अव्यभिचारस्तावदिहापि प्रमाणान्तरसाधारणोऽस्त्येव । व्याप्तिलक्षणेन विषयेण विषयवत्वमपि न नास्ति । तस्मात् प्रमाणान्तरागृहीतव्याप्तिग्रहणप्रवणः प्रमाणान्तरमूहः ।

—प्रमाणमीमांसा, पृ० ३३—३८ ।

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APPENDIX A

THE PROBLEM OF 'FIGURES AND MOODS OF SYLLOGISM' IN BUDDHIST LOGIC

N.B.—"Hetu" means "probans",

"Sādhya" means "probandum",

"Pakṣa" means "place where hetu is *found* to exist and sādhya *is to be proved* to exist",

"Sapakṣa" means "place where sādhya is definitely known *to exist*",

"Vipakṣa" means "place where sādhya is definitely known *not to exist*".

I

The three rules of syllogism are :

(*i*) pakṣe sattvam eva (=hetu's *only presence* in pakṣa),

(*ii*) sapakṣe eva sattvam (=hetu's presence in *sapakṣa only*),

(*iii*) vipakṣe asattvam eva (=hetu's *only absence* from vipakṣa).

Now we must distinguish

(*i*) between 'pakṣe sattvam eva (=hetu's *only presence* in pakṣa)' and 'pakṣe eva sattvam (=hetu's presence in *pakṣa only*)',

(*ii*) between 'sapakṣe sattvam eva (=hetu's *only presence* in sapakṣa' and 'sapakṣe eva sattvam (=hetu's presence in *sapakṣa only*)',

(*iii*) between 'vipakṣe asattvam eva (=hetu's *only absence* from vipakṣa)' and 'vipakṣe eva asattvam (=hetu's absence from *vipakṣa only*);'

for (*i*) to say 'pakṣe sattvam eva' is to demand that hetu should always be present (and never absent) in pakṣa (and this is the actual First Rule of Syllogism which demands that hetu should be present in *all* pakṣa); on the other hand, to say 'pakṣe eva sattvam' is to demand that hetu should be present in pakṣa and in nothing else (but this is not actually demanded inasmuch as hetu must be present also in sapakṣa):

(*ii*) to say 'sapakṣe sattvam eva' is to demand that hetu should always be present (and never absent) in sapakṣa (but this is not actually demanded inasmuch as hetu need not be present

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in all sapakṣa), on the other hand, to say 'sapakṣe eva sattvam' is to demand that hetu should be present in sapakṣa and in nothing else (and this is the actual Second Rule of Syllogism which implies that hetu should not be present anywhere except in sapakṣa). (Of course, the Second Rule cannot imply that hetu should not be present in pakṣa (which too is something other than sapakṣa), for hetu's presence in pakṣa—and in *all* pakṣa at that—is the condition *sine qua non* of all inference.)

(iii) to say 'vipakṣe asattvam eva' is to demand that hetu should always be absent (and never present) in vipakṣa (and this is the actual Third Rule of Syllogism which demands that hetu must be absent from *all* vipakṣa); on the other hand, to say 'vipakṣe eva asattvam' is to demand that hetu should be absent from vipakṣa and from nothing else (but this is not actually demanded inasmuch as hetu may be absent also from some sapakṣas).

II

Viewing the same thing from another angle, we find that vyāpti (=proposition stating the relation between hetu and sādhya) should be a universal proposition of the form "All hetumān is sādhyavān", and this by obversion becomes "No hetumān is sādhyābhāvavān" which, in its turn, is equivalent to "No sādhyābhāvavān is hetumān"—the contrapositive of the original proposition. The propositions "All hetumān is sādhyavān" (in a way also "No hetumān is sādhyābhāvavān") and "No sādhyābhāvavān is hetumān" are called "anvaya-vyāpti" and "vyatireka-vyāpti" respectively.

Now in the propositions of A-form (as is the more usual form of anvaya-vyāpti) the subject is distributed but not so the predicate, while in the propositions of E-form (as are the less usual form of anvaya-vyāpti and all vyatireka-vyāpti) the subject as well as predicate are distributed. It is these facts which are expressed in the form of the following rules (which may be called Rules of the Major Premise and are yielded by the last two official rules of syllogism set forth above) :—

(i) Hetu must be present in *some* locii of sādhya; that is to say, hetu need not be present in *all* locii of sādhya;

(ii) Hetu must be absent from *all* non-locii of sādhya; that is to say, it will not do if hetu is absent from only some-non-locii of sādhya.

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The first official rule of syllogism may be called the Rule of the Minor Premise. For it says that hetu must be present in *all* pakṣa, which, in turn, comes to saying that the minor premise cannot be particular (for pakṣa is the subject in the minor premise while it is only in a particular proposition that the subject is undistributed).

III

With all this in the background let us try to clinch the crux of the matter.

The general form of an anumāna based on anvaya-vyāpti is

I. ∵ Yo yo hetumān sa sa sādhyavān,

∵ Pakṣo hetumān,

∴ Pakṣaḥ sādhyavān.

II. ∵ Yo yo hetumān sa sa na Sādhyābhāvavān,

∵ Pakṣo hetumān,

∴ Pakṣo na sādhyāvavān.

And the general form of an anumāna based on vyatirekavyāpti is

III ∵ Yo yah sādhyābhāvavān sa sa na hetumān,

∵ Pakṣo hetumān,

∴ Pakṣo na sādhyābhāvavān.

Now substituting M for 'hetumān', P for Sādhyavān' and P for sādhyābhāvavān', and S for 'pakṣa', the above syllogisms become

I. ∵ All M is p

∵ All S is M

∴ All S is P

II. ∵ All All M is not-P

(=No M is P)

∵ All S is M

∴ No S is P

III. ∴ All P is not-M

(=No P is M)

∵ All S is M

∴ No S is P

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Thus *Rules of Syllogism for Quantity are* :—

I. The Major premise must be universal.

II. The Minor premise must be universal.

(These rules exlude all moods with a particular premise.)

Rules of Syllogism for Quality are :—

I. The Minor premise must be affirmative.

II. The Major premise may be either affirmative or negative.

(The first of these rules excludes Camestres. The Third and Fourth figures are altogether excluded by a subsequent rule.)

Rules for Position of Terms are :—

I. In the Minor premise the minor term must be the subject.

II. In the affirmative Major premise the middle term must be the subject.

III. In the negative Major premise either the middle term or the major term may be the subject.

(The first of these rules altogether excludes the Third and Fourth Figures. Camestres is also excluded by the second of these rules.)

All this explains why for anumāna based on anvaya-vyāpti the only valid moods are Barbara and Celarent (of which the first is more usual) while for that based on vyatireka-vyāpti the only valid mood is Cesare.

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APPENDIX B

THE NEO-NAIYĀYIKA'S TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY AND HIS DEFINITIONS OF VYĀPTI EXPRESSED WITH THE HELP THEREOF

In the text we have hinted at the neo-Naiyāyika's rather morbid preoccupation with the task of formulating a proper definition of vyāpti. But perhaps the biggest hurdle in one's following the neo-Naiyāyika's arguments is the formidable technical terminology the logician has thought fit to devise for his purpose on hand. The following Note is being appended with a view to acquainting the readers with some of the most fundamental technical terms of neo-Nyāya. Next it will be demonstrated how these technical terms have been made use of in formulating the three definitions of vyāpti considered in the text.

I

A major source of difficulty in Navya-Nyāya is the ambiguity of some of its most basic technical terms. For example, in one way or other, the terms 'avacchedaka', 'pratiyogī', and 'anuyogī' are all ambiguous. The case of 'pratiyogī' and 'anuyogī' is very obvious, and let us first dispose of it.

(*i*) An abhāva or absence is said to have for its pratiyogī that of which it is abhāva; thus ghaṭa is pratiyogī of ghaṭābhāva, paṭa is pratiyogī of paṭābhāva, etc., (*ii*) The place where there resides an abhāva is said to be the anuyogī of this abhāva; thus in case there is no jar in the room the room (=kakṣa) is the anuyogī of 'absence of jar (=ghaṭābhāva)'.

But each and every relation is also said to have a pratiyogī and an anuyogī. As a general rule, a relation has for its pratiyogī that which has this relation to something else while this something else is the anuyogī of the relation in question. Thus the fact that the jar's colour resides in jar by samavāya relation is expressed by saying that samavāya has ghaṭa-rūpa for its pratiyogī and ghaṭa for its anuyogī.

In this connection let us remember that the Naiyāyika can institute some relation or other even between things apparently quite unrelated to each other. Hence we should keep in mind a general rule, viz., "to say that '*y* is thus related to *x*' means '*x* has with *y* (or *x* resides in *y* by) the relation thus relatedness' ". For example,—

(*i*) "Vahni is kāraṇa of dhūma" means "Dhūma" has with vahni (or dhūma resides in vahni by) the relation kāraṇatā";

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(*ii*) "Dhūma is kārya of vahni" means "Vahni has with dhūma (or vahni resides in dhūma by) the relation kāryatā";

(*iii*) "Ghaṭa is viṣaya to ghaṭa-jñāna" means "Ghaṭa-jñāna has with ghaṭa (or ghaṭa-jñāna resides in ghaṭa by) the relation viṣayatā";

(*iv*) "Ghata-jñāna is viṣayī to ghaṭa" means "Ghaṭa has with ghaṭa-jñāna (or ghaṭa resides in ghaṭa-jñāna by) the relation viṣayitā";

(*v*) "Paṭa is sva-samavāyi-samaveta to tantu-rūpa (because paṭa is samaveta in the sāmavāyi of tantu-rūpa—i.e., in tantus)" means "Tantu-rūpa has with paṭa (or tantu-rūpa resides in paṭa by) the relation sva-samavāyi-samavetatva".

In all these cases it is permissible to say that "*x resides in y*" by such and such relation, but there are some rare cases where this is not permissible. For example,—

(*vi*) "Rāma is sva-sūnu (=own son) of Daśaratha" means "Daśaratha has with Rāma the relation sva-sūnutā", but we cannot say "Daśaratha resides in Rāma by the relation sva-sūnutā". (Theoretically, the prefix "sva" can be attached to the name of any and every relation, but in practice its use is found to be convenient in some cases and not so in others. Thus the name of the relation sva-samavāyi-samavetatva must be prefixed by "sva" but the names of the relations kāraṇatā, viṣayatā, etc., may or may not be (and generally they are not) so prefixed. It is interesting to note that svatva itself is a relation (indicating possession pure and simple). Thus "*y* is sva (=own) to *x*" mean "*x* has with *y* the relation svatva". For example, in so far as a minister is king's own minister the king has with this minister the relation svatva; this relationship will be expressed by calling the minister either 'rajñaḥ svakīyo mantrī or' 'rājakīyo mantri. Obviously, svatva too is the type of relation which (in case *x* has this relation with *y*) does not permit us to say that "*x* resides in *y*".)

The type of relations represented by (*i*) to (*v*) are called vṛtti-niyāmaka (=occurrence-exciting) relations, the type represented by (*vi*) vṛtty-aniyāmaka (=non-occurrence-exciting) relations. But vṛtty-aniyāmaka relations are so few in number that we can easily ignore their existence. However, technically and strictly speaking, samavāya, saṃyoga, svarūpa,

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and kālika are the only vṛttī-niyāmaka relations. (An entity resides in kāla (=time) by kālika relation. Svarūpa-sambandha is a peculiar type of relation. For example, this is the relation by which an abhāva resides in its locus. Again, this is the relation by which those generic properties which are denied the title 'jāti' (and are called 'upādhis') reside in the individuals in which they do. Thus inasmuch as 'ākāśatva', 'Devadattatva', and 'ghaṭatvatva' are not jātis but upādhis they reside in ākāśa, Devadatta, and ghaṭatva respectively by svarūpa-sambandha. There are also certain even more odd cases of svarūpa-sambandha.) And this means that the relations spoken of above, viz., kāraṇatā, kāryatā, viṣayatā, viṣayitā, sva-samavāyi-samavetatva, etc., are all vṛtty-aniyāmaka relations. But in practice all relations except those like sva-sūnutā are treated as vṛtti-niyāmaka. This is why the Naiyāyika can say about almost any two things that one of them resides in the other, and this he demonstrates by finding out some relation (however remote and obscure) as obtaining between those two things. And to say that this thing *has with* the other thing—and not that it *resides in* the other thing by—the relation concerned is correct even technically.

To come to our proper point, a relation has for its pratiyogī that which has this relation to something while this something is the anuyogī of this relation. Thus in the above examples (*i*) dhūma is pratiyogī and vahni anuyogī of the relation kāraṇatā, (*ii*) vahni is pratiyogī and dhūma anuyogī of the relation kāryatā, (*iii*) ghaṭa-jñāna is pratiyogī and ghaṭa anuyogī of the relation viṣayatā, (*iv*) ghaṭa is pratiyogī and ghaṭa-jñāna anuyogī of the relation viṣayitā, (*v*) tantu-rūpa is pratiyogī and paṭa anuyogī of the relation sva-samavāyi-samavetatva, and (*vi*) Daśaratha is pratiyogī and Rāma anuyogī of the relation sva-sūnutā.

The difficulties arising out of the ambiguity in the terms "pratiyogitā" and "anuyogitā" are often sought to be obviated by calling the former type of pratiyogitā and anuyogitā "abhāvīya pratiyogitā" and "abhāvīya anuyogitā" while the latter type "sambandhīya pratiyogitā", and "sambandhīya anuyogitā", but such usage is very rare, and, as a matter of fact, some of the Nyāya arguments actually hinge on the ambiguity in question. In any case, the English equivalent of 'abhāvīya pratiyogī', should be 'counterpositive of the absence', that of 'abhāvīya anuyogī' 'locus of the absence', that of 'sambandhīya pratiyogī' 'adjunct of the relation', and that of 'sambandhīya anuyogī' 'subjunct of the relation'.

Let us next examine the ambiguity attached to the term "avacchedakatā" the central technical term of the Naiyāyika. The term 'avacchedakatā' has been coined to avoid ambiguities in expression. Thus when there

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is a jar in the room and I say "Jar occurs in the room (=kakṣe ghaṭo vartate)" somebody might wrongly contradict me by saying "No, that particular jar (meaning thereby some jar not present in the room) does not occur in the room". On the other hand even when there actually exists a jar in the room somebody might wrongly argue "There occurs no jar in the room, because that particular jar (meaning thereby some jar not present in the room) does not occur in the room". In the first of these cases the chance for wrong contradiction may be avoided by saying 'Same jar or other (and not every jar) occurs in the room"; in the second case the wrong argument may be contradicted by saying "No, even if it *is* the case that certain jars do not occur in the room it *is not* the case that no jar whatsoever occurs in the room". It is with the help of the term 'avacchedakatā' that 'presence of jar' is made to mean 'presence of *some jar or other*', and, again, it is with the help of this very term that 'absence of jar' is made to mean 'absence of *all jars whatsoever*'. The exact procedure is as follows :—

When x is found to occur in y, x is said to possess "occurrentness" or "superstratumness" (="vṛttita" or "ādheyatā") and y to possess "locusness" or "substratumness" (="adhikaraṇatā", "āśrayatā", or "ādhāratā"). It is further added that "the occurrentness residing in x is described (=nirūpita) by the locusness residing in y" while "the locusness residing in y is described (=nirūpita) by the occurrentness residing in x". Thus when smoke occurs on mountain (=dhūmaḥ parvate vartate) dhūma possesses vṛttitā and parvata adhikaraṇatā, and we say that "the occurrentness residing in dhūma is described by the locusness residing in parvata (=dhūma-niṣṭhā ya vṛttitā sā parvata-niṣṭha-adhikaraṇatā-nirupitā vṛttitā)" while "the locusness residing in parvata is described by the occurrentness residing in dhūma (=parvata-niṣṭhā ya adhikaraṇatā sā dhūma-niṣṭha-vṛttitā-nirupitā adhikaraṇatā)". After this comes the question of avacchedakatā, which serves to avoid two possible ambiguities. First, when x occurs in y what occurs in y is only *one* member belonging to the class defined by x-ness (and not *every* member belonging to this class). Secondly, when x occurs in y it occurs there by *one relation* (and not by *every* relation). Hence it is said that the occurrentness residing in x is limited (or avacchinna) by the generic property x-ness on the one hand and the relation concerned on the other, e.g., in our example we say that dhūma-niṣṭha vṛttitā is avacchinna by dhūmatva on the one hand and saṃyoga--sambandha on the other. Hence the full expression for "smoke occurs on mountain" is "saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna-dhūmatva-avacchinna-(dhūma-niṣṭha)-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ. (The bracketed part is omitted after a little practice.) In an exactly similar fashion, when x occurs in y the locusness residing in y is limited by y-ness

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on the one hand and the relation concerned on the other; e.g., in our example we say that parvata-niṣṭha-adhikaraṇatā is avacchinna by parvatatva on the one hand and saṃyoga-sambandha on the other. Hence the full expression for "smoke occurs on mountain" is "saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna-parvatatva-avacchinna-(parvata-niṣṭha-) adhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-vṛttitāvān dhūmaḥ".

Generally, the limitor-property (=avacchedaka-dharma) is got by adding the suffix 'ness' to the occurrent or the locus concerned, but it is not always the case. Thus, for example, when we say "staff-holder occurs in house (=daṇḍī gṛhe vartate)" the occurrentness residing in daṇḍin is limited not by *daṇḍitva* but *by daṇḍa*. However, the principle underlying this case is the same as that underlying the earlier ones; for just as dhūmatva is what is common and peculiar to all dhūmas and parvatatva what is common and peculiar to all parvatas, daṇḍa is what is common and peculiar to all daṇḍins.

There is some difficulty about the limitor-relation (=avacchedaka-sambandha) also. The limitor-relation is the relation by which the seat of the limited (=avacchinna) entity (properly called a 'relational abstract') resides wherever it does—for our purpose. Thus in our case saṃyoga-sambandha is the avacchedaka-sambandha of dhūmaniṣṭha-vṛttitā because dhūma (—the seat of vṛttitā) resides wherever it does (i.e., in mountain) by saṃyoga-sambandha. But what should be the avacchedaka-sambandha of parvata-niṣṭha-adhikaraṇatā? Strictly speaking, it should be the relation by which parvata (—the seat of adhikaraṇatā) resides—for our purpose, but for our purpose parvata resides nowhere, it being merely the locus of dhūma. However, in such cases the same relation which is the limitor-relation of vṛttitā is also said to be the limitor-relation of adhikaraṇatā. (This is why we have called above saṃyoga-sambandha the avacchedaka-sambandha not only of dhūma-niṣṭha-vṛttitā but also of parvata-niṣṭha-adhikaraṇatā.) Another—and more intriguing—case of this type of difficulty we come across when we have to mention the limitor-relation of hetutā, sādhyatā, and pakṣatā. For the limitor-relations of hetutā and sādhyatā are the relations by which hetu (—the seat of hetutā) and sādhya (—the seat of sādhyatā) respectively reside wherever they do (i.e. in pakṣa), but the limitor-relation of pakṣatā is difficult to determine, and this owing to the fact that for our purpose pakṣa resides nowhere, it being merely the locus of hetu and sādhya. Here we cannot even say that pakṣatā-avacchedaka-sambandha is the same as hetutā-avacchedaka-sambandha and sādhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha, for hetutā-avacchedaka-sambandha and sādhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha need not be one and the same. The result is that pakṣatā-avacchedaka-sambandha is never to be mentioned.

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All positive relations can be given a treatment similar to the one just given to the relation of (rather relational pair consisting of) vṛttitā and adhikaraṇatā. In all such cases the relata concerned are known by different names, and the corresponding relational abstracts can be got by adding the suffix "ness" (in Sanskrit "tā" or "tva") to these names. Thus we have the pairs consisting of relational abstracts like hetutā and sādhyatā, kāryatā and kāraṇatā, viṣayatā and viṣayitā, etc., and we can say (for example) :—

(*i*) Dhūma-niṣṭha-hetutā-nirūpita-sādhyatāvān vahniḥ, or Vahni-niṣṭha-sādhyatā-nirūpita-hetutāvān dhūmaḥ;

(*ii*) Tantu-niṣṭha-kāraṇatā-nirūpita-kāryatāvān paṭah, or Paṭa-niṣṭha-kāryatā-nirūpita-kāraṇatāvāntaḥ tantavaḥ;

(*iii*) Ghaṭa-niṣṭha-viṣayatā-nirūpita-viṣayitaśāli (ghaṭa-) jñānam, or (Ghaṭa-) · jñāna-niṣṭha-viṣayītā-nirūpita-viṣayatāśālī ghaṭaḥ; etc. etc.

Here also we can make our meaning more precise by making mention of the relevant limitor-properties and limitor-relations.

A special role is played by the pair of relational abstracts avacchedakatā and avacchinnatā; for with its help we can extend an expression to any length we like. Thus, for example, when we say "staff-holder occurs in house (=daṇḍī gṛhe vartate)" there resides in daṇḍin a vṛttitā which is avacchinna by daṇḍa on the one hand and saṃyoga-sambandha on the other (for daṇḍin occurs in gṛha by saṃyoga-sambandha). But avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍa (—the avacchedaka-dharma-really speaking, avacchedaka-dravya-in question) can be treated as a new relational abstract and we can say that this avacchedakatā is avacchinna by daṇḍatva on the one hand and saṃyoga-sambandha on the other (for daṇḍa occurs in daṇḍin by saṃyoga-sambandha). Again, the avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatva (—the new avacchedaka-dharma in question) is avacchinna by daṇḍatvatva on the one hand and samavāya-sambandha on the other (for daṇḍatva occurs in daṇḍa by samavāya relation). And thus we can go on ad indefinitum—in theory at least. Here we should also keep in mind that vṛttitā residing in daṇḍin is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍa, avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍa is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatva, avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatva is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatvatva, and so on and so forth. This happens in the following manner. The relation between daṇḍin and daṇḍa is such that there resides vṛttitā in daṇḍin and vṛttitā-avacchedakatā in daṇḍa; hence we say that vṛttitā residing in daṇḍin is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍa (and *vice versa*). Again, the relation between daṇḍa and daṇḍatva

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is such that there resides vṛttitā-avacchedakatā in daṇḍa and vṛttitā-avacchedakatā-avacchedakatā in daṇḍatva; hence we say that avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍa is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatva (and *vice versa*). Similarly, the relation between daṇḍatva and daṇḍatvatva avacchedakata-avacchedakata is such that there resides vṛttitā-avacchedakatā-avacchedakatā in daṇḍatva and vṛttitā-avacchedakatā-avacchedakatā avacchedakatā in daṇḍatvatva; hence we say that avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatva is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatvatva (and *vice versa*). Thus we can go on as long as we like—at least in theory. But we are also free to stop our process wherever we like—only the earlier we stop the less precise will be our expression. The indicative mark of the cessation of our process will be the occurrence of the term "...—avacchinna" (at the beginning of our compound) where the term "......niṣṭha-avaccheda-katā-nirūpita" will occur in case we decide to prolong further the process in question. (Of course, we are also free to make no mention of avaccheda-katā at all; for example, "daṇḍi gṛhe vartate" may be put simply as "daṇḍi-niṣṭha-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvad gṛham".) Thus if we want to proceed no further than daṇḍa's avacchedakatā we may put "daṇḍī gṛhe vartate" in the form "daṇḍa-avacchinna-daṇḍi-niṣṭha-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvad gṛham"; if we want to proceed no further than daṇḍatva's avacchedakatā we may put it in the form "daṇḍatva-avacchinna-daṇḍa-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā-nirūpita-daṇḍi-niṣṭha-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvad gṛham"; if we want to procceed no further than daṇḍatvatva's avacchedakatā we may put it in the form "daṇḍatvatva-avacchinna-daṇḍatva-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā nirūpita-daṇda-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā-nirūpita-daṇḍi-niṣṭha-vṛittitā-nirūpita-adh-ikaraṇatāvad gṛham"; and so on and so forth. Here we should note that when we are speaking of an avacchedakatā being nirūpita by another avacchedakatā we are taking into account the avacchedakatā of the avacchedaka-dharma alone (and not also the avacchedakatā of the avacchedaka-sambandha); this explains why at each step we have left the avacchedaka-sambandha untouched. Let us now also insert the avacchedaka-sambandha, and in each case let it limit the concerned relational abstract directly and not through the medium of nirūpita avacchedakatā. (Theoretically, it is possible to formulate similar chain-transformations by treating the avacchedakatā of the avacchedaka-sambandha as nirūpita (and, of course, at the same time niūpaka) avacchedakatā; but in practice it is never done.) Thus in the first stage we say that daṇḍi-niṣṭha-vṛttitā is avacchinna by saṃyoga-sambandha (for daṇḍin occurs in gṛha by saṃyoga-sambandha); in the second stage we say that saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna-daṇḍi-niṣṭha-vṛttitā is avacchinna by daṇḍa (or, if we do not want to stop, is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍa): in the third stage we say that daṇḍa-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā is avacchinna by saṃyoga-sambandha (for daṇḍa

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occurs in daṇḍin by saṃyoga-sambandha); in the fourth stage we say that saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna-daṇḍa-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā is avacchinna by daṇḍatva (or, if we do not want to stop, is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatva); in the fifth stage we say that daṇḍatva-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā is avacchinna by samavāya-sambandha (for daṇḍatva occurs in daṇḍa by samavāya sambandha): in the sixth stage we say that samavāya-sambandha-avacchinna-daṇḍatva-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā is avacchinna by daṇḍatvatva (or if we do not want to stop is nirūpita by avacchedakatā residing in daṇḍatvatva); and so it can go on ad indefinitum. Thus the full expression for "daṇḍi gṛhe vartate" is

"daṇḍatvatva-avacchinna-samavāya-sambandha-avacchinna-daṇḍatva-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā-nirūpita-saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna-daṇḍa-niṣṭha-avacchedakatā-nirūpita-saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna-daṇḍi-niṣṭha-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvad gṛham".

An important pair of relational abstracts is given by the relation obtaining between the subject and the predicate of a sentence. The members of this pair are the relational abstracts "qualificandness" (="viśeṣyatā" or "viṣayatā") and "qualifierness" (="prakāratā" or "viśeṣyatā"). Strictly speaking these relational abstracts have meaning only in a knowledge-situation. Thus the subject of the sentence giving expression to a piece of knowledge is called the viśeṣya or viṣaya of this knowledge while the predicate (i.e., qualifier of the subject) or this sentence is called the prakāra or viśeṣaṇa of the knowledge in question. In case the subject of a sentence has two sorts of qualifiers—one occurring in the subject-part and the other occurring in the predicate-part of the sentence—we reserve the name 'prakāra' (or 'chief qualifier') for the latter and the name 'viśeṣaṇa' (or 'qualifier') for the former. In case no qualifiers occur in the subject-part of the sentence those occurring in the predicate-part may be called either 'prakāra' or 'viśeṣaṇa'. Theoretically, it is always possible to find out one qualifier in the subject-part of a sentence, and this qualifier is the generic property of the subject concerned. Thus in the sentence "man is tall (=naro lambaḥ)", 'man (=nara)' is viśeṣya and 'tallness (=mambatva)' is prakāra (or viśeṣaṇa); while in the sentence "foolish man is tall (=mūrkho naro lambaḥ)" 'nara' is viśeṣya, mūrkhatva is viśeṣaṇa, and lambatva is prakāra. But strictly speaking, even in the sentence 'naro lambaḥ' 'nara' is viśeṣya, 'naratva' is viśeṣaṇa, and 'lambatva' is prakāra. To an extent, the relational abstracts viśeṣyatā and prakāratā (or viśeṣaṇatā) behave exactly as do the relational abstracts spoken of above. Thus in the sentence "naro lambaḥ" we can say—

(*i*) nara-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakārātaśāli lambatvam;
or (*ii*) lambatva-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatāśālī naraḥ.

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But in the case of these new relational abstracts we can also bring in (and we generally do bring in) the mention of jñāna, and this in the following manner. We can say that 'such and such viśeṣyatā' or 'such and such prakāratā' is nirūpita by the knowledge concerned. Thus we say that the knowledge "man is tall (=naro lambaḥ)" is a knowledge which is the nirūpaka (=describer) of the prakāratā residing in lambatva, which prakāratā, in turn, is nirūpita by viśeṣyatā residing in nara. That is to say, " 'naro lamba' iti jñānam nara-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-lambatva-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpakam jñānam". Or we can say that the knowledge "man is tall (=naro lambaḥ)" is a knowledge which is the nirūpaka (=describer) of the viśeṣyatā in turn, is nirūpita by the prakāratā residing in lambatva. That is to say, "naro lamba' itijñānam lambatva-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpita-nara-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpakam jñānam". But we should note very carefully that the nirūpaṇa (or description) of a viśeṣyatā or a prakāratā by the jñāna concerned is of a character totally different from that of the nirūpana (or description) of a viśeṣyatā and a prakāratā by each other. The point to note is that in the case of jñāna's nirūpaṇa of viśeṣyatā or of prakāratā the nirūpaṇa is not mutual as it is in the case of viṣeśyatā's nirūpaṇa of prakāratā (which nirūpaṇa is at the same time prakāratā's nirūpaṇa of viṣeśyatā). Thus in our example viśeṣyatā residing in nara and prakāratā residing in lambatva are each nirūpita by the knowledge concerned, but this knowledge is not nirūpita either by this viśeṣyatā or by this prakārata; on the other hand, viśeṣyatā residing in nara and prakāratā residing in lambatva are nirūpita by each other.

There are two more cases—both important—of nirūpaṇa of the type represented by jñāna. Thus in the case of a relation pratiyogitā residing in the pratiyogī describes and is described by anuyogitā residing in the anuyogī, but these pratiyogitā and anuyogitā are each described by (though neither of them describes) the relation concerned. Thus the fact that ghaṭa-rūpa resides in ghaṭa by samavāya relation yields following statements :—

(*i*) Ghaṭarūpa-niṣṭha-samavaya-pratiyogitā-nirūpita-samavaya-anuyogitāśālī ghaṭaḥ,

(*ii*) Ghaṭa-niṣṭha - samavāya - anuyogitā -nirūpita-samavāya-pratiyogitāśāli ghaṭarūpan,

(*iii*) Ghatarūpa-niṣṭha-pratiyogitā-nirupita- ghaṭa-ghaṭa-niṣṭha - anuyogitā-nirūpakaḥ sanavāya-sanbandhaḥ, and

(*iv*) Ghaṭa-niṣṭha-anuyogitā-nirūpita-ghaṭarūpa-niṣṭha-pratiyogitā- nirūpakaḥ samavāya-saṃbandhaḥ.

Similar is the case with an abhāva's nirūpaṇa of the pratiyogitā and anuyogitā residing in its pratiyogī and anuyogī respectively. That is to

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say, pratiyogitā residing in the pratiyogī of an abhāva describes and is described by anuyogitā residing in the anuyogī of this abhāva, but these Pratiyogitā and anuyogitā are each described by (though neither of them describes) the abhāva concerned. Thus the fact that jar is absent from the room (=kakṣe ghaṭo nāsti) yields the following statements :—

(*i*) Ghaṭa-niṣṭha-ghaṭābhāva-pratiyogitā-nirupits-ghaṭābhāva - anuyogitāśālī kakṣaḥ,

(*ii*) Kakṣa-niṣṭha-ghaṭābhāva-anuyogitā-nirūpita-ghaṭābhāva- pratiyogitāśālī ghaṭaḥ,

(*iii*) Ghaṭa-niṣṭha-pratiyogitā-nirūpita-kakṣa-niṣṭha-anuyogitā-nirupako bhāvaḥ, and

(*iv*) Kakṣa-niṣṭha-anuyogitā-nirūpita-ghaṭa -niṣṭha-pratiyogitā - hirūpako-'bhāvaḥ. (The case of abhāva will come up for a detailed treatment in the immediate sequel.)

There is a shorthand form of expressing positive (and, as we shall see, also negative) relationships. Thus the full expression for the statement "smoke is on the mountain (=dhūmaḥ parvate vartate)" should be either

(*i*) Dhūma-niṣṭha-vṛttitā-nirūpite-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ, or

(*ii*) Parvata-niṣṭha-adhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-vṛttitāvān dhūmaḥ.

Now (*i*) may be made more precise by adding that dhūmatva is the avacchedaka-dharma of the vṛttitā in question, while (*ii*) may be made more precise by adding that parvatatva is the avacchedaka-dharma of the adhikaraṇatā in question. But some times (*i*) is also written as

(*iii*) Dhūma-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ,

while (*ii*) is also *w*ritten as

(*iv*) Parvata-nirūpita-vṛttitāvān dhūmaḥ.

And (*iii*) is made more precise by adding that dhūmatva is the avacchedaka-dharma of the adhikaraṇatā in question, while (*iv*) is made more precise by adding that parvatatva is the avacchedaka-dharma of the vṛttitā in question. Thus what is avacchedaka of adhikaraṇatā in the former form of expression becomes the avacchedaka of vṛttitā in the latter form, while what is avacchedaka of vṛttita in the former form becomes the avacchedaka of adhikaraṇatā in the latter form. This situation is some what confusing, but by way of explanation we are told that in the first case the avacchedaka is "niṣṭhatva-sambandhena avacchedaka (=resident-limitor)" while in the second case it is "nirūpitatva-sambandhena avacchedaka (=describer-limitor)". This because in the first case the avacchedaka resides in that in which there resides the avacchinna relational abstract, while in the second case the avacchedaka resides in that which *describes* the avacchinna relational

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abstract. Thus in the first case dhūmatva, resides in dhūma in which there resides the vṛttitā avacchinna by dhūmatva, while parvatatva resides in parvata in which there resides the adhikaraṇatā avacchinna by parvatatva. On the other hand, in the second case dhūmatva resides in dhūma which describes the (parvata-niṣṭha) adhikaraṇatā avacc hinna by dhūmatva, while parvatatva resides in parvata which describes the (dhūma-niṣṭha) vṛttitā avacchinna by parvatatva. To put it shortly, the term "avacchedakatā" is ambiguous even within the sphere of positive relationships; (how this ambiguity is further deepened when we also take into consideration the case of negation will become clear soon). (Also note that in the second type of expressions considered here "nirūpaṇa" means something different from what it meant earlier, for here it is not the case of one relational abstract being nirūpita by another relational abstract (as was the case till now) but that of a relational abstract being nirūpita by the locus of another relational abstract.

We have finished our treatment of avacchedakatā considered in the context of positive relationships; now we start our treatment of avacchedakatā considered in the context of negation.

We have seen that every abhāva has a pratiyogī and an anuyogī. The pratiyogī of an abhāva may be called its "counterpositive" inasmuch as a pratiyogī is that positive entity of which the absence is indicated by the abhāva concerned; e.g., ghaṭa is the pratiyogī of ghaṭābhāva. The anuyogī of an abhāva may be called its "locus" inasmuch as anuyogī is the seat of the abhāva concerned; e.g., the room where there exists no jar is the anuyogī of ghaṭābhāva.

We have also seen that abhāva-pratiyogitā and abhāva-anuyogitā describe each other, while each of them is described by (though neither of them describes) the abhāva concerned.

Now comes the question of avacchedakatā. Here let us first dispose of the case of anuyogitā, for this case involves no new considerations except those already taken note of in the context of positive relationships. Thus when there exists no jar in the room the room (=kakṣa) is said to be the anuyogī of 'jar's absence (=ghaṭābhāva)'. And anuyogitā residing in kakṣa is avacchinna by kakṣatva on the one hand and saṃyoga-sambandha on the other. This addition makes it clear that ghaṭābhāva exists in some kakṣa or other (and not in every kakṣa) and also that what is meant to be negated is ghaṭa's saṃyoga-sambandha (and not every sambandha) with the kakṣa concerned. Now we have earlier seen that it is difficult to point out the avacchedaka-sambandha of adhikaraṇatā and of pakṣatā. This is because the avacchedaka sambandha is that sambandha by which the seat of

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the avacchinna relational abstract resides (wherever it does) for our purpose, while for our purpose an adhikaraṇa (—the seat of adhikaraṇatā) resides nowhere, it being merely the locus of the occurrent concerned, and a pakṣa resides nowhere, it being merely the locus of the hetu and sādhya concerned. A similar difficulty arises in the case of abhāva-anuyogitā (as a matter of fact, in the case of all anuyogitā); for the avacchedaka-sambandha of anuyogitā should be that sambandha by which anuyogī (—the seat of anuyogitā) resides (wherever it does) for our purpose, but for our purpose an anuyogī resides nowhere, it being merely the locus of the abhāva concerned. The solution of the difficulty is the same as was found in the case of adhikaraṇatā (but could not be found in the case of pakṣatā). For just as the avacchedaka-sambandha of vṛttitā is treated as the avacchedaka-sambandha of adhikaraṇatā as well, so also is the avacchedaka-sambandha of pratiyogitā treated as the avacchedaka-sambandha of anuyogitā as well. Thus in our example saṃyoga-sambandha has been said to the avacchedaka-sambandha of anuyogitā simply because this is the avacchedaka-sambandha of pratiyogitā. And the avacchedaka-sambandha of pratiyogitā is the relation denied of pratiyogī in respect of anuyogī; (e.g., in our example saṃyoga-sambandha is denied of ghaṭa in respect of kakṣa).

Lastly, we take up the question of avacchedakatā in the case of pratiyogitā. In a way the utility of the concept of avacchedakatā (so far as it concerns the avacchedaka-dharma) is here just the opposite of what it was in the case of positive relationships. Thus by saying that the vṛttitā residing in dhūma that occurs on parvata is dhūmatva-avacchinna we want to say that some dhūma or other (and not all dhūma) occurs on parvata; but by saying that the abhāvīya pratiyogitā residing in ghaṭa that is absent from kakṣa is ghaṭatva-avacchinna we want to say that all ghaṭa (and not merely some ghaṭa or other) is absent from kakṣa. The avacchedakatā of avacchedaka-sambandha also plays different (thought not so strikingly different) roles in the case of abhāva-pratiyogitā and in the case of positive relationships; for by saying that dhūma's vṛttitā in relation to parvata is saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna we want to say that dhūma. has saṃyoga-sambandha with parvata while by saying that ghaṭa's abhāvīya pratiyogitā in relation to kakṣa is saṃyoga-sambandha-avacchinna we want to say that ghaṭa does not have saṃyoga-sambandha with kakṣa.

An important point concerning the avacchedaka-sambandha of abhāva-pratiyogitā also deserves notice. Generally, in the case of abhāva we deny either saṃyoga-sambandha or samavāya-sambandha of pratiyogī with

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anuyogī. Thus when we wish to say that dhūma does not have saṃyoga-sambandha with parvata we express our statement in the form "saṃyoga-sambandha avacchinna-dhūmatva avacchinna-(dhūma-niṣṭha-) pratiyogitāka-abhāvavān parvataḥ", and when we wish to say that dhūma does not have samavāya-sambandha with parvata we express our statement in the form "samavāya-sambandha-avacchinna-dhūmatva-avacchinna-(dhūma-niṣṭha-) pratiyogitāka-abhāvavān parvataḥ". But there are also cases when we wish to deny tādātmya-sambandha (='relation of identity') of pratiyogī with anuyogī; thus the fact that dhūma does not have tādātmya-sambandha with parvata (i.e., the fact that dhūma is not identical with parvata) is expressed in the form "Tādātmya—sombandha-avacchinna-dhūmatva avacchinna-(dhūma-niṣṭha-) pratiyogitāka-abhāvavān pravataḥ". But to say that dhūma does not have tādātmya-sambandha with parvata is equivalent to saying that dhūmatva does not reside in parvata by samavāya-sambandha (for dhūmatva reside by samavāya-sambandha only in dhūma which is the only entity with which dhūma has tādātmya-sambandha). Now the fact that dhūmatva does not reside in parvata by samavāya-sambandha can be expressed in the form "samavāya-sambandha-avacchinna-dhūmatvatva-avacchinna-(dhūmatva-niṣṭha-) pratiyogitāka-abhāvavān parvataḥ". And the Naiyāyika feels that this involves an anomaly. For here we have two equivalent statements (both meaning that dhūma is not identical with parvata), but one of them says that dhūma-pratiyogitāka-abhāva resides in parvata while the other says that dhūmatva-pratiyogitāka-abhāva resides in parvata. The Naiyāyika has a separate name for this type of abhāva (i.e., for abhāva denying the identity of one thing with another); it is called 'anyonyābhāva (=mutual absence)'. He, therefore, gives expression to the present anomaly by saying that dhūma-anyonyābhāva has for its pratiyogī both dhūma and dhūmatva (and the same is the case with all anyonyābhāva). This anomaly has led to serious difficulties, but it could be easily avoided by noticing that dhūma-niṣṭha-pratiyogitā of dhūma-anyonyābhāva is avacchinna by tādātmya-sambandha while dhūmatva-niṣṭha-pratiyogitā of the same abhāva is avacchinna by samavāya-sambandha. But leaving out of account all consideraton of avacchedaka-sambandha the Naiyāyika continues to treat the present case as anomalous and thus invites for himself troubles which are avoidable.

However, even the ambiguity of the term "avacchedakatā" has one advantage. We have seen that there is a shorthand form of expressing positive relationships. E.g., we can replace "dhūma-niṣṭha-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ" by "dhūma-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ"; and since in this latter expression dhūmatva is the avacchedaka-dharma of adhikaraṇatā (while in the former it is the avacchedaka-dharma of vṛttitā)

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its fuller statement becomes "dhūmatva-avacchinna-dhūma-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ" which, in turn, can be further shortened as "dhumatva-avacchinna-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ" (keeping in mind that the avacchedakatā in question is 'nirūpitatva-sambandhena avacchedakatā' and not 'nisṭhatva-sambandhena avacchedakatā'). A somewhat similar procedure can be adopted in the case of abhāva. Thus "dhūmatva-avacchinna-pratiyogitā-nirūpako-'bhāvaḥ" can be shortened as "dhūmatva-avacchinno 'bhāvaḥ" (keeping in mind that, strictly speaking, it is not abhāva but abhāva-pratiyogitā which is avacchinna by dhūmatva, and this because the question of avacchedakatā arises only in the case of relational abstracts like pratiyogitā, vṛttitā, adhikaraṇatā, hetutā, sādhyata, etc.). Hence the statement "there exists no smoke on the mountain" can be put in the form "dhūmatva-avacchinna-abhāvavān parvataḥ". And we have just seen that the statement "there exists some smoke on the mountain" can be expressed in the form "dhūmatva-avacchinna-adhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ". Now it can easily be seen that these two statements are contradictory of each other; (in the terminology of Western Logic they are the propositions of E-form and I-form respectively). That is to say, there is in Navya-Nyāya a striking structural similarity between propositions contradictory of each other. But let us not forget that this similarity has been purchased at the cost of a twofold ambiguity in the term "avacchedakatā"; for, first, we give one and the same name to nirūpitatva-sambandhena avacchedakatā' and 'nisṭhatva-sambandhena avacchedakatā', and, secondly, we give one and the same name to an operation which yields the meaning "some, not all" as also to an operation which yields the meaning "all, not some".

II

Let us now see how to express with the help of the above technical terminology the common and the essential feature of all the definitions of vyāpti considered by the neo-Naiyāyika. As noted in the text, all these definitions tell us that hetu cannot coexist with sādhyābhāva; in other words, they all say "No hetumān is sādhyābhāvavān". Now it is obvious that the proposition "No hetumān is sādhyābhāvavān" is equivalent to the proposition "All hetumān is sādhyavān", these propositions being each other's obvert. The question naturally arises as to why no definition of vyāpti is expressed in the form of the latter of these propositions. And the answer is that the Naiyāyika's technical terminology was incapable of giving precise expression to a proposition of the form "All hetumān is sādhyavān" (i.e., to a proposition of the A-form). For example, the Naiyāyika could say "Some smoke or other exists in a particular place where there exists fire (i.e., some

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dhūma exists in a vahnimat-sthala)", and he could also say "Some fire or other exists in a particular place where there exists smoke (i.e., some vahni exists in a dhūmavat-sthala)". The first of these statements would be expressed in the form "dhūmatva-avacchinna-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvad etad vahnimat-sthalam", the second in the form "vahnitva avacchinna-vṛttitā-nirūpita-adhikaraṇatāvad etad dhumavat-sthalam". However neither of these expressions can yield the idea that "All smoke exists in a place where there exists fire (i.e., all dhūma exists in a vahnimat-sthala)", but this precisely is the idea that a proposition of the form "All hetumān is sādhyavān" seeks to express. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika could give expression to the idea—an idea sought to be expressed by a proposition of the form "No hetumān is sādhyābhāvavān" —that "No dhūmavat-sthala is not-vahnimatsthala (=vahnyabhāvavat-sthala)" which is equivalent to the idea that "There exists in dhūma an absence of vṛttitā-in-relation-to-a-place-where-there-exists-vahnyabhāva". For 'a place-where-there-exists-vahnyabhāva' is 'vahnitva-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāva-adhikaraṇa', vṛttita in relation to this place is 'vahnitva-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāva-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-vṛttitā', and absence of this vṛttita is 'vahnitva-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāva-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-vṛttitātva-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāva'; hence to say that this absence exists in dhūma is to say that dhūma is 'vahnitva-avacchinna -pratiyogitāka-abhāva-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita--vṛttītātva--avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāvavān'. And since dhūma is hetu and vahnitva sādhyata-avacchedaka-dharma in a particular case of inference, we can generalise this case by saying that in a valid inference hetu is—

"Sādhyatā-avacchedaka-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāva-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-vṛttitātva-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāvavān".

Further precision can be given to this idea by bringing in the question of avacchedaka-sambandha. Thus when we say that dhūma cannot exist in a place where there exists vahnyabhāva we mean that dhūma cannot exist in a place where vahni is absent by sādhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha (and in the present case the sādhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha is saṃyoga inasmuch as it is fire's saṃyoga with mountain—the pakṣa—which is sought to be inferred); for dhūma can well exist in a place (say, a mountain) where vahni is absent by samavāya-sambandha. (It is in vahnyavayavas (=fire-constituents) alone that vahni exists by samavāya-sambandha.) Again, when we say that dhūma cannot exist in a place where there exists vahnyabhāva we mean that dhūma cannot exist by hetutā-avacchedaka-sambandha in a place where vahni is absent by sādhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha (and in the present case the hetutā-avacchedaka-sambandha is saṃyoga inasmuch as it is smoke's saṃyoga with mountain—the pakṣa—which is the ground of

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inference); for dhūma exists by samavāya-sambandha in a place—viz., dhūmāvayavas (=smoke-constituents)—where vahni is absent by sādhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha. Hence we should say that in a valid inference hetu is :—

"Sadhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha-avacchinna-sādhyatā avacchedaka-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāva-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-hetutā-avacchedaka-sambandha-avacchinna-vṛttitātva-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāvavān."

This, in fact, is the expanded form of the first prima facie definition which originally stands as; "Hetu must not reside in what possesses 'absence of sādhya' (=sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvam hetoḥ)".

The following are the successive steps through which the fifth *prima facie* definition is expanded :—

(1) The definition originally stands as: "Hetu must not reside in what is different from sādhya's locus (=sādhyavad-anya-avṛttitvam hetoḥ)". To put it technically—

sādhyavad-bheda-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-vṛttitā-abhāva-vān hetuḥ.

(Note the equation "sādhyavad-anya = Sādhyavad-anyonyābhāvavān = sādhyavad-bhedavān = sadhyavad-bheda-adhikaraṇa"—for "bheda' is here but a synonym for 'anyonyābhāva'.)

(2) Here "sādhya's locus" means "sādhya's locus by the same relation by which sādhya is sought to be proved to exist in pakṣa". For example, the inference "Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky" seeks to prove the existence of fire in mountain by saṃyoga-sambandha. Hence smoke should not reside in what is different from "fire's locus *by saṃyoga-sambandha*" though it can well reside in what is different from "fire's locus by, say, samavāya-sambandha", E.g., smoke does reside in mountain which is different from "what is fire's locus by samavāya-sambandha" (i.e., from fire's constituent-particles wherein the composite fire resides by samavāya-sambandha). Thus the definition becomes sādhyatā-avacchedaka-sambandha-avacchinna-sādhyavad-bheda-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-vṛttitā-abhāva-vān hetuḥ.

(Strictly speaking, 'sādhyavad' should be replaced here by 'sādhya-adhikaraṇatāvad', for what needs avaccheda is a relational abstract like adhikaraṇatā and not the possessor of this relational abstract.)

(3) "Sādhya's locus" means "all locus of sādhya". Thus in the above example smoke should not reside in what is different from "*all locus* of fire" thought it can well reside in what is

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different from this or that locus of fire. E.g., a mountain may be different from one particular locus of fire and yet may itself possess smoke (and hence fire). Thus the definition becomes :—

Sādhyatā - avacchedaka - sambandha - avacchinna - sādhyavattva - avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-bheda -adhikarana - nirūpita - vṛttitā abhāva-vān hetuḥ.

(4) "Hetu must not reside" means "hetu must not reside by the relation by which it is found to exist in pakṣa". Thus in the above example smoke is found to exist in mountain by samyoga-sambandha. Hence smoke should not reside *by saṃyoga-sambandha* in what is different from all locus of fire though it can well reside in such a locus by, say, samavāya-sambandha. E.g. the composite smoke resides by samavāya-sambandha in smoke's costituent-particles which are different from all locus of fire. Thus the definition becomes.

Sādhyatā - avacchedaka-sambanadha - avacchinna - sādhyavattva avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-bheda- adhikaraṇa-nirūpita- - hetut avacchedaka-sambandha-avacchinna-vṛttita-abhāva-vān hetuḥ

(5) "Hetu must not reside" means "hetu must in no case reside". For example, in the invalid inference "Mountain is smoky, because it is fiery" fire does not reside in certain non-locii of smoke (e.g. in a lake) but it does reside in certain other non-locii of smoke (e.g., in a red-hot piece of iron). Thus the definition becomes :—

Sādhyatā - avacchedaka - sambandha - avacchinna - sādhyavattvaa avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-bheda-adhikarana- nirūpita - hetutā-avacchedaka-sambandha - avacchinna - vṛttitātva avacchinn-prativogitāka-abhāva-vān hetuḥ.

(6) "Hetu must not reside" means "hetu quâ 'possessor of the hetutā-avacchedaka dharma' ". For example, smoke possesses the generic properties smokeness as well as substanceness; but smoke quâ a possessor of smokeness is the hetu of fire. Hence thing possessing smokeness (i.e. smokes) should not reside in a non-locus of fire though things possessing substanceness can well reside in a non-locus of fire. (The example usually

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considered is different. To appreciate that we have to keep in mind the Nyāya thesis that existence(=sattā) belongs to substances, qualities, and actions (but not to the remaining four types of entities posited by the school). Thus it can be said that "existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-actions" belongs to substances and to them alone. Hence it is valid to argue "This entity is substance, because it possesses 'existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-actions' ". Here the hetutā-avacchedaka dharma is " 'existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-actions'-ness and not " 'pure-existence'-ness". And the argument is valid because "existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-actions" does not belong to non-substances even though 'pure existence' belongs to non-substances like qualities and actions.) Thus the definition becomes—

Sādhyatā - avacchedaka - sambandha - avacchinna - sādhyavattva-avacchinna - pratiyogitāka - bheda-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-hetutā - avacchedaka-sambandha-avacchinna-vṛttitā - anavacchedaka-hetutā-avacchedaka-dharma-vān-hetuḥ.

(To further elucidate the point, 'x quâ possessor of the generic property p lacks vṛttitā-in-relation-to-y' means 'x possesses the generic property p, while nothing quâ possessor of p possesses vṛttitā-in-relation-to-y'. And 'nothing quâ possessor of p possesses vṛttitā-in-relation-to-y' means 'p is a generic property that is non-avacchedaka of vṛttitā-in-relation-to-y'.)

Lastly, the following are the successive steps through which the Final Definition is expanded:—

(1) The definition originally stands as: "No absence coexisting with hetu should have sādhya for its counterpositive, and such a hetu should coexist with such a sādhya, *hetu-adhikaraṇa-vṛtty-abhāva-apratiyogi-sādhya-samānādhi-karaṇam hetuḥ*)".

(2) When it is said "absence coexisting with hetu should not have sādhya for its counterpositive" what is meant is that hetu should not coexist with "absence of 'the *totality* of things possessing the sādhyatā-avacchedaka dharma' " though it can well coexist with "absence of *this or that* possessor of the sādhyatā-avacchedaka dharma". Thus in the valid inference "This entity possesses quality, because it possesses

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substanceness'' 'substance-ness' does not coexist with "absence of all quality whatsoever" though it can well coexist with "absence of this or that quality". Thus the definition becomes—

Hetv-adhikaraṇa-vṛtty-abhāva-pratiyogitā-anavacchedaka-sādhyatavacchedaka-avacchinna-sādhya-samanādhi-karaṇam hetuḥ.

(To further elucidate the point, what is being said here is that sādhya quâ possessor of the sādhyatā-avacchedaka dharma lacks 'absence-in-relation-to-a-locus-of-hetu'. Now 'x quā possessor of the generic property p lacks absence-in-relation-to-y' means 'x possesses the generic property p while nothing quâ possessor of p possesses absence-in-relation-to-y'. And 'nothing quâ possessor of p possesses absence-in-relation-to-y' means 'p is a generic property that is non-avacchedaka of [the pratiyogita-of-] absence-in-relation-to-y'. Also note that 'sādhyatā-avacchedaka-avacchinna sādhya' here means 'sādhyatā-avacchedaka-dharmavān sādhya'.)

(3) (*a*) "Absence coexisting with hetu" means "absence coexisting with what possesses the hetutā-avacchedaka dharma". Thus in the valid inference "This entity is substance, because it possesses 'existence-ness" does not coexist with "existence-"absence of substance-ness" does not coexist with "existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and actions" though it does coexist (in qualities and actions) with "pure existence". The validitiy of the inference in question remains unimpaired because 'existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-actions' is (and 'pure existence' is not) the possessor of the hetutā-avacchedaka dharma.

(*b*) Again, "absence coexisting with hetu" means "absence existing in a locus where hetu exists by the same relation by which it (i.e. hetu) is found to exist in pakṣa". Thus in the inference "Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky" 'absence of fire' does not exist in a locus where smoke exists by saṃyoga-sambandha (which is the relation by which hetu is found to exist in pakṣa) though it can well exist in a locus where smoke exists by, say, samavāya-sambandha; (thus 'absence of fire' exists in smoke's

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constituent-particles wherein the composite smoke exists by samavāya-sambandha).

Thus the definition becomes—

Hetuta-avacchedaka-avacchinna - hetutā - avacchedaka-sambandha - avacchinna-hetv-adhikaraṇa-vṛttty-abhāva - pratiyogitā - anava - cchedaka-sādhyatā-avacchedaka-avacchinna-sādhya - samānā - dhikaraṇam hetuḥ.

(Here also 'hetu-adhikaraṇa' should be replaced by 'hetu-adhikaraṇatā-vad'.)

(4) "Absence" means "absence which does not coexist with its counterpositive (=pratiyogi-vyadhikaraṇa abhāva)". Thus in the inference "This entity possesses conjunction-with-monkey, because it is this tree" 'this-tree-ness' coexists with 'absence of conjunction-with-monkey', but since 'absence of conjunction' is an absence which coexists with its counterpositive the inference is not invalid. Thus the definition becomes—

Pratiyogi-vyadhikaraṇa-hetutā-avacchedaka- avacchinna -hetutā - avacchedaka-sambandha-avacchinna-hetv -adhikaraṇa -vṛtty - abhāva-pratiyogitā - anavacchedaka - sādhyatā - avacchedaka-avacchinna-sādhya-samānādhikaraṇam hetuḥ.

[This final definition has been expanded still further, but since the forthcoming refinements pertain to the difficulty entertained in para. (4) and since we consider this to be a pseudo-difficulty we are refraining from delving further into business. (We have also omitted a refinement that occurs quite early but is of minor importance.) However, our chief purpose here was to demonstrate how the neo-Naiyāyika has expressed his definitions of vyāpti with the help of his newly evolved technical terminology.]

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